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World Trade Organization

WT/DS54/R
WT/DS55/R
WT/DS59/R
WT/DS64/R


2 July 1998
(98-2505)
Original: English

Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting the Automovile Industry

Report of the Panel

(Continued)


(b) Treatment of Cars Imported Unassembled

14.194 Indonesia maintains a duty of 200 per cent on imports of passenger cars, and as a result imports of CBU passenger cars (that is, completely-built-up cars) into Indonesia are very small. In fact, almost all passenger cars imported into Indonesia, including the 306 and the Optima, are imported as CKD (completely knocked-down) kits and assembled in Indonesia. The complainants have stated that the Escort and Neon would have been imported in CKD kit form and assembled in Indonesia as well. Article 6.3 provides that serious prejudice may arise where the effect of the subsidy is "to displace or impede the imports of a like product of another Member into the market of the subsidizing Member" or is "a significant price undercutting by the subsidized product as compared with the price of a like product of another Member." Thus, in the context of a displacement or impedance claim, the question arises whether imports of CKD kits are "imports of a like product [to the Timor] of another Member" where the final passenger car assembled in Indonesia is a "like product" to the Timor. In the case of price undercutting, the related question is whether a passenger car assembled in Indonesia from an imported CKD kit is a "like product of another Member."

14.195 In response to questions posed by the Panel, the complainants provided the following information regarding the form in which their passenger cars were imported. The European Communities indicated that virtually all cars were exported to Indonesia in CKD kits. These kits include "almost all" the parts and components necessary for assembling the cars, the only parts and components purchased in Indonesia being low cost universal components such as batteries and tires, or accessories such as radios, CD-players and loudspeakers. Further, the European Communities stated (and Indonesia did not contest) that data provided by Indonesia during consultations indicated that the "local content" of EC passenger cars assembled in Indonesia ranged from 6.4 to 8.3 per cent in 1996 (it is unclear whether Indonesia considered the Optima to be a US or EC passenger car; the same data indicate that US passenger cars contained between 7.7 and 11.1 per cent local content in 1996). 742 The United States indicated that Escorts would have been ordered in groups of 20 vehicles, packaged in waterproof, pre-engineered cases. The CKD kit would have contained "all of the individual parts necessary to build a complete Escort, except for locally procured parts and components, such as oil and gasoline." The local content initially would have been well under 20 per cent, although Ford planned on increasing that over time. The Neon would have been shipped in lots of 72 vehicles, filling 85 boxes. The items to be sourced locally would have included such things as paint, oil, gasoline and other commodities. No US or EC passenger car has achieved the 20 per cent local content level required to enjoy lower tariffs on imported parts and components.

14.196 It is not contested by Indonesia that the CKD kits imported or allegedly planned for importation into Indonesia are products "of another Member." Thus, the issue is whether those kits "have characteristics closely resembling", and are thus "like", completed Timors. In this respect we note, first, that the end uses of the imported CKD kits are the same as those of finished passenger cars (although additional steps are required before that end use is achieved). Second, given that the local content of the CKD kits is quite low, the overwhelming majority of the components in the CKD kits not only closely resemble but are physically identical to those found in the final product, with the only difference being that those components are unassembled rather than assembled. Thus, the question is whether the unassembled components can properly be considered to be "like" the finished product assembled from those components, i.e., whether the difference between a product assembled and unassembled is sufficiently important that the unassembled product does not "closely resemble" the assembled product.

14.197 We do not consider that an unassembled product ipso facto is not a like product to that product assembled. Recalling the view of the Appellate Body that tariff classification may be a useful tool in like product analysis743, we note that, under the General Rules for the Interpretation of the Harmonized System:

Any reference in a heading to an article shall be taken to include a reference to that article complete or unfinished, provided that, as presented, the incomplete or unassembled article has the essential character of the complete or unfinished article.

We think that a comparable approach to the relation between assembled and unassembled products makes good sense in the context of this dispute. It appears that, in order to avoid paying 200 per cent duties on CBU passenger cars, EC and US car producers ship to Indonesia virtually complete CKD kits that are effectively "cars in a box." Accordingly, we believe that they can properly be considered to have characteristics closely resembling those of a completed car.

(c) Products Not Originating in a Complaining Member

14.198 Before turning to an analysis of adverse effects, we must first consider whether the United States may claim that it has suffered serious prejudice as a result of displacement/impedance or of price undercutting with respect to a product which does not originate in the United States solely on the basis that the producer of that product is a "US company".

14.199 We have determined that US and EC companies sell, or allegedly would be selling but for the subsidies provided pursuant to the National Car programme, four passenger car models that are (or, in the case of the Neon, may be) "like products" to the Timor: the Escort, the Optima, the 306 and the Neon. During the course of the proceedings, both the European Communities and the United States asserted that they had suffered serious prejudice as a result of the displacement/impedance and price undercutting of the Optima and the Escort. In response to a question from the Panel, the United States confirmed that CKD kits for the Optima were sourced in the European Communities and that, had plans to sell the Escort gone ahead, those CKD kits also would have been sourced in the European Communities. The United States argues, however, that the producers of those CKD kits (General Motors and Ford) are undeniably US companies, and that serious prejudice to US interests may arise as a result of displacement/impedance or price undercutting with respect to their products, wherever sourced.

14.200 In considering this issue, our starting point is that both Article XVI of GATT and the SCM Agreement are Annex 1A multilateral agreements on trade in goods. It comes as no surprise, therefore that in its discussion of serious prejudice, Article XVI:1 focuses on the effects of subsidization on trade in goods. That article provides as follows:

If any contracting party grants or maintains any subsidy, including any form of income or price support, which operates directly or indirectly to increase exports of any product from, or to reduce imports of any product into, its territory, it shall notify the Contracting Parties in writing of the extent and nature of the subsidization, of the estimated effect of the subsidization on the quantity of the affected product or products imported into or exported from its territory and of the circumstances making the subsidization necessary. In any case in which it is determined that serious prejudice to the interests of any other contracting party is caused or threatened by any such subsidization, the contracting party granting the subsidy shall, upon request, discuss with the other contracting party or parties concerned, or with the Contracting Parties, the possibility of limiting the subsidization. (emphasis added).

This focus on the trade effects of subsidization is carried over into Part III of the SCM Agreement. Article 5 provides that no Member should cause, through the use of any subsidy, "adverse effects to the interests of other Members." One such adverse effect is "serious prejudice to the interests of another Member," which the SCM Agreement indicates is used in the same sense as in Article XVI:1. 744 Article 6.3 provides that serious prejudice may arise where one or several of four listed situations exist. As we have seen, the United States alleges two such situations, i.e., (i) that "the effect of the subsidy is to displace or impede the imports of a like product of another Member into the market of the subsidizing Member"; and (ii) that "the effect of the subsidy is a significant price undercutting by the subsidized product as compared with the price of a like product of another Member in the same market or significant price suppression, price depression or lost sales in the same market" (emphasis added).

14.201 In our view, the text of Article XVI and of Part III of the SCM Agreement make clear that serious prejudice may arise where a Member's trade interests have been affected by subsidization. We see nothing in Article XVI or in Part III that would suggest that the United States may claim that it has suffered adverse effects merely because it believes that the interests of US companies have been harmed where US products are not involved. The United States has cited no language in Article XVI:1 or Part III suggesting that the nationality of producers is relevant to establishing the existence of serious prejudice. Accordingly, given that serious prejudice may only arise in the case at hand where there is "displacement or impedance of imports of a like product from another Member" or price undercutting "as compared with the like product of another Member", we do not consider that the United States can convert such effects on products from the European Communities into serious prejudice to US interests merely by alleging that the products affected were produced by US companies.

14.202 In light of our view that the existence of alleged harm to US companies is not a basis for a claim of serious prejudice to the interests to the United States, the question remains whether one Member may bring a claim that another Member has suffered serious prejudice as a result of subsidization. In our view the answer is no. It will be recalled that Article 7 of the SCM Agreement sets forth the steps to be taken by a Member which believes that it has suffered adverse effects within the meaning of Part III. Article 7.2 provides that:

A request for consultations under paragraph 1 shall include a statement of available evidence with regard to (a) the existence and nature of the subsidy in question, and (b) the injury caused to the domestic industry, or the nullification or impairment, or serious prejudice [footnote omitted] caused to the interests of the Member requesting consultations.

It is clear from Article 7.2 that the dispute settlement procedures set forth in Article 7 may only be invoked by a Member where that Member believes that it has itself suffered serious prejudice as a result of subsidization.

14.203 Our view on these issues is confirmed by Article 6.7, which allows a subsidizing Member to raise a defence to a displacement/impedance claim where "imports from the complaining Member" or "exports from the complaining Member" are affected by such factors as export prohibitions or restrictions, natural disasters, and arrangements limiting exports. These provisions of Article 6.7 assume that the products subject to a claim of serious prejudice arising from displacement or impedance originate in the complaining Member.

14.204 For the foregoing reasons, we find that the United States cannot assert that it has suffered serious prejudice as a result of displacement/impedance or price undercutting with respect to products that do not originate in the United States. 745

4. Should the Panel consider the effects of subsidies provided pursuant to the June 1996 Car Programme?

14.205 It will be recalled that the National Car programme provides a number of subsidies for the Timor. Under the February 1996 car programme, Timors assembled in Indonesia benefit from an exemption from import duties with respect to imported parts and components, as well as an exemption from the luxury sales tax, provided those Timors meet specified local content requirements. Under the June 1996 car programme, PT TPN was authorized to import up to 45,000 CBU Timors from Korea exempt from (200 per cent) import duties during the period 30 June 1996 to 30 June 1997 and to sell those Timors free of luxury sales tax provided that certain requirements regarding counter-purchase and use of Indonesian workers in Korea were satisfied. It will further be recalled that Indonesia submitted the results of an audit indicating that those requirements had not been met, and indicated that a process would begin to seek repayment of the subsidies provided with respect to those Korean-origin Timors. Indonesia now argues that the Panel should not consider the effects of the subsidies provided pursuant to the June 1996 car programme because it has now expired. Because assembly on a significant scale of the Timor in Indonesia has not yet begun, 746 subsidies pursuant to the "February 1996 programme" have yet to be provided to any substantial degree. Thus, Indonesia contends, no actual serious prejudice may be found to exist.

14.206 We do not agree with Indonesia that we are precluded from considering the effect of subsidies pursuant to the June 1996 car programme when analysing whether the subsidies in this case have caused serious prejudice to the interests of the complainants. We agree with the complainants that in this case there are a variety of different subsidy measures provided pursuant to a single National Car programme, and that it makes little sense to treat each one separately when analysing the existence of serious prejudice. Rather, we must assess the "effect of the subsidies" on the interests of another Member to determine whether serious prejudice exists, not the effect of "subsidy programmes." We note that at any given moment in time some payments of subsidies have occurred in the past while others have yet to occur in the future. If we were to consider that past subsidies were not relevant to our serious prejudice analysis as they were "expired measures" while future measures could not yet have caused actual serious prejudice, it is hard to imagine any situation where a panel would be able to determine the existence of actual serious prejudice. Thus, we decline to proceed on the course suggested by Indonesia. 747

5. Displacement and Impedance

14.207 Having determined that certain EC and US passenger car models are (or, in the case of the Neon, may be) like products to the Timor, we must next examine whether the complainants have demonstrated that the effect of the subsidies provided pursuant to the National Car programme has been to displace or impede the exports of those models from the Indonesian market.

(a) Market Share Data

(i) Relevance of Article 6.4

14.208 Before proceeding to an examination of the market share data submitted by complainants, we must consider the threshold legal issue of whether Article 6.4 of the SCM Agreement is relevant to a dispute, such as this, where the adverse effects alleged by the complainants relate to displacement or impedance of a like product into the market of the subsidizing Member under Article 6.3(a). That Article provides as follows:

For the purpose of paragraph 3(b), the displacement or impeding of exports shall include any case in which, subject to the provisions of paragraph 7, it has been demonstrated that there has been a change in relative shares of the market to the disadvantage of the non-subsidized like product (over an appropriately representative period sufficient to demonstrate clear trends in the development of the market for the product concerned, which, in normal circumstances, shall be at least one year). "Change in relative shares of the market" shall include any of the following situations: (a) there is an increase in the market share of the subsidized product; (b) the market share of the subsidized product remains constant in circumstances in which, in the absence of the subsidy, it would have declined; (c) the market share of the subsidized product declines, but at a slower rate than would have been the case in the absence of the subsidy. (emphasis added).

The European Communities and the United States acknowledge that Article 6.4 on its face does not apply to the displacement and impedance claims in this dispute, as their claims are based on Article 6.3(a) (effect in the market of the subsidizing Member) while Article 6.4 only applies "for the purpose of" Article 6.3(b) (effects in the market of a third country). The complainants argue, however, that there is no reason why the type of analysis set forth in Article 6.4 should not be appropriate also in the case of claims of displacement and impedance of imports from the market of the subsidizing country. Indonesia, by contrast, contends that Article 6.4 is not relevant to this dispute.

14.209 The significance of this issue in terms of the obligations on the complainants is considerable. If the type of analysis set forth in Article 6.4 is appropriate in this case, then the complainants arguably could make a prima facie case of displacement or impedance simply by demonstrating that the market share of a subsidized product has increased over an appropriately representative period. If, on the other hand, the type of analysis set forth in Article 6.4 is not appropriate in this case, then the complainants must demonstrate that "the effect of the subsidy " is to displace or impede imports into Indonesia, that is, that they have lost export sales to Indonesia that they would otherwise have made and that those export sales were lost as a result of the subsidies provided pursuant to the National Car programme.

14.210 We agree with Indonesia that Article 6.4 is not relevant in this case. The drafting of the provision is unambiguous, and the specific reference to Article 6.3(b) creates a strong inference that an Article 6.4 type of analysis is not appropriate in the case of Article 6.3(a) claims. The complainants have identified nothing in the context of the provision or the object and purpose of the SCM Agreement that would suggest a different conclusion.

14.211 Our conclusion does not of course mean that market share data are irrelevant to the analysis of displacement or impedance to a subsidizing Member's market. To the contrary, market share data may be highly relevant evidence for the analysis of such a claim. However, such data are no more than evidence of displacement and impedance caused by subsidization, and a demonstration that the market share of the subsidized product in the subsidizing Member has increased does not ipso facto satisfy the requirements of Article 6.3(a).

To continue with Actual Sales and Market Share Data


742 According to Indonesia, "[t]he local content of cars assembled in Indonesia is based on local value added . . . . [E]ach part and component is given an average weighted value with reference to a finished car (weight averaged over each car category). The level of manufacturing that occurs in Indonesia also is factored into the local content calculation."

743 Alcoholic Beverages (1996), op. cit., Appellate Body Report, p. 21.

744 SCM Agreement, Note 13 to Article 5.

745 We note that the issue addressed here is not whether the United States need demonstrate the existence of trade effects in order to establish the nullification or impairment of benefits arising from the violation of a provision of the WTO Agreement. It is well established that in such cases no demonstration of actual trade effects is required. Superfund, op. cit.. Rather, we are addressing a situation where the existence of adverse effects is the essence of the claim.

746 PT TPN is temporarily assembling 1,000 units per year at a plant in Tambun. Its full-scale facility at Karawang, which will have an annual capacity of 63,000 Timors, was not to begin production until sometime in 1998.

747 We recall that, late in the Panel process, Indonesia indicated that it had terminated subsidies pursuant to the National Car programme. For the reasons set forth in paragraph 14.9 supra, we nevertheless will proceed to consider whether subsidies pursuant to the National Car programme are causing serious prejudice to the interests of the European Communities and the United States.