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ARGENTINA - DEFINITIVE ANTI-DUMPING
(Continuation)
(iii) Supporting evidence
4.111 The Preliminary Dumping Determination did not mention the lack of
supporting evidence, and in particular of invoices. Nor was this supposed
deficiency mentioned in the letters of 30 April 1999. This issue was raised for
the first time by the DCD at the meeting of 11 May 1999.
4.112 The letters of 22 June 1999 and of 3 August 1999 contain no reference to
this alleged deficiency.
4.113 The Final Dumping Determination records that Bismantova and Casalgrande
submitted the requested invoices on 7 and 11 June 1999, respectively. It makes
no suggestion to the effect that the exporters failed to provide sufficient
supporting invoices (or any other supporting evidence), or that the normal value
and export price information supplied by the exporters was disregarded for that
reason.
(iv) Representativeness of the domestic sales
4.114 The supposed lack of representativeness of the domestic sales reported by
the exporters was mentioned for the first time in the Final Dumping
Determination. Moreover, the DCD did not draw any conclusions from this.
(v) Currency conversions
4.115 The Preliminary Dumping Determination records that the exporter Bismantova
completed the tables in Annex VI in Italian lire and provided exchange rates
between that currency and the US$, but attaches no consequences to this. This
issue was not raised again until Argentina�s first written submission to the
Panel.
(vi) Export sales to third countries
4.116 The Preliminary Dumping Determination records that Marazzi and Caesar did
not report export sales to third countries in Annex IX, together with the
explanations given by both exporters to the effect that such information was not
provided in accordance with the instructions contained in the questionnaire,
which only required to complete Annex IX in the event that the volume of
domestic sales was not sufficiently representative. The Preliminary Dumping
Determination attaches no consequences to this. This issue was not raised again
by the DCD and is not mentioned in the Final Dumping Determination.
(vii) Cost-of-production data for the exported merchandise
4.117 The Preliminary Dumping Determination records that Marazzi did not report
cost of production data for the exported merchandise in Annex XI, together with
Marazzi�s explanation that the cost of production of the exported merchandise
was the same as that of the merchandise sold in Italy. The Preliminary Dumping
Determination attaches no consequences to this. The issue was not raised again
by the DCD during the investigation and is not mentioned in the Final Dumping
Determination.
(viii) Translation of accounting documents
4.118 The Preliminary Dumping Determination mentions that Bismantova,
Casalgrande and Caesar did not provide a Spanish translation of their balance
sheet, but attaches no consequences to this. The issue was not raised again by
the DCD during the investigation.
4.119 The Panel recalled that Argentina, in paragraph 39 of its first written
submission, states that �the submission of information and documentation for
which confidential treatment is requested constitutes a limiting factor with
respect to the analysis and public conclusions of the implementing authority�
(emphasis added by Argentina). The Panel asked Argentina whether, in its
opinion, the confidential nature of the information submitted constituted a
constraint on the investigating authority�s ability to base its determination on
that information. The Panel further asked Argentina to explain in which way it
considered that confidentiality limited the DCD�s analysis in this case. The
Panel also asked the EC to comment on the above-quoted statement from Argentina.
4.120 To this question, the EC provided the following reply.
4.121 Argentina�s interpretation is mistaken. Articles 6.5.1 and 6.5.2 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement do not require the investigating authority to base its
findings on non-confidential information. Indeed, if so, the submission of
confidential information by the parties would be totally redundant.
4.122 Article 6.5.2 provides that the investigating authority may, subject to
certain requirements, disregard confidential information. This provision would
be unnecessary if the investigating authority had to use always non-confidential
information.
4.123 Further confirmation is provided by Articles 12.2.1 and 12.2.2, which
stipulate that the notice or the report of the imposition of provisional and
definitive measures, respectively, shall pay due regard to the requirement for
the protection of confidential information. Again, this would have been
unnecessary if the dumping and injury determinations had to be based exclusively
on non-confidential information.
4.124 Dumping and injury determinations require necessarily the use of
information which is confidential by nature, including information which is not
capable of summarization. Argentina�s interpretation would make it impossible
for the investigating authority to make an accurate dumping or injury
determination without violating its duties under Article 6.5. The present case
proves this point. The DCD was able to make a dumping determination (partially)
based on non-confidential information supplied by the exporters only because the
exporters had been forced previously to relinquish virtually all their
confidentiality claims.
4.125 The Panel asked the Parties whether they drew a distinction between the
obligation of authorities to protect confidential information from disclosure,
on the one hand, and the obligation of authorities to use for their
determinations exporter data that meets the requirements of the Agreement.
4.126 The EC replied that the investigating authority must base its
determination of dumping on information provided by the exporter, including that
for which confidential treatment has been requested. The investigating authority
may not disregard the information provided in confidence by the exporter and
resort to �facts available� except in the circumstances specified in Article
6.5.2.
4.127 The Panel recalled Argentina�s statement that, according to the DCD, the
non-confidential summaries submitted by the exporters were insufficient under
Article 6.5.1 AD Agreement, since this provision required that such summaries
permit a �reasonable understanding of the substance of the information provided
in confidence�. The Panel asked the parties how did they interpret the objective
of Article 6.5.1, that is, whose �reasonable understanding� was being addressed
� that of the public or that of the investigating authorities?
4.128 The EC replied that the non-confidential summaries provided for in Article
6.5.1 serve exclusively to inform the other interested parties. They constitute
a compromise between the conflicting objectives of protecting the
confidentiality of the information supplied by each party and of allowing the
other parties to defend adequately their interests.
4.129 The Panel asked the parties whether the following summary of relevant
facts was correct. The exporters requested confidentiality for most of the
information provided in their questionnaire reply. On 30 April 1999, the DCD
sent letters to the exporting firms requesting them to consider providing a more
detailed non-confidential summary than that already provided in the
questionnaire replies, to elaborate on the information supplied, or to remove
the requested confidentiality that had been granted by the investigating
authority. More specifically, information on sales in the Italian market (Annex
VIII) and the cost structure of the goods in the domestic Italian market (Annex
X) was requested. On 4 June 1999, the exporting firms submitted public and
confidential information concerning domestic sales of the product concerned,
with conversion tables that were submitted as confidential information. On 7
June 1999, Bismantova and Casalgrande further submitted as confidential
information sales invoices relating to the Italian domestic market. By its
letters of 22 June 1999 and 3 August 1999, the DCD requested the exporting firms
to reconsider the requested confidentiality of the information concerning
product codes and the production costs. The DCD�s report acknowledged that the
exporting firms agreed by letters of 23 and 24 June that the product code item
could be made non-confidential. On 10 August 1999, the exporting firms further
agreed to remove the confidentiality of the item concerning cost of production
provided that the names of the companies relating to each cost structure were
not revealed.
4.130 To this question, the EC provided the following reply.
4.131 The above summary of the facts is generally correct. Nevertheless, some
additional clarifications were in order:
(a) The letters of 30 April 1999 did not request the exporters to provide
�information on sales in the Italian market (Annex VIII) and the cost structure
of the goods in the domestic Italian market (Annex X)�. Those letters mentioned
exclusively the supposed deficiencies of the non-confidential summaries.
Moreover, the letters addressed to Bismantova and Caesar did not mention Annex
X.
(b) The EC recalls that on 11 May 1999 representatives of the exporters held a
meeting with the case-handlers, in which the DCD specified its requests.
(c) On 4 June 1999, the four exporters did not submit �public and confidential
information concerning domestic sales�, but rather a non-confidential summary of
both their domestic and export sales as previously reported in their
questionnaire responses. In addition, as indicated correctly in the summary,
they submitted in confidence conversion tables, with the product and customer
codes.
(d) On 7 and 10 June 1999, Casalgrande and Bismantova submitted not only
invoices of domestic sales, but also invoices of export sales to Argentina and
to third countries.
(e) The letter of 22 June 1999 requested exclusively the disclosure of the
�product code� used in the non-confidential summaries of Annexes VII and VIII
submitted on 4 June 1999. The disclosure of the cost of production tables
(Annexes X and XI) was requested for the first time in the letter of 3 August
1999.
4.132 The Panel asked the parties to clarify whether, in light of the exporters�
agreement to re-classify the information as requested, the concerns the DCD
raised with regard to the confidential nature of the information at the time of
the preliminary determination (recorded on page 23 of the DCD�s Final Dumping
Determination) had been resolved by the time of the final determination. The
Panel further asked the parties to indicate which of the exporters� information,
if any, was still confidential at the time of the final determination. If
certain information had remained as confidential, the Panel also asked the
parties to clarify whether non-confidential summaries were provided for this
confidential information.
4.133 To this question, the EC provided the following reply.
4.134 In response to the DCD�s requests, the exporters were forced to waive
virtually all their confidentiality requests. Thus, they assumed that all the
concerns of the DCD with respect to this issue had already been resolved by the
time of the final determination. Indeed, as mentioned above, the Final Dumping
Determination does not say anywhere that that the information submitted by the
exporters in response to the DCD�s requests was deemed insufficient or that the
exporters� normal value and export price information was rejected because the
exporters failed to disclose confidential information or provide adequate
non-confidential summaries.
4.135 More specifically, at the time of the final determination, the exporters
maintained the following confidentiality requests:
(a) Annex III (list of customers): the exporters did not provide a
non-confidential summary for this Annex. The EC considers that this information
is not capable of summarization (see Panel Report on Guatemala � Definitive
Anti-Dumping Measures on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico, WT/DS156/R, adopted
17 November 2000, at para. 8.211).
(b) Annex IV (information on the exporter�s market situation), Annex V (summary
of sales in different markets � quantity) and Annex VI (summary of sales in
different markets � value): the exporters provided non-confidential summaries
together with their questionnaire responses of 10 December 1998, in which the
actual figures had been replaced by indexes. Argentina raised no objections with
respect to the non-confidential summaries of these Annexes until its first
written submission in these proceedings.
(c) Annex VII (export sales to Argentina), Annex VIII (domestic sales) Annex IX
(export sales to other markets): following the DCD�s requests of 30 April 1999
and of 22 June 1999, the exporters maintained their confidentiality requests
only with respect to the customer code.
(d) Annexes X and XI (cost of production tables): in response to the DCD�s
request of 3 August 1999, the exporters accepted to disclose these Annexes,
provided that the name of the exporter was kept confidential.
(e) Invoices: the exporters requested confidential treatment for the invoices
submitted on 7 and 10 June 1999. Nevertheless, the contents of these invoices
are summarised in the non-confidential summaries provided on 4 June 1999.
4.136 The Panel asked Argentina to explain the relevance of the DCD�s finding
that the four exporters included in the sample only represented 1.92 per cent of
the total volume of sales in the home market. In particular, did the 1.92 per
cent refer to all sales made by Italian producers, including those with no
exports to Argentina? If this was the case, the Panel asked the parties whether
they were of the view that, as a legal matter, companies selected for an
individual determination have to account collectively for a large percentage of
all home market sales made.
4.137 To this question, the EC provided the following reply.
4.138 Article 6.10 allows the investigating authority to limit the examination
to (1) a statistically valid sample of exporters; or (2) the largest percentage
of the volume of exports from the country in question which can reasonably be
investigated. The question posed by the Panel may arise only where the
investigating authority resorts to the first method.
4.139 In the present case, it is unclear which of the two methods permitted by
Article 6.10 was followed by the DCD, even if both parties have been referring,
without too much precision, to a �sample� of exporters. The following comments
are, therefore, based on the assumption that the DCD intended to select a
�statistically valid sample�.
4.140 The purpose of an anti-dumping investigation is to establish whether the
exports under investigation are dumped. The existence of dumping does not
require the existence of domestic sales. Therefore, there is no reason why a
sample should include a large percentage of domestic sales.
4.141 This interpretation is supported by the second method provided in Article
6.10. If the percentage of domestic sales is irrelevant for the purposes of that
method, why should it be considered as decisive when applying the first method?
4.142 At any rate, assuming that the percentage of domestic sales were in fact
relevant in assessing whether a sample is statistically valid for the purposes
of Article 6.10, Argentina disregards that, as noted by Japan in its third party
submission, a sample covering a relatively small percentage of the relevant
universe may nevertheless be �statistically valid�.
4.143 The Panel asked the parties to confirm whether that the four exporters
included in the sample accounted, in quantity terms, for around 70 per cent of
all exports made.
4.144 The EC replied that this had been the case.
4.145 The Panel asked the parties to comment on the relevance of the fact that
the DCD initially accepted the sampling methodology suggested by the exporters�
association, although the sampled firms were later found by the DCD to cover too
few home sales.
4.146 The EC replied that the decision to limit the examination to the four
exporters concerned was a decision of the DCD, even if it was suggested by
Assopiastrelle. The DCD could and should have verified in advance the
representativeness of the sample. Consequently, the DCD is estopped from
claiming now that the sample was not representative.
4.147 The Panel recalled that the exporters� questionnaire made reference to the
provision of supporting documentation in two places. In the introductory
section, while indicating that supporting documentation must be provided, it
also allowed exporters the possibility to identify instead the source of the
information reported. In addition, Section B requested the submission of any
supporting documentation that would help the DCD to better understand the
mechanics of the reported transactions. The Panel asked Argentina whether it was
of the view that, according to the specifications of the questionnaire used by
the DCD, respondents were obliged to provide full documentary evidence of each
and every sale reported. The Panel further asked Argentina to clarify whether
any of the exporters chose to comply with the requirement set out in the
introductory section of the questionnaire by identifying the source of its
information. If no exporters took advantage of that option, the Panel asked
Argentina whether it was of the view that the DCD was entitled to require the
submission of �additional� supporting documentation without specifying what that
information should consist of.
4.148 The EC replied that the exporters� replies to Annexes VII, VIII and IX
include the number and the date of the sales invoices from which the information
reported in those Annexes was derived. Thus, in any event, those Annexes would
satisfy the requirement to indicate the �source of the information�.
4.149 The Panel recalled that, on page 14 of the EC�s first written submission,
the EC argued that the Argentine authority acted inconsistently with paragraph 6
of Annex II of the AD Agreement, by failing to inform the exporters that their
responses had been rejected and by failing to state the reasons therefor. The
Panel asked the EC whether this is not a separate claim of the EC but rather an
additional argument in support of the EC�s claim that the DCD disregarded the
normal value and export price information of the exporters inconsistently with
Article 6.8 and Annex II.
4.150 The EC replied that this was the case.
(d) Replies of the EC to the questions made by Argentina, following the first
meeting of the Panel with the parties, that relate to the EC�s claim under
Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement
4.151 The EC replied to the questions made by Argentina relating to the EC�s
claim under Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement as follows.
4.152 Argentina asked the EC why it considers irrelevant the legal requirement
to provide translations set forth in article 28 of Decree 1759/72, when the EC
regards as mandatory article 25 of that same Decree, regarding deadlines for
submitting documents in administrative proceedings conducted in Argentina.
4.153 To this question, the EC replied as follows.
4.154 The two situations can be easily distinguished.
4.155 The interpretation of the obligations imposed upon the investigating
authority by the AD Agreement cannot be left to the discretion of each Member.
Thus, the definition of what constitutes �necessary information� or a
�reasonable period� made in the domestic law of each Member is subject to review
by Panels.
4.156 Nonetheless, each Member�s own interpretation of those notions creates
legitimate expectations for the interested parties. The investigating authority
is estopped from claiming that information submitted within the deadline which
it has prescribed (computed according to the applicable domestic rules) has not
been submitted within a �reasonable period�.
4.157 Argentina asked the EC what value the EC attaches to non-confidential
summaries, bearing in mind the obligations arising from Article 6.5.1, if, as
argued by the EC in its first oral statement, �the non confidential summaries
serve exclusively to inform the other interested parties, so that they can
defend adequately their interests�.
4.158 The EC replied that its answer to this question was reflected in its
answers to questions 3, 4 and 5 made by the Panel following the first meeting.
4.159 Argentina asked the EC why it believed there would not be a justification
for resorting to the �facts available� even in situations where samples turn out
to be admittedly not representative.
4.160 The EC replied that the decision to limit the examination to a sample of
exporter is taken by the investigating authority, which must satisfy itself in
advance that the sample is sufficiently representative. Thus, the situation
described in the question might arise only as a result of the investigating
authority�s own fault. Exporters should not be penalized for the lack of
diligence of the investigating authority.
4.161 The circumstances in which the investigating authority may resort to facts
available are enumerated exhaustively in Article 6.8. Neither that provision,
nor Article 6.10 authorise the investigating authority to use facts available in
the event that the sample turns out not to be sufficiently representative in the
course of the investigation.
4.162 Argentina asked the EC how one check the veracity of the pricing
information regarding home-market sales in the absence of supporting
documentation relating to those sales. Argentina further asked the EC how one
can check the veracity of this kind of information in cases where the
investigating authorities are unable to conduct an on-site verification.
Argentina also asked the EC why it gave greater value to an on-site verification
than to the provision of supporting documentation.
4.163 The EC replied that its point was simply that the questionnaire did not
request the exporters to provide copies of all invoices and that, moreover, this
would have been a most unusual request in light of the verification methods
usually followed by most investigating authorities.
4.164 Argentina asked the EC why it considered �ridiculous� the issue of
currency conversions, even through Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement specifically
dealt with the way in which those conversions shall take place. Argentina
further asked the EC whether it considered that exchange rates did not have an
impact in the calculation of dumping margins. Argentina also asked the EC
whether it was of the view that it was unreasonable to request the submission of
exchange rate data in order to avoid assigning staff to calculate the value of
each of the sales falling within the period of investigation.
4.165 The EC replied that the alleged deficiency concerned exclusively Annex VI,
which contains a summary of the sales by market. The 24 amounts reported in that
Annex were not used in the dumping calculation. In any event, they can be easily
converted into US$ by using the exchange rates provided by Bismantova or other
publicly available rates.
(e) Arguments of the EC in its second written submission in support of its claim
under Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement
4.166 In its second written submission, the EC made the following arguments in
support of its claim under Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement.
4.167 During the consultations, Argentina argued that the information submitted
by the exporters had not been rejected. Rather, according to Argentina, that
information was �considered� by the DCD on an �equal footing� with the
information supplied by the petitioner.
4.168 That position is clearly untenable under the AD Agreement. Thus,
predictably, in its first written submission Argentina invokes a
misunderstanding on the part of the EC and argues that the DCD did in fact
reject the exporters� information for the reasons set out in Article 6.8 of the
AD Agreement.
4.169 The grounds invoked now by Argentina for resorting to �facts available�
are either wrong as a matter of fact, or clearly insufficient as a matter of
law, or both.
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