(d) Relationship between Paragraph 12 of the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV and the footnote to the 1994 Understanding on the Balance of Payments Provisions of the GATT 1994

109. India went on to note that the reference to the application of measures in the text of the footnote to the 1994 Understanding was identical to that in the text of paragraph 12 of the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994. None of the other clauses giving access to the DSU in the WTO agreements and Understandings contained a similar reference to the application of measures. These limited access to the DSU in respect of import restrictions and regional trade agreements in an identical fashion and for the same reasons. In both these areas, there were longstanding and serious controversies among the contracting parties to the GATT 1947 on the appropriateness of resorting to the procedures of Article XXIII. Different views had been expressed on the relationship between the procedures under Article XXIV and Article XXIII during the GATT Council�s discussions in 1982 on the United States� recourse to Article XXIII with respect to tariff preferences granted by the EC within the framework of association agreements with Mediterranean countries. ⁹⁹ After a long debate and consultations, the GATT panel on "Citrus" had been established, and had found that:

"In the opinion of the Panel, examination - or re-examination-of Article XXIV agreements was the responsibility of the CONTRACTING PARTIES. In the absence of a decision by the CONTRACTING PARTIES and without prejudice to any decision the CONTRACTING PARTIES might take in the future on such a matter, the Panel was of the view that it would not be appropriate to determine the conformity of an agreement with the requirements of Article XXIV on the basis of a complaint by a contracting party under Article XXIII:1(a) . . . . such an examination should be done clearly in the context of Article XXIV and not Article XXIII, as an assessment of all the duties, regulations of commerce and trade coverage as well as the interests and rights of all contracting parties were at stake in such an examination and not just the interests and rights of contracting party raising a complaint�The Panel considered that the practice, so far followed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, never to use the procedures of Article XXIII:2 to make recommendations or rulings on the GATT-conformity of measures subject to special review procedures was sound. It felt that the purposes served and balance of interest underlying them would be lost if contracting parties could invoke the general procedures of Article XXIII:2 for the purpose of requesting decisions by the CONTRACTING PARTIES on measures to be reviewed under the special procedures. The Panel therefore concluded that it should . . . abstain from an overall examination of the bilateral agreements." ¹⁰⁰

110. India mentioned that this issue also arose in the proceedings of the panel on "Bananas I", which faced the claim that tariff preferences for bananas granted by the EEC under the Lomé Convention were justified by Article XXIV interpreted in the light of Part IV of the GATT on Trade and Development. The panel recognized that it could be argued that the procedures of Article XXIV prevailed over those of Article XXIII. However, the panel did not have to rule on this issue because it found that Article XXIV was not modified by Part IV. ¹⁰¹
111. In that dispute, the European Communities (the EC) argued that the review procedures for regional free trade agreements contained in Article XXIV:7 should prevail over the general dispute settlement procedures in Article XXIII of the GATT 1947 and that panels, therefore, should not examine any measures justified under a free trade agreement. The Panel was of the view that:

[E]ven if the latter argument were accepted, the procedures of Article XXIV could reasonably be permitted to prevail over those of Article XXIII only in those cases in which the agreement for which Article XXIV was invoked was prima facie the type of agreement covered by this provision, i.e., on the face of it capable of justification under it. ¹⁰²

112. In Bananas I, even the EC admitted that the measures at issue in that dispute "was justified not by Article XXIV on its own, but by Article XXIV taken in combination with the provisions of Part IV of the General Agreement". The Panel found, however, that:

�the requirements of Article XXIV were not modified by the provisions of Part IV. The Panel consequently had to conclude that a legal justification for the tariff preference accorded by the EC to imports of bananas originating in the ACP countries could not emerge from an application of Article XXIV to the type of agreement described by the [EC] in the Panel's proceedings �. ¹⁰³

Thus, the reasoning of the Bananas I panel actually supported examining only whether the measure in question was prima facie relatable to Article XXIV. If the measure prima facie was covered by Article XXIV, the Panel should desist from subjecting the measure to review.

113. India concluded that the identical terms of the footnote to the 1994 Understanding and of paragraph 12 of the Understanding on Article XXIV represented a compromise between the conflicting positions taken by the contracting parties in these cases. On the one hand, they confirmed the right to resort to the DSU procedures; on the other hand, they limited that right to "matters arising from the application" of measures under the balance-of-payments provisions and regional agreements. That compromise ensured that the application of all such measures could be examined by a panel and that Members could not escape their obligations under the DSU merely by invoking Article XVIII:B or Article XXIV. At the same time it ensured that the justification of import restrictions and regional trade agreements would be determined by the WTO bodies that had been given the competence to make that determination.
114. The United States noted that the Bananas I panel realized the implications of the argument (made by the European Communities in that case and by India in this case) against permitting dispute settlement procedures under Article XXIII in a situation where Article XXIV (or, to translate the argument to India�s position in this case, Article XVIII) procedures were available: the implication being that a Member�s mere invocation of Article XXIV (or Article XVIII) would insulate that Member�s actions from all other Members� rights under Article XXIII. Therefore, the Bananas I panel reasoned that, at a minimum, panels acting under Article XXIII could make decisions as to whether a measure for which Article XXIV (or Article XVIII) had been invoked was "on the face of it capable of justification under" that Article. ¹⁰⁴ The Bananas I panel then went on to determine whether the agreement at issue in that case was on its face an agreement of the type envisaged by Article XXIV; the panel noted that at least one of the requirements of Article XXIV was not met by that agreement (namely the requirement that the agreement cover trade between the parties, not just into one party�s territory from the others�).
115. Addressing India's claim that � because of similar wording in the two WTO Understandings concerning balance-of-payments measures and Article XXIV � recourse to dispute settlement was not available to examine the "justification" of measures claimed to be justified under either Article XVIII or Article XXIV, the United States noted that India did not appear to accept that position itself; in the dispute entitled Turkey � Restrictions on Imports of Textiles and Clothing Products, India had recently caused the establishment of a panel to examine whether certain quantitative restrictions imposed by Turkey in accordance with the customs union agreement between Turkey and the European Union could be justified under Article XXIV. ¹⁰⁵
116. The United States also recalled its position with respect to the context within which the Uruguay Round negotiations had taken place and its position that in light of that context, the texts of the two Understandings had to be understood as confirming rather than limiting the availability of dispute settlement under Article XXIII.
117. India responded that in its request for the establishment of a Panel, India had alleged violation of only Articles XI and XIII of GATT 1994 and Article 2 of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC). On the understanding that it was without prejudice to its rights in the panel proceedings involving India and Turkey, India explained that it had not sought any finding about the justification of EU - Turkey custom union under Article XXIV. When Turkey tried to defend its action by citing Article XXIV, India pointed out that Article XXIV:8(a)(ii) could not be applied in such a way as to modify the obligations of Members in respect of Article 2.4 of the ATC and Article XI:1 of GATT 1994. India therefore, considered that it had not taken a position in this dispute with the United States which contradicted its position in its dispute with Turkey. India pointed out that in the present panel proceedings, the US claim was not about the application of the measures, which was on a non-discriminatory MFN basis, but about their justification. India reiterated that according to the text, this was outside the scope of the provisions of the 1994 Understanding, which clearly state that dispute settlement provisions "may be invoked with respect to any matters arising from the application of restrictive import measures taken for balance-of-payments purposes".

(e) Practice under GATT 1947

118. India argued that the importance of distinguishing between the justification of the measure itself and the conformity of the application of the measure had been recognized in the jurisprudence on Article XX which established different criteria for the adoption of a measure (to be examined under the relevant sub-paragraph of Article XX) and its application (to be examined under the preamble). A GATT panel found that "the preamble of Article XX made clear that it was the application of the measure and not the measure itself that needed to be examined." The Appellate Body confirmed in the "United States � Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline" case that the preamble of Article XX addresses not so much the questioned measure but rather the manner in which that measure is applied. ¹⁰⁶ In the Bananas case, the Appellate Body made a clear distinction between issues arising from the application of tariff quotas (which it considered to be covered by the Licensing Agreement) and those arising from the tariff quotas themselves (which it considered to be covered by the GATT). ¹⁰⁷ In the present case also, India was convinced that the Appellate Body would recognize as well that the footnote to the 1994 Understanding referred by its express terms only to the "application" of restrictive import measures, not the measures themselves, and interpret this provision accordingly.
119. The United States considered it was incorrect to draw a hard and fast distinction between application and justification. First, India's allusion to the Citrus Panel was of limited relevance. Not only had the Citrus panel report never been adopted, it had been criticized in the GATT Council by several contracting parties for its refusal to recognize recourse to dispute settlement pursuant to Article XXIII:1(a) with respect to those agreements. ¹⁰⁸ Furthermore, Bananas I reached the opposite conclusion when it considered an argument by the defending contracting parties that the procedures available to the CONTRACTING PARTIES under Article XXIV precluded recourse to dispute settlement under Article XXIII. The Bananas I panel did not accept that such preclusion was possible under the GATT 1947 and went on to find that even if some form of preclusion should be considered to exist, then "the procedures of Article XXIV could reasonably be considered to prevail over those of Article XXIII only in those cases in which the agreement for which Article XXIV was invoked was prima facie the type of agreement covered by this provision ... ." ¹⁰⁹ The panel further noted that "[i]f preferences granted under any agreement for which Article XXIV had been invoked could not be investigated under Article XXIII, any contracting party, merely by invoking Article XXIV, could deprive other contracting parties of their rights under Article XXIII." ¹¹⁰ The Bananas I panel thus clarified that a panel could indeed examine the consistency with Article XXIV of an agreement (the Lomé Agreement) for which Article XXIV cover had been claimed. That panel rejected the Citrus panel�s non liquet approach and ruled that the Lomé Convention did not fulfill the basic legal requirements of Article XXIV. The United States concluded that this Panel could do the same and find that India�s restrictions no longer fulfilled the basic legal requirements of Article XVIII:B.
120. With respect to India's citation of Gasoline, the United States argued that the Appellate Body in that case clearly considered that the text of Article XX, which is divided into an introduction and a series of subparagraphs, required a two-part review. Following that two-part review the Appellate Body concluded that the challenged measures were not justified because they failed the test set out by the introductory clauses of Article XX � or, in the jargon that India wanted to see adopted, that the measures were not "justified" because they were improperly "applied". ¹¹¹ In the view of the United States, the Appellate Body had not made the distinction that India was trying to make.
121. In response to India's reference to the Citrus and Bananas I panel reports, the United States drew the Panel's attention to the panel report in Korea � Beef , as well as to the limited applicability of the cases that India had cited. The Korean Beef report in particular had analyzed the text of the General Agreement and concluded that the periodic reviews conducted under Article XVIII:B constitute a separate track from dispute settlement under Article XXIII. Contrary to India's suggestion, the panel had reached and decided that issue as a matter separate from the issue of whether the Korean restrictions were justified.
122. The United States found the reasoning of the Korea � Beef panel report particularly instructive because Korea sought to raise the same "jurisdictional" bar claim that India now asserted. That panel had found that it could proceed to examine the justification of measures claimed to be justified under Article XVIII:B, notwithstanding Korea's argument that such measures were beyond the power of the panel to review.

"In comparison [to Article XVIII:12], the wording of Article XXIII was all-embracing; it provided for dispute settlement procedures applicable to all relevant articles of the General Agreement, including Article XVIII:B. The former provided for the detailed examination of individual measures by a panel of independent experts whereas the latter provided for a general review of the country�s balance-of-payments situation by a committee of government representatives�It was the view of the Panel that excluding the possibility of bringing a complaint under Article XXIII against measures for which there was claimed balance-of-payments cover would unnecessarily restrict the application of the General Agreement. This did not preclude, however, resort to special review procedures under Article XVIII:B. Indeed, either procedure, that of Article XVIII:12(d) or Article XXIII, could have been pursued by the parties in this dispute." ¹¹²

123. The Panel's reasoning in Bananas I was relevant only to the extent that the Panel determined that it should not follow the reasoning in Korea � Beef. If, for example (contrary to the position of the United States), the Panel determined that as a general matter a Member need not remove its balance-of-payments measures until requested to do so by the General Council, the Panel should follow the reasoning of Bananas I and determine at a minimum whether India's measures prime facie were capable of justification under Article XVIII:B. The United States submitted that, in view of the IMF's determinations with respect to India's balance-of-payments situation, as well as the other facts presented by the United States, the challenged measures were not "capable of justification" under Article XVIII:B..
124. However, as the Bananas panel found in the context of Article XXIV and the Korea - Beef panel found in the context of Article XVIII:B, India�s argument would unnecessarily restrict the application of the WTO Agreement. If India�s approach were accepted, a mere claim of balance-of-payments cover could be used to frustrate justified access to dispute settlement. The United States urged the Panel to reject India�s invitation to create such a restriction not found in the text of either the DSU or Article XVIII.
125. In the view of the United States. contracting parties were always free to resort to dispute settlement under Article XXIII of GATT 1947 with respect to any matters relating to Article XVIII:B. The text of neither Article XII nor Article XVIII:B prohibited recourse to dispute settlement under Article XXIII; equally, the text of Article XXIII did not contain any such prohibition. As a matter of practice, during the first years of operation of the GATT, in the event any issue arose with respect to measures justified under Article XII, an aggrieved contracting party was able to proceed with dispute settlement under Article XXIII. This was stated expressly in the 1950 Report of the Working Party on "The Use of Quantitative Restrictions for Protective and Commercial Purposes", which said:

"It appeared to the CONTRACTING PARTIES that insofar as these types of practice were in fact carried on for [certain protective and commercial purposes] and were not justified under the provisions of Articles XII to XIV in relation to the use of import restrictions to protect the balance of payments or under other provisions of the Agreement specifically permitting the use of import restrictions, they were inconsistent with the provisions of the Agreement, and such misuse of import restrictions might appropriately provide a basis for recourse to the procedures laid down in the Agreement for the settlement of disputes. Moreover, it was not particularly relevant to the Agreement whether such practices were determined unilaterally or in the course of bilateral negotiations." ¹¹³

126. Similarly, in 1952, at the request of the United States, a working party had been established under Article XXIII to examine the justification (including the balance-of-payments justification) for Belgium�s restrictions against dollar area imports; the restrictions had been imposed to avoid a surplus in intra-European trade. ¹¹⁴ In short, the practice prevailing in decisions taken under the GATT 1947 before 1955 (i.e., before the Review Session adopted the present version of Article XVIII) permitted the establishment of Article XXIII panels to consider measures maintained for balance-of-payments purposes. The position had remained unchanged after the Review Session. In 1957, the Working Party on German Import Restrictions considered measures maintained by Germany for which there was no longer a balance-of-payments justification. Many delegations (including India) declared themselves ready to resort to dispute settlement on the grounds of nullification or impairment if the German restrictions remained in place:

"[A] substantial number of delegations (Australia, Canada, Ceylon, Denmark, India, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America) ... pointed out that, as the Federal Republic was no longer entitled to resort to the provisions of Article XII, the maintenance of restrictions, unless sanctioned by any other provision of GATT, would be in breach of Article XI ... .These delegations emphasized that the very structure of the Agreement would be undermined and the balance of rights and obligations between contracting parties upset if ... Germany continued to maintain restrictions inconsistently with the General Agreement ... . If the Federal Government followed the policy which it now declared, it might well leave other contracting parties no choice but to take action on grounds of nullification and impairment." ¹¹⁵

127. Subsequent decisions adopted with respect to Article XVIII, such as the two sets of consultation procedures adopted by the Council in 1970 and 1972 ¹¹⁶ and the 1979 Declaration on Trade Measures Taken for Balance-of-Payments Purposes¹¹⁷, had not changed the relationship between Article XVIII:B and Article XXIII.
128. India noted that most of the authorities cited by the United States related to the period before 1957 prior to the amendment of Article XII and the introduction of Article XVIII:B, which resulted in introducing procedures for consultations on import restrictions for balance-of-payments purposes. Moreover, the 1950 Report of the Working Party on the "The Use of Quantitative Restrictions for Protective and Commercial Purposes" not only had not been a working party set up under Article XXIII but also appeared to proceed on the assumption that the import restrictions in question did not have any justification under Article XII and were inconsistent with Articles XIII and XIV. ¹¹⁸ Similarly, the working party established under Article XXIII to examine the justification for Belgium's restrictions on imports from the dollar area had been concerned with discriminatory import restrictions that were not directed towards controlling the general level of imports. ¹¹⁹
129. India added that the Report on Quantitative Restrictions adopted at the Review Session recommended against stricter limits on import restrictions and the introduction instead of special consultation procedures both in Articles XII and XVIII:B. ¹²⁰ After the introduction of consultation procedures in Article XII, the economic justification of import restrictions had never been determined by a dispute settlement panel though the application of import restrictions had been considered after the Committee had determined that there was no economic justification for the import restrictions of a particular contracting party. Thus, a working party was set up under Article XXIII to review import restrictions maintained by Germany under Article XII only after consultations resulted in the conclusion that Germany's import restrictions were no longer justified. ¹²¹
130. India pointed out that in the case of Korea - Beef, the Panel did not decide on its own that import restrictions had no balance-of-payments justification but determined the legal status in light of the conclusions of the Committee. Several contracting parties had been of the view that the panel procedures could not be used as a substitute for the consultation process in the Committee and that these panels should not be established. Others considered that the resort to Article XXIII was an unconditional right. In the end, three parallel panels on Korea - Beef were established ¹²² and the controversy on this issue continued in the proceedings before them. ¹²³ The panels avoided deciding the issue by concluding in reports with identical findings that the Committee had already determined the legal status of the import restrictions imposed by Korea and they could therefore base their decision on the determination made by the CONTRACTING PARTIES. The panel which examined the United States complaint ruled:

"The Panel considered the various arguments of the parties to the dispute concerning past deliberations by the CONTRACTING PARTIES on the exclusivity of special review procedures under the General Agreement. However, the Panel was not persuaded that any of these earlier deliberations in the GATT were directly applicable to the present dispute� . The latest full consultation concerning Korea�s balance-of-payments situation in the Balance-of- Payments Committee had taken place in November 1987, the report of which had been adopted by the CONTRACTING PARTIES in February 1988 . . . The Panel considered that it should take into account the conclusions reached by the Balance-of-Payments Committee. ¹²⁴

131. The panel then examined the conclusions in the Committee, noted that the prevailing view had been "that the current situation and outlook for the balance of payments was such that import restrictions could no longer be justified under Article XVIII:B", noted that the balance-of-payments situation had improved since the consultations and found on that basis that the import restrictions were not justified by Article XVIII:B. The remainder of the panel�s findings dealt with matters arising from the application of the import restrictions, in particular their consistency with Articles II, X and XIII. The panel thus did not arrogate to itself the competence of the Committee and the CONTRACTING PARTIES but based its ruling on the conclusions that had already been reached by these bodies."
132. However, India noted that the United States' claimed that the Korea Beef case supports its position on dispute settlement being available even in the absence of a finding on justification of import restrictions by the Committee after consultations. India referred to the finding of that Panel, under the heading "Procedural aspects", that contracting parties had the right to resort to Article XXIII in respect of measures for which Article XVIII:B was invoked, thereby rejecting the argument of Korea that the panel could examine neither the application nor the justification of the measures because the procedures set out in Article XVIII:B were lex specialis in relation to those set out in Article XXIII. Under the heading "Justification for restrictions" that Panel had found that:

The latest full consultation concerning Korea's balance-of-payments situation in the Balance-of-Payments Committee had taken place in November 1987, the report of which had been adopted by the CONTRACTING PARTIES in February 1988� The Panel considered that it should take into account the conclusions reached by the Balance-of-Payments Committee. ¹²⁵

133. India stated that that Panel had then examined the conclusions in the Committee, noted that the prevailing view had been "that the current situation and outlook for the balance of payments was such that import restrictions could no longer be justified under Article XVIII:B" and that this view had been adopted by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, and found on that basis that the import restrictions were not justified by Article XVIII:B. The remainder of that Panel's findings dealt with matters arising from the application of the import restrictions, in particular their consistency with Articles II, X and XIII. That Panel thus did not decide on its own that Korea's import restrictions had no balance-of-payments justification; it determined the legal status of the import restrictions in the light of the action the CONTRACTING PARTIES had taken on them.
134. When the panel actually examined the justification for Korea's beef import restrictions, it did not initiate a de novo review of the justification under Article XVIII:11 for Korea's import restrictions. Instead, it looked to the results of the previous consultations in the Committee to determine the justification of Korea's import restrictions on beef. It found that the consensual decision-making procedure of the Panel had been frustrated by Korea because the report of the Committee had indicated that the prevailing view in the Committee was that Korea's import restrictions could no longer be justified. Thus, the Korea - Beef panel took a nuanced and carefully-reasoned approach to the issue of how to reconcile the special responsibility for examining the justification of import restrictions under Article XVIII:11 expressly assigned to the Committee with the general dispute-settlement procedures in Article XXIII. The report of the Korea - Beef ruling on this central issue in this dispute was especially important because it was adopted by the CONTRACTING PARTIES.
135. In the present dispute, however, India noted that the Committee's Report on Consultations with India reflected that a significant proportion of the Committee found that India's import restrictions were justified. Therefore, India clearly had not abused the procedures of the Committee. Subsequently, India reached agreement with all the dissenting members of the Committee except the United States on its time-schedule. Therefore, effectively there was a consensus (barring only the United States) within the Committee on approving India's time-schedule. Accepting the arguments of the United States in this case, therefore, could result in frustrating the ability of the Committee to exercise its responsibility in the future. A single member could frustrate a consensus on approving the legal status of the import restrictions of a Member invoking Article XVIII:B in the future and then take recourse to dispute settlement on the basis that the legal status of the import restrictions remained in doubt.
136. The United States noted that India's settlements with other Members had not been notified to the Committee, had in any event not been signed until after the United States made its request for the establishment of this Panel, and were irrelevant to the questions before this Panel.

To continue with Burden of Proof

⁹⁹ GATT documents C/M/159-162.

¹⁰⁰ Panel Report on European Community � Tariff Treatment on Imports of Citrus Products from Certain Countries in the Mediterranean Region, Op. Cit., p. 81.

¹⁰¹ DS32/R, 3 June 1993, p. 81 (not adopted).

¹⁰² Ibid., para 367.

¹⁰³ Ibid., para. 372.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., para. 367.

¹⁰⁵ WT/DS34/2, circulated 2 February 1998; WT/DSB/M/43 and Corr.1.

¹⁰⁶ Report of the Appellate Body on United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (WT/DS2/AB/R), 29 April 1996, p. 22.

¹⁰⁷ Report of the Appellate Body on European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (WT/DS27/AB/R), 9 September 1997, paras. 197 and 198.

¹⁰⁸ GATT document C/M/186, C/M/187.

¹⁰⁹ DS32/R, Op. Cit., para. 367.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., para. 367.

¹¹¹ WT/DS2/AB/R, pp. 20-21, 29.

¹¹² Panel Report on Republic of Korea � Restrictions on Imports of Beef, adopted on 7 November 1989, BISD 36S/202, 227, paras. 96-97; Panel Report on Republic of Korea � Restrictions on Imports of Beef, adopted on 7 November 1989, BISD 36S/234, 265, paras. 112-13; Panel Report on Republic of Korea � Restrictions on Imports of Beef, adopted on 7 November 1989, BISD 36S/268, 303, paras. 118-19.

¹¹³ GATT/CP.4/33 (Sales No. GATT/1950-3), para. 22.

¹¹⁴ GATT/IC/7; GATT/IC/SR.3, pp. 19-20; Analytical Index / Guide to GATT Law and Practice (6^th ed., 1995),pp. 689, 702.

¹¹⁵ Report of the Working Party on German Import Restrictions, 30 November 1957, BISD 6S/55, 56, paras. 2 and 3.

¹¹⁶ Documentation for Article XII:4(b) and Article XVIII:12(b) Consultations, L/3388, adopted on 28 April 1970, BISD 18S/48, and Procedures for Regular Consultations on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions with Developing Countries, L/3772/Rev.1, adopted on 19 December 1972, BISD 20S/47.

¹¹⁷ L/4904, adopted on 28 November 1979, BISD 26S/205.

¹¹⁸ GATT/CP.4/33 (Sales No. GATT/1950-3).

¹¹⁹ GATT/IC/7; GATT/IC/SR.3, pp. 19-20.

¹²⁰ Report of the Review Working Party on Quantitative Restrictions, L/332/Rev.1, adopted on 2, 4 and 5 March 1955, BISD 3S/170, 171, para. 4.

¹²¹ German Import Restrictions, BISD 6S/55, 56, Op. Cit.

¹²² Panel Report on Republic of Korea � Restrictions on Imports of Beef, BISD 36S/268, Op. Cit.

¹²³ Ibid., BISD 36S/279-289.

¹²⁴ BISD 36S/302-304.

¹²⁵ BISD 36S/302-304.