|
|
espa�ol - fran�ais - portugu�s |
Search
|
UNITED STATES - MEASURES TREATING
(Continuation) 8.27 The United States refers to a number of dictionary definitions of the words
"entrust" and "direct" (some of which are broader than those used by Canada),
including, "give responsibility to"; "cause to move in or take a specified
direction"; "regulate the course of"; "guide (someone or something)"; "instruct
(someone or something) with authority", "give authoritative instructions to; to
ordain, order (a person) to do (a thing) to be done; order the performance of".
For the United States, it cannot be said that no export restraint is capable of
satisfying any of these definitions. At a minimum, according to the United
States, an export restraint can "regulate the activities of" or "cause" a
private body to carry out one of the enumerated functions of subparagraphs (i)-(iii)
and thus provide a financial contribution. The United States submits that "[a]n
export restraint is a direction to provide goods to domestic purchasers if it
can be shown, as a factual matter, that there is a proximate causal relationship
between the export restraint and the behaviour of the producers of the
restrained product. Of course, whether such a causal relationship exists can
only be assessed on a case-by-case basis".125 In particular, the United States
argues, if the restraint results in the producer having no practical or
commercial choice but to sell (or to increase its sales) in the domestic market,
the restraint is the same as a direction to sell in the domestic market. The
United States further elaborates on this point, stating that "there would need
to be a demonstrated causal relationship"126 between an export restraint and a
private body's action (e. g., the provision of a good) in order for there to be
a financial contribution.
8.28 In our view, the requirement of "entrustment" or "direction" in
subparagraph (iv) refers to the situation in which the government executes a
particular policy by operating through a private body. The question in this
dispute relates to the conditions under which the government can be considered
to be operating through a private body as foreseen by subparagraph (iv). The
dictionary meaning of the word "entrust" is, inter alia, to "give (a person,
etc.) the responsibility for a task . . . Commit the . . . execution of (a task)
to a person . . . ".127 The word "direct" is defined, inter alia, as to "[g]ive
authoritative instructions to; order (a person) to do . . . order the
performance of".128 In this regard, we consider significant the fact that, for
"direct" when followed by "to" plus an infinitive (i. e., a verb), the
dictionary gives as a meaning to "give a formal order or command to"129, as this
is precisely the construction used in subparagraph (iv) (". . . entrusts or
directs a private body to carry out . . .").
8.29 It follows from the ordinary meanings of the two words "entrust" and
"direct" that the action of the government must contain a notion of delegation
(in the case of entrustment) or command (in the case of direction). To our
minds, both the act of entrusting and that of directing therefore necessarily
carry with them the following three elements: (i) an explicit and affirmative
action, be it delegation or command; (ii) addressed to a particular party; and
(iii) the object of which action is a particular task or duty. In other words,
the ordinary meanings of the verbs "entrust" and "direct" comprise these
elements - something is necessarily delegated, and it is necessarily delegated
to someone; and, by the same token, someone is necessarily commanded, and he is
necessarily commanded to do something. We therefore do not believe that either
entrustment or direction could be said to have occurred until all of these three
elements are present.
8.30 Having said that, it is clearly the first element - an explicit and
affirmative action of delegation or command - that is determinative. The second
and third elements - addressed to a particular party and of a particular task -
are aspects of the first. Any assessment of whether delegation or command has
occurred would necessarily be in reference to that which has been delegated or
commanded and in reference to the one to whom it has been delegated or
commanded. As aspects of and flowing from the first element of the definition,
the second and third elements provide further support for our view that the
action must be an explicit and affirmative act of delegation or command. We
note, in this regard, that the "entrusts or directs" language in subparagraph
(iv) is followed by the language "a private body to carry out . . . ", which is
similar to that which we have used to describe the second and third elements of
the definition of entrustment or direction. Thus, the subsequent language in
subparagraph (iv) confirms our view of the requirement of an explicit and
affirmative action.
8.31 Government entrustment or direction is thus very different from the
situation in which the government intervenes in the market in some way, which
may or may not have a particular result simply based on the given factual
circumstances and the exercise of free choice by the actors in that market.
Indeed, governments intervene in markets in various ways, and with various
policy or profit objectives, and these interventions might have various results,
including results that are not intended by, or that are even undesirable for,
the government. We do not see how a scenario of this type would comprise the
three elements that we consider to be germane to the definition of entrustment
or direction. That is, the fact that two different government actions might
happen to have the same result in a given situation does not transform the
nature of the actions, i. e., it does not mean that the two actions are
effectively one and the same. Otherwise put, the distinction that we make
between entrustment or direction and a government intervention which might or
might not have a particular effect in a particular market at a particular time
is not merely semantic.
8.32 The phrase "entrusts or directs" in Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) is immediately
preceded by the phrase "a government makes payments to a funding mechanism or".
We consider that these two phrases are aimed at capturing equivalent government
actions. Both are government actions that substitute an intermediary (whether a
funding mechanism or a private body) to make a financial contribution that
otherwise would be made directly by the government. In other words, the action
of a government making payments to a funding mechanism and that of it entrusting
or directing a private body to carry out the functions listed in subparagraphs
(i)-(iii) are equivalent government actions. This is further contextual support
for our view that entrustment or direction constitutes an explicit and
affirmative action, comparable to the making of payments to a funding mechanism.
8.33 Our understanding of the United States' view is that, where the effect of
an export restraint is to induce domestic producers to sell their product (in
greater quantities or exclusively) to the domestic purchasers/users of that
product, this is the same as if the government had explicitly and affirmatively
ordered the domestic producers to do so, and that thus there is a financial
contribution in the form of government-entrusted or government-directed
provision of goods. In forwarding this argument of "functional equivalence" or
"conceptual equivalence", the United States focuses primarily on the
effects or
the results of a government action, rather than on the nature of the action, in
order to determine whether that action constitutes a financial contribution.
Thus, according to the US approach, the existence of a financial contribution in
the case of an export restraint depends entirely on the reaction thereto of the
producers of the restrained good, and specifically on the extent to which they
increase their domestic sales of the restrained product because of the
restraint. Under the US approach, the existence of a financial contribution in
the case of an export restraint therefore actually cannot be determined from the
nature of that action (the export restraint) as such.
8.34 We consider that it cannot be the case that the nature of a Member
government's measure under the SCM Agreement is to be determined solely on the
basis of the reaction to that measure by those it affects. Rather, the existence
of a financial contribution by a government must be proven by reference to the
action of the government. To determine whether a financial contribution exists
under subparagraph (iv) solely by reference to the reaction of affected entities
would mean in practice that a different standard would apply under that
provision as compared to the standard under subparagraphs (i)-(iii), which
involves consideration of the action of the government first. Similarly, we do
not see how the reaction of private entities to a given governmental measure can
be the basis on which the Member's compliance with its treaty obligations under
the WTO is established.
8.35 Moreover, applying the "effects" approach to the question of whether a
financial contribution exists would have far-reaching implications. In
particular, it would seem to imply that any government measure that creates
market conditions favourable to or resulting in the increased supply of a
product in the domestic market would constitute a government-entrusted or
government-directed provision of goods, and hence a financial contribution.
While the United States does not appear to argue that this is the result it
seeks, it points to no legal basis on which export restraints could be
distinguished from other measures causing the same sorts of market effects. In
response to a question as to what such a legal basis would be under the US
approach, the United States submits:
"First, under the ordinary meaning of 'direct', there would have to be the
requisite causal connection between the government measure and the behaviour of
private actors in order for a financial contribution to exist . . . Thus, the
legal basis is found in subparagraph (iv) itself. Second . . . it would be
short-sighted to focus solely on the financial contribution element of an
actionable subsidy . . . One must take into account the fact that the
application of the concepts of 'benefit' and 'specificity' will weed out
government measures that might arguably satisfy the definition of 'financial
contribution'."130
8.36 Thus, the only "legal basis" cited by the United States is the "causal
connection between the government measure and the behaviour of private actors".
Given that such a causal connection could exist in respect of a wide variety of
government measures, by this argument the United States seems implicitly to
acknowledge that, under its approach, any government measure that caused an
increase in the domestic supply of a good would, for that reason alone,
constitute government-entrusted or government-directed provision of goods and
hence a financial contribution.
8.37 A hypothetical example better illustrates the difficulties of the US
"effects" approach. Let us assume that a government imposes extremely high
tariffs on imports of coal. It follows that the price of imported coal in the
domestic market would increase and the supply thereof would perhaps decrease.
Domestic downstream users of coal, such as steel producers, would probably find
it more economical to purchase coal from domestic producers, who would thus see
an increase in their sales volumes and would be likely to secure better terms of
sale as well. A government action - the imposition of high tariffs on coal -
would have benefited producers of coal by causing downstream users of coal to
make a greater proportion of purchases from domestic producers vis-�-vis foreign
producers as compared to the situation prior to the imposition of such tariffs.
Surely this cannot be considered to be a situation where a government "entrusts
or directs" a private body (users of coal) to purchase goods within the meaning
of subparagraph (iii) - or "entrusts or directs" a private body (producers of
coal) to provide goods within the meaning of subparagraph (iii) - and hence to
constitute a financial contribution, although that is precisely the result that
applying the US "effects" approach would yield. Were that to be the case,
tariffs would constitute financial contributions and, given that they would
necessarily confer a benefit on some actors in the market, tariffs would
constitute subsidies within the meaning of Article 1 of the SCM Agreement.
8.38 In the above example of imposition of tariffs, there may well be a question
as to consistency with Article II of the GATT 1994, which deals with Members'
schedules of concessions. It is, however, doubtful that the concept of financial
contribution contained in Article 1.1(a) of the SCM Agreement seeks to bring
such government action within the ambit of the SCM Agreement. To the contrary,
by introducing the notion of financial contribution, the drafters foreclosed the
possibility of the treatment of any government action that resulted in a benefit
as a subsidy131 . Indeed, this is arguably the principal significance of the
concept of financial contribution, which can be characterised as one of the
"gateways" to the SCM Agreement, along with the concepts of benefit and
specificity. To hold that the concept of financial contribution is about the
effects, rather than the nature, of a government action would be effectively to
write it out of the Agreement, leaving the concepts of benefit and specificity
as the sole determinants of the scope of the Agreement.
8.39 We note in this context that in the Uruguay Round the United States took
the position that benefit was the key factor in the determination of the type of
measure that constituted a subsidy.132 Similarly, in this dispute, the United
States submits, in response to questions from the Panel concerning the
determination of "entrusts or directs", and the legal significance, if any, of
the concepts of "benefit" and "specificity" for interpretation of the term
"financial contribution", that:
"[U]nder the ordinary meaning of 'direct', there would have to be the requisite
causal connection between the government measure and the behaviour of private
actors in order for a financial contribution to exist . . . ";133
and that:
"The requirements of 'benefit' and 'specificity' are relevant [to the question
of legal interpretation of the concept of 'financial contribution'] because
Canada and the European Communities [] are attempting to induce the Panel to
adopt an unwarrantedly narrow interpretation of subparagraph (iv) based on
unsubstantiated allegations of a 'parade of horribles' that supposedly would
occur if their narrow interpretation is not accepted. However, the fact is that
the 'benefit' and specificity' elements will operate so as to render many
alleged indirect subsidies non-actionable and, thus, non-countervailable."134
We understand the United States' response to our question of legal
interpretation to be primarily that the practical consequences of a broad
interpretation of the concept of financial contribution would be limited because
in practice such an interpretation will not convert enormous numbers of
government regulatory measures into subsidies, in view of the probable absence
in many cases of benefit and specificity.
8.40 But this response is not satisfactory; the requirements of "benefit" and
"specificity" are separate legal questions from, and are not relevant to, the
legal interpretation of the term "financial contribution"135. The US effects-based
approach implies that the "financial contribution" element is not a meaningful
legal requirement and thus not a limiting factor in itself in respect of the
determination of the type of measure that falls within the scope of the SCM
Agreement, and that the only limiting factors are "benefit" and "specificity".
This of course cannot be correct. Indeed, as noted above, the Appellate Body
stated in Brazil - Aircraft that "the issues - and the respective definitions -
of a 'financial contribution' and a 'benefit' are two separate legal elements in
Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement, which together determine whether a 'subsidy'
exists".136 We believe therefore that the US approach would effectively, and
impermissibly, eliminate financial contribution as a "separate legal element".
8.41 We find further support in the reasoning of the Appellate Body in the
appeal of the original Panel ruling in Canada - Aircraft for our view that the
United States' "effects" approach (i. e., increase as a matter of fact in the
domestic supply of the restrained good as a result of an export restraint) is an
impermissible basis for determining the existence of a financial contribution
under subparagraph (iv). In the Canada - Aircraft appeal, the specific
definitional question under the SCM Agreement was the meaning of de facto export
contingency in the sense of SCM Article 3.1(a) and footnote 4. The underlying
principle was, however, similar. In particular, Canada argued in that case that,
for a subsidy to be de facto contingent on export performance, it "must
cause the recipient to prefer exports to domestic sales".137
8.42 The Appellate Body rejected this argument and essentially agreed with
Brazil and the United States that the focus of the SCM Agreement's obligations
is on the granting government138. The Appellate Body stated that "[i]t does
not
suffice to demonstrate solely that a government granting a subsidy anticipated
that exports would result"139 , and elaborated that, while "[a] subsidy may well be
granted in the knowledge, or with the anticipation, that exports will result . .
. that alone is not sufficient, because that alone is not proof that the
granting of the subsidy is tied to the anticipation of exportation"140. In other
words, the Appellate Body found that a cause and effect relationship between the
subsidy and actual or anticipated trends in exports was not sufficient to
satisfy the "tied to" standard of conditionality for export contingency to
exist.141 Similarly, in the case before us, for the "entrusts or directs" standard
to be met, i.e., for there to be a financial contribution in the sense of
subparagraph (iv), the government's action must be the focus, rather than the
possible effects of the action on, or the reactions to it by, those affected,
even if those effects or reactions are expected.
8.43 Nor are we persuaded by the parallel that the United States seeks to draw,
in support of its cause-and-effect argument, between a certain statement in the
Canada - Dairy Panel's findings in respect of item (d) of the Illustrative List
of Export Subsidies142 (which findings in any event were rendered moot by the
Appellate Body), and the "entrusts or directs" standard of SCM Article
1.1(a)(1)(iv)143 . In particular, the panel statement cited by the United States is
that it was not necessary "that the federal or provincial governments
specifically direct a certain outcome or course of action to be achieved or
taken" for the milk pooling system at issue to constitute provision of goods by
a government "through government-mandated schemes" in the sense of item (d) of
the Illustrative List. In fact, this statement by the Canada - Dairy Panel, when
seen in its full context, leads to the opposite conclusion from that advanced by
the United States. First, the general context for the statement was the Panel's
finding that it was the government (and not marketing boards or other entities
acting on their own) that decided which milk should be sold to which customers
at which prices, and that enforced these decisions through a system of permits
and other measures. Second, the immediate context for the cited statement of the
Panel was that, even to the extent that the marketing boards and other entities
had some discretion to make certain marketing decisions, that discretion had
been explicitly delegated to them by the government and thus the exercise of
that discretion (i. e., the situation where the government did not "specifically
direct a certain outcome or course of action") did not alter the conclusion that
milk was being provided through "government-mandated schemes". This is neither
the same as nor analogous to the US approach and thus provides no support for
the US argument that an increase in the domestic supply of a good which happens
to result, as a matter of fact, from the application of some government
intervention in the market for that good constitutes government-entrusted or
government-directed provision of the good.144 To the contrary, the Panel made this
statement in reference to a market every aspect of the operation of which was
explicitly and tightly controlled and managed by the government.
8.44 In sum, we consider that the ordinary meanings of the words "entrusts" and
"directs" require an explicit and affirmative action of delegation or command.
Moreover, we find that the "effects" test (i. e., a proximate causal
relationship)145 advanced by the United States as the definition of "entrusts or
directs" has implications which in our view would be contrary to the intended
scope and coverage of the SCM Agreement, in that it would effectively read out
of the text of Article 1 the financial contribution requirement. Thus, we find
that an export restraint in the sense that the term is used in this dispute
cannot satisfy the "entrusts or directs" standard of subparagraph (iv).
(ii) "Private body"
8.45 In its initial submissions in this dispute, Canada takes issue with the
idea that the individual producers of a good subject to export restraints could
be considered to be a "private body". The essence of Canada's argument on this
point is that the term "private body" connotes a "collectivity" which a
disparate group of producers does not have. For Canada, a "private body" is an organised private group or collective entity that has a separate and independent
existence. The fact that a given group of individuals can be described by a
common characteristic (e. g., gold miners), would not transform the universe of
such individuals into a "private body".
8.46 However, in its later submissions in this dispute, Canada seems to indicate
that an explicit government direction or entrustment to a given producer or
group of producers, whether individually or collectively, and no matter how
identified or defined, would itself transform those producers into a "private
body" in the sense of subparagraph (iv). According to Canada:
"In order for a government to entrust or direct someone to do something, there
must be some sort of government communication with the person or group so
entrusted. This could occur in a variety of ways . . . Whatever device is
available or chosen would identify the person(s) to whom the entrustment or
direction was given and would impose the obligation on that person(s) to carry
out a specific financial contribution . . . "146
According to Canada, the term "private body" is thus given meaning by the
surrounding text in subparagraph (iv), which includes the function of government
entrustment or direction.147
8.47 The United States essentially submits that Canada's (original) argument
would suggest that, even if the government in question were to command each of
the many private producers of a given product to act in a certain way, these
producers nevertheless could not be deemed to be "private bodies" in the sense
of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv), because they were not organised into a collective
entity of some sort. In other words, for the United States, Canada seems to
indicate that only an organised body or collective entity with a separate
existence can in Canada's view be a "private body". The United States argues
that nothing in the text implies such a limitation of the term "private body".
In the US view, any private entity is a private body, whether or not organised
as a "collectivity". Rather, any common characteristic in respect of a given
group of individuals does transform the universe of such individuals into a
"private body". For instance, in the case of an export restraint, producers of
the good subject to the export restraint would constitute a "private body".
Moreover, for the United States, as long as there is some entity that could
constitute a private body, Canada has not discharged its burden of proof in
respect of this element.
8.48 We note that the original argument by Canada is essentially supplanted by
its argument as to the nature (i. e., explicitness) of a government action that
is necessary for that action to constitute government "entrustment or direction"
of a private body to do something. Canada thus appears effectively to have
dropped its "organised" entity approach. To our minds, the difference of opinion
between the parties on the definition of "private body" therefore hinges on the
difference of opinion between them on the definition of "entrusts or directs".
In other words, under the approach advanced by both parties, it is the nature of
entrustment or direction that would define the composition of the relevant
"private body", and the latter could only be identified as a function of the
former.
8.49 We believe that the term "private body" is used in Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) as
a counterpoint to "government" or "any public body" as the actor. That is, any
entity that is neither a government nor a public body would be a private body.
Under this reading of the term "private body", there is no room for
circumvention in subparagraph (iv)148. As it is a government or a public body that
would have to entrust or direct under subparagraph (iv), any entity other than a
government or a public body could receive the entrustment or direction and could
constitute a "private body". This is entirely logical. We do not consider that
there is any need for a further definition of "private body", be it in reference
to the nature of entrustment or direction or a common characteristic or some
other factor. To the contrary, if there were such a further narrowing of the
term "private body" in the Agreement, this would effectively exclude from any
subsidy disciplines actions by some entities even if the entities in question
had been explicitly and affirmatively ordered to take those actions by a
government. For these reasons, we conclude that the companies or other entities
affected by or reacting to an export restraint would be "private bodies" in the
sense of subparagraph (iv).
(iii) "To carry out one or more of the type of functions illustrated in (i) to
(iii) above"
125 Comment of the United States on
question 9 from the Panel to Canada following the first meeting (italic emphasis
in original, underline emphasis added).
126
Comment of the United States on question 11 from the
Panel to Canada following the first meeting.
127 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Volume 1, 1993, Clarendon
Press, Oxford.
128
Id.
130
Response of the United States to question 36(a) from the Panel following the
first meeting.
131 See paras. 8.66 , infra, on negotiating history.
132
Submission by the United States, MTN.GNG/NG10/W/29, 22 November 1989, para.
II.1(a) (Exhibit CAN-34).
134
Response of the United States to question 36(b) from the Panel following the
first meeting.
135
We believe, in particular, that the appropriate way to conceive of "financial
contribution" is purely as a transfer of economic resources by a government to
private entities in the market, without regard to the terms of that
transfer. Such a transfer can be effected either by a government directly
(subparagraphs (i)-(iii)) or indirectly through private bodies (subparagraph
(iv)). The question of the terms on which the transfer is made does not have to
do with the existence of a financial contribution but rather goes to the
separate issue of benefit, as Article 14 makes clear, by providing that to
determine whether a benefit exists, the terms of the financial contribution need
to be compared with the market terms.
136 Brazil � Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, Appellate Body Report,
WT/DS46/AB/R, adopted 20 August 1999, para. 157 (emphasis in original).
137 Canada � Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, Report of
the Appellate Body, WT/DS70/AB/R, adopted 20 August 1999, para. 20.
138 Id., para. 170.
139 Id., para. 170.
140 Id., para. 171.
141 Id., paras. 171-172.
142
SCM Agreement, Annex I.
143
First Written Submission of the United States, paras. 62, 65-66.
144
We note that the United States premises this argument on its view that item (d)
of the Illustrative List, and the Canada � Dairy Panel's reasoning in
respect thereof, constitute relevant context for the concept of
government-entrusted or government-directed provision of goods in the sense of
SCM Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) and (iv), on the grounds that "indirect subsidies
falling under item (d) must involve financial contributions within the meaning
of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv)". Given that the passage from Canada � Dairy
cited by the United States does not stand for the proposition asserted by the
United States, we do not believe that it is necessary to consider, as such, the
relationship between SCM Article 1 and the Illustrative List in SCM Annex I.
145 See para. 8.26, supra.
146
Response of Canada to question 26 from the Panel following the second meeting.
|
|