WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION |
WT/DS70/RW
9 May 2000
(00-1750) |
|
Original: English |
CANADA - MEASURES AFFECTING THE EXPORT
OF CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT
Recourse by Brazil to Article 21.5 of the DSU
Report of the Panel
(Continuation)
ANNEX 1-1
FIRST SUBMISSION OF BRAZIL
(23 December 1999)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
- INTRODUCTION
- CANADA'S AMENDMENTS TO THE TPC PROGRAMME DO NOT MAKE IT CONSISTENT WITH THE
SUBSIDIES AGREEMENT, AND DO NOT CONSTITUTE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DSB'S
RECOMMENDATIONS AND RULINGS
- CANADA SHOULD WITHDRAW THE TPC PROGRAMME ENTIRELY, AS IT RELATES TO
THE REGIONAL AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY
- CANADA'S IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY DOES NOT CHANGE THE STATUS OF TPC
CONTRIBUTIONS AS SUBSIDIES UNDER ARTICLE 1 OF THE SUBSIDIES AGREEMENT
- THE AMENDMENTS TO THE TPC PROGRAMME ARE COSMETIC, AND DO NOT CHANGE THE
STATUS OF TPC CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE CANADIAN REGIONAL AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY AS DE
FACTO EXPORT CONTINGENT UNDER ARTICLE 3 OF THE SUBSIDIES AGREEMENT
- The Canadian Regional Aircraft Industry Remains Export-Oriented,
and the Canadian Government's Recognition of the Significance of that
Export-Orientation Is Still Evident
- Canada's Removal of the "Near to Market" Terminology from TPC
Documents Is Irrelevant
- The Goals and Objectives of the TPC Programme Remain Intimately
Linked to Export
- Canada Has Failed to Provide Many Documents Necessary to Determine Whether
the 'New' TPC Programme Remains de facto Contingent on Export
- CANADA'S AMENDMENTS TO THE CANADA ACCOUNT DO NOT MAKE IT CONSISTENT WITH
THE SUBSIDIES AGREEMENT, AND DO NOT CONSTITUTE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DSB'S
RECOMMENDATIONS AND RULINGS
- CONCLUSION
LIST OF EXHIBITS
I. INTRODUCTION
1. In Canada - Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft1, subsidies by
the Canadian government to the regional aircraft industry via two programmes -
Canada Account and Technology Partnerships Canada ("TPC") - were determined by
this Panel and the Appellate Body to constitute prohibited export subsidies
under Article 3.1(a) of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
("Subsidies Agreement"). Pursuant to Article 4.7 of the Subsidies Agreement, the
Panel and the Appellate Body identified the subsidies to be withdrawn by Canada:
Canada Account debt financing for the export of Canadian regional aircraft, and
TPC assistance to the Canadian regional aircraft industry.2
2. The Panel's and the Appellate Body's recommendations and rulings regarding
Canadian withdrawal of these subsidies were adopted by the Dispute Settlement
Body ("DSB") on 20 August 1999. On 18 November 1999, the 90-day period for
implementation of the DSB's recommendations and rulings expired. On 19 November
1999, Canada announced measures ostensibly constituting implementation of the
DSB's recommendations and rulings. Brazil has attached Canada's 19 November 1999
letter to the DSB, and its 19 November 1999 statement to the DSB, as Exhibits
Bra-1 and Bra-2, respectively.
3. The Canadian measures do not adequately implement the DSB's recommendations
and rulings, and the impugned programmes remain inconsistent with the Subsidies
Agreement. As a result, and under Article 21.5 of the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes ("DSU"), Brazil requested that
the DSB refer the matter to this Panel for resolution.3 Pursuant to that request,
the Panel was established on 9 December 1999.
4. Brazil will demonstrate in this submission that the measures heralded by
Canada as effective implementation of its obligations under the Subsidies
Agreement are little more than cosmetic, and make no substantive changes to the
underlying subsidy programmes. Accordingly, Brazil reiterates its request that
the Panel resolve, in these proceedings, the disagreement between Brazil and
Canada regarding "the existence or consistency with [the Subsidies Agreement] of
measures taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB."4
II. CANADA'S AMENDMENTS TO THE TPC PROGRAMME DO NOT MAKE IT CONSISTENT WITH THE
SUBSIDIES AGREEMENT, AND DO NOT CONSTITUTE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DSB'S
RECOMMENDATIONS AND RULINGS
A. CANADA SHOULD WITHDRAW THE TPC PROGRAMME ENTIRELY, AS IT RELATES TO THE
REGIONAL AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY
5. Canada's amendments to the TPC programme neither implement the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB, nor bring TPC into conformity with the
Subsidies Agreement. First, Canada's actions do not remove TPC contributions
from the category of government financial contributions that confer a "benefit"
and constitute a "subsidy." Second, de facto export contingency is still
"inferred from the total configuration of the facts constituting and
surrounding" any TPC contributions to the Canadian regional aircraft industry.5
6. Particularly with regard to de facto export contingency, the cosmetic changes
undertaken by Canada and described below are simply not enough. Were they
sufficient, the entire purpose behind the prohibition of de facto export
contingency in Article 3.1(a) of the Subsidies Agreement - to prevent
circumvention of the provision prohibiting de jure export contingency - would be
undermined.6 Withdrawing a de facto export subsidy like TPC, the very design and
structure of which betrays its de facto export contingency, cannot adequately be
achieved without complete and total abolition of the TPC programme altogether,
as it applies to the Canadian regional aircraft industry.
7. The facts surrounding TPC's structure, objectives and economic backdrop, and
the facts surrounding assistance to the regional aircraft industry, require this
result to rid the programme of any remaining "inference" of de facto export
contingency. This result, in fact, is also supported by the textual
interpretation of the term "subsidy" proposed by Canada itself. Before the
Appellate Body, Canada argued that the terms "'[s]ubsidy' and 'subsidy
programme' are used interchangeably" in the Subsidies Agreement, and that TPC
was a "subsidy programme" cognizable under the Subsidies Agreement.7 If this is
the case, then the DSB's recommendation, pursuant to Article 4.7 of the SCM
Agreement, that Canada "withdraw the subsidy," further confirms that Canada is
required to withdraw TPC, in its entirety, as it relates to the regional
aircraft industry.
B. CANADA'S IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY DOES NOT CHANGE THE STATUS OF TPC
CONTRIBUTIONS AS SUBSIDIES UNDER ARTICLE 1 OF THE SUBSIDIES AGREEMENT
8. The status of TPC contributions as "subsidies" under Article 1 of the
Subsidies Agreement remains unchanged by Canada's implementation strategy. TPC
contributions are still "financial contribution[s] by a government," under
Article 1.1(a)(1) of the Subsidies Agreement. TPC's Special Operating Agency
Framework Document ("TPC Framework Document") - the document that replaced, with
only slight modifications, the "old" TPC Charter8 - states that "TPC's activities
are funded through Parliamentary appropriations."9 Canada's announcements
regarding implementation also do not suggest that TPC contributions are no
longer provided in one of the forms listed in sub-paragraphs (i) through (iv) of
Article 1.1(a)(1) to the Subsidies Agreement.
9. Canada has not, moreover, demonstrated that TPC contributions will no longer
confer a "benefit" within the meaning of Article 1.1(b). The "benefit to
recipient" standard adopted by the Panel, and affirmed by the Appellate Body,
states that a "benefit" exists if a recipient has "received a 'financial
contribution' on terms more favourable than those available to the recipient in
the market."10 Indeed, the Panel determined that while TPC's rate of return on its
contributions to the regional aircraft industry was projected at a maximum of [
] per cent,11 a commercial investor would expect a rate of return of 19.91 - 21.92
per cent on a similar investment. TPC contributions, therefore, are still on
terms more favourable than those available to the recipient on the market.
10 TPC's most recent annual report, moreover, distinguishes TPC from commercial
financial lenders: "[U]nlike commercial financial institutions that measure
return solely in financial terms, the return to TPC is also measured in terms of
a broad range of non-financial benefits to Canada that flow from successful
projects."12 The annual report also notes that given the failure of some TPC-funded
projects, "TPC's expected repayment may be less than nominal."13
11. Under these circumstances, TPC contributions, even after implementation of
Canada's purported compliance measures, continue to confer "benefits" and
continue to constitute "subsidies" under Article 1.1(b) of the Subsidies
Agreement.
C. THE AMENDMENTS TO THE TPC PROGRAMME ARE COSMETIC, AND DO NOT CHANGE THE
STATUS OF TPC CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE CANADIAN REGIONAL AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY AS DE
FACTO EXPORT CONTINGENT UNDER ARTICLE 3 OF THE SUBSIDIES AGREEMENT
12. Canada's amendments to TPC are merely cosmetic, and do not constitute
effective implementation of its obligations under the Subsidies Agreement. Even
after the amendments to TPC:
the same three industry sectors will receive TPC assistance;
- the same types of projects will be eligible for TPC funds;
- the same objectives and fundamental economic realities underlie TPC's creation
and continued existence;
- the aerospace industry continues to receive far and away the greatest share of TPC contributions and disbursements; and,
- the Canadian aerospace industry in general, and the regional aircraft industry
in particular, remains export-oriented.
13. The only real difference - apart from the fact that Canada forecasts
available TPC funds to increase by 396 per cent between now and 200314 - is that
the word "export" is less ubiquitous than it was previously, at least in those
documents made publicly available by the Canadian government.
14. This is not enough. As the Panel is aware, subsidies provided to the
Canadian regional aircraft industry under the auspices of the TPC were found to
be prohibited export subsidies in fact, rather than in law. A determination that
subsidies are "contingent . . . in fact . . . upon export performance," in the
words of the Appellate Body, "must be inferred from the total configuration of
the facts constituting and surrounding the granting of the subsidy . . ."15 This
is distinct from a determination of de jure export contingency, which is
demonstrated "on the basis of the words of the relevant legislation, regulation
or other legal instrument."16
15. Merely sanitizing publicly-released documents to remove references to the
word "export" is not sufficient to bring Canada into compliance with this
Panel's determination of de facto export contingency. According to the Appellate
Body, demonstration of de facto export contingency depends not upon uncovering
express reference to "export" as a condition for receipt of a subsidy (although
such references abound in Canadian materials), but rather depends on the
inference of export contingency drawn from the totality of the facts. This is
the entire purpose of the de facto export contingency provision - to prevent
Members from circumventing the prohibition of de jure export contingency by
merely purging all references to the term "export."17 It is this question of proof
- demonstrating express contingency on export versus inferred contingency on
export - that defines the very difference between a de jure, as opposed to a
de
facto, case.
16. Canada's implementation measures change only the superficial evidence of
export contingency, but make no substantive change whatsoever in the underlying
programme. de facto export contingency is still, in the words of the Appellate
Body, "inferred from the total configuration of the facts constituting and
surrounding" any TPC contributions to the Canadian regional aircraft industry,
regardless of Canada's efforts to purge from its documents express reference to
the word "export."18 TPC's structure, objectives and economic backdrop require
this inference, and thus require a determination that Canada has not complied
with the recommendation and ruling of the DSB that Canada "withdraw the
subsidy."
17. Canada may assert, as it has previously, that Brazil's claim of Canadian
non-compliance rests solely on the fact that TPC subsidies are granted to
"enterprises that export," a fact that, while certainly relevant to the Panel's
review,19 cannot (under footnote 4 to the Subsidies Agreement) form the entire
basis of a determination of de facto export contingency. In the sections to
follow, however, Brazil will describe a series of facts both related to and
apart from the export orientation of the Canadian regional aircraft industry.
These facts, together, lead to the very same inference derived by the Panel in
its original decision: TPC contributions to the Canadian regional aircraft
industries remain de facto contingent upon and in fact tied to export
performance.
1. The Canadian Regional Aircraft Industry Remains Export-Oriented, and the
Canadian Government's Recognition of the Significance of that Export-Orientation
Is Still Evident
18. An expert report included with Brazil's submissions to the Panel, and the
Panel itself, noted the export orientation or the export propensity of the
Canadian regional aircraft industry.20 This fact remains unchanged. Brazil has
attached, as Exhibit Bra-7, a series of tables and supporting documentation
updating the results of this expert report. This update demonstrates that during
the period from 23 October 1998 (the end date for the earlier expert report)
through 15 December 1999, every sale of Canadian regional aircraft - without
exception - was for export.
19. Moreover, the appeal of this export orientation to the Canadian government
has not been eliminated by Canada's amendments to TPC:
- TPC has previously justified its support to its main beneficiary by pointing
out that the industry is "highly export oriented";21
- The Canadian Minister of Industry has justified particular instances of TPC
support with the statement that "[a]erospace is a crucial sector for Canada's
economy, with exports growing at 10 per cent per year."22
- The Leader of the Government in the House of Commons has stated that a key
"output" of a TPC-supported project - the Dash 8-400 - is "the
building of
exports," which he argued was, along with job creation, "just what the
government had in mind when we established" TPC.23
- As recently as October 1999, the Canadian government touted the Canadian
aerospace industry as "[g]lobally competitive with exports exceeding 70 per cent
of output," and as "Commercial market focused/Export Oriented."24 TPC, which
"invests with industry in near-market opportunities," is listed among those
government programmes supporting this export-based industry.25
- Industry Canada's 1998/99 Survey of the Canadian Aerospace and Defence
Industry, published on 29 November 1999, projects that the Canadian aerospace
industry's exports will increase to 70 per cent of total sales in 2000.26
- a June 1999 study sponsored in part by Industry Canada concludes that the
Canadian aerospace industry exported 78 per cent of its production in 1998, and
projects a 90 per cent increase in export sales during the period 1991-2001.27 The
same study notes that "rapid growth of the value of export sales" was achieved
by a shift from exports of "manufactured components and sub-systems" to exports
of "complete aircraft and systems."28
- The Aerospace Industries Association of Canada projects that 71 per cent of
the industry's sales revenue will be derived from exports in 2000,29 and that the
industry's "exports continue to be the principal engine of [its] growth"30 -
factors that surely did not escape Industry Canada when it succumbed to the
Association's "advocacy efforts [to] secur[e] an additional $150 million in
funding for [TPC]."31
20. Like any other "fact" relevant under footnote 4 to the Subsidies Agreement,
the Canadian government's acknowledgement of the overwhelming export orientation
of the industry, and its admission that this factor drives the government's
commitment to fund that industry, can serve in part as the basis for an
inference that, without that export orientation, the abundant funding sources of TPC would not be available to the industry.
21. The crucial role the regional aircraft industry specifically, and the
aerospace industry generally, play in Canada is translated into the funding
priorities of Canadian subsidy programmes: as before the amendments announced by
the Canadian government on 19 November, TPC continues to provide contributions
to the same three categories of industry as before (Aerospace and Defence,
Enabling Technologies, and Environmental Technologies),32 and continues, as
before, to be captive to the regional aircraft and the aerospace industry. Since
inception of the programme, 65 per cent of TPC contributions have gone to the
aerospace industry;33 in the period 1998-1999, 76 per cent of TPC disbursements
went to that industry.34 The economic significance of this bias will become
increasingly relevant to the industry in the coming years, since available TPC
funds are slated to increase by 396 per cent between now and 2003.35
22. Nothing, in short, has changed - neither the industries eligible for TPC
contributions, nor the recognized export-orientation of the industry that enjoys
the lion's share of those contributions, nor the significance of that industry's
export orientation to Canadian government officials, nor that industry's
prospects for continued dominance of TPC's treasury. None of these factors is
destined for change.
23. When the Canadian government grants TPC funds to the Canadian regional
aircraft industry - today as in the past - it is eminently aware, as its
statements reveal, of that industry's overwhelming export-orientation. To keep
it that way, the Canadian aerospace industry receives the vast majority of the
rapidly increasing pool of TPC funds available. These facts lead directly to the
unavoidable conclusion that, without exceptional export performance, the
Canadian regional aircraft industry would not receive TPC subsidies. The
inescapable inference is, therefore, that continued receipt of those subsidies
is in fact tied to export performance.
2. Canada's Removal of the "Near to Market" Terminology from TPC Documents Is
Irrelevant
24. As part of its implementation strategy, Canada announced that it will now
"focus on promoting technological innovation and enhancing the technological
capability of Canadian industry, rather than commercialization," and that
eligible activities will now be for "industrial research and pre-competitive
development."36 Canada then goes on to specify three categories of TPC "Eligible
Activities" - "industrial research," "pre-competitive development," and
"studies."37 Brazil makes the following three observations regarding this aspect
of Canada's implementation strategy.
25. First, TPC's "new" emphasis on "technological innovation" rather than
"commercialization" is presumably in response to the Panel's identification of
TPC's focus on "'near market R & D'" projects as one factor supporting a finding
of de facto export contingency.38 This "new" emphasis, however, does not immunize TPC from characterization as a prohibited export subsidy. The Appellate Body
noted that "[i]t is. . . no 'less . . . possible' that the facts, taken
together, may demonstrate that a pre-production subsidy for research and
development is 'contingent . . . in fact . . . upon . . . export performance.'"39
Removing "commercialization" or the "near market R & D" focus from TPC's focus,
therefore, and shifting instead to a focus on "industrial research and
pre-competitive development,"40 would not make it any less possible to infer from
the facts that TPC constitutes a prohibited export subsidy.41
26. Second, and to the extent that this factor is still relevant as one among
many contributing to an inference of de facto export contingency,42 Canada's
amendments to TPC do not in fact rid it of considerations regarding
"commercialization." TPC's most recent "Current Statistics," published on the
TPC website on 6 December 1999, state that "TPC contracted projects, if
successful, are forecasted to generate sales of more than $89.6 billion . . ."43 TPC still considers that its subsidies are to be used to "generate sales" - a
virtual synonym for "commercialization."
27. Moreover, two of the categories of TPC "eligible activities" betray an
interest in projects linked to actual products. Under the category of
"Industrial research," TPC funds projects "aimed at the discovery of new
knowledge, with the objective that such knowledge may be useful in developing
new products, processes or services, or in bringing about a significant
improvement to existing products, processes or services."44 Eligible projects in
the category of "Pre-competitive development" specifically include the
"translation of industrial research findings into a plan, blueprint or
design
for new, modified or improved products, processes or services."45
28. Finally, immediately after noting that "Canada's aerospace and defence
industries supply regional and business jet and turboprop aircraft, commercial
helicopters, propulsion and major avionics systems, and electronics parts and
components, and aviation support systems such as air traffic control systems,"
TPC's website states that "[i]nvestments by Technology Partnerships Canada help
this vital part of the Canadian economy maintain and expand its position of
technological excellence and so contribute to the country's well-being."46 The
industry's successful commercialization of broad product lines, and TPC's role
in "helping" the industry "maintain and expand" its position through
commercialization of those products, are two factors that do not escape the
Canadian government.
29. Third, the three categories of TPC "eligible activities" are remarkably
similar pre- and post-implementation. Brazil has attached as Exhibit Bra-20 an
excerpt from the TPC website, dated 21 January 1998, describing certain of the
prerequisites for TPC assistance:
The project activities must include one of the following: development or
demonstration of a product, process and/or technology; certain preproduction
activities; technical or marketing feasibility studies.47
30. These descriptions exhibit considerable similarity to the "new" TPC
categories of eligible activities: what was previously "development or
demonstration" or "preproduction activities," for example, is now
"pre-competitive development"; what was then the category of "feasibility
studies" is now simply "studies."48 Nothing of substance has changed; if funding
for the development of commercial products was available in the "old" TPC, it is
similarly available in the "new" TPC, and as it did before contributes to an
inference of de facto export contingency.
3. The Goals and Objectives of the TPC Programme Remain Intimately Linked to
Export
31. Canada's materials regarding the "new" TPC are replete with references to
the programme's objectives, most commonly phrased as "increasing economic
growth, creating jobs, and supporting sustainable development."49 These same
objectives are at times characterized as the "new" TPC's "programme objectives,"50
but are repeated elsewhere in the TPC materials as part of the programme's
mandate,51 selection criteria,52 assessment criteria,53 or examples of strategic
benefits to be established by an applicant to secure TPC funds.54
32. These same objectives were also central to the "old" TPC. TPC's Charter and
its Business Plan formerly stated that the programme's mandate was "to stimulate
economic growth and create jobs in Canada," and that two of its objectives were
"to increase growth and wealth creation."55 The "Terms and Conditions" document
for the "old" TPC stated that the programme was to "contribute to achieving
Canada's objectives of: (a) increasing economic growth and wealth creation; (b)
supporting sustainable development," etc.56 Similarly, the closing paragraph of
Industry Canada News Releases announcing contributions under the "old" TPC
included a statement that TPC "is a central element of the government's agenda
to promote technological development as a catalyst for economic growth and job
creation, through increased productivity and competitiveness."57
33. More importantly, achieving these objectives - increasing or creating
economic growth, wealth and jobs - has been expressly linked, by the Canadian
government itself, as well as by other organizations, to the export performance
of Canadian industry:
- Industry Canada's International Business Strategy ("CIBS") makes clear that
"exports are critical to Canada's economic and social well-being, and
serve as the engine that is driving Canada's economy."
58
- In particular, the CIBS makes explicit the connection between job creation and
exports, arguing that "[i]ncrease [sic] trade means new and better jobs for
Canadians - it is estimated that for every $1 billion of exports, 11,000
Canadian jobs are created or sustained."59
- In describing its "Jobs Strategy," the aim of which is "to co-ordinate efforts
to create more and better jobs for Canadians," Industry Canada states that
"[w]ith one in three Canadian jobs dependent on exports, a critical component of
the Jobs Strategy is to encourage more Canadian firms to export
. . ."60
- Industry Canada affirms that "Canada's economic growth and job creation
in the
past three years have been driven by exports to the United States."61
- In its review of the Aerospace and Defence sector, Industry Canada emphasizes
that
[t]he Canadian aerospace and defence industry is a vital and growing component
of our national economy. It is a major contributor to research and development
(R&D); employment; national income; exports; national defence; and international
prestige. It is also one of Canada's leading advanced-technology sectors, and
its innovative products are recognized around the world. It ranks fifth among
world exporters of aircraft and aircraft parts, and could well achieve fourth
place, if present trends continue. However, the continued growth of the
aerospace and defence industry, and its contribution to the wealth and job
creation in Canada, will depend largely on its ability to capture a growing
share of world aerospace and defence markets.62
In other words, to achieve wealth and job creation in Canada - two of TPC's
objectives - aerospace exports have been, are, and will be necessary.
- The Canadian Minister of Industry has identified the close relationship
between Canadian aerospace exports, Canadian economic growth and the creation of
Canadian jobs. According to the Minister, "[a]erospace is a crucial sector for
Canada's economy, with exports growing at a rate of 10 per cent per year," with
the result that "TPC's investment in [aerospace industry] projects will help
increase the global competitiveness of this industry, while supporting jobs in
Montreal, in Halifax and across the country, generating economic growth and
export dollars."63
- The Conference Board of Canada also acknowledges the link between exports and TPC's goals of job creation and increasing economic growth, noting that:
Exports have been a driving force in the [Canadian] economy over the past 10
years, with real growth averaging 7 per cent on an annual basis - well ahead of
the average 2 per cent annual real GDP growth. One in three jobs in Canada is
dependent on trade. If Canadian business cannot continue to access markets
abroad for their products, services and investments, the continued growth of the
Canadian economy will be threatened.64
34. The significance of the link between export performance and growth, wealth
or jobs has not changed with Canada's amendments to TPC. When TPC makes the
increase or creation of economic growth, wealth and jobs part of its selection
criteria,65 its assessment criteria,66 or a "strategic benefit" to be demonstrated
by an applicant to secure a TPC subsidy,67 the Panel should infer that it is
implicitly conditioning receipt of that subsidy on export performance. Without
committing to export performance, an applicant cannot meet TPC's selection or
assessment criteria, cannot demonstrate that it will provide the requisite
strategic benefits imposed by the TPC programme, and will not receive a TPC
subsidy.
4. Canada Has Failed to Provide Many Documents Necessary to Determine Whether
the 'New' TPC Programme Remains de facto Contingent on Export
35. Although Canada has made certain documents regarding the "new" TPC publicly
available, many others have not been provided. The Panel's decision regarding
TPC's de facto export contingency relied, for example, upon the TPC Business
Plan, the TPC Aerospace and Defence Generic Model Agreement, TPC Project Summary
Forms, and the two-volume, 350-page TPC Interim Reference Binder.68 "Business
confidential" documents provided by Canada with its replies to questions from
the Panel in the original proceedings, moreover, were also relevant to a review
of the question of de facto export contingency. These documents include
Programme Forecasts and Progress Reports.69
36. Yet, none of these documents has been made publicly available with regard to
the "new" TPC. Since Canada has not produced replacements for these documents,
the Panel should consider that the original documents still apply, and still, as
before, constitute facts demonstrating that TPC subsidies are contingent in fact
on export performance, as detailed in paragraph 9.340 of the Panel Report.
37. The "new" TPC Framework Document, moreover, refers to several new documents
that Canada has not provided, including the Treasury Board's "repayable
contributions policy,"70 TPC's "Evaluation Framework,"71 any "specialized reports"
developed for the TPC Advisory Board,72 "case evaluation" forms,73 the "Memorandum
of Understanding" between TPC and the Industry Sector,74 "records of decisions"
issued by the Secretariat of the Programmes and Services Board,75 minutes of
Interdepartmental Advisory Committee meetings and TPC Management Board meetings,76
and "sector strategies, technical assessments, priorities and technology
roadmaps" developed by the Sector Branches.77
1 WT/DS70/R (14 April 1999) (Adopted as modified by the
Appellate Body, 20 August 1999) [hereinafter "Panel Report"]; WT/DS70/AB/R (2
August 1999) (Adopted 20 August 1999) [hereinafter "Appellate Body Report"].
2 Panel Report, paras. 10.1 ((b) and (f)), 10.3; Appellate
Body Report, para. 221.
3 Brazilian Letter to DSB, 23 November 1999 (Exhibit Bra-3).
4 DSU, Article 21.5.
5 Appellate Body Report, para. 167.
6 Appellate Body Report, para. 19.
7 Submission of Appellant Canada, 13 May 1999, paras. 45-46
(Exhibit Bra-28).
8 Superceded TPC Charter (in TPC Interim Reference Binder,
March 1998) (Exhibit Bra-4).
9 TPC Special Operating Agency Framework Document, pg. 6
(Exhibit Bra-5) [hereinafter "TPC Framework Document"].
10 Appellate Body Report, para. 157; Panel Report, para.
9.112.
11 Panel Report, para. 9.312. See also Canada's reply to
questions from the Panel, dated 21 December 1998, reply to question 33.
12 TPC Annual Report, 1998-1999, pg. 20 (Exhibit Bra-6).
13 Id. at pg. 21.
14 TPC Annual Report, 1998-1999, pg. 28 (row titled "Total
funds available for new contributions in future years," comparing 1999-2000
figure with 2002-2003 figure) (Exhibit Bra-6).
15 Appellate Body Report, para. 167 (emphasis in original).
16 Id.
17 Id. The European Communities initially proposed
the de facto contingency prohibition "since experience has shown that government
practices may be easily manipulated or modified in order to avoid this [de jure]
prohibition ," which on its own is therefore "open to circumvention." Elements
of the Negotiating Framework, Submission of the European Communities,
MTN.GNG/NG10/W/31 (27 November 1989).
18 Appellate Body Report, para. 167.
19 Appellate Body Report, para. 173.
20 Panel Report, para. 9.325 (footnote 623).
21 TPC Annual Report, 1996-1997, pg. 5 (emphasis added)
(Exhibit Bra-8).
22 Industry Canada News Release, 10 January 1997 (emphasis
added) (Exhibit Bra-9).
23 Industry Canada News Release, 17 December 1996 (emphasis
added) (Exhibit Bra-10).
24 "Think Canada, Think Bottom Line, Think Aerospace
Industry, Think Investment," October 1999, pgs. 3, 33 (emphasis added) (Exhibit
Bra-11).
25 Id. at pg. 20.
26 Industry Canada, "Results of the 1998/99 Survey of the
Canadian Aerospace and Defence Industry," 29 November 1999 (emphasis added)
(Exhibit Bra-12).
27 "Canadian Aerospace Suppliers Base Strategy for Change,"
25 June 1999, pgs. 1, 16-17 (relevant excerpt included at Exhibit Bra-13).
28 Id. at pg. 17(emphasis added).
29 Aerospace Industries Association of Canada Annual
Report, 1999, pg. 4 (Exhibit Bra-14).
30 Id. at pg. 13 (emphasis added).
31 Id. at pg. 12.
32 See Framework Document, pgs. 5-6 (Exhibit Bra-5).
See also TPC Terms and Conditions, pg. 1 (Exhibit Bra-15); TPC Investment
Application Guide, pgs. 3-4 (Exhibit Bra-16).
33 TPC Current Statistics, 6 December 1999
(Exhibit Bra-17).
34 TPC Annual Report, 1998-1999, pg. 27
(Exhibit Bra-6).
35 Id. at pg. 28 (row titled "Total
funds available for new contributions in future years," comparing
1999-2000 figure with 2002-2003 figure).
36 Industry Canada News Release, 18 November
1999, pg. 3 (Exhibit Bra-18).
37 TPC Terms and Conditions, pg. 2 (Exhibit
Bra-15); TPC Investment Application Guide, pg. 4 (Exhibit Bra-16).
38 Panel Report, paras. 9.339, 9.340, 9.341.
39 Appellate Body Report, para. 174.
40 Industry Canada News Release, 18 November
1999, pg. 3 (Exhibit Bra-18).
41 Appellate Body Report, para. 167.
42 Id.
43 TPC Current Statistics, 6 December 1999
(emphasis added) (Exhibit Bra-17).
44 TPC Terms and Conditions, pg. 2 (emphasis
added) (Exhibit Bra-15); TPC Investment Application Guide, pg. 4
(emphasis added) (Exhibit Bra-16).
45 Id. (emphasis added).
46 TPC website, "Aerospace and Defence," pg. 1
(Exhibit Bra-19).
47 TPC website, "Project Identification and
Description," 21 January 1998 (Exhibit Bra-20).
48 Compare Id. with TPC Terms and
Conditions, pg. 2 (Exhibit Bra-15).
49 Industry Canada News Release, 18 November
1999, pg. 3 (Exhibit Bra-18).
50 TPC Framework Document, pg. 4 (Under section
titled "Program Objectives," Canada states that "[c]ontributions
under TPC will be administered in a way that will contribute to:
increasing economic growth and creating jobs and wealth; supporting
sustainable development . . ." etc.) (Exhibit Bra-5).
51 Id. at pg. 4 (Under section titled
"Mandate," Canada states that "TPC is a technology investment fund
established to contribute to the achievement of Canada's objectives
such as increasing economic growth, jobs and wealth creation, and
supporting sustainable development.").
52 TPC Investment Application Guide, pg. 6
(Under section titled "What are the criteria that TPC uses for
selecting investments," Canada notes that investment outlines and
proposals are assessed on the extent to which they demonstrate,
among other things, "that the project contributes to the strategic
objectives of the government, including technological and net
economic benefits to Canada (increasing economic growth, creating
jobs and wealth, and supporting sustainable development).") (Exhibit
Bra-16).
53 TPC Terms and Conditions, pg. 2 (Under
section titled "Assessment Criteria," Canada states that
applications for TPC funds will be assessed according to the extent
to which they demonstrate, among other things, "that the project
contributes to the strategic objectives of the government, including
technological and net economic benefits to Canada.") (Exhibit
Bra-15).
54 TPC Investment Application Guide, pg. 8
(Under section titled "What is the format for preparing a TPC
investment outline," Canada states that certain information
regarding "strategic benefit" must be demonstrated, including
"[p]otential economic benefit to Canada (for example, jobs created
or maintained, economic growth, wealth creation, sector or supplier
development, contribution to sustainable development, new corporate
mandates, leveraged investments, strategic alliances, etc.)."
(Exhibit Bra-16).
55 Superceded TPC Charter (in TPC Interim
Reference Binder, March 1998), pg. 3 (Exhibit Bra-4); TPC Business
Plan, 1996-1997, pg. iii (Exhibit Bra-21).
56 Superceded TPC Terms and Conditions (in TPC
Interim Reference Binder, March 1998), pg. 1 (Exhibit Bra-22).
57 See, e.g., Industry Canada News
Release, 10 January 1997 (Exhibit Bra-9); Industry Canada News
Release, 17 December 1996 (Exhibit Bra-10).
58 Industry Canada, CIBS Overview, "Executive
Summary," pg. 2 (emphasis added) (Exhibit Bra-23).
59 Id. at pg. 1 (emphasis added).
60 Industry Canada, CIBS Strategic Overview,
"International Business Development Priorities," pg. 1 (emphasis
added) (Exhibit Bra-24).
61 Industry Canada, CIBS Geographic Overview,
pg. 1 (emphasis added) (Exhibit Bra-25).
62 Industry Canada, CIBS Aerospace and Defence,
pg. 1 (emphasis added) (Exhibit Bra-26).
63 Industry Canada News Release, 10 January
1997 (emphasis added) (Exhibit Bra-9).
64 Conference Board of Canada, Performance
and Potential 1999, "Working Smarter, Not Harder," pg. 107
(footnote omitted) (emphasis added) (Exhibit Bra-27).
65 TPC Investment Application Guide, pg. 6
(Section titled "What are the criteria that TPC uses for selecting
investments") (Exhibit Bra-16).
66 TPC Terms and Conditions, pg. 2 (Section
titled "Assessment Criteria") (Exhibit Bra-15).
67 TPC Investment Application Guide, pg. 8
(Section titled "What is the format for preparing a TPC investment
outline") (Exhibit Bra-16).
68 Panel Report, para. 9.340.
69 These documents were included behind "BCI
Tab 1" and "BCI Tab 2," respectively, to Canada's 21 December 1998
replies to questions from the Panel.
70 TPC Framework Document, pg. 7 (Exhibit
Bra-5). The press release announcing Canada's implementation
strategy suggests that TPC's repayment policies have in fact been
changed. Industry Canada News Release, 18 November 1999, pg. 4
("Repayments will no longer be primarily based on royalties tied to
product sales but will take different forms depending on the project
. . .") (Exhibit Bra-18).
71 TPC Framework Document, pg. 10 (Exhibit
Bra-5).
72 Id.
73 Id. at pg. 18, 20.
74 Id. at pg. 18.
75 Id. at pg. 19.
76 Id.
77 Id. at pg. 20.
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