4. Whether the initiation is before the Panel 

4.49 Guatemala considers that Mexico is precluded from raising claims against the initiation of the investigation because: (1) it did not contest the final measure; (2) it did not claim that the provisional measure had been applied as a result of an investigation initiated in violation of Article 1 of the ADP Agreement; and (3) it did not claim that the provisional measure had been applied in violation of Article 7.1(i) of the ADP Agreement following the initiation of an investigation not in accordance with Article 5. According to Guatemala, to be able to bring the initiation of an investigation before the Panel, the complaining Member must either contest the final measure pursuant to Article 1 of the ADP Agreement, or contest the provisional measure pursuant to Articles 1 or 7.1 of the ADP Agreement. Initiation does not of itself constitute a "measure" within the meaning of Article 19 of the DSU. If the initiation were a "measure", Article 17.4 would indicate the necessary conditions for referring the "initiation measure" (as part of the "matter" on which the consultations were held) to the DSB.¹⁶

4.50 With the exception of the elimination of the conciliation phase, Guatemala considers that Article 17 of the ADP Agreement is virtually identical to Article 15 of the Tokyo Round Anti-Dumping Code. Guatemala argues that a panel was never established under Article 15 of the Tokyo Round Anti-Dumping Code just to examine the initiation of an anti-dumping investigation or the investigation itself. Indeed, a panel set up under the Tokyo Round Anti-Dumping Code was never asked to restrict itself to examining a provisional measure without the complainant party also submitting a claim regarding the final measure. For example, in EC - Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Cotton Yarn from Brazil ¹⁷, Brazil held consultations with the EC on 11 November 1991 after it had imposed the provisional measure on 23 September 1991. Guatemala notes that the EC imposed the final measure on 23 March 1992, and that the parties held consultations on this measure on 27 October 1993. In other words, after imposition of the provisional measure, Brazil held consultations for the purpose of dealing with the claims relating to the provisional measure. When the final measure had been imposed, Brazil held consultations for the purpose of dealing with the claims relating to the final measure and, subsequently, a panel was established. 

4.51 Guatemala recalls that during the Uruguay Round negotiations, several countries proposed to amend Article 15 of the Tokyo Round Anti-Dumping Code to allow Members to contest the initiation of an investigation before a provisional or final measure was imposed. The delegation of Singapore stated that "[p]rocedures should be established which would allow the exporting country to challenge the initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding, if the initiation was frivolous and not consistent with the Code requirements." ¹⁸ Singapore explained that:

"Present dispute settlement procedures provide for the exporting country to seek conciliation only after the imposition of provisional duties. However, trade damage would already have been caused and code obligations violated at the stage of initiation of the anti-dumping investigation. Therefore dispute settlement procedures should be available at all stages of the anti-dumping proceedings." ¹⁹

4.52 Guatemala notes that the Nordic countries similarly proposed an amendment to Article 15 of the Tokyo Round Anti-Dumping Code, to allow Members " ... to invoke the dispute settlement mechanism already in the course of an anti-dumping investigation ... ." ²⁰ The Nordic countries proposed that the phrase "and final action has been taken by the administering authorities of the importing country to levy definitive duties or to accept price undertakings" should be deleted from Article 15.3. ²¹ During the Uruguay Round, at a meeting of the Negotiating Group on anti-dumping, one delegation commented that "[d]ispute settlement procedures should be available at all stages of the anti-dumping proceedings, and procedures should also allow exporting countries to challenge the initiation of a proceeding." ²²

4.53 Guatemala states that the signatories to the Uruguay Round rejected proposals that would have allowed Members to make a claim against the initiation of an investigation without contesting the provisional or final measures in their complaints. Guatemala asserts that the text eventually agreed upon, Article 17.4 of the ADP Agreement, is virtually the same as Article 15.3 of the Tokyo Round Anti-Dumping Code. According to Guatemala, under Article 17.4, in order to bring the initiation of an investigation before a panel, the Member must respect the same procedures (with the exception of conciliation) as under Article 15.3 of the Tokyo Round Anti-Dumping Code. The Member must await imposition of the final measure (unless it can show that the provisional measure was having a significant impact), hold consultations on the final measure and allow the specified time-limit to elapse before requesting the establishment of a panel to examine the final measure directly. According to Guatemala, when the Signatories rejected proposals to allow Members to make a claim against the initiation of an investigation without also contesting the provisional or final measure, they had very good reason for doing so. Firstly, for a panel to examine the decision to initiate an investigation whose final outcome might be negative would violate the fundamental GATT principle of judicial economy. Members should not be obliged to dissipate their resources in defending a decision on initiation or on the conduct of an investigation that does not lead to the imposition of a provisional or final measure. Secondly, restricting the dispute settlement procedure to claims against provisional or final measures prevents an exporting country from utilizing the dispute settlement mechanism to intimidate the investigating country or to obtain termination of the investigation or a negative preliminary or final determination. Guatemala suggests that the risk of intimidation is greater when the country conducting the investigation is much less developed and considerably less experienced in anti-dumping investigations than the exporting country. 

4.54 Guatemala notes that Article 19.1 of the DSU is consistent with Guatemala's interpretation of the words "matter" and "measure" under the ADP Agreement and the DSU. The only "measures" imposed under the ADP Agreement are provisional measures, final measures, or price undertakings. In the present procedure, Mexico has agreed that the final measure is outside the Panel's terms of reference. There has never been a price undertaking. Consequently, the provisional measure is the only measure on which the Panel may make a recommendation, in accordance with Article 19.1 of the DSU. According to Article 7.1 of the ADP Agreement, a provisional measure may only be imposed if an investigation has been initiated properly. The Panel could recommend, therefore, that Guatemala bring the provisional measure into conformity with the Agreement, but only if it is determined that (a) the provisional measure has a significant impact, in accordance with the provisions of Article 17.4, and (b) the initiation of the investigation is not consistent with Guatemala's obligations under Article 7.1. Mexico does not claim that Guatemala has violated paragraph 1 of Article 7.

4.55 According to Guatemala, even on the remote hypothesis that the Panel concludes that Guatemala improperly initiated the investigation, it would be legally inadmissible and an open violation of its terms of reference for the Panel to recommend that Guatemala bring the final measure into conformity with the Agreement. Mexico could have made its request for consultations and for the establishment of a panel in relation to the final measure, basing its claim on Article 1 of the ADP Agreement and arguing that the final measure had been applied following an investigation that had not been initiated in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement. This was the approach adopted by Mexico in 1990 when it challenged the measure imposed by the United States against grey portland cement. In the present case, however, Mexico did not request consultations or the establishment of a panel to examine the final measure and did not allege that the final measure violated Article 1 of the ADP Agreement. Article 17 of the ADP Agreement does not regulate the question of recommendations by panels. The Panel should, therefore, interpret the ADP Agreement in light of Article 19 of the DSU. Neither the "investigation" nor the "initiation" constitutes a "measure" that can be brought into conformity with the ADP Agreement, as provided in Article 19 of the DSU. 

4.56 Guatemala submits that if a Member wishes to bring a case against the initiation of an anti-dumping investigation, it must either demonstrate that the provisional measure had a significant impact, or await the imposition of the final measure. ²³ If the Member considers that the provisional and final measures were not imposed in accordance with the ADP Agreement, then, during the consultations, in its request for the establishment of a panel and in its first submission, it must claim that the provisional measure was imposed in violation of Article 7.1 or Article 1 of the ADP Agreement, and that the final measure was imposed in violation of Article 1 of the ADP Agreement. According to Guatemala, Article 7.1 provides that the provisional measure may only be imposed if an investigation has been initiated in accordance with the provisions of Article 5 of the ADP Agreement. Article 1, on the other hand, states that an anti-dumping measure may only be applied pursuant to an investigation initiated and conducted in accordance with the ADP Agreement. A claim made under Article 1 may relate to the final anti-dumping measure imposed pursuant to an investigation initiated in a manner inconsistent with the Agreement. Guatemala submits that Mexico did not claim or allege violation of Article 1, did not make any claim about the final measure, did not show that the provisional measure had a significant impact, and did not claim or allege violation of Article 7.1. Consequently, Guatemala requests the Panel to reject Mexico's claims relating to the initiation of the investigation. 

4.57 Mexico notes that according to Guatemala, Article 17.4 of the ADP Agreement provides that only three types of measure may be challenged in the anti-dumping context: (a) a provisional measure; (b) a final measure; or (c) a price undertaking. Mexico submits that this assertion is based on two totally incorrect assumptions: (1) that what is referred to the DSB is the measure (not the matter) and (2) that Mexico's claim was based on the first sentence of Article 17.4 when in fact it was based on the second sentence of Article 17.4. Following the same logic as Guatemala, though on a correct basis (i.e. that Mexico lodged its claim under the second sentence of Article 17.4), Mexico submits that the initiation of an anti-dumping investigation constitutes a measure for the purposes of Article 19.1 of the DSU. In the second sentence of Article 17.4 (unlike the first sentence, which mentions two of the three measures referred to by Guatemala), it is established that when a Member "considers that the [provisional] measure was taken contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 7, that Member may also refer such matter to the DSB". Since Article 7.1(i) of the ADP Agreement refers explicitly to the initiation of an investigation, Mexico argues that initiation constitutes a part of the matter referred to the DSB. According to Mexico, the only difference between the first and the second sentences is that, for the matter to be submitted to the DSB, the first sentence requires the application of either of the two measures stated (final measure or price undertaking), whereas the second requires only application of the provisional measure. However, in both cases the matter may include any violation of the ADP Agreement, including those related to the initiation of an investigation. 

4.58 Mexico suggests that, from a practical point of view, it is illogical to assume that the initiation of an investigation may not be the subject of the remedy provided for in Article 19.1 of the DSU. Such an assumption would imply that the initiation of any investigation would be exempt from the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism and that the second sentence of Article 17.4 of the ADP Agreement is totally inoperative. If the initiation of an investigation is not regarded as a measure, then it could never be submitted to a panel since the latter would be unable to make any recommendations thereon, even though Article 17.4 of the ADP Agreement allows any Member to refer such a matter to the DSB. Furthermore, if the second sentence of Article 17.4 referred only to provisional measures, it would be inoperative because the time needed for consultations, the establishment of a panel and the panel report would in all cases exceed the maximum period allowed between the preliminary and final determinations in an anti-dumping investigation. In other words, by the time the panel's findings on a provisional measure were issued, the measure would have been replaced by a definitive measure which could not have been examined by the panel because it was issued after the panel was established. Mexico submits that both Article 17 of the ADP Agreement and Appendix 2 and Article 7.1 of the DSU refer to the "matter", and not the "measures", as in cases other than anti-dumping. Although the initiation of an anti-dumping investigation constitutes a "measure" for the purposes of Article 19.1, it remains a "matter" for the purposes of Article 17.4 of the ADP Agreement and Article 7.1 of the DSU. "Matter" is a broader concept than "measure", and includes the latter without coming into contradiction with it. Accordingly, Mexico submits that Article 19.1 of the DSU applies to the case under examination. 

4.59 Guatemala notes that Mexico's complaint was brought by virtue of the second sentence of Article 17.4 of the ADP Agreement, because the "matter" (i.e. the "claims" referring to the measure specified in the application) mentioned in Article 17.4 is the same as the "matter" that was the subject of the request for consultations under Article 17.3. Mexico admits that the "matter" on which the consultations were held did not include the claims concerning the final measure, because at the time the final measure had not been issued. As long as the final measure had not been issued, there was no way to comply with the requirements in Article 17.4 whereby the Member that requested consultations in respect of that matter should consider that the consultations "have failed to achieve a mutually agreed solution," simply because the final measure was not part of the consultations and is not one of the claims included in the matter submitted to the Panel for examination. In short, only the claims which challenge the provisional measure constitute the matter at issue in this case, and consequently, only the second sentence of Article 17.4 is relevant to the request for the establishment of this Panel. 

4.60 Guatemala also argues that it is not true that the initiation of the investigation and the provisional measure could not be the subject of consultations or could not properly be examined by a panel. Guatemala considers both to be possible, provided the complaining Member meets the prerequisites laid down in the second sentence of Article 17.4 of the ADP Agreement. In other words, once significant impact has been established, if the complaining party invokes the violation of Article 7.1 (concerning the initiation), it is possible to hold consultations under Article 17.3 and then to request the establishment of a panel to examine the provisional measure. If the examination is favourable to the complainant, the panel may recommend that the provisional measure be brought into conformity with the Agreement; in short, this would be the means by which to remedy the significant impact claimed by the complainant. In fact, the panel may remedy the repercussion caused by a provisional measure even where a Member has not challenged the final measure, and may also do so when the Member has challenged both the provisional measure and the final measure and the panel concludes that the final measure was issued in conformity with the Agreement. 

4.61 Guatemala argues that while Mexico is concerned that the examination of the provisional measure might be inoperative when the Panel produces its report, and is therefore insisting that the initiation of the investigation should be given the status of a measure that can be challenged in itself, the fact is that the ADP Agreement does provide for the examination of a provisional measure when its trade impact so justifies. In this particular case, Mexico was somewhat hasty in bringing the dispute when the provisional measure was not causing an impact that justified such premature action, undoubtedly in an unsuccessful attempt to prevent Guatemala from imposing the final measure. Moreover, Mexico's concern confirms that the challenge of a provisional measure is exceptional and that the exporting Member should only challenge a provisional measure when its impact is such that it simply cannot await the final measure. If Mexico, in these proceedings, had invoked and demonstrated significant impact, and it did not, the way would be clear for it to invoke and demonstrate the violations allegedly committed by the investigating authority under Article 7, paragraph 1. 

4.62 Guatemala maintains that Article 17.4 of the ADP Agreement identifies in a concrete and exhaustive manner the measures that can be subject to examination: the provisional measure, the price undertaking and the final measure. Guatemala submits that Article 1 of the ADP Agreement supports its position that the initiation of the investigation is not a measure. Indeed, within the same sentence Article 1 of the ADP Agreement speaks of the "anti?dumping measure" and stipulates that the said measure shall be applied pursuant to investigations initiated. What is more, if the initiation were a "measure," Article 17.4 would clearly indicate the necessary conditions for referring the "initiation measure" (as part of the "matter" on which the consultations were held) to the DSB. The fact is, Article 17.4 does not in any way provide for the establishment of a panel to examine the initiation of an investigation. 

4.63 Mexico also notes that Article 17.3 of the Spanish version of the ADP Agreement establishes clearly that if a Member considers that an "acci�n", not a "measure", by another Member nullifies or impairs any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under the ADP Agreement or that the achievement of any objective is being impeded, that Member may request consultations with a view to reaching a mutually satisfactory resolution of the matter. Mexico states that it is plain from this text that nowhere does the ADP Agreement establish that only measures may be the subject of consultations. The ADP Agreement establishes that consultations may concern any action by another party which violates the rights of the exporting party, i.e. actions both at the initiation stage and in the course of the investigation. Consequently, in the present dispute and for the purposes of Article 17 of the ADP Agreement and Article 7.1 of the DSU, Mexico submits that the term "action"/"acci�n" should be used instead of the "measures" used by Guatemala. According to Mexico, to do otherwise would be to distort the intent of the authors of both these instruments in drafting the above Articles. 

4.64 Guatemala, in noting Mexico's argument concerning the word "acci�n", observes that the terminological difference pointed out by Mexico is simply a superficial difference without substantive effect. In any case, for the purposes of interpretation Guatemala refers to Article 33.1 of the Vienna Convention, which stipulates that when a treaty has been authenticated in two or more languages, the text is equally authoritative in each language, unless the treaty provides or the parties agree that, in case of divergence, a particular text shall prevail. The Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO and the Multilateral Agreements in Annex thereto were produced in Spanish, French and English, with the indication that each text was equally authentic. Thus, in order to interpret the meaning, or rather the lack of meaning, of the word "acci�n", the Panel may, in its examination of Article 17.3 of the ADP Agreement, refer to the English and French versions. In this regard, Guatemala cites United States - Procurement of a Sonar Mapping System ²⁴, in which the panel used the French and Spanish texts of the Tokyo Round Code on Government Procurement to interpret the English version. Moreover, Article 33.3 of the Vienna Convention stipulates that "the terms of the Treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic text". Thus, the word "acci�n" used in the Spanish version, which does not appear in the English and French versions, is a mere anomaly without relevance to the case at issue. Without prejudice to this fact, it is possible that the translator may have included the word "acci�n" as a way of rounding out the concept without actually contradicting the other language versions since the "action" of the investigating authority will ultimately acquire concrete form or expression in the adoption of measures. According to Guatemala, the three language versions refer to measures of the ADP Agreement. This conclusion is supported by Article 33.4 of the Vienna Convention, which stipulates that the meaning which best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the Treaty, shall be adopted. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention also stipulates that a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. Guatemala notes that Article 17.3 of the ADP Agreement and Article 4.4 of the DSU establish that only the "measure" identified in the application and the claims relating to that measure which make up the "matter at issue" may be the subject of consultations. According to Guatemala, therefore, the word "acci�n" in the Spanish version is meaningless. 

4.65 Mexico notes Guatemala's argument that to be able to bring the initiation of an investigation before a panel, the complaining Member must either contest the final measure pursuant to Article 1, or contest the provisional measure pursuant to Articles 1 or 7.1. According to Mexico, this argument is unjustified from the point of view of both the substance and the accuracy of the reasoning. As regards substance, Mexico contends that claims concerning the initiation of an investigation must be made in respect of the provisions of the ADP Agreement concerning the initiation of investigations, and not in respect of Article 7. Article 7, paragraph 1(i) simply recalls that one of the conditions for applying provisional measures is the initiation of the investigation in accordance with the provisions of Article 5 of the Agreement. According to Mexico, Article 7.1(i) does not itself contain the substantive provisions which define a challenge to the initiation of an investigation. Mexico submits that the accuracy of Guatemala's argument is also faulty, since Mexico did indeed cite Article 7 of the ADP Agreement in the request for the establishment of a panel, as well as in the other documents submitted by Mexico to the Panel. 

4.66 Guatemala contends that Mexico's request for establishment of a panel does not cite either the first or second sentences of Article 17.4 of the ADP Agreement, and does not cite paragraph 1 of Article 7. The ordinary meaning of the text clearly indicates that in the case of a final measure or a price undertaking, the drafter is not imposing, as a prerequisite, either a trade impact or the violation of Article 7.1, while any dispute concerning a provisional measure is, by its exceptional character, subject to those two requirements. In its request for establishment of a panel, Mexico did not bring any claim based on paragraph 1 of Article 7 of the ADP Agreement, and this omission cannot be corrected in its written submissions to the Panel. Because it failed to cite these legal provisions or invoke the violation of Article 7.1 in compliance with the prerequisites laid down in Article 17.4 of the ADP Agreement, Guatemala requests that the Panel reject Mexico's complaint. 

4.67 Guatemala further states that Mexico recognized in its rebuttal that "the final measure was not included in the request for the establishment of a panel" and also recognized that the final measure "in itself is not challenged." ²⁵ Consequently, even if Mexico had invoked the violation of Article 1 on the grounds that the initiation did not comply with the legal requirements, the Panel would not have the mandate to examine the final measure. Moreover, Guatemala notes that Mexico's oral submission at the First Meeting stated that "Mexico did not in any way request that the final determination of Guatemala's anti-dumping investigation should be considered by this Panel. The reason being that the final determination was not a topic discussed in the consultations held with Guatemala." In other words, if this Panel were to rule on the final measure, it would be violating its obligation to examine only those measures in respect of which there has been an opportunity to achieve a mutually agreed solution. 

5. Whether certain claims were in the request for establishment and are before the Panel.

 4.68 Guatemala asserts that seven claims were not included in Mexico's request for the establishment of a panel, and therefore fall outside the Panel's terms of reference. Guatemala's objections relate to Mexico's claims: 

• that Guatemala failed to give adequate consideration to the increase in imports from Cruz Azul; 
•  that Guatemala failed to give adequate consideration to the fall in the price of the domestic product; 
•  that Guatemala failed to give adequate consideration to the loss of customers; 
• that Guatemala failed to give adequate consideration to the likelihood of an imminent increase in Mexican exports to Guatemala; 
• that Guatemala violated Articles 6.1, 6.2 and 6.8 of the ADP Agreement by not accepting the technical accounting evidence regarding the normal value and the export price charged by the exporter during the original investigation; 
• that Guatemala violated Articles 6.5.1 and 6.5.2 of the ADP Agreement by accepting confidential information from Cementos Progreso without demanding a public version thereof, or the reasons why confidential treatment was required; and 
• that Guatemala violated Articles 6.1 and 6.2 of the ADP Agreement by failing to establish specific time-limits for Cruz Azul to submit information in defence of its interests. 

4.69 According to Guatemala, the ADP Agreement contains special provisions for the settlement of disputes which are applicable solely to anti-dumping cases. The rules of the Tokyo Round Anti-Dumping Code - which preceded the ADP Agreement, and which contained similar provisions on this subject - were interpreted by panels to mean that, in the request for the establishment of a panel in a dispute concerning anti-dumping, the complainant was obliged to describe the individual claims in more specific detail than was normally required under the general provisions of the GATT dispute settlement system. Thus, Guatemala recalls that the Appellate Body relied on the following interpretation adopted by panels under the Tokyo Round Anti-Dumping Code:

"The "matter" referred to a panel for consideration consists of the specific claims stated by the parties to the dispute in the relevant documents specified in the terms of reference. We agree with the approach taken in previous adopted panel reports that a matter, which includes the claims composing that matter, does not fall within a panel's terms of reference unless the claims are identified in the documents referred to or contained in the terms of reference." ²⁶

4.71 According to Guatemala, panels convened to deal with anti-dumping cases have considered that under the Tokyo Round Anti-Dumping Code, the terms of reference of a panel must satisfy two objectives: "[1] definition of the scope of a panel proceeding, and [2] provision of notice to the defending Party and other Parties that could be affected by the panel decision and the outcome of the dispute." ³¹ In order to satisfy those objectives, each individual claim composing the matter must be identified in the written communication(s) referred to or contained in the terms of reference of the panel. In other words, individual claims would have to be specified in the document requesting the establishment of a panel. ³² In support of this position, Guatemala stresses that the document defining the terms of reference is prepared by the complainant. ³³ Thus, in order for an individual claim to be examined by a panel, it must fall within the latter's terms of reference and to that end must have been specifically identified in the request for the establishment of a panel.  

16. Guatemala notes that the EC stated in a meeting of the GATT Anti-Dumping Committee that the initiation of an investigation is not equivalent to a "measure". ADP/M/40, para 242 (15 September 1993).

17. EC - Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Cotton Yarn from Brazil, ADP/137, paras. 1 and 6, adopted on 30 October 1995.

18. MTN.GNG/NG8/W/55, page 10 of the English text (13 October 1989).

19. Ibid, pages 10-11 of the English text.

20. MTN.GNG/NG8/W/64, page 10 of the English text (22 December 1989).

21. MTN.GNG/NG8/W/76, page 5 of the English text (11 April 1990).

22. MTN.GNG/NG8/15, page 55 of the English text (19 March 1990).

23. Guatemala notes that Members may hold informal consultations at any time on any aspect of the anti-dumping procedure.

24. United States - Procurement of a Sonar Mapping System, GPR.DS1/R, not adopted, para. 4.18, dated 23 April 1992.

25. As originally submitted, Mexico's rebuttal stated that "the final measure was not included in the request for the establishment of a panel", and "the final measure in itself is not challenged". Mexico submitted a corrigendum to its rebuttal, correcting its argument to read "the final determination was not included in the request for the establishment of a panel", and "the final determination in itself is not challenged".

26. Report of the Appellate Body, Brazil - Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut, DS22/AB/R, page 22, adopted on 21 February 1997.

27. Guatemala refers to United States - Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from Norway, ADP/87, paragraph 332, adopted on 27 April 1994. See also EC - Anti-Dumping Duties on Audio Tapes in Cassettes Originating in Japan, ADP/136, paragraph 295, not adopted, dated 28 April 1995.

28. Report of the Appellate Body, Brazil - Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut, DS22/AB/R, page 22, adopted on 21 February 1997.

29. In support of its argument, Guatemala refers to United States - Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from Norway, ADP/87, paragraph 332, adopted on 27 April 1994; United States-Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from Norway, SCM/153, paragraph 212, adopted on 28 April 1994; EC - Anti-Dumping Duties on Audio Tapes in Cassettes Originating in Japan, ADP/136, paragraph 295, not adopted, dated 28 April 1995. Guatemala particularly points to the decision of the panel in United States - Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from Norway, rejecting Norway's definition of the "matter" in dispute as "the imposition of anti-dumping duties by the United States on imports of Atlantic salmon". According to the panel (para. 342):

"The logical implication of the definition advanced by Norway of the 'matter' before the Panel was that whenever a panel was established in a dispute concerning the imposition of anti-dumping duties, such a panel could examine any aspect of the procedures followed and determinations made by the investigating authorities of the party which had imposed the anti-dumping duties, regardless of whether that aspect had been referred to in the complaining party's request for the establishment of a panel. There would therefore be practically no limit to the claims which could be raised before a panel without any advance notice to the defending party or to third parties."

31. United States Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from Norway, ADP/87, paragraph 336, adopted on 27 April 1994; United States - Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from Norway, SCM/153, paragraph 208, adopted on 28 April 1994; EC - Anti-Dumping Duties on Audio Tapes and Cassettes Originating in Japan , ADP/136, paragraph 297, not adopted, dated 28 April 1995. The panel in EC -Anti-Dumping Duties on Audio Tapes and Cassettes Originating in Japan found that "the notice function of terms of reference was particularly important in providing the basis for each Party to determine how its interests might be affected and whether it would wish to exercise its right to participate in a dispute as an interested third party."

32. EC - Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton Yarn from Brazil, ADP/137, paragraph 450, adopted on 30 October 1995; United States - Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from Norway, ADP/87, paragraph 336, adopted on 27 April 1994; United States - Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from Norway, SCM/153, paragraph 208, adopted on 28 April 1994; EC - Anti-Dumping Duties on Audio Tapes and Cassettes Originating in Japan, ADP/136, paragraph 303, not adopted, dated 28 April 1995.

33. United States - Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from Norway, ADP/87, paragraph 336, adopted on 27 April 1994.