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AND MANMADE FIBRE UNDERWEAR Report of the Panel
5.91 The United States
noted that while export data were generally not as reliable as
import data, at the request of the TMB, the US had supplied an
export table. Even after using export data to adjust for the
overstatement in the market, the figures before the TMB had confirmed
the determination made by CITA. After examining the import data,
CITA examined output, market share, employment, domestic price
and profits and investment information. That information had
led CITA to the conclusion that there was a case of serious damage,
or actual threat thereof to the US domestic industry. While the
United States did not supply data on productivity, inventory,
wages and exports, it was not required to do so under Article 6.3
of the ATC. The variables in Article 6.3 of the ATC not
directly included in the March Market Statement (productivity,
inventories and wages) had been discussed during the TMB examination
in oral responses by the United States to questions from TMB members.
Costa Rica had omitted any recognition of the express proviso
in Article 6.3 of the ATC that:
A similar proviso was also found
concerning the additional factors for consideration in Article 6.4
of the ATC. Nevertheless, the United States had provided verbal
responses to questions concerning productivity, wages, and inventory
to the TMB. Increase in Imports into the United States
(see also The Counting of Reimports,
paragraphs 5.142-5.149)
5.92 Costa Rica further
argued that, in accordance with its obligation to demonstrate
the existence of an increase in imports, the United States should
have presented specific and relevant factual information on the
subject, and then have analyzed it. In this regard, however,
the March Market Statement only indicated that imports in this
category had increased from 65.5 million dozen in 1992
to 79.9 million dozen in 1993 and 97.3 million dozen in 1994,
reflecting increases of 22 per cent in each year with respect
to the previous year. The United States had not made any distinction
concerning the nature of this trade, nor any analysis thereof,
an omission which was particularly serious in this case given
the increasing importance of "807 trade" in this
category. In fact, over the last six years there had been a substantial
change in the United States industry producing cotton and man-made
fibre underwear. There had been a shift from producing and assembling
the product locally to producing the product components locally,
which were then assembled abroad and returned to the same companies
in the United States for marketing. This co-production process
(see Section II) had enabled the United States industries
to retain their market share in the United States.
5.93 Costa Rica questioned
whether, in the case of clothing produced on the basis of the
coproduction process, one was dealing with "imports"
or rather with a case of domestic production which, despite assembly
in another country, did not for that reason alone cease to be
domestic production. In fact, the United States itself had
considered imports of cut parts for assembly in the United States
as products of the country where the parts were cut. United States
exports of cut parts should be considered United States products.
Furthermore, when this case was reviewed by the TMB in July 1995,
the United States itself had submitted a loose sheet giving alleged
export data in this category, in which cut parts subsequently
assembled abroad were included as exports, which logically showed
that for this industry these were part of domestic production.
5.94 Costa Rica noted
that the "807 trade" had risen from 31.8 million dozen
in 1992 to 42 million dozen in 1993 and 57 million
dozen in 1994, accounting for an ever larger part of trade in
category 352/652. This reflected a pattern which, by all indications,
would continue and become more pronounced in the future, driven
by the investment policies and incentives that the United States
maintained in relation to the Caribbean Basin and Mexico.
5.95 In the view of Costa Rica,
much of the cited increase in imports did not in fact exist, and
therefore the United States did not have the right to use the
transitional safeguard. By nevertheless having done so, it violated
Article 6.2 of the ATC. However, if it were to be considered
that there was in fact an increase in imports of underwear, it
was quite clear that if such imports were increasing it was because
United States production of the cut pieces, that were subsequently
assembled, was increasing in the same proportions. In other words,
if ever more underwear was being assembled in other countries
it was because in the United States ever more cut pieces for underwear
were being produced that need to be assembled, from which it necessarily
followed that any industry producing cut pieces for underwear
was thriving and therefore did not need to be protected from something
that was rather of benefit to it.
5.96 The United States
considered that the ATC did not prohibit inclusion of re-imports
in imports; on the contrary, Article 6.2 of the ATC directed
importing Members to examine increases in "total" imports.
The ATC also did not require Members to separate re-imports from
total imports. In fact, all textile and apparel re-imports were
defined under United States law as foreign articles. The US Bureau
of the Census' statistics reflected HTSUS 9802 re-imports as apparel
which were cut in the US, exported to be assembled, and then re-imported
under HTSUS 9802 as finished garments. HTSUS 9802 re-imports
were included in domestic production (cut parts), exports (cut
parts), and imports (finished garments). Re-imports must clear
customs like any other imported good. Costa Rica had admitted
to the TMB that companies producing goods for re-import into the
United States were subject to the same laws, fees and taxes as
other domestic Costa Rican manufacturers. HTSUS 9802 apparel
re-imports into the US received duty reductions to the extent
that they incorporated US content.
Application of Safeguard
to Individual Member(s)
5.97 Costa Rica argued
that in the case of the ATC, since the Agreement allowed the selective
and discriminatory application of a safeguard measure, it was
necessary to fulfil this second stage which was not normally present
in other existing safeguard mechanisms in the multilateral system,
precisely in order to be able to identify the Member or Members
to which the measure would be applied. Thus, Article 6.4
of the ATC stated that:
5.98 In the view of Costa Rica,
in the second, attribution stage, the importing Member must demonstrate
the fulfilment of two substantive requirements: a sharp and substantial
increase in imports, actual or imminent, from such a Member or
Members individually; and the causal relationship between this
increase and the serious damage or actual threat thereof created
by total imports. In accordance with the above provisions, the
fulfilment of the three requirements set out in the first stage
was an essential precondition to be able to go on to the
second stage of the demonstration process. Only when, after having
fulfilled the requirements of the first stage, and it had also
fulfilled the two requirements of the second stage, may the importing
Member apply a transitional safeguard to an exporting Member.
Obligation of Demonstration
- Fulfilment of Substantive Requirements
5.99 Costa Rica argued
that, in order to be able to fulfil the above-mentioned requirements,
the ATC imposed on the importing Member an obligation of demonstration.
Under Article 6.2 of the ATC, the Member wishing to apply
a transitional safeguard was obliged to make a determination prior
to adopting the measure. In the determination, the Member had
the obligation to demonstrate fulfilment of the substantive requirements
laid down in order to be able to establish such a measure. It
was noted that while it was the Member's obligation to make the
determination, the actual content of the determination was clearly
established by Article 6 of the ATC itself: it consisted
in demonstrating the existence of the substantive requirements
that must be fulfilled in order to adopt a transitional safeguard.
It was not a question of stating, alleging or repeating opinions
without any grounds, but rather of showing or proving that the
factual situation on which the Member wished to take protective
action fully met the specified conditions. The burden of proof
rested with the Member intending to restrict trade. If the Member
took safeguard action without having demonstrated the existence
of all the substantive requirements in the two stages as described
above - as the United States had done in this case, it was violating
the ATC (see also Burden of Proof in Section C).
5.100 This demonstration process
which the Member wishing to impose the safeguard must carry out
may in turn be divided into two: firstly, the Member must present
the specific and relevant information on the facts giving rise
to its claim in accordance with Article 6.7 of the ATC;
and secondly, it must make an examination of the factors listed
in Articles 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 and of how the conditions it
was presenting fell within the substantive criteria laid down
by the ATC as necessary requirements to justify the adoption of
a safeguard measure. If the information was not presented, the
necessary analysis could not be carried out, and consequently
there would be a breach of the ATC. In the case under consideration,
the United States had failed to demonstrate the existence of the
substantive elements of the first stage of the demonstration process,
and still less those of the second stage, thereby violating Articles 6.2,
6.3, 6.4 and 6.7.
5.101 The United States
stated that it had met all of the substantive requirements of
Article 6 of the ATC and that after doing so, met its burden
of proof and the transitional safeguard action was justified.
It was now up to Costa Rica to show that the United States
determination was unreasonable and inconsistent with the requirements
of the ATC, in particular Article 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 6.7 and
6.6(d).
Consultations on Safeguard
5.102 The United States noted that, once the determination had been made, the importing Member must request consultations with the relevant exporting Members. Article 6.7 of the ATC also provided that requests for consultations on proposed safeguard action must be accompanied by "specific and relevant factual information, as up-to-date as possible," particularly factors referenced in Articles 6.3 and 6.4 of the ATC.
5.103 As under the Multifibre
Arrangement (MFA) system, during consultations on the application
of the safeguard, importing Members must take into account four
areas of more favourable treatment as appropriate. One area of
more favourable treatment relevant in this matter was that accorded
to re-imports included in the determination of serious damage,
or actual threat thereof that constituted a significant proportion
of an exporting Member's trade. It was not until the consultation
stage that the United States was required to give more favourable
treatment in accordance with Article 6.6(d) of the ATC.
The ATC left the definition of re-imports and the manner of applying
more favourable treatment to the importing Member. If the consultations
provided for in Article 6.7 of the ATC did not result in
a mutual solution, the importing Member must exercise its option
to take action to limit the relevant imports within 30 days.
Once that action was taken, Article 6 of the ATC required
automatic review by the TMB.
Data Required for Consultations
and Other Relevant Information
5.104 Costa Rica
considered that the "other relevant information" should
be understood as information relevant or related to the information
specified in the earlier paragraph, which was taken into consideration
by the importing Member at the time of making its determination
about the market situation and which was available to the exporting
Member. The main task of the TMB in this respect was, in accordance
with Article 6.10 of the ATC, to examine whether the determination
made by the importing Member fit the requirements of the ATC.
Thus, the examination was restricted to those elements which
the importing Member had taken into consideration in making its
determination and of which the exporting Member was duly cognizant
at the time. These may be different from the factual elements
mentioned in Article 6.7 of the ATC, but they must be related
to them. It could not be argued that the TMB could conduct its
examination on the basis of information which the importing Member
had not taken into consideration at the time of making its determination
- because it did not exist, because it was not available or for
any other reason - and which the exporting Member did not have
an opportunity to examine and refute before the imposition of
the restraint. To do otherwise would jeopardize the rights of
the exporting Member and would be contrary to the provisions of
the ATC.
5.105 Costa Rica
recognized that paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of Article 6
of the ATC did not distinguish between "reimports"
and imports, but used only the latter term. However, they did
not consider that this by itself should be taken to mean that
"807 trade" should necessarily be regarded as imports.
On the contrary, the word "imports" should be analysed
in the context of the case in question and the economic rationale
of "807 trade", in order to determine whether,
in this particular case, "807 trade" could or could
not be regarded as imports for the purposes of Articles 6.2, 6.3
and 6.4.
5.106 The United States
pointed out that Article 6.7 of the ATC required that the
call for consultations must be "accompanied by specific and
relevant data, as uptodate as possible" relating
to the factors referred to in Articles 6.3 and 6.4 of
the ATC. Like the working party in the "Fur Felt Hat"
case, Article 6.7 of the ATC did not require perfect data.
The data relied upon by the CITA at the time of its determination
in March were in fact as uptodate as possible, and
provided information as close as possible to the reference period.
The United States had presented revised and updated data to the
TMB in July which only confirmed the correctness of the CITA's
analysis in March that transitional safeguard action was appropriate.
5.107 The data to be used in
examining whether a determination was consistent with Article 6
of the ATC must be those data actually used by the authorities
of the importing Member at the time it made the determination.
The relevant data in this case were those required by Article 6.7
of the ATC. Nevertheless, all later updated or supplementary
data only corroborated the data in the March Market Statement.
5.108 The United States
pointed out that the TMB must review the case, determine whether
the safeguard action was justified and make appropriate recommendations
to the Members concerned. In addition to the data supplied in
accordance with Articles 6.7 and 6.10 of the ATC also allowed
the TMB to consider "any other relevant information provided
by the Members concerned." Importing Members must notify
the Chairman of the TMB, providing relevant factual data at the
same time the request for consultations was made. When a restriction
was in place, the ATC placed a three-year cap on the duration
of safeguard measures applied by Members, unless the product concerned
was integrated earlier.
F. SERIOUS DAMAGE OR
ACTUAL THREAT THEREOF
5.109 Costa Rica
submitted that the second substantive requirement that any Member
wishing to acquire the right to take safeguard action must demonstrate
was serious damage or actual threat thereof to the domestic industry
producing like and/or directly competitive products, as stated
in Article 6.2 of the ATC. It was noted that Article 6.2
of the ATC referred to the fulfilment of a requirement that may
take one of two forms: it may be that what existed was serious
damage to the domestic industry, or it may be that what existed
was the actual threat of serious damage to the domestic industry.
However, it was also noted that while the requirement was fulfilled
by the existence of either of the two conditions, they were precisely
two different hypotheses, owing to the time factor. In the case
of serious damage, the injury to the domestic industry had already
occurred, whereas in the case of actual threat of serious damage
the injury to the industry had not yet occurred but there was
an imminent and hence actual possibility that it would occur.
It was not possible to use the same information and the same
type of analysis to prove both that a supposed fact had occurred
or that it was about to occur.
5.110 Costa Rica
claimed that it was the understanding of the TMB itself that serious
damage and actual threat of serious damage were not the same thing,
since in this particular case it had concluded that the existence
of serious damage had not been found, but it could not reach a
consensus on the existence of actual threat of serious damage.
If the two conditions were a single hypothesis, the conclusion
that one did not exist would necessarily lead to the conclusion
that the other did not exist. However, the TMB had not taken
this view. The most important consequence of this difference
was that the nature of the information submitted and of the analysis
made to demonstrate each hypothetical condition was necessarily
different, as it was not the same thing to demonstrate that damage
had already occurred as to demonstrate that damage might occur.
That was why the logical corollary of this difference was that
an importing Member could not submit the same information in this
connection and carry out the same type of analysis in order to
argue indiscriminately that what had existed was damage or threat
of damage. At a given point in time - the moment when the call
for consultations was made - either one condition existed or the
other condition existed. To make an appropriate demonstration
thereof the importing Member must at that point in time define
what the supposed situation of its industry actually was and make
the call, submitting the corresponding information and, if appropriate,
adopting the restriction on the basis of the condition it selected.
5.111 Costa Rica
stated that correct identification by the importing Member of
the supposed claim made in relation to the state of its domestic
production was essential in order to comply properly with its
demonstration obligation. In the view of Costa Rica, it
was only when the TMB had determined that the existence of serious
damage had not been proven that the United States changed
tack and appeared to assume that it could maintain its restriction
on the basis of the purported threat, which had not been alleged
or proved previously. The United States affirmed that as
the ATC was not worded in the same terms as other WTO Agreements,
it was not possible to require the presentation of different information
in order to prove serious damage or actual threat of serious damage.
However, Costa Rica argued that even though something may
not be specifically stated in an agreement, common understanding
required it, because it was not possible to use the same information
and the same type of analysis to prove both that a supposed fact
has occurred or that it is about to occur.
5.112 Costa Rica
argued that, in some measure, that was what the United States
had done in this process. The great majority of the communications
initially sent by the United States in connection with the case,
the Statement submitted in March and the adoption of the unilateral
restriction in June were all based on the purported existence
of serious damage to the United States industry. The United States
had begun this case and had adopted this restriction on the basis
of the existence of serious damage, and had not considered that
a threat existed. That was why the element of actual threat had
not even been taken into account. Hence, at the moment when the
TMB determined that serious damage did not exist, the United States
should have withdrawn the unilateral restriction it had imposed.
5.113 However, the United States
had not withdrawn the restriction, but had maintained and even
renewed it. Although the United States had not explicitly argued
this at any time, it appeared to have assumed that it was authorized
to maintain the measure on the basis that the TMB could not reach
a consensus on the existence of actual threat of serious damage.
In the view of Costa Rica, this reasoning was incorrect
and violated Articles 6.2 and 6.3 of the ATC, which specifically
required the demonstration that this was the condition, with the
presentation and analysis of specific and relevant information
concerning the existence of actual threat of serious damage.
The fact was that there existed neither serious damage to the
United States industry, nor actual threat of serious damage to
that industry, which was why, by adopting a restriction without
this second requirement being fulfilled, the United States
had violated Articles 6.2 and 6.3 of the ATC. 5.114 The United States argued that Article 6.2 of the ATC required that a Member determine that a particular product was being imported into its territory in such increased quantities as to cause "serious damage, or actual threat thereof" to the domestic industry producing like or directly competitive products. Unlike other agreements such as the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI, the ATC did not provide separate requirements for determinations of threat of injury. "Serious damage" or "actual threat" never appeared separately in the text of Article 6 of the ATC; each reference to one of these two different legal concepts was coupled with a reference to the other. Thus, Article 6 of the ATC provided only one standard, with one set of criteria, for determinations of serious damage or actual threat thereof. This standard and these criteria had been employed in the CITA determination of March 1995. Thus, this determination of "serious damage, or actual threat thereof" was fully consistent with Articles 6.2 and 6.3 of the ATC.
5.115 The United States noted that their 27 March 1995 diplomatic note to Costa Rica making the actual call for consultations had referred to "serious damage, or actual threat thereof" to the industry producing underwear in the United States, even if the March Market Statement which accompanied it abbreviated this reference to "serious damage". Furthermore, during consultations with Costa Rica the United States had consistently taken the position that underwear imports from Costa Rica were causing both serious damage and actual threat of serious damage. During TMB deliberations, in July 1995, it was clarified that the reference in the March Statement had included both serious damage and actual threat of serious damage, and the United States had corrected the statement accordingly.
5.116 Costa Rica
was of the view that the US diplomatic note of 27 March 1995
was merely a standard form used by the United States for its calls.
Even though the note alleged a threat of serious damage, the
fact was that the statement attached to it in order to justify
the restriction - the March Market Statement did not
contain any information or analysis relating to this allegation.
Moreover, during the consultations held between the two governments
under Article 6 of the ATC, no evidence or analysis of any
kind was submitted that might have demonstrated the existence
of such a threat. Similarly, there was no mention of the existence
of a threat of serious damage as justification for the adoption
of a safeguard in the notes which the United States had attached
to the various restraint proposals it submitted to the Government
of Costa Rica.
5.117 With respect to the status
of the TMB finding that serious damage had not been demonstrated,
the United States pointed out that they did not agree with
the TMB finding and did not at the time it was made; nothing in
the ATC made TMB findings or recommendations binding on the parties
concerned. As a practical matter in light of the TMB's initial
finding the United States had been compelled to shift the focus
of its argument to "actual threat" after July 1995,
but as a matter of law the ATC did not confer upon the TMB the
power to make findings of fact that legally bound Members. Moreover,
as noted in relation to the standard of review, the burden of
proof was on Costa Rica to produce a prima facie case that
the US determination was inconsistent with Articles 6.2 and 6.3
of the ATC; the United States did not have the burden here of
proving that its actions had been consistent with the ATC (see
also Section V:C). Furthermore, the question to be addressed
was not the existence of "serious damage" as such, but
whether facts had been advanced which provided convincing evidence
that it was unreasonable for CITA to determine that the adverse
effects of increased underwear imports on the US domestic underwear
industry had amounted to serious damage, or actual threat thereof.
5.118 Costa Rica
observed that, in its first review of this case, the TMB had reached
the clear conclusion that "serious damage ... had not
been demonstrated", as required by Articles 6.2 and
6.3 of the ATC. It was clear that the restriction imposed by
the United States infringed the above-mentioned provision because
the United States had failed to demonstrate the existence of serious
damage to its industry. As the TMB decision in this regard had
not been challenged, it had to be understood that both parties
had accepted it. Consequently, the discussion as to the supposed
existence of serious damage should not be reopened, since it was
clear that this was not demonstrated at the time when it should
have been demonstrated.
5.119 Costa Rica
argued that the United States had also failed to demonstrate the
purported actual threat of serious damage. The industry producing
clothing classified in category 352/652 was not only not suffering
any serious damage but also not suffering any actual threat of
serious damage, as required under Article 6 of the ATC.
Firstly, the United States itself did not consider that actual
threat of serious damage existed in this case. It never argued
that this was the case in order to justify the unilateral restriction
imposed on Costa Rica. This was shown by the unreliable, erroneous,
contradictory and incomplete information it had included in the
March Market Statement, which did not serve for making an analysis
of whether serious damage existed, and was not even designed to
be used as a basis for an alleged actual threat of serious damage.
When the United States made the call for consultations, the condition
it had in view was that of serious damage and not of actual threat
of serious damage. That was why the March Statement did not make
any specific reference to the issue of threat, except indirectly
in a single sentence of the text. That is also why, when the
United States published in the Federal Register the request for
public comments concerning these negotiations, it referred only
to serious damage, and not to actual threat of serious damage.
5.120 The supposition of actual
threat of serious damage became important when the TMB, after
having reached the conclusion that the existence of serious damage
had not been demonstrated, did not reach a consensus as to the
existence of actual threat of serious damage - a strange decision,
considering that the hypothetical condition of actual threat was
not in itself under consideration - and recommended that the parties
hold further consultations bearing this in mind, inter alia.
It may be thought that, following the TMB's decision, the only
option open to the United States was to try to justify a posteriori
the restriction adopted, by now invoking a supposed threat to
its underwear-producing industry. However, the fact was that
it also failed to establish this justification, even in subsequent
months.
5.121 Costa Rica
argued that neither the March Market Statement, nor the July Statement,
nor any other information furnished by the United States, not
even following the imposition of the unilateral restriction, provided
evidence or furnished an analysis of the kind required to demonstrate
the existence of actual threat. The obligation to demonstrate
the actual threat of serious damage had two dimensions. Firstly,
it was necessary to demonstrate that an imminent increase in imports
existed, on the basis of objective criteria, such as the goods
having already been exported and en route; or that they were
in port waiting to be shipped; or that they were covered by a
contract and would be shipped once production had been completed.
A second dimension, closely linked to the first, referred to
volume, in the sense that not every possible increase in imports
was capable of creating a threat. It followed from the foregoing
that it was necessary that the goods should be able to be counted,
which in turn was linked with the need for objective criteria
to determine the imminence of the imports.
5.122 The United States
argued that they were not required by the ATC to choose between
serious damage and actual threat in making their determination.
The ATC standard allowed Members to assert, at the same time,
both serious damage or actual threat. The plain meaning of the
standard invoked merely the notion that there could be a determination
on the basis of serious damage or actual threat. Neither was
exclusive of the other. There was no obligation in other safeguard
proceedings that one standard must be alleged instead of the other.
The ATC treats them equally, that is, without any special factors
to establish a case for one or the other. The simple fact was
that Members could allege both based on the same factors. In
addition, contrary to the assertion of Costa Rica, it did not
follow that if the TMB found that there was no serious damage,
and reached no consensus on threat, there was no threat. No
consensus on threat was just that. No consensus on that finding,
therefore, no finding or decision on threat.
5.123 Upon request of the Panel,
the United States argued that they did not take the view
that a finding of actual threat of serious damage implied some
sort of prospective analysis because there was no provision of
this kind in the ATC that would have guided the United States
in making its determination. The United States did not split
the phrase "serious damage, or actual threat thereof"
and was not asking the Panel to do so. The ATC did not provide
separate criteria for threat. They maintained that whatever analysis
was chosen by the Panel must not add to or diminish the rights
and obligations of the parties. They believed that the ATC must
be observed and that any interpretation that would rewrite
the ATC would probably require the reopening of the Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the WTO.
The March 1995 Market
Statement
5.124 Costa Rica considered
that the United States could base its restriction only on the
March Market Statement which was the statement the United States
had notified within the terms of Article 6 of the ATC and
on the basis of which consultations had been held. It also provided
the basis for the United States' adoption of a unilateral restraint.
Thus, it was clear that the March Market Statement alone ought
to be examined by the Panel in order to determine whether the
restriction applied by the United States complied with Article 6
of the ATC.
5.125 Conversely, Costa Rica
was of the view that a finding of actual threat of serious damage
implied a prospective analysis. Since the ATC required that the
threat be "actual", this implied that the Member wishing
to impose this ground could not do so on the basis of conjecture
of speculation, but must effectively demonstrate that there was
an imminent damaging impact on the industry which was about to
occur in the future. Once this specific and relevant information
had been presented, the importing Member must carry out a prospective,
forwardlooking analysis of what could happen to its industry,
bearing in mind that what was under examination was the imminence
of a situation that had not yet occurred. In the case under consideration,
the United States had submitted absolutely no information aimed
at seeking to demonstrate the existence of actual threat of serious
damage, still less to carry out any kind of analysis to that end.
Hence, it was impossible to consider that the unilateral restriction
imposed could have been based on the existence of a supposed actual
threat.
5.126 Costa Rica
contrasted the requirements of Article 6.3 of the ATC with
the information included in the March Market Statement. According
to Article 6.3 of the ATC, in making a determination of serious
damage,
5.127 Costa Rica
argued that, pursuant to this provision, the United States had
to demonstrate the effect of imports from Costa Rica on the state
of its underwear producing industry, as reflected in changes in
the relevant economic variables. The first stage of this process
of demonstration consisted of the presentation of the necessary
information to be able subsequently to make an analysis of the
information. In this connection, Article 6.7 of the ATC
provided that:
5.128 Given the characteristics
of the information in the March Market Statement summarized
by Costa Rica in the following table - it was impossible
in their view for the United States to fulfil their obligation
to demonstrate the existence of serious damage.
Presented by the United States
5.129 Costa Rica
noted that of the 11 factors listed in Article 6.3 of the
ATC, the March Market Statement had not included any information
concerning four of them; it had included information which the
United States itself subsequently considered wrong in the case
of three of them (two of which were output and prices); and included
information for three factors based on a survey whose coverage,
methodology, representativeness, dates etc. were not mentioned
- and indeed, on another occasion the United States itself declared
that it could not use this type of instrument to collect information
in these cases. In these circumstances, the only possible conclusion
was that the information submitted by the United States was unreliable,
erroneous, contradictory and lacking, and therefore any measure
based on it was in breach of Articles 6.2, 6.3 and 6.7 of
the ATC.
5.130 Costa Rica
argued that the information submitted was unreliable for three
reasons: firstly, much of it did not give the source from which
it is taken; secondly, where a source was specified, it turned
out not to be very serious; and lastly, the best evidence that
the information of the March Market Statement was unreliable was
that in July the United States itself submitted fresh information
that substantially contradicted all the major indicators covered
in the March Statement. Then, a few months later the United States
again published information that was at variance both with the
information produced in July and with the information included
in the March Statement.
5.131 Costa Rica
recalled that Section III of the March Market Statement was divided
into two sections, the first headed "serious damage to the
domestic industry" and the second "industry statements".
The first of these sections included data on domestic production,
market share loss and import penetration, for which the source
was given. In the case of the information on employment and man
hours it stated that the data were derived from various sources,
which were not identified with any degree of precision. It was
noted that the industry statements had a questionable source,
being
5.132 In effect, the data on
employment, sales, profits, investment, capacity and prices included
in the March Market Statement were based on an alleged survey
whose coverage, methodology, representativeness, date, etc., were
unknown since the Statement was completely silent in this respect.
This explained the opinions included in the Statement for which
there was so little basis or justification. Clearly, it was impossible
to make generalizations of any kind or determine the state of
the industry on the basis of a number of opinions from one or
two firms - it was recalled that the Statement itself stated that
there were 395 establishments producing in this category - for
which no grounds or explanations were given and included in a
survey whose details were unknown. It was also obvious that this
could not constitute any kind of demonstration of the impact of
imports on the industry in question, since it did not shed any
light on the effect of the increased imports on the variables
mentioned.
5.133 Costa Rica
did not consider the data based on the alleged survey of individual
firms, of which nothing was known, to be serious. The survey
referred to the opinions of one or two firms as to capacity utilization,
inventories, exports, wages, profits and investment. The submission
of information was so important that the United States should
have included in its Statement data on at least all the factors
set out in Article 6.3 of the ATC and perhaps even on some
others; however, it had failed to do so.
5.134 The problem of the March
Market Statement was not confined to the lack of information but
also to the total absence of any analysis of that information.
The United States did not make any kind of analysis of the information,
although given the incoherencies of that information, it would
have been difficult to do so. This led Costa Rica
to the conclusion that with the information submitted, the United
States had failed to fulfil its obligation to demonstrate the
existence of serious damage to its industry, as required under
Articles 6.2 and 6.3 of the ATC, and as the TMB itself
had found.
The July 1995 Market
Statement
5.135 Costa Rica
considered that the reliability of the information was also brought
into question by the United States, which published further
data in July and again in October 1995, altering the March data
substantially. Thus, in July data that differed from the March
data were given in essential fields including: (a) number
of establishments producing underwear in category 352/652: in
March there were 395, but in July there were 302; (b) supposed
decline in output: whereas in March output was believed to have
declined by 4 per cent between 1992 and 1993 and by a further
4 per cent between 1993 and 1994, in July it was indicated that
the first percentage remained the same but that in the second
period there was no decline; (c) market size: whereas in
March, "807" production was wrongly counted twice, both
as domestic production and as imports, in July this market size
was "adjusted", introducing significant alterations
compared with the March Statement; (d) number of workers
employed in the sector: whereas the March Statement stated that
46,377 people worked in the sector in 1992, in July it was stated
that that was not the number, but rather 35,191 persons, in other
words the March Statement was wrong by 11,000 workers; (e) average
price of United States underwear production: whereas in March
it was stated that this was $30 per dozen, in July it was "clarified"
that this figure had a margin of error of nearly 100 per cent,
the price being between $16 and $20 per dozen.
5.136 Costa Rica
emphasized that the March Market Statement, on which the consultations
had been held and the unilateral restriction imposed in June 1995,
had so many errors that all its main parameters were modified
in July. Virtually the only section of the March Statement that
was not modified was that based on the survey. Furthermore, in
October 1995 the Textile and Apparel Office of the United
States Department of Commerce had published updated statistics
to June 1995 for category 352/652 in which some of the data
given in July were "revised" once again, having already
been "revised" with respect to the March Statement,
and the results obtained were at variance with those submitted
earlier. It thus turned out once again that the data for output
and market size were different. This lack of reliability of the
information submitted by the United States was enough to maintain
beyond all doubt that the United States had failed in its primary
duty of presenting the necessary information to proceed to carry
out an analysis of whether the serious damage it alleged actually
existed.
5.137 The July Statement had
been used by the United States from July 1995 and up to the establishment
of the Panel as an "ex post facto" justification for
the restriction applied to Costa Rican trade in this category
in June 1995. Nevertheless, Costa Rica had always maintained
that the July Statement could not be regarded as the basis for
the call, since it was not. The information contained in the
July Statement was not that which should be analysed for the purpose
of determining whether the restriction adopted by the United States
complied with Article 6 of the ATC. In this respect, it
was correct to say that this statement had no legal relevance.
The July Statement was useful for confirming how erroneous was
the information included in the March Statement which formed the
basis of the unilateral restriction adopted in June 1995.
This Statement - which for the most part was based
on the same information that was available in March - was
useful as evidence, inasmuch as it showed that the information
which served as basis for the adoption of the restriction in question
was seriously flawed.
5.138 The United States
pointed out that it had a general practice of monitoring and updating
textile and apparel production and trade data. The data provided
in July only confirmed the correctness of the CITA's analysis
in March that transitional safeguard action was appropriate.
As regards the updated information provided in October 1995,
these were equally irrelevant. The United States pointed
out, however, that the October 1995 data still showed a 5.5 per cent
decline in underwear production during the January-June 1995
period. Furthermore, more recent published updates in March 1996
showed that underwear production actually declined by 2.8 per cent
for the period from 1 October 1994 to 30 September 1995.
This and other updated information demonstrated that the situation
for US underwear manufacturers progressively deteriorated during
1995.
Analysis of March and July
Market Statements
5.139 According to Costa Rica,
both the March Market Statement and the July Market Statement,
annual shipments amounted to $3.2 billion. However, analysing
the data on the basis of which this information had been obtained
it found that this figure was not correct. Thus, considering
that the amount of annual shipments was obtained by multiplying
the volume of clothing produced by the average producer price
of the clothing, and making this calculation for 1994, the ensuing
result would be $5.06 billion according to the data in the March
Statement, while according to the information in the July Statement
this figure could be $3.37 billion or $3.03 billion, according
to which United States producer price was used. In any case,
what was important to stress was that while one section of each
of the Statements gave a figure, if the data in the Statement
itself were multiplied in order to obtain the same figure a different
result was obtained. Clearly, there was an error in the figure
of the annual shipments, production data or in the price, which
then also significantly affected other data included in the Statement.
5.140 The United States
considered that the information provided in the March and July
Statements was not contradictory and was consistent with the requirements
of Article 6 of the ATC. Costa Rica had asserted that the
data available in March 1995 contradicted the updated data the
United States had provided to the TMB in July 1995. The
March Statement presented by the United States contained
data from a variety of official sources, current at that time.
Article 6.7 of the ATC provided that when requesting consultations
the requesting Member must supply "factual information as
up-to-date as possible". The March data had satisfied that
requirement, even though some of the information had been preliminary.
During consultations and the TMB proceeding, the United States
had been asked to provide other and updated information. The
TMB had put many questions to the United States for response during
the proceeding as well. In the context of the Article 6.10
of the ATC reference that the TMB must consider the earlier statement
and "any other relevant information", the United States
had provided a revised statement during the July proceeding which
was accepted by the TMB.
5.141 The information in the
July Statement had not, in the view of the United States
contradicted the March Statement, but had only supported it.
Since Article 6.7 of the ATC stated that
of the call action, there was
no credibility issue with respect to the data presented in March
or July. Article 6.7 of the ATC clearly recognized that
the data upon which the initial request for consultations was
based, would necessarily be imperfect. Article 6.10 of the
ATC similarly acknowledged that data would not be as accurate
as desired at the time of the call, requiring that the TMB
The latter was clearly designed
to include further updated information that was available at the
time of TMB review. The Counting of Re-imports
(see also Increase in Imports,
paragraphs 5.92-5.96)
5.142 According to Costa Rica,
one of the most serious mistakes in the March Market Statement,
was the double counting of "807" production and the
problem of the alteration of market size. In its statistics,
the United States had rightly included as domestic production
the production of pieces that were part of a garment subsequently
assembled in another country and then reimported into the United
States under tariff heading 9802.00.80. However, it had
also included as imports the same pieces once they had been assembled,
even though they had already been counted as domestic production.
This resulted in an alteration in the size of the market, because
the same product was included twice.
5.143 Having been made aware
of this problem by the comments addressed to it by Costa Rica,
the United States had tried to correct the situation in its July
Market Statement, but, according to Costa Rica, in
the wrong way. Thus, in July the United States counted "807"
production once; but it chose to include "807" production
as imports and not as domestic output, which appeared inconsistent
as "807" production was domestic production in
the sense of manufacture and/or cutting of cloth. Assembly, which
was the only part of the process carried out abroad, had a much
smaller weight in the final cost of production of underwear, and
therefore this "807" production should not have been
counted as imports.
5.144 In support of this same
approach, although in contradiction with what it had done in the
July Statement, when the case was being reviewed by the TMB in
July the United States submitted a loose sheet giving the supposed
export data in this category, in which it included cut pieces
as exports. In other words, whereas in the July Statement the
United States counted "807" production as imports, in
the export data it provided in the same month it counted it as
domestic production. Then, in the data published in October they
returned to the March situation, disregarding the entire problem
of double counting of "807" production which the July
Statement had tried to take into consideration. TO CONTINUE WITH USA - RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF COTTON AND MANMADE FIBRE UNDERWEAR |
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