UNITED STATES � ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES ON
STAINLESS STEEL PLATE IN COILS AND STAINLESS
STEEL SHEET AND STRIP
FROM KOREA

Report of the Panel

(Continued)

ANNEX 1-1

FIRST SUBMISSION OF KOREA

(5 May 2000)

CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION
    
2. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

1. REQUEST FOR CONSULTATIONS 
    
2. CONSULTATIVE PROCESS
    
3. REQUEST FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF A PANEL
    
4. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PANEL 

3. STATEMENT OF FACTS 

1. INTRODUCTION TO US ANTI-DUMPING LAW AND PROCEDURE 
    
2. PROCEDURAL FACTS CONCERNING THE US ANTI-DUMPING INVESTIGATIONS OF KOREAN SSPC AND SSSS 

1. The SSPC Investigation: Procedural Facts
    
2. The SSSS Investigation: Procedural Facts 

3. FACTS CONCERNING THE WTO DEFICIENCIES OF THE US ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES AT ISSUE 

1. POSCO's Sales to an Unaffiliated Customer that Later Went Bankrupt 
    
2. The Division of the Investigation Period into Separate "Averaging Periods" for Purposes of Comparing Average Normal Values with Average Export Prices
    
3. POSCO's Dollar-Priced "Local Sales" in the Korean Home Market

(a) POSCO's Accounting Practices for the Different Types of Sales It Makes 

(b) POSCO's Reported Local Sales of SSSS and SSPC

(c) The DOC's Treatment of Local Sales

(d) The DOC's Rationale for Its Treatment of POSCO's "Local Sales" 

4. LEGAL ARGUMENT 

1. THE UNITED STATES' TREATMENT OF POSCO'S SALES TO AN UNAFFILIATED US CUSTOMER THAT LATER WENT BANKRUPT WAS UNFAIR AND INCONSISTENT WITH GATT 1994 AND THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT

1. The United States Unfairly Adjusted POSCO's Export Price to Account for a Factor that Does Not "Affect Price Comparability," in Violation of Article VI:1 of GATT 1994 and Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

(a) Article VI:1 of GATT 1994 and Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement Permit Adjustments to the Prices Being Compared Only for "Differences Which Affect Price Comparability" 

(b) A Customer's Failure to Pay Is Not a Difference Affecting Price Comparability for Which an Adjustment is Permitted under GATT Article VI:1 and Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

(c) One Customer's Failure to Pay Is Not a "Difference Affecting Price Comparability" for Which Adjustments May be Made to the Prices of Other Sales to Other Customers Who Did Pay

2. The United States' Treatment of the Non-payment by One Customer Was Inconsistent with the "Fair Comparison" Requirement of Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

(a) Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement Mandates that the Comparison of Export Price to Normal Value, Which Underpins Any Finding of Dumping, Must be "Fair" 

(b) The Adjustment to Export Price for the Non-payment by One Customer Was Inconsistent with the "Fair Comparison" Requirement of Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement 

(c) As Past Decisions of the United States Have Recognized, the Inclusion of Atypical US or Home-Market Sales in the Price Comparisons Used to Calculate Dumping Margins Is Unfair

3. The Failure of the United States to Follow Its Established Practice and Exclude these Atypical US Sales from Its Analysis, and the Failure to Provide a Coherent Rationale for Its Treatment of these Sales, Were Inconsistent with Article X:3(a) of GATT 1994 and  Article 12.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

(a) Article X:3(a) of GATT 1994 Establishes "Minimum Standards of Transparency and Procedural Fairness" that Are Amplified by the Specific Procedural Requirements of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

(b) The DOC's Treatment of the Atypical US Sales Failed to Meet the "Minimum Standards" of Procedural Fairness Set by Article X:3(a) of GATT 1994 and Article 12.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

2. THE UNITED STATES UNFAIRLY CHANGED ITS METHODOLOGY FOR CALCULATING DUMPING MARGINS, ALLEGEDLY TO ACCOUNT FOR THE DEPRECIATION OF THE KOREAN WON, IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 2.4, 2.4.1, AND 2.4.2 OF THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT 

1. The "Multiple Averaging" Methodology Used by the United States Is Inconsistent with Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement 
    
2. The Change in the Price Comparison Methodology Adopted by the United States to Account for the Devaluation of the Korean Won Is Inconsistent with the Requirements of Article 2.4.1 of the  Anti-Dumping Agreement, Which Permits Departures from the Normal Comparison Methodology Only for an Appreciation of the Exporting Country's Currency
    
3. The Use of the "Multiple Averaging" Methodology Was Inconsistent with the Procedural Requirements of GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement
    
4. The "Multiple Averaging" Methodology Is Inconsistent with the Underlying Basis for the Anti-Dumping Measures against SSPC and SSSS, and Thus Deprived POSCO of the "Fair Comparison" Required by Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

3. THE COMPARISON OF NORMAL VALUE TO EXPORT PRICE WAS UNFAIR AND CONTRARY TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT, BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES INFLATED THE NORMAL VALUE BY "DOUBLE CONVERTING" DOLLAR-PRICED SALES IN KOREA INTO WON AND THEN BACK INTO DOLLARS USING DIFFERENT EXCHANGE RATES 

1. The "Double Conversion" of the Dollar-Denominated Home-Market Sales Prices Violated Article 2.4.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, Which Permits Currency Conversions Only When Such Conversions Are Required
    
2. The "Double Conversion" Methodology Employed by the United States Is Unreasonable and Departs from Established Practice Without Adequate Explanation, and Thus Is Inconsistent with the  "Uniform" and "Reasonable" Administration of the Anti-Dumping Laws Required by GATT Article X:3(a) and Article 12 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

(a) The "Double Conversion" Methodology Employed by the United States Constituted a Departure from Its Previous Practice that Was Unwarranted, Contrary to the Evidence, and Inadequately Explained

(b) The "Double Conversion" Methodology Adopted by the United States Unreasonably Penalizes Exporters for Differences Between Official Korean and US Exchange Rates, and Is Otherwise Unreasonable

3. The Double-Conversion Methodology Adopted by the United States Unfairly Penalizes Exporters for Differences between Official Korean and US Exchange Rates, Even Though Such Differences Cannot Be Anticipated and Are Beyond the Exporters' Control

5. CONCLUSION
    

NOTE: In this submission, including the exhibits, Korea has placed information which POSCO has previously designated as business proprietary information in brackets ("{ }"). This information has been omitted and the brackets left in the text."{ }"

I. INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Republic of Korea ("Korea") contests the anti-dumping measures imposed by the United States on stainless steel plate in coils ("SSPC") and stainless steel sheet and strip in coils ("SSSS") from Korea, respectively, on 21 May 1999 and 27 July 1999. These anti-dumping measures are inconsistent with the obligations of a Member of the World Trade Organization ("WTO"), including Article VI and X of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 ("GATT 1994") and Articles 1, 2, 6, and 12 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (the "Anti-Dumping Agreement").

1.2 In the proceedings that led to the imposition of anti-dumping measures on SSPC and SSSS from Korea, the United States made critical errors on three major issues, which resulted in a massive overstatement of the "dumping margins" found for Pohang Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. ("POSCO"), the Korean producer. As discussed below, the treatment of these issues by the United States violated numerous individual provisions of GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement. As a result, the United States imposed anti-dumping measures far in excess of those permitted by the Anti-Dumping Agreement, when a proper analysis would have resulted in little, if any, dumping margins for POSCO.

1.3 The first of these issues arose from the fact that an unrelated US customer of POSCO went bankrupt and, as a result, failed to pay POSCO for certain purchases. In its preliminary determinations, the United States had excluded POSCO's sales to this customer from its analysis, because it concluded that these sales were "atypical." However, in its final determinations, the United States reversed course: It included these sales in its calculation of the export price, and also deducted the cost of these unpaid sales as an adjustment to the export price-thus reducing the export price of all US sales to all US customers. Not surprisingly, the comparison of these reduced export prices to home-market prices artificially created and inflated the dumping margins. In applying this methodology, the United States acted inconsistently with its WTO obligations in the following respects:

• Article VI:1 of GATT 1994 and Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement permit adjustments to be made only for "differences which are � demonstrated to affect price comparability." But the fact that a customer unexpectedly goes bankrupt after a sale is made does not affect the comparability of prices that were set at the time of sale. Consequently, the non-payment by the bankrupt US customer did not, and was not demonstrated to, affect price comparability - neither for the specific US sales for which the customer did not pay, nor for the other US sales to other US customers who did pay. Accordingly, the adjustment made for the bankrupt customer's non-payment was inconsistent with the provisions of GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
   
• Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement also requires the investigating authorities to make a "fair comparison" of export price and normal value. The inclusion of the unpaid sales in the dumping calculations, and the deduction of the cost of the bankrupt customer's unexpected non-payment from the export prices for all US sales to all US customers, was not consistent with this fair comparison requirement, because: (1)it created an unbalanced comparison that distorted the results, and (2)it effectively penalized POSCO for a factor beyond its control, despite established US judicial precedents holding that it is "unreal, unreasonable and unfair" for a finding of dumping to be based on "a factor beyond the control of the exporter."
   
• Article X:3(a) of GATT 1994 requires each WTO Member to "administer � its laws, regulations, decisions and rulings" in a "uniform, impartial and reasonable manner." The methodology employed by the United States was not consistent with this requirement, because it failed to follow, and failed to provide a rational basis for departing from, established US practice. The United States has acknowledged that the inclusion in dumping calculations of sales that are "extraordinary for the market in question" can "lead to irrational or unrepresentative results." To avoid such results, the United States routinely excludes atypical sales from its analysis of export price and normal value. Despite conceding that the sales to the bankrupt customer were atypical, however, the United States failed to follow that established practice in these cases. Also, Article 12.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires the investigating authorities to provide a full explanation of the reasons for their determinations. In these cases, however, the United States failed to provide an adequate explanation of its decisions.

1.4 The second of these issues arose from the manner in which the United States calculated and compared the average export prices and normal values to determine the dumping margin. Under the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the normal methodology employed by the United States, the investigating authority calculates a single average export price and a single average normal value, and then determines the dumping margins by comparing these single averages. In these cases, however, the United States departed from its established practice and the explicit requirements of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, by dividing the period of investigation into sub-periods and then calculating dumping margins based on a comparison of the average export price and normal value for each of these sub-periods (rather than for the entire investigation period). The United States claimed that this departure from the proper methodology was required to account for the devaluation of the Korean won during the investigation period. The effect of this departure, however, was to artificially create dumping margins in a manner contrary to the WTO obligations of the United States:

• Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires that the calculation of dumping margins be based on a comparison of a single average normal value to a single average of "prices of all comparable export transactions." A "multiple averaging" methodology is not consistent with that requirement.
   
• Article 2.4.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement permits alterations to the standard price comparison methodology to account for currency movements only when the exporting country's currency is appreciating against the importing country's currency in a manner that would create or inflate dumping margins. It does not permit alterations to the standard price comparison methodology to account for currency devaluations that would reduce the dumping margins. Consequently, the adoption of a "multiple averaging" methodology to account for a currency devaluation was not consistent with the requirements of Article 2.4.1.
   
• As mentioned, Article X:3(a) of GATT 1994 requires each WTO Member to "administer ... its laws, regulations, decisions and rulings" in a "uniform, impartial and reasonable manner." In a decision addressing the same issue in another case (which was issued only months before the decisions in these cases), the United States held that no adjustment to its standard price comparison methodology was appropriate to account for the devaluation. In these cases, however, the United States failed to follow that established methodology-and thus did not act in a uniform and reasonable manner. Also, Article 12.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires the investigating authorities to provide a full explanation of the reasons for their determinations. In these cases, however, the United States failed to provide an adequate explanation of its departure from the standard single-average methodology.
   
• Articles 6.1, 6.2, and 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement require the investigating authorities to give exporters notice of all "essential facts" in order to provide them with a "full" and "ample opportunity" to defend their interests. In these cases, however, the United States did not decide to depart from its established methodology until the final stage of the anti-dumping investigations (after the United States had followed its established policy in the preliminary determinations). The United States therefore failed to provide POSCO with the required opportunity to fully defend its interests.
   
• Finally, Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires investigating authorities to base anti-dumping measures on a "fair comparison." In the unique circumstances of these cases, the "multiple-averaging" methodology was not consistent with that requirement. In effect, the "multiple averaging" methodology allowed the United States to base the finding of dumping solely on sales before the devaluation of the Korean won, when a proper analysis showed that there was no dumping after the devaluation. Such a result is fundamentally unfair where, as in these cases, petitioners' claims of injury were explicitly based on the alleged impact of increasing imports caused by the "Asian economic crisis" that accompanied the devaluation of the Korean won and, the United States based its affirmative injury determinations- which allowed it to impose anti-dumping measures- on these post-devaluation imports.

1.5 The third of these issues arose from certain "local sales" POSCO made in its home market, for which the prices were set in US dollars. The United States did not base its calculation of normal value for these sales on the actual invoice prices in US dollars- as it had in previous cases involving similar dollar-denominated home-market sales. Instead, it converted the dollar-denominated home-market sales into Korean won using one exchange rate, and then converted them back into US dollars (for comparison to export price) using a different exchange rate. The United States held that this methodology was appropriate, because the exchange rates used to record these transactions in POSCO's internal accounting records- although matching the official exchange rates announced by the Korean Exchange Bank- differed slightly from certain US benchmark rates. The result, however, was the artificial creation and inflation of the dumping margins, in a manner that was contrary to the following WTO obligations of the United States:

1.6 Article 2.4.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which permits currency conversions only when such conversions are "required." The distortive "double-conversion" of the dollar-denominated home-market sales prices was not "required," however, when the United States could simply have used the dollar-denominated prices without conversion, and thus avoided the distortion.

• Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires investigating authorities to base anti-dumping measures on a "fair comparison." In this case, however, the United States employed a distortive comparison that created and inflated the dumping margins because POSCO's internal records used the official exchange rates set by the Korean Exchange Bank, and not US exchange rates that were not even known on the relevant date.
   
• Finally, Article X:3(a) of GATT 1994 requires each WTO Member to "administer ... its laws, regulations, decisions and rulings" in a "uniform, impartial and reasonable manner." The United States failed to act in the required uniform and reasonable manner when it chose not to follow its established methodology of using dollar-denominated home-market prices without conversion. It also failed to act reasonably when it rejected the official exchange rates set by the Korean Exchange Bank, and held that POSCO should have used US exchange rates that were not even known on the relevant date. Also, Article 12.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires the investigating authorities to provide a full explanation of the reasons for their determinations. In these cases, however, the United States failed to provide an adequate explanation of the departure from its past practices.

1.7 As a result of its treatment of these three critical issues, the United States imposed anti-dumping measures against SSPC and SSSS from Korea in circumstances not provided for in Article VI of GATT 1994 and pursuant to investigations not conducted in accordance with the Anti-Dumping Agreement. The imposition of these anti-dumping measures thus violated Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of GATT 1994.

1.8 Korea therefore requests that the Panel find that: (i) the US anti-dumping measures concerning imports of SSPC and SSSS from Korea, including the anti-dumping investigations and other actions preceding these measures, are inconsistent with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and GATT 1994; (ii) the United States has nullified or impaired benefits accruing, directly or indirectly, to Korea under the WTO Agreements; and (iii) the United States is impeding the achievement of the objectives of the WTO Agreements. Korea also requests that the Panel recommend that the United States bring its anti-dumping measures against SSPC and SSSS from Korea into conformity with the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement and GATT 1994. Specifically, Korea further requests that the Panel suggest that the United States revoke the anti-dumping duty orders concerning SSPC and SSSS from Korea.

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. REQUEST FOR CONSULTATIONS

2.1 On 30 July 1999, Korea requested consultations with the United States regarding the anti-dumping measures against SSPC and SSSS from Korea that are being imposed on the basis of dumping investigations conducted in a manner that was unfair and inconsistent with the WTO Agreements (WT/DS179/1). Korea made its request pursuant to Article 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (the "Dispute Settlement Understanding" or "DSU"), Article XXIII:1 of GATT 1994, and Article 17.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

B. CONSULTATIVE PROCESS

2.2 Pursuant to this request, Korea and the United States consulted in Geneva on 17 September 1999. Unfortunately, the consultations failed to resolve the dispute.

C. REQUEST FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF A PANEL

2.3 On 14 October 1999, Korea requested the establishment of a panel with the standard terms of reference provided by Article 7 of the DSU (WT/DS179/2). Korea made this request pursuant to Article 6 of the DSU, Article XXIII:2 of GATT 1994, and Article 17.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Korea's panel request sets forth the challenged US measures with specificity, along with the legal basis of the complaint.

D. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PANEL

2.4 On 19 November 1999, the Dispute Settlement Body (the "DSB") established a panel pursuant to Korea's request. The Panel's terms of reference are:

To examine, in light of the relevant provisions of the covered agreements cited by Korea in document WT/DS179/2 the matter referred to the DSB by Korea in that document and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in those agreements.

The members of the Panel are Mr. Jos� Antonio S. Buencamino (Chairman), Ms. Enie Neri de Ross, and Mr. G. Bruce Cullen (WT/DS179/3).

III. STATEMENT OF FACTS

3.1 As the measures at issue are anti-dumping measures arising from two separate, but broadly similar, anti-dumping investigations under US anti-dumping law, this Statement of Facts is organized as follows:

3.1.1 Part A provides an introduction to US anti-dumping law and procedure.

3.1.2 Part B describes the procedural history of the US anti-dumping investigations of Korean SSPC and SSSS.

3.1.3 Part C provides the facts most relevant to the WTO deficiencies of the US anti-dumping measures against Korean SSPC and SSSS.

A. INTRODUCTION TO US ANTI-DUMPING LAW AND PROCEDURE

3.2 In the United States, responsibility for administering the anti-dumping laws is divided between the US Department of Commerce (the "DOC") and the US International Trade Commission (the "USITC"). The DOC is responsible for determining whether or not imports are being sold in the United States at "less than fair value" (i.e., whether the imports are being "dumped"). The USITC is responsible for determining whether or not imports are causing or threatening injury to a US industry. For the United States to issue an anti-dumping order and thereby impose final anti-dumping measures, it is necessary for the DOC to make a final affirmative determination of dumping and for the USITC to make a final affirmative determination of injury.¹

3.3 The DOC makes the determination of dumping by comparing the "export price" (for sales to the United States) to the " normal value" (which is normally based on the prices for home-market sales). Under US law, the export price and normal value are subject to certain adjustments before they are compared.² The DOC then calculates an average adjusted normal value and export price for each product comparison. The "dumping margin" for each product then represents the amount by which the average adjusted normal value exceeds the average adjusted export price for that product (i.e., normally the price difference between the home-market price and the export price).

3.4 After the DOC initiates an anti-dumping investigation, the USITC makes a preliminary injury determination. If the preliminary determination of the USITC is affirmative, the investigation returns to the DOC. In order to gather the information needed for the anti-dumping investigation, the DOC issues questionnaires requesting information about exporters' costs, export prices, home-market prices, and other issues.

3.5 The DOC reaches its preliminary determination on the basis of the facts presented in the exporters' responses to the questionnaires. The DOC may also address legal issues needed to reach a preliminary determination. The analysis underlying the preliminary determination is explained in the published notice of the DOC preliminary determination, and in an internal DOC "analysis memorandum," which is provided to the parties.³

3.6 The DOC next conducts "verification" of the responses to the questionnaires and prepares its "verification reports." After verification, the DOC prepares a report on its verification findings, which is provided to the parties. The parties participating in the investigation then simultaneously submit "case briefs" to the DOC concerning legal issues raised by the preliminary determination. Each later simultaneously submits a "rebuttal brief" commenting on the other's arguments. A hearing may then be held at which the parties explain their arguments, and respond to the arguments of the other parties, before DOC officials.

3.7 The DOC then reaches its final determination. As with the preliminary determination, the analysis underlying the final determination is explained in the published notice of the determination, and in an internal DOC "analysis memorandum." The published notice of the final determination also summarizes comments made by the parties in their briefs and presents the DOC's view of those comments.

3.8 If the DOC's final determination is negative (i.e., if the DOC determines that US sales are not being made at prices below normal value), the investigation ends. On the other hand, if the DOC's final determination is affirmative, the investigation returns to the USITC. The USITC then makes a final determination whether the imports are causing or threatening injury to a US industry. If the USITC makes a negative final determination, the investigation ends. If the USITC makes an affirmative final determination, it so notifies the DOC, which then publishes an anti-dumping order.

3.9 The determinations by the DOC and USITC are published in the US Federal Register. The published determinations by the DOC normally contain a discussion of the issues that have arisen in the investigation, as well as an explanation of the DOC's position on the comments raised by the parties. These published DOC determinations are also supplemented by internal "analysis memoranda" by the DOC's staff.

3.10 The final decisions by the DOC and USITC may be appealed, as a matter of right, to the US Court of International Trade ("USCIT"). The decisions by the USCIT may then be appealed, as a matter of right, to the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("CAFC"). The parties may request that the US Supreme Court review decisions by the CAFC; however, the US Supreme Court is not obligated to accept such appeals and, in practice, it has never accepted an appeal of a decision by the CAFC arising from an anti-dumping proceeding.

1 The US statutory provisions authorizing the DOC and USITC to perform investigations and impose anti-dumping duties are set forth in Section 731 et seq. of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (the "Tariff Act"). These statutory provisions are codified in Section 1673 et seq. of Title 19 of the US Code. The DOC�s regulations addressing the procedures and substantive methodologies employed in its anti-dumping investigations and reviews are set forth in Section 351 of Title 19 of the Code of Federal Regulations. A copy of the relevant provisions of the US anti-dumping statute is provided in ROK Ex. 1. A copy of the relevant provisions of the DOC�s regulations is provided in ROK Ex. 2.

2 The manner in which these adjustments are made depends, in part, on whether the US sales being analyzed are classified as "export-price" or "constructed-export-price" sales. As a general matter, an "export-price" analysis is used when the merchandise is sold by the exporter directly to an unaffiliated customer in the United States (or in certain situations in which the merchandise is sold through an affiliated importer). A constructed-export-price analysis is used in certain circumstances where the merchandise is sold through an affiliated importer in the United States. See Tariff Act �� 772(a) and (b), 19 USC. �� 1677a(a) and (b).

Under US law, when a "constructed-export-price" analysis is used, the DOC will deduct from the US sales price the amount of any " direct selling expenses" incurred on the US sales. See Tariff Act � 772(d), 19 USC. � 1677a(d). By contrast, when an "export price" analysis is used, the DOC does not deduct these US direct selling expenses from US price. Instead, the DOC makes the adjustment for the US direct selling expenses by increasing the normal value - that is, it adds to the home-market price the amount of the direct selling expenses incurred on the comparable US sales. See Tariff Act � 773(a)(6)(C)(iii), 19 USC. � 1677b(a)(6)(C)(iii). See also 19 C.F.R. � 351.410(c).

However, the net effect on the dumping margins of these two methodologies is essentially the same, since an increase in the normal value has the same effect as a decrease in the export price when calculating the "price difference" between the two. Therefore, for purposes of simplicity, this Submission will refer to "decreases in the export price on all US sales" to refer to the combined effect of increases in the normal value for some US sales and decreases in the export price for the other US sales.

3 The DOC�s procedures also permit the parties to comment on any "ministerial" errors in the preliminary determination. If the DOC agrees that there were "ministerial errors," it may issue an amended preliminary determination correcting those errors.

To continue with B. PROCEDURAL FACTS CONCERNING THE US ANTI-DUMPING INVESTIGATIONS OF KOREAN SSPC AND SSSS

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