4.336 According to Mexico, the above consideration was one of the reasons for which Mexico, on the basis of Article 6.7 and subparagraph 2 of Annex I quoted above, objected to the verification visit on the terms sought by the Ministry. Furthermore, both in the written communication of 25 November 1996, which was submitted before Mexico was notified of the verification visit, and at the time of the visit by the investigating authority, Cruz Azul informed the Ministry that non-governmental experts Daniel Joseph Cannistra and Joanna Schlesinger had conflicts of interest because they had been advisors to the United States cement companies that had filed claims against Mexican exporting companies in an anti-dumping investigation. Mexico asserts that these individuals were still advisors to those companies at the time when the Ministry decided to carry out the verification visit, as is clear from the documents that were attached to the written communication mentioned above. 

4.337 Mexico states that both it and Cruz Azul considered that the participation of non-governmental experts who had been advising United States cement companies against Mexican companies, including Cruz Azul, constituted a conflict of interest, bearing in mind that their participation in the verification and analysis of information from that company could be biased against the exporting company. According to Mexico, concern on the part of Mexico and Cruz Azul increased when, during the verification visit one of the non-governmental experts, Mr. Daniel Joseph Cannistra, told the representative of Mexico that the objection to their participation would be penalized by using the most adverse information available. 

4.338 Mexico contends that both in the written communication of 25 November 1996 and in the record of the verification visit, Mexico and Cruz Azul proposed to the verification team that the verification should be based on the information on the normal value and export price corresponding to the period 1 June to 30 November 1995, in keeping with Article 6.7 and Annex I of the ADP Agreement. Furthermore, Cruz Azul and Mexico offered to carry out the verification visit with the participation of two officials from the Ministry, Edith Flores de Molina and Gabriela Montenegro, together with the only non-governmental expert who had no conflict of interest. Mexico notes that the verification team nevertheless cancelled the visit altogether, and used the most adverse information available. 

4.339 Guatemala submits that the Ministry did notify Mexico of its intention to bring in non-governmental experts. In a letter dated 26 November 1996, the Ministry advised Cruz Azul and SECOFI who the non-governmental experts participating in the verification would be. The letter was addressed to Cruz Azul with an indication that a copy had been sent to SECOFI. As the verification was to take place in Mexico and not in Guatemala, the Ministry considered it more important to notify the Mexican Government of the names of the non-governmental experts through SECOFI in Mexico City than through the Mexican Embassy in Guatemala. In a document attached to the letter, the Ministry informed Cruz Azul that the verification would take place from 3 to 6 December 1996, and stated that the purpose of the visit would be to verify the information already provided and obtain more information; that the period to be verified was 1 June 1995 to 31 May 1996; that the Ministry, as investigating authority, was responsible for deciding whether non-governmental experts should be called in; and that if Cruz Azul refused to cooperate the Ministry would be obliged to use the best information available. In the first paragraph of its letter to the Ministry dated 2 December 1996, Mexico acknowledged that it had received that notification on 26 November 1996. According to Guatemala, Mexico therefore admits that it was informed of this, i.e. of the inclusion of the said experts, which is all that paragraph 2 of Annex I of the ADP Agreement requires. According to Guatemala, Mexico's 2 December letter also indicates that it had an opportunity to respond to the inclusion of non-governmental experts before the date set for the verification visit, although neither the government of the exporting country nor the exporting enterprise has a right to present a "reply". 

4.340 Mexico denies that it was informed of the Ministry's intention to bring in non-governmental experts, or that Mexico acknowledged that it had received notification of the use of non-governmental experts on 26 November 1996. SECOFI never received the letter dated 26 November 1996. Furthermore, contrary to what Guatemala says, that letter does not mention the intention to include non-governmental experts, much less the exceptional circumstances that warranted their participation. According to Mexico, this suggests that it was not in Guatemala's interest that Mexico should receive due notice of the visit of the non-governmental experts. Mexico also argues that the reason given for sending the second letter to Cruz Azul with a copy to SECOFI instead of the Mexican Embassy in Guatemala, as was the case with an earlier letter concerning the verification that did arrive, is not satisfactory given that the two letters dealt with the same verification visit in Mexico. As Mexico informed the Ministry in its letter of 2 December 1996, the Mexican Government became aware of Guatemala's intention to include non-governmental experts through Cruz Azul, and never as a result of any official communication from Guatemala. To date, Mexico has not officially received any copy of the letter from the Guatemalan authorities to Cruz Azul containing the names of the non-governmental experts participating in the verification visit, even though this document mentions that a copy should have been sent to the Government of Mexico. Mexico notes that in the same letter it told the Ministry that it was opposed to the verification visit being carried out under the proposed conditions. Mexico acknowledges that it did not request information from Guatemala relating to the "exceptional circumstances" allegedly justifying recourse to non-governmental experts, but states that it did not do so because the onus was on Guatemala to provide this type of information. Mexico also observes that Cruz Azul, in its letter of 25 November 1996, had requested the Ministry of the Economy to comply with the obligation laid down in the ADP Agreement of justifying the inclusion of non-governmental experts. The Guatemalan authority had not given this request due attention and had decided to send its verification team, including non-governmental experts. 

4.341 Guatemala submits that it was not obliged under the ADP Agreement to explain the exceptional circumstances that warranted the participation of non-governmental experts. Article 6.2 of the ADP Agreement does not refer to non-governmental experts. Paragraph 2 of Annex I to the ADP Agreement merely requires that the exporting firm and its government should be informed of the intention to include non-governmental experts in the investigating team. Article 6.2 and Paragraph 2 of Annex I do not impose any obligation to explain the exceptional circumstances, nor do they state that the consent of the exporting Member must be obtained in order to utilize such experts. By the time of the notification required by paragraph 2 of Annex I, Guatemala asserts that it had already decided that there were exceptional circumstances requiring the use of non-governmental experts. The decision to include non-governmental experts is left to the discretion of the Member. Consequently, there would be no purpose in informing the exporting Member of the reasons for their inclusion. Guatemala suggests, for example, that the reasons might be confidential and to disclose them might compromise the effectiveness of the verification. In any event, Guatemala asserts that Mexico knew that this was the first anti-dumping investigation ever carried out in Guatemala. The exceptional circumstance which required Guatemala to obtain the assistance of consultant experts on anti?dumping was the fact that the Ministry had never before carried out a verification and was not familiar with the methods used to verify adjustments to the normal value and the export price by the foreign exporter and was not conversant with the GAAP standards used by Mexico. The firm Economic Consulting Services was appointed to assist in the verification and to train the Ministry staff to carry out future verifications. 

4.342 Mexico notes that Guatemala argues that it was not obliged to explain the exceptional circumstances that led it to include non-governmental experts in the investigating team, while at the same time claiming that Mexico had to "demonstrate significant impact" in order to be able to resort to Article 17.4 of the ADP Agreement. Mexico submits that on the one hand, there is failure to comply with the provisions of the ADP Agreement while, on the other, non-existent obligations are added. Paragraph 2 of Annex I to the ADP Agreement clearly establishes the obligation to "so inform" the firms and the authorities of the exporting Member (i.e. to inform them of the exceptional circumstances and the intention to include non-governmental experts in the investigating team). 

4.343 Mexico submits that it is wrong to justify the presence of the non-governmental experts on the grounds that this was Guatemala's first investigation. In principle, Mexico accepts that it was important for Guatemala to take the advice of non-governmental experts, particularly as this was its first investigation. However, this does not provide a valid reason for disregarding the obligation imposed on Guatemala by paragraph 2 of Annex I to the ADP Agreement. 

4.344 Concerning Mexico's allegation that the non-governmental experts had a conflict of interest, Guatemala submits that the Ministry's letter of 26 November 1996 specifically stated that the persons who would act as non-governmental experts had signed an agreement to protect the confidentiality of all the information to which they had access. Moreover, in its submission to the Panel, Mexico supplied copies of administrative protective orders from the United States applicable to ongoing administrative reviews connected with the anti-dumping order concerning grey portland cement from Mexico, in which the persons concerned undertook not to divulge any information obtained in those proceedings, which was the exclusive property of the party under investigation. Consequently, Guatemala submits that the persons concerned could use none of the information obtained in the United States anti-dumping case during the verification at Cruz Azul. In accordance with the agreement on confidentiality, under the section "sanctions for violation of the conditions of the preventive order", the non-governmental experts agreed that "if it is determined that a person has violated the obligation of confidentiality, this person shall be subject to all Guatemalan and Mexican laws and regulations". In addition, the agreement indicated that sanctions under the laws of one or other of the countries would be left to the discretion of the party owning the information. As far as Guatemalan legislation is concerned, Article 355 of the Criminal Code provides that any person who discloses or utilizes an industrial or trade secret or any other secret of economic importance not freely available to him, either for his own purposes or on behalf of a third party, shall be liable to imprisonment for a period of six months to two years and to a fine of Q 200 to Q 2,000. 

4.345 Guatemala stresses that, contrary to Mexico's submission, Cruz Azul was not an interested party in any of the administrative reviews in which Mr. Daniel Joseph Cannistra and Ms. Joanna Schlesinger participated on behalf of the cement producers of the United States. Guatemala notes that Cruz Azul made no claim to the effect that the United States clients of Mr. Cannistra and Ms. Schlesinger had any interest in the results of the anti-dumping proceeding in Guatemala. ¹⁰⁷ The Mexican claims regarding the existence of a conflict of interest are therefore without foundation, and in any event the alleged conflict was irrelevant since Cruz Azul declined to allow the information specified by the Ministry to be verified. 

4.346 Mexico emphasises that it has never alleged that the non-governmental experts (in particular, Mr Cannistra and Ms. Schlesinger) did not sign agreements to protect the confidentiality of the information to which they had access during the visit or that there was any possibility of their disclosing it, but argued that since they had participated in investigations carried out by the United States against Mexican cement companies, ¹⁰⁸ it was questionable whether they would show the impartiality and objectivity expected of any adviser, in particular considering that they represented the interests of their country's cement companies and were predisposed to believe that Mexican exports were being dumped. According to Mexico, it is particularly noteworthy that Mexico's concerns about some of the non-governmental experts selected by Guatemala being in a situation of conflict of interest have not been given proper consideration by Guatemala, whereas in the present dispute Guatemala considered that one of the original Panel members might have had a conflict of interest because of an event that was not even definitely going to take place. 

4.347 Guatemala notes that Mexico accepted that it was important for Guatemala to take the advice of non-governmental experts, particularly as this was its first investigation, but nevertheless objects to the participation of such experts at verification. Firstly, the fact that an expert has participated in a verification does not mean that the expert represents the interests of a particular enterprise, since one of the prerequisites for participating as a professional expert is objectivity and impartiality; moreover, there is no provision in the ADP Agreement that prevents an investigating authority from seeking the advice of non-governmental experts that have participated in verifications in other countries. The rules governing verification stipulate only that the non-governmental experts should be subject to effective sanctions for breach of confidentiality requirements. Guatemala's legislation provides for such sanctions and Mexico admitted that Guatemala had fulfilled that obligation. 

4.348 Guatemala states that any alleged procedural omission did not cause nullification or impairment of the benefits accruing to Mexico under the ADP Agreement. Guatemala has provided sufficient arguments to refute the claim of nullification or impairment, and has also pointed out that any alleged error was harmless. 

3. Scope of verification 

4.349 Mexico submits that the Ministry violated Article 6.7 and paragraphs 7 and 8 of Annex I of the ADP Agreement by seeking to verify information that was not part of the reply to the questionnaire submitted by Cruz Azul, and by failing to respond to Cruz Azul's requests for information essential to the verification. 

4.350 Mexico asserts that the investigating authority notified Cruz Azul on 6 November 1996 of the procedure to be followed for the verification of data on sales and costs both for the original period of investigation and for the extended investigation period, and of the presence of non-governmental experts. The Ministry did not request information on costs either in the initial questionnaire or in the additional one, but only at the time of notification of the visit on 6 November 1996. In the light of this situation, Cruz Azul requested the Ministry by written correspondence of 25 November 1996 to provide an explanation of the content and scope of the verification procedure, and the reasons and legal grounds for which it had been decided to verify information neither submitted nor requested during the course of the investigation. According to Mexico, questions were asked specifically as to the reason for including the company's production costs, for extending the investigation period, and concerning the legal status of the non-governmental experts. Cruz Azul also informed the Ministry that it would agree to the verification if it were based on the information actually submitted for the period 1 June to 30 November 1995 ¹⁰⁹ and in the presence of non-governmental experts without conflict of interests. In that correspondence, Cruz Azul stated that its position should in no way be construed as opposition to or obstruction of the visit. The Ministry never replied to that correspondence, although it was essential to the conduct of the verification visit in accordance with paragraph 8 of Annex I of the ADP Agreement. 

4.351 According to Mexico, the conduct of the verification visit under the terms indicated by the Ministry would have been in breach of the provisions of Article 6.7 and Annex I, paragraph 7 of the ADP Agreement, as it would have included the review of information not submitted by the exporting firm in its questionnaire response. According to Mexico, Annex I, paragraph 7 of the ADP Agreement states that the object of the verification is the information provided in the exporting firm's questionnaire response¹¹⁰ , and the collection of further details relating to that information. Under no circumstance is the authority empowered to request further, completely new information (whether as regards time or substance), as the Ministry had intended to do. 

4.352 Mexico submits that the term "verify" means that the investigating authority is entitled to confirm for itself whether the information provided by the company involved corresponds to the actual facts. In other words, the object of on-the-spot verification is to confirm that the information provided by the company in its questionnaire response is true and accurate. This is apparent from the text of paragraph 7 of Annex I to the ADP Agreement, the beginning of which states that "... the main purpose of the on-the-spot investigation is to verify information provided or to obtain further details". According to Mexico, paragraph 7 of Annex I is also clear as regards the extent of the verification, which relates only to the "information provided" or the obtaining of "further details". The text does not justify extending the investigation period, or changing the basis of calculation of the normal value from domestic selling prices to a constructed normal value. This goes far beyond obtaining further details, which by definition relates to the information provided in the questionnaire response, and not to new information. Mexico submits that a detail cannot extend beyond the matter being detailed. A detail must always be a subset of the set that is being analyzed, otherwise it would no longer be a detail. 

4.353 Mexico emphasises that the words "any further information which needs to be provided" used subsequently in paragraph 7 of Annex I to the ADP Agreement should not be used to extend the scope of the verification. These words are limited to the context of the second part of the first sentence of paragraph 7 of Annex I to the ADP Agreement; that is to say, they serve as a reminder of what is "standard practice prior to the visit to advise the firms concerned of the general nature of the information to be verified". According to Mexico, these words do not apply to the paragraph as a whole. Moreover, from the language of this part of paragraph 7 of Annex I, Mexico suggests that the words "further information which needs to be provided" are intended to make it clear that it is not a question of the investigating authority merely indicating "the general nature of the information to be verified". This expression cannot, however, be taken to extend the scope of the verification which is, as established at the beginning of paragraph 7, "to verify information provided or to obtain further details". 

4.354 Mexico argues that despite the manifest willingness of Cruz Azul and Mexico to carry out the verification visit in keeping with the provisions of the ADP Agreement, the Ministry cancelled the verification when they were already at the firm's domicile, stating that they would use "the most adverse information available". Mexico submits that if the Ministry had carried out the verification of Cruz Azul sales for the investigation period considered in the preliminary determination, it would have arrived at a negative margin of dumping. 

4.355 Guatemala submits that it was entitled to verify the information relating to Cruz Azul's production costs and sales. Article 6.7 of the ADP Agreement says nothing about the scope of the verification, and paragraphs 7 and 8 of Annex I do not support Mexico's claims. Guatemala recalls that the premise of Mexico's argument is that the Ministry sought to verify information which Cruz Azul had not furnished. However, Mexico fails to state - and expressly argues the contrary - that the Ministry had requested the information in question and that Cruz Azul had failed to provide that information. Specifically, the Ministry asked Cruz Azul for information on production costs in Section C2, part 3.5 of the original questionnaire issued on 26 January, and in Section 2(f) of the supplementary questionnaire issued on 14 October. Cruz Azul failed to provide information on its production costs in its reply to the original questionnaire, and only gave a partial response (relating to one of two plants) in its reply to the supplementary questionnaire. Cruz Azul also declined to supply any information about sales for the period 1 December 1995 to 30 May 1996 (i.e. the extended investigation period), as requested in Section 2(g) of the supplementary questionnaire. Guatemala submits that the Ministry advised Cruz Azul of its intention to conduct a verification of, inter alia, the information on sales and costs for the original period and the extended period of investigation which had been requested in the original and supplementary questionnaires respectively. Thus, Cruz Azul knew that Guatemala would verify both the information actually supplied in the replies to its questionnaires and the additional information which Guatemala had requested in its original questionnaire and its supplementary questionnaire. Furthermore, Guatemala submits that the reference in paragraph 7 of Annex I to the standard practice of advising the exporter of "any further information which needs to be provided" clearly means that the investigating authority is entitled to verify information that has not been supplied by the exporter. This reference to "further information" would be rendered meaningless if the investigating authority was entitled to advise the exporter of the need to provide the said "further information", but was not allowed to verify the information when it was supplied. 

4.356 Guatemala asserts that the refusal by Cruz Azul to provide complete information on production costs for both plants prevented the Ministry from estimating whether Cruz Azul's sales on the domestic market were below cost, and from calculating any adjustment for the recognized difference in physical characteristics between the product sold in Mexico and the product exported to Guatemala. According to Guatemala, Cruz Azul's refusal to provide information on its sales for the period from 1 December 1995 to 30 May 1996 prevented the Ministry from calculating a final dumping margin based on the most recent information. Cruz Azul's failure to provide the necessary information could have led the investigating authority to cancel the verification and given grounds for the Ministry to proceed on the basis of the facts available. Instead, acting in good faith and giving Cruz Azul a last chance, Guatemala notes that the Ministry endeavoured to obtain the outstanding information during the verification visit. Paragraph 7 of Annex I expressly provides that "prior to the visit" the investigating authority should "advise the firms concerned of the general nature of the information to be verified and of any further information which needs to be provided ...". Guatemala asserts that the Ministry complied with this provision by notifying Cruz Azul of the additional information that it was required to provide. Guatemala denies not replying to the letter from Cruz Azul of 25 November 1996. In accordance with paragraph 8 of Annex I to the ADP Agreement, the Ministry replied on 26 November 1996, and agreed to state its conditions for the verification visit. Guatemala submits that although the Ministry tried in good faith to accommodate Cruz Azul to the best of its ability, Cruz Azul denied the Ministry the opportunity to verify the information in its possession. As a result, given the fact that the information from Cruz Azul was not verifiable in accordance with paragraph 3 of Annex II to the ADP Agreement, and since Cruz Azul did not provide other necessary information in accordance with Article 6.8 of the ADP Agreement, the Ministry cancelled the verification and used the best information available. 

4.357 Mexico states that Article 2.2 (and by extension Article 2.2.1) of the ADP Agreement is applicable only "when there are no sales of the like product in the ordinary course of trade in the domestic market of the exporting country or when, because of the particular market situation or the low volume of the sales in the domestic market of the exporting country, such sales do not permit a proper comparison ..." Since in this instance the Ministry established that, in accordance with the ADP Agreement, Cruz Azul's sales in Mexico "are representative and can thus be used as a basis to calculate the normal value", Mexico submits that there was no need to resort to the alternative normal values contained in Article 2.2 (exports to third countries or constructed normal value). According to Mexico, this is confirmed in section C ("Normal Value") of the questionnaire sent by the Ministry to Cruz Azul, in which it is stated that the dumping application can be presented in two ways. The first way allows the applicant to argue that the export price is lower than the domestic selling price in the country of origin, using the domestic selling price as the normal value. Mexico asserts that if an applicant adopts this approach, data on normal value must be provided in accordance with section C.1 of the questionnaire. Mexico recalls that the questionnaire stated "... in cases of constructed normal value please submit the information corresponding to sections C.1 and C.2." Thus, whereas an applicant using domestic selling prices as the basis of normal value is required to complete only Section C.1 of the questionnaire, an applicant using a constructed normal value must complete both Sections C.1 and C.2 thereof. Mexico notes from Cementos Progreso's application, and from the Ministry's preliminary determination, that the Ministry initiated the investigation using domestic selling prices as the basis of normal value, without recourse to a constructed normal value. According to Mexico therefore, it was only necessary for Cruz Azul to reply to section C.1 of the questionnaire. 

4.358 Mexico suggests that recourse to the two alternative normal values indicated in Article 2.2 of the ADP Agreement is not optional for the investigating authority, but depends directly on the provisions of that Article. Therefore, Mexico submits that the information requested by the Ministry should have been limited to the information required to determine the normal value on the basis of domestic market prices, without the inclusion of cost data which might be necessary to determine a constructed normal value. According to Mexico, the fact that it is a question of mutually exclusive alternatives also means that the importing Member has no right arbitrarily to change the basis of calculation of normal value from domestic selling prices to constructed normal value. For this reason, Mexico submits that the request for cost information in section 2(f) of the supplementary questionnaire was inappropriate. 

4.359 Guatemala submits that the Ministry requested the information on costs in order to determine whether the sales of a like product in the domestic market of the exporting country were at prices below per unit (fixed and variable) costs of production, as stipulated in Article 2.2.1 of the ADP Agreement. According to Article 2.2.1 and footnote 5 to the ADP Agreement, an investigating authority may reject sales at prices below cost and treat them as not being in the ordinary course of trade if such sales are made within an extended period of time in substantial quantities. Since Cruz Azul did not provide information on costs, Guatemala could not determine which sales may have been made below cost, and therefore to be excluded, when calculating the margin of dumping on the basis of domestic selling prices. Moreover, under Article 2.4 of the ADP Agreement the investigating authority is required to make due allowance for differences in physical characteristics which affect price comparability. Guatemala submits that the Ministry requested the information on Cruz Azul's variable costs in order to make due allowance for the differences in physical characteristics affecting price comparability. Guatemala suggests that Mexico has failed to take account of these reasons justifying the Ministry's request for cost data. 

4. Technical accounting evidence 

4.360 Mexico submits that the Ministry violated Articles 6.1, 6.2 and 6.8 of the ADP Agreement by refusing to accept technical accounting evidence submitted by Cruz Azul after cancellation of the verification visit. 

4.361 Mexico states that in a letter dated 18 November 1996, Cruz Azul provided the investigating authority with technical accounting evidence, so that it would have objective and reasonable information concerning the firm's normal value and the export prices for the original period of the investigation (1 June to 30 November 1995). This technical accounting evidence was formally submitted by Cruz Azul in exercise of its right of defence as provided for in Articles 6.1 and 6.2 of the ADP Agreement. The purpose of the technical accounting evidence was to provide the Ministry with further data on which to base its conclusions before making a final determination. When appearing before the Ministry on 18 December 1996, Cruz Azul explained clearly and precisely the nature of the technical accounting evidence and its importance to the investigation, adding that a firm of accountants specialized in the field and independent of Cruz Azul had been entrusted with its preparation. Mexico notes that, nevertheless, in the final determination of 17 January 1997, the Ministry resolved "... that the technical evidence submitted by the exporting firm on 18 December 1996 (confidential information) cannot replace verification of the information by the Guatemalan investigating authority, as indicated under Article 6.6 of the ADP Agreement." According to Mexico, the Ministry rejected the evidence without assessing its content or its relevance, which meant that the Ministry was unable to ascertain the accuracy or adequacy of the evidence submitted by Cruz Azul concerning normal value and export price. 

4.362 Mexico notes that, with reference to Article 6.8 (and Annex II, paragraph 6) of the ADP Agreement, Cruz Azul neither denied access to nor withheld necessary information, nor significantly obstructed the investigation. Cruz Azul participated actively in the whole of the investigation. For this reason and in the face of the Ministry's threat during the verification visit to use the best information available, Cruz Azul tried to do everything in its power not to be characterized as uncooperative, in order that the margin of dumping should not be determined on the basis of the most adverse information. Mexico recalls that the Ministry, when it issued its final determination, nevertheless carried out its threats and rejected all the information provided by Cruz Azul in the course of the investigation, characterizing it as uncooperative and determining a dumping margin on the basis of the information most detrimental to its interests, even though the technical accounting evidence would have enabled it to check Cruz Azul's information, inasmuch as it came from another independent source as provided in paragraph 7 of Annex II to the ADP Agreement. According to Mexico, the Ministry should not have disallowed the technical accounting evidence and, at all events, should have immediately informed Cruz Azul of its reasons for rejecting the technical accounting evidence and allowed an opportunity for new explanations to be provided within a reasonable time-frame. Mexico asserts that the Ministry did not do any of this. 

4.363 Guatemala denies that Cruz Azul cooperated during the investigation. Cruz Azul refused to provide the information on costs and sales requested by the Ministry and refused to permit a verification. Hence, in accordance with Article 6.8 and Annex II.7 of the ADP Agreement, Guatemala proceeded, as was appropriate, to use the best information available.

Continue on to IV. Main Arguments of the Parties, Section 4.364

Notes:

107. Guatemala suggests that there is no reason to believe that the United States cement producers would favour the imposition of an anti?dumping order in Guatemala against Mexican cement. On the contrary, the United States producers might prefer Mexico to export cement to Guatemala rather than to the United States. Consequently, it is likely that those producers would oppose the imposition of anti?dumping measures in Guatemala.

108. Mexico asserts that Cruz Azul was covered by the residual duty imposed by the United States.

109. According to Mexico, this information had been requested by the Ministry in accordance with Article 6.1 of the ADP Agreement.

110. Mexico also refers to Article 6.1 and Annex II, paragraph 1 of the ADP Agreement