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UNITED STATES - DEFINITIVE SAFEGUARD MEASURES (Continuation)
(a) The Safeguard Measure
(i) The US measure does not comply with Articles XIII or XIX nor does it comply
with the requirements of Article 5
(1) The requirements of Article XIII and Article 5 must be read as a whole
4.165 The proper interpretation of the Agreement on Safeguards and Article XIII
must proceed from the fact that the WTO is a single treaty. As such, all of the
provisions of the treaty must apply with full force and effect. Article II:2 of
the WTO Agreement expressly manifests the intention of the Uruguay Round
negotiators that the provisions of the WTO Agreements and the Multilateral Trade
Agreements included in its Annexes 1, 2 and 3 must be read as a whole. Moreover,
as the Appellate Body properly notes in Argentina - Footwear, the General
Interpretative Note to Annex IA provides that "[i]n the event of conflict
between a provision of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 and a
provision of another agreement in Annex 1A ... the provision of the other
agreement shall prevail to the extent of the conflict." In this case, the United
States has not alleged, nor does there exist, a conflict between any of the
provisions of Article XIII, which regulates tariff-rate quotas ("TRQs"), and the
provisions of Article 5. The Preamble to the SA states that the object and
purpose of the SA is to "clarify and reinforce the disciplines of GATT 1994."
While Article XIX is specifically mentioned, it is not exclusively mentioned -
all of the disciplines of GATT 1994 are incorporated.
4.166 The United States seeks to make much of the fact that Article 5 does not
include each concept contained in Article XIII and essentially argues that the
"intent" of the negotiators was to "exclude" certain obligations and rights
contained in Article XIII. Korea submits that, the determination of the "intent"
of the negotiators is unknowable and equivocal except as to the extent that the
negotiators did know, based on the Note to Annex 1A, that the GATT Agreements
and GATT 1994 would be read together except in the case of a conflict.
(2) Article 5.1: TRQs are quantitative restrictions
4.167 Korea observes that the US position has been to rely on one Article of the
GATT 1994, Article XI, to define a quantitative restriction, and to dismiss
another Article of the GATT 1994, Article XIII, on the grounds that Article XIII
has, in essence, been superseded by Article 5. The United States, however, never
clarifies why only one Article of the GATT 1994 was superseded, rather than both
Articles or neither.
(3) The US measure is a TRQ: The overall limit should have been set in
accordance with Article 5.1 and Article XIII
4.168 It is absurd to suggest, as the United States does, that the determination
of whether a measure is a TRQ depends upon whether it has been legally and
properly constructed by a Member. This reasoning is circular and would allow a
Member to evade all of the requirements of Article XIII by circumventing certain
requirements of Article XIII. Moreover, not all TRQs must have a fixed overall
amount. Article XIII.2(a) provides for fixing the overall amount of the quota
"wherever practicable." For example, import licenses are contemplated as an
alternative to an overall quota. The United States has not given an adequate
justification of why the President concluded it was impracticable when the ITC
Majority found it "practicable" to fix an overall limit of the quota element of
the TRQ.
(4) Article 5.2(a): TRQs are "quotas" within the meaning of 5.2(a)
4.169 The plain meaning of "quota" applies to both "straight" quotas and tariff
quotas.
4.170 When only tariffs are imposed, Article I requires that they be applied on
an MFN basis, at the same level for all suppliers. However, when "quotas" are
applied, Article XIII.2(d) requires that they be allocated in accordance with a
Member's proportional share during a representative period. In other words, the
same quotas cannot be given to each supplier regardless of their historical
share. The reason is that "discrimination" takes on a different meaning for
quotas than it does for tariffs. For this reason, Article XIII.2 requires that
historical trade patterns should not be disrupted.
4.171 Similarly, a tariff combined with a quota does not have the same impact on
trade as a straight tariff: the set quantity can enter at the bound rate, which
impacts the degree to which trade will be affected by the tariff. There is an
implicit cost preference for imports under the "quota" at the bound rates.
(ii) Regardless of the type of measure, the measure violates Article XIX:I and
Articles 5.1 and 7.1 because the measure was not limited to the extent and the
time necessary to remedy the injury and allow adjustment
(1) What the United States really means by ex post facto reasoning
4.172 The United States maintains that the Appellate Body decision in Korea -
Dairy Safeguard permits them to provide: "ex post justification of why the
measure was permissible at the time of application." (Korea does not agree with
this interpretation. Moreover, Korea submits that the United States has not even
provided an "ex post" explanation of its remedy.) The absurdity of US
speculation about what "might" have justified a 19 per cent TRQ highlights the
dangers of a standard which allows Members to "make it up as they go along." A
"requirement" which can be so easily sidestepped is no requirement at all and
reads the prescriptions of Article 5.1 ("to the extent necessary"). As discussed
below, the US argument hinges on an overly broad reading of Korea - Dairy
Safeguard.
(2) The meaning of Korea - Dairy Safeguard and the obligations of Article 5.1
4.173 Korea believes that the decision of the Appellate Body in Korea - Dairy
Safeguard should be considered in its proper legal context. The issue before the
Appellate Body was whether Article 5.1, by its terms, required a specific
finding that the measure, in that case a quantitative restriction, was
"necessary." While the Appellate Body rejected the broad language of the Panel
with respect to the obligations of Article 5.1, the holding did not extend past
the question presented: the extent of the obligation to justify a quantitative
restriction if the relief imposed is consistent or inconsistent with the import
average during the representative three years.
4.174 Korea reiterates that the holding in Korea - Dairy Safeguard applies to
this case because the US measure is a quantitative restriction in the form of a TRQ. Therefore, the United States must demonstrate either that the measure did
not reduce imports below the last three representative years or should have
demonstrated that such additional import restriction was "necessary."
(3) Article 5.1 imposes an obligation even if the measure is not a TRQ
4.175 Significantly, the Appellate Body also observed that Article 5.1 imposed
an obligation that applies regardless of the particular form of the safeguard
measure.
(i) An explicit justification in the determination itself was required in this
case
4.176 When the competent authorities make explicit findings that certain levels
of relief are "sufficient" and others are "excessive," the Member has an
affirmative obligation to explain why a distinctly harsher measure is
"necessary."
(ii) Korea's prima facie case that the safeguard measure exceeded what was
"necessary"
4.177 Even if this obligation is read narrowly - not requiring a separate and
explicit justification - the justification nonetheless must be found in the
decision-making. Korea sees none. Korea's inferential evidence of the intended
impact of the President's measure is as follows:
(1) Total "in-quota" imports were projected to be approximately 63,000 short
tons (based on seven significant suppliers). (Current data shows total
"in-quota" imports of 64,067 tons.)
(2) Very limited "out-of-quota" imports could be expected at the 19 per cent
tariff level:
(i) The duty imposed was 6 to 10 times the level of the bound rate.
(ii) Each supplying country could supply 9,000 short tons at bound rates.
(iii) Two very significant suppliers (Canada and Mexico) were not controlled.
(iv) Imported and domestic line pipe were highly substitutable.
(v) The US industry had substantial unused capacity and US capacity exceeded
consumption.
(3) Total imports, excluding Canada and Mexico, equalled 78,671 tons from March
2000-February 2001. Of that total, only 14,604 tons entered at the 19 per cent
duty rate. In-quota imports totaled 64,067 tons.
(4) The only economic analysis undertaken for the purpose of meeting obligations
under Article 5.1 were the Economic Memoranda.
4.178 All of these facts demonstrate that the very significant level of import
restriction should have been anticipated and that the President's measure
exceeded what the ITC identified as "necessary."
4.179 If the United States has confidential data to demonstrate that the
President's measure would not have reduced imports below the 151,124-ton level
defined by the ITC as "necessary," the United States should provide it. Korea
submits that in the absence of an affirmative demonstration by the United States
of its "intended level," or a US denial accompanied by evidence that the
restricted level was below that intended by the measure, the actual level of
imports is the best evidence of the import target level of the measure.
(iii) Burden of proof on the issue of whether the measure was in conformity with
the requirements of Article 5.1
4.180 First, Korea believes that it is the obligation of the United States, in
accordance with Article 5.1 and read together with Articles 3.1 and 4.2(c), to
demonstrate, in its published report, that the measure was necessary. The US
obligation in this respect is freestanding and the US failure to meet it is a
violation in itself.
4.181 Neither the Proclamation nor supporting memorandum provide any analysis or
justification for the measure. Korea notes, however, that in its letter of 23
April, the United States has conceded that there are additional memoranda and
documents of both a confidential and non-confidential nature, which accompanied
the President's decision. However, according to the United States, those
documents are either "redundant" or can, at the whim of the United States, be
withheld on the grounds that they are inconsistent with the President's final
decision.
4.182 Based on the inferential evidence discussed above, Korea believes that it
has met its burden establishing a prima facie case that the President's measure
was excessive and in violation of Article 5.1. The United States has not
demonstrated (or even attempted to demonstrate) that the measure was necessary,
or that the level of import restriction which resulted from the measure was the
level intended.
(iv) Article 5.1 imposes a continuing obligation
4.183 The obligation only to apply safeguard measures to the extent necessary is
an ongoing obligation. This is confirmed by the language of Article 5.1: "shall
apply." In this case, actual import data confirm that the measure as imposed is
"excessive" since it is far below the level of 151,124 short tons found to be
"necessary" by the ITC Majority. Given that the measure as applied exceeds "the
extent necessary," it must be withdrawn or liberalized in accordance with
Article 7.4. The United States is currently conducting a "mid-term" review in
this case under Section 204 of the 1974 Trade Act, which allows the President to
"reduce, modify, or terminate" the measure. Korea urges the Panel to provide
guidance and instruction to the United States regarding necessary modification
or termination.
(v) The obligations of Article 5.1 have to be read together with the obligations
imposed by Articles 3.1 and 4.2(c)
4.184 Article 3.1 imposes an independent obligation requiring that the
investigation, findings, and conclusions of the competent authorities must
demonstrate the legal and factual basis for the measure. Also, Article 5.1 is
textually related to Article 4.2(c) since the "necessary" level must be to
alleviate the serious injury contained in the "detailed analysis."
(vi) The United States violated Article 2 and provisions of Articles I, XIII:1
and XIX by exempting Canada and Mexico from the measure
(1) The proper interpretation of Footnote 1: The Appellate Body in Argentina -
Footwear
4.185 Korea's position is that it is impossible to read the Appellate Body
opinion as providing that the last sentence of Footnote 1 is separate from the
rest of Footnote, as the United States appears to argue. Footnote 1 does not
apply to actions by a single country, such as the United States, rather than a
customs union.
4.186 Korea does not understand the US argument to be that Article XXIV,
standing alone, provides the United States with a "defense" to the violation of
Article 2.2. In any event, this position is not supportable because the
"defense" would be "invoked" only on a case-by-case basis under the structure of
NAFTA. Moreover, the United States would have to overcome the hurdles to such a
defense presented by the General Interpretive Note to Annex 1A of the GATT 1994:
that Article 2.2 prevails over Article XXIV to the extent of any conflict.
(b) The ITC Investigation of Increased Imports, Serious Injury, and Causation
(i) The US measure is inconsistent with Article XIX and Article 2 because
imports did not increase suddenly, sharply and recently
4.187 The United States maintains that the two six-month periods (the last 12
months) analysis is "arbitrary," "crafted," and "contrived." Further, the United
States argues that the ITC did not collect or assess data on a six-month basis
in 1998. The US argument fails since the data was available for imports as well
as for injury indicators and the legitimacy of such a "two-period" analysis has
already been demonstrated by the ITC itself. The most recent data, by
definition, are the most relevant data. The US position that "a one year period
would hardly suffice" is incorrect and specifically contradicted by the
Appellate Body admonition in Argentina - Footwear against the use of "any other
period of several years." The "recent period" is the last one-year period of the
investigation and a decline in the interim six-month period would constitute the
most relevant evidence in the recent period.
4.188 The need for such a precise legal standard was justified by the Appellate
Body on the grounds that Article XIX is an extraordinary remedy dealing with
fair trade: "when construing the prerequisites for taking such actions, their
extraordinary nature must be taken into account." This is not to say that only
one year of data should be collected. Rather, in analyzing the data received,
the focus of the investigation for purposes of assessing whether imports of
subject merchandise entered "in such increased quantities ... and under such
conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury," must be the most
recent one-year period.
(1) Absolute increase
4.189 The United States can no longer dispute that absolute import trends showed
a decline for 12 months beginning in the second half of 1998. The US 16 February
Letter clearly demonstrates that the public data (which includes Arctic and
alloy products) does not accurately represent the imports of subject merchandise
in the first and second halves of 1998 and 1999.
(2) Relative increase
4.190 The United States repeatedly asserts - incorrectly - that imports relative
to production were at their highest in the first half of 1999. Having said this,
the United States has not directly disputed that imports relative to production
declined in the first half of 1999 relative to the second half of 1998. Indeed,
this is an incontrovertible fact.
(ii) The United States failed to demonstrate that the US line pipe industry was
suffering serious injury as required by Article XIX and Articles 3.1, 4.1 and
4.2
(1) The United States did not satisfy the requirements of Articles 3.1 and
4.2(c)
4.191 The Appellate Body in Argentina - Footwear read Articles 3.1 and 4.2(c) to
require that the authorities adequately explain how they came to the conclusions
that they did and to specify the data relied on to reach those conclusions of
fact and law. The Appellate Body in US - Lamb Meat confirmed this. Korea is not
arguing that the decisions of the ITC must be unanimous, but rather that the
data relied on and the conclusions reached were inconsistent and, therefore, had
to be reconciled.
4.192 In Korea's view, the US position that the difference between "threat" and
current injury is merely a question of "degree" and "timing" is surprising. The
industry is either seriously injured and significantly impaired or it is not, as
the Appellate Body recognized in US - Lamb Meat. The United States simply
retorts that "the Commissioners did not reach contrary findings of fact." But
the data relied on and the conclusions reached were inconsistent. As these
contrary findings were not reconciled, the requirements of Articles 3.1, 4.1 and
4.2 are not met.
(2) The data is flawed since it includes data from other industries
(i) "The line pipe industry"
4.193 Articles 2.1 and 4.1(c) provide that the industry should be defined as the
producers of the like or directly competitive products. The ITC's failure to
ensure that the effects from the downturns in the OCTG market did not infect the
data regarding line pipe made the relied on data unusable for purposes of
Article 4.2(a) injury factors.
(ii) Geneva and Lone Star
4.194 In Korea's view, the US statement regarding Geneva is not responsive to
the question posed by the Panel for the very reasons observed by Commissioner
Crawford. Specifically:
(1) The reference used by the United States that "Geneva did not produce other
products in the facilities where line pipe was made" is a reference to the Staff
Report in which they are referring to production of other pipe products.
(2) The problem was that Geneva shut down one of its blast furnaces and
attributed the shutdown to the line pipe market. That shutdown, however, was
driven by circumstances in its principal markets: hot-rolled coil and plate.
4.195 The ITC improperly accepted mere assertions by the domestic industry
witnesses regarding Geneva. In the case of dual-stencilled line pipe from Korea,
however, the ITC insisted that the precise quantity had to be established. The
ITC considered that the less exact data was unusable. Such a difference in
standards on two similar issues cannot be justified.
4.196 Moreover, with respect to Lone Star, it turns out that Commissioner
Crawford was correct: the result of Lone Star's allocation of SG&A was to
"substantially reduce" the operating income of both Lone Star and the industry
as a whole.
4.197 Finally, Korea notes that the United States essentially admits that the
other Commissioners did not address Geneva or Lone Star issues.
(iii) The cost allocations artificially lowered the profitability of the line
pipe industry
4.198 The data for Lone Star confirms Korea's position that the data, if
properly analyzed for line pipe alone, reveals significantly different financial
results for the industry. This issue was not sufficiently investigated and
resolved as required by Article 3.1 and 4.2.
4.199 With respect to the question of whether shipments of OCTG fell
disproportionately to shipments of line pipe in the period from late-1998 to
late-1999, Exhibit 48C presented by Korea at the First Substantive Meeting
demonstrates that the US statement is incorrect. With respect to the US position
that fixed costs, such as overhead and SG&A, are relatively insignificant, one
adjustment by one producer alone - Lone Star - increases industry profitability
by as much as 33 per cent according to the United States. The potential impact
of "over"-allocated SG&A and fixed overhead for every producer which produced
OCTG and line pipe can safely be assumed to be significant.
(c) The Downturn in the Industry's Condition Was Temporary and Improving at the
End of the Period
4.200 The United States insists that injury occurred in 1998 and interim 1999.
However, Korea notes that the ITC Majority Opinion and Separate Views on Injury
relied on the second half of 1998 and the first half of 1999 as the period of
injury. Korea believes that the Panel should clarify this point with the United
States. In addition, the United States has not responded to Korea's point about
the significance of the fact that two new producers entered the line pipe
industry. Korea believes that this evidence, together with the evidence on
overall industry capital expenditures, confirms that the US industry also
understood that the "downturn" was isolated and temporary.
4.201 The United States maintains that the improvement of the industry at the
end of the period, does not prevent a finding of serious injury. Korea recalls
the decision of the Panel in US - Wheat Gluten to the effect that the most
relevant period is the end of the period because Article 2.1 requires that the
industry must be suffering serious injury when the measure is imposed. The
United States maintains that the evidence concerning the upturn in the industry
is "only anecdotal." The United States ignores the fact that evidence of this
upturn was specifically cited by the ITC Commissioners and formed the basis for
the remedy recommendation of both the Majority Opinion and Separate Views on
Injury.
4.202 The United States also argues that the price increase data is
"extra-record" information. Korea has demonstrated in its written submission in
response to the US request to exclude certain data that this information was on
the ITC record at the injury stage. The United States is also contradicted by
record information with respect to the $25-$30 price increase. The price
increase was not due to rising raw material prices. Finally, as noted in Korea's
First Written Submission, announced price increases totaled $80/ton by the time
of the ITC decision (as noted by Respondents and Commissioner Crawford). This
evidence indicates that the industry was no longer suffering injury as required
by Articles 2.1 and 4.1(b).
(d) The United States Failed to Demonstrate a Causal Relationship Between
Increased Imports and Serious Injury in Violation of Article XIX and Article 4
(i) There was no coincidence of trends between imports and the performance of
the domestic industry
4.203 The United States argues that a coincidence of trends is not required for
a finding of causation. Yet, the Panel and the Appellate Body in Argentina -
Footwear were quite clear on this point.
4.204 The United States now argues to the Panel that the facts explain why the
trends did not coincide, but they get the facts wrong:
(1) The information on lag-times contradicts the US position. In fact, most of
the merchandise is sold before the merchandise enters the United States.
(2) The United States is incorrect that the ITC did not compare first half and
second half 1998 data.
(3) The difference in trends between imports and the condition of the domestic
industry is not minor.
(ii) Conditions of competition did not demonstrate that there was a causal
relationship between increased imports and the performance of the industry
(1) Dual-stencilled line pipe
4.205 The ITC did not properly consider the market effect of dual-stencilled
line pipe: that such pipe was actually sold as standard pipe and thus did not
compete with line pipe. The fact that there had been several years of litigation
over the proper classification of such pipe strongly supported the conclusion
that the effect might be very significant.
(2) Imports did not lead down prices
4.206 The United States did not address Korea's argument that the data confirms
that declines in the line pipe industry's profitability were caused principally
by the increase in unit costs rather than a decline in prices for line pipe.
4.207 The United States defence of the ITC's finding relies on three levels of
proof to demonstrate that imports drove down prices and thereby profitability:
(1) Statements in questionnaire responses. However, reliance on such statements
cannot take the place of an analysis of the actual pricing data.
(2) Declines in average unit value ("AUV") data. Average unit import price data
is not reliable because it is based on public data, which includes products
other than the "like product" under investigation.
(3) The ITC's pricing data. This data did not demonstrate that imports led down
prices.
(iii) The pricing data submitted by the United States
4.208 As the United States explained at the First Substantive Meeting, the ITC
Majority did not evaluate the trends in underselling. The pricing data submitted
by the United States confirms that imports did not lead down prices:
(1) Underselling was generally a condition of competition.
(2) In no case did the margin of underselling expand in the period of July 1998
through June 1999 compared to the strongest period of industry health (January
1997 through June 1998).
(3) In the case of Product 5, the data confirms that imports oversold domestic
prices, while in the case of Product 6, domestic prices declined even in the
absence of import competition.
(e) Other Factors Were the Cause of Any Injury
(i) The US methodology conflicts with Article 4.2(b)
4.209 Korea's view is that the focus and sequence of the US evaluation of "other
factors" in this case is inconsistent with Article 4.2(b). The ITC begins with
an analysis of the combined effects of other factors plus imports and determines
whether, all together, they cause "injury." The ITC does not independently
evaluate whether increased imports bear a "substantial and genuine" relationship
to serious injury. The fact that imports may be a greater cause of injury than a
single other factor cannot establish that increased imports caused serious
injury.
4.210 The ITC Majority principally relied on a two-period analysis to evaluate
causation. They compared the period of 1994-1996 with the period of 1998 and the
first half 1999. However, imports did not demonstrate greater growth. Also, the
ITC improperly assumed that the effects of the oil and gas crisis could be
measured in their totality by reference to the level of apparent consumption in
1999. This analysis ignored the very significant fact that there was a 30 per
cent decline in apparent consumption from the first half of 1998 to the first
half of 1999. Furthermore, that decline coincided with a 25 per cent increase in
domestic capacity (on an annualized basis) due to significant new capacity
coming onstream.
4.211 Thus, the ITC failed to properly identify and isolate the effects of all
other "differences" between those two periods, inter alia increased capacity,
declining export markets, and decreasing domestic consumption.
(ii) The United States does not consider the cumulative effect of all other
factors
4.212 Korea notes that the US defense of its causation decision proceeds from a
faulty premise: "the ITC ensures that injury caused by any, or all other factors
together is not sufficient to sever the causal link." The United States, in
fact, does not do this because it is statutorily prevented from doing so. The
only means to assure that injury from other factors (individually or
cumulatively) is not attributed to imports in accordance with Article 4.2(a) is
to "cumulatively" consider all other factors. In this case, the overwhelming
effect of the oil and gas crisis which caused consumption to drop dramatically
from its high in 1997, and the build up of significant "over" capacity by the
domestic industry with the addition of two new producers, the elimination of
export markets, and consequent ferocious domestic competition were all factors
that combined to "so dilute the effects" of imports that imports were no longer
a substantial cause of injury.
(iii) The ITC should have investigated the shift from OCTG to line pipe as an
"other factor"
4.213 With respect to the shift from OCTG to line pipe, the United States has
not properly investigated the issue in accordance with its obligations under
Articles 3 and 4.2(a).
(iv) The safeguard measure was intended to remedy injury caused by other factors
4.214 When several causes result in injury, each factor is only responsible for
the actual injury caused. Therefore, injury must be apportioned between each of
the causes to assure that the injury from other factors is not improperly
"attributed" to imports in violation of Article 4.2. The United States
improperly attributed injury caused by other factors to increased imports in the
remedy recommendation.
(f) The ITC's Threat of Injury Determination Violated Articles 2 and 4 and
Article XIX
4.215 Korea reiterates its argument from its First Written Submission.
(g) The United States Failed to Demonstrate the Unforeseen Developments Which
Lead to the Increased Imports Which Caused Serious Injury
4.216 There is no indication in the ITC's determination that the ITC addressed
the issue of unforeseen developments. Therefore, the ITC determination does not
demonstrate unforeseen developments.
(h) The US Decision Did Not Satisfy the Requirements of Emergency Action of
Article 11 or Article XIX
4.217 The United States seeks to draw an impossible distinction between the
legal basis for a remedy and the remedy itself. Obviously, emergency actions
require emergency circumstances.
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