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UNITED STATES � ANTI-DUMPING ACT OF 1916
AB-2000-5 AB-2000-6
(Continued)
B. Mandatory and Discretionary Legislation
84. In the proceedings before the Panel, the United States invoked the
distinction between mandatory and discretionary legislation41 to make two types of
argument:
� the 1916 Act is non-mandatory legislation within the meaning of the GATT/WTO
practice essentially because (i) with respect to both civil and criminal
proceedings, US courts have interpreted in the past and/or could in the future
interpret the 1916 Act in a manner consistent with the WTO obligations of the
United States and (ii) the US Department of Justice has discretion to initiate
or not criminal proceedings under the 1916 Act.42
85. With respect to the first of these arguments, the Panel concluded:
The question whether the 1916 Act could be or has been interpreted in a way that
would make it fall outside the scope of Article VI is � simply a question of
assessing the current meaning of the law.43
86. As regards the second argument made by the United States, the Panel found:
� the discretion enjoyed by the US Department of Justice to initiate a case
under the 1916 Act should not be interpreted as making the 1916 Act a
non-mandatory law.44
87. On appeal, the United States asks us to reverse the Panel's interpretation
and application of the distinction between mandatory and discretionary
legislation.
88. As indicated above, the concept of mandatory as distinguished from
discretionary legislation was developed by a number of GATT panels as a
threshold consideration in determining when legislation as such - rather than a
specific application of that legislation - was inconsistent with a Contracting
Party's GATT 1947 obligations.45 The practice of GATT panels was summed up in
United States - Tobacco46 as follows:
� panels had consistently ruled that legislation which mandated action
inconsistent with the General Agreement could be challenged as such, whereas
legislation which merely gave the discretion to the executive authority of a
contracting party to act inconsistently with the General Agreement could not be
challenged as such; only the actual application of such legislation inconsistent
with the General Agreement could be subject to challenge.47 (emphasis added)
89. Thus, the relevant discretion, for purposes of distinguishing between
mandatory and discretionary legislation, is a discretion vested in the executive
branch of government.
90. The 1916 Act provides for two types of actions to be brought in a United
States federal court: a civil action initiated by private parties, and a
criminal action initiated by the United States Department of Justice. Turning
first to the civil action, we note that there is no relevant discretion accorded
to the executive branch of the United States' government with respect to such
action.48 These civil actions are brought by private parties. A judge faced with
such proceedings must simply apply the 1916 Act. In consequence, so far as the
civil actions that may be brought under the 1916 Act are concerned, the 1916 Act
is clearly mandatory legislation as that term has been understood for purposes
of the distinction between mandatory and discretionary legislation.
91. The Panel, however, examined that part of the 1916 Act that provides for
criminal prosecutions, and found that the discretion enjoyed by the United
States Department of Justice to initiate or not to initiate criminal proceedings
does not mean that the 1916 Act is a discretionary law.49 In light of the case law
developing and applying the distinction between mandatory and discretionary
legislation50, we believe that the discretion enjoyed by the United States
Department of Justice is not discretion of such a nature or of such breadth as
to transform the 1916 Act into discretionary legislation, as this term has been
understood for purposes of distinguishing between mandatory and discretionary
legislation. We, therefore, agree with the Panel's finding on this point.
92. In any event, we note that, on appeal, the United States does not directly
challenge the Panel's finding that the discretion to enforce the 1916 Act
enjoyed by the United States Department of Justice does not mean that the 1916
Act is discretionary legislation, but instead takes issue with several aspects
of the reasoning employed by the Panel in reaching this conclusion. First,
according to the United States, the Panel erred by "creating" a rule that the
mandatory/discretionary distinction can apply only if the challenged legislation
has never been "applied". In response to our inquiries at the oral hearing, the
United States identified the following statement by the Panel as "creating" such
a rule:
The question whether there could be a possibility to interpret the 1916 Act in
the future so that it would fall outside the scope of Article VI would be
relevant, according to the United States - Tobacco case, only if the 1916 Act
had not yet been applied.51
93. Review of the context in which the above passage appears in the Panel
Reports reveals that the Panel did not, as the United States argues, find that
the distinction between mandatory and discretionary legislation is only relevant
if the challenged legislation has never been applied. Rather,
in response to the United States' argument that the circumstances of the present
cases resemble those in United States - Tobacco , the Panel noted that these
cases are factually different from United States - Tobacco , where no
implementing measures had been adopted and the law had never been applied, and
reasoned that "[t]hese differences have implications for the burden of proof."52
We see no finding by the Panel that the distinction between mandatory and
discretionary legislation is relevant only if the challenged legislation has
never been applied.
94. The United States also takes issue with the Panel's identification and
application of the burden of proof, in particular the Panel's statement that:
� the United States, as the party having raised this defence, failed to supply
convincing evidence that the 1916 Act should be considered as "non-mandatory
legislation" within the meaning of GATT 1947/WTO practice.53 (emphasis added)
95. According to the United States, the Panel erred in characterizing the
distinction between discretionary and mandatory legislation as a "defence" which
the United States bore the burden of proving.
96. In our Reports in United States - Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool
Shirts and Blouses from India54 and European Communities - Hormones55, we found
that a complaining Member bears the burden of bringing forth sufficient evidence
and legal argument to demonstrate that, prima facie , another Member's measure is
inconsistent with a relevant obligation of that other Member under the covered
agreements. Once the complaining Member has done so, the burden shifts to the
defending Member to introduce evidence and legal argument sufficient to rebut
the prima facie case.
97. Our examination of the Panel Reports shows that the Panel correctly
articulated56 and applied57 the burden of proof in the cases before it. The Panel,
in its analysis, found that the European Communities and Japan had satisfied
their respective burdens of proof by establishing a prima facie case that the
1916 Act is, on its face, inconsistent with Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the
Anti-Dumping Agreement . Having so found, the Panel went on to examine the
arguments and evidence presented by the United States to rebut this prima facie
case. One such argument made by the United States was that the 1916 Act is
discretionary legislation. The Panel found that the United States did not supply
persuasive evidence in support of this argument. We are satisfied that, in these
cases, the Panel correctly identified and applied the burden of proof.
98. The United States further claims that, in the Japan Panel Report, the Panel
wrongly concluded, based on the reasoning of the panel in the unadopted European
Communities - Audio Cassettes panel report, that:
� to the extent that Article 18.4 requires the conformity of the 1916 Act with
the Anti-Dumping Agreement as of the date of entry into force of the WTO
Agreement for the United States, the notion of mandatory/non-mandatory
legislation is no longer relevant in determining whether the Panel can or cannot
review the conformity of the 1916 Act with the Anti-Dumping Agreement.58 (emphasis
added)
99. We note that answering the question of the continuing relevance of the
distinction between mandatory and discretionary legislation for claims brought
under the Anti-Dumping Agreement would have no impact upon the outcome of these
appeals, because the 1916 Act is clearly not discretionary legislation, as that
term has been understood for purposes of distinguishing between mandatory and
discretionary legislation. Therefore, we do not find it necessary to consider,
in these cases, whether Article 18.4, or any other provision of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, has supplanted or modified the distinction between mandatory and
discretionary legislation.59 For the same reasons, the Panel did not, in the Japan
Panel Report, need to opine on this issue.60
100. Lastly, we note that, before the Panel and before us, the United States
invoked the distinction between mandatory and discretionary legislation to argue
that the 1916 Act cannot be mandatory legislation because United States' courts
have interpreted or may interpret the 1916 Act in ways that would make it
consistent with the WTO obligations of the United States. As we have seen, in
the case law developed under the GATT 1947, the distinction between mandatory
and discretionary legislation turns on whether there is relevant discretion
vested in the executive branch of government. The United States, however, does
not rely upon the discretion of the executive branch of the United States'
government, but on the interpretation of the 1916 Act by the United States'
courts. In our view, this argument does not relate to the distinction between
mandatory and discretionary legislation.
101. On this point, we agree with the Panel that the question whether the 1916
Act could be or has been interpreted by the United States' courts in a way that
would make it fall outside the scope of Article VI of the GATT 1994 is a matter
of determining the meaning of the law in order to examine its consistency with
the United States' obligations.61 We review, to the extent that it is relevant in
these appeals, the Panel's assessment of the meaning and consistency of the 1916
Act in the following sections of this Report.
102. As a result of the above reasoning, we uphold, to the extent that we have
found it necessary to consider the issue, the Panel's interpretation and
application of the distinction between mandatory and discretionary legislation.
V. Applicability of Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement
to the 1916 Act
103. The Panel found that Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping
Agreement apply to the 1916 Act. With respect to the applicability of Article VI
to the 1916 Act, the Panel concluded:
Having interpreted Article VI of the GATT 1994 in accordance with the Vienna
Convention, we have reached the conclusion that the rules and disciplines of
that article apply to laws that address "dumping" as defined in Article VI:1.
Having examined the text of the 1916 Act, we have found that the transnational
price discrimination test incorporated in that law falls within the definition
of "dumping" of Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994. �62
The Panel further concluded that:
� the applicability of Article VI to the 1916 Act also implies the applicability
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement to the 1916 Act.63
104. The United States appeals these findings. According to the United States,
Article VI of the GATT 1994 applies to a law of a Member only when two criteria
are satisfied: first, the law must impose anti-dumping duties and, second, it
must "specifically target" dumping within the meaning of Article VI:1. The
United States emphasizes that the 1916 Act does not impose anti-dumping duties -
it provides for imprisonment, the imposition of fines or an award of treble
damages. Moreover, the United States argues that the 1916 Act does not
"specifically target" dumping, but rather predatory pricing. The United States,
therefore, maintains that Article VI and, by implication, the
Anti-Dumping Agreement, do not apply to the 1916 Act.
105. Article VI of the GATT 1994 concerns "dumping". "Dumping" is defined in
Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994 and further elaborated in Article 2 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement . The first sentence of Article VI:1 defines "dumping" as
conduct:
� by which products of one country are introduced into the commerce of another
country at less than the normal value of the products �
106. The second and third sentences of Article VI:1 state:
For the purposes of this Article, a product is to be considered as being
introduced into the commerce of an importing country at less than its normal
value, if the price of the product exported from one country to another
(a) is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the
like product when destined for consumption in the exporting country, or,
(b) in the absence of such domestic price, is less than either
(i) the highest comparable price for the like product for export to any third
country in the ordinary course of trade, or
(ii) the cost of production of the product in the country of origin plus a
reasonable addition for selling cost and profit.
Due allowance shall be made in each case for differences in conditions and terms
of sale, for differences in taxation, and for other differences affecting price
comparability.
Article 2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement further elaborates the definition of
"dumping" in Article VI:1 by setting out detailed rules for the determination of
dumping.
107. We note that, under Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994 and Article 2 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement, neither the intent of the persons engaging in "dumping"
nor the injurious effects that "dumping" may have on a Member's domestic
industry are constituent elements of "dumping".
108. With regard to "dumping", Article VI of the GATT 1994 states, in relevant
part:
1. The Members recognize that dumping � is to be condemned if it causes or
threatens material injury to an established industry in the territory of a
Member or materially retards the establishment of a domestic industry. �
2. In order to offset or prevent dumping, a Member may levy on any dumped
product an anti-dumping duty not greater in amount than the margin of dumping in
respect of such product. �
109. Whether Article VI of the GATT 1994 is applicable to the 1916 Act depends,
first of all, on whether Article VI regulates all possible measures Members can
take in response to dumping. If Article VI regulates only the imposition of
anti-dumping duties and neither prohibits nor regulates other measures which
Members may take to counteract dumping, then, since the 1916 Act does not
provide for anti-dumping duties, Article VI would not apply to the 1916 Act.
110. Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994 makes clear that dumping is "to be
condemned
if it causes or threatens material injury". (emphasis added) However, Article
VI:1 does not address the remedies that Members may take against dumping.
111. Remedies are addressed in Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994. The only type of
measure that Article VI:2 explicitly authorizes Members to impose "in order to
offset or prevent dumping" is an anti-dumping duty. However, Article VI:2 does
not specify that Members may impose only
anti-dumping duties in order to offset or prevent dumping.
112. In arguing that Article VI of the GATT 1994 regulates only the imposition
of anti-dumping duties and does not apply to other measures taken to counteract
dumping, the United States emphasizes that Article VI:2 states that Members "may
levy on any dumped product an anti-dumping duty �". (emphasis added). For the
United States, the verb "may" indicates that while Members "may" choose to
impose anti-dumping duties and thereby be bound by the rules of Article VI,
Members may also choose to impose other types of anti-dumping measures, in which
case they are not bound by the rules of Article VI.
113. We agree with the first part of the United States' argument, namely, that
the verb "may" indicates that it is permissive, rather than mandatory, to impose
anti-dumping duties. However, it is not obvious to us, based on the wording of
Article VI:2 alone, that the verb "may" also implies that a Member is permitted
to impose a measure other than an anti-dumping duty.
114. We believe that the meaning of the word "may" in Article VI:2 is clarified
by Article 9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement on the "Imposition and Collection of
Anti-Dumping Duties". Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement
are part of the same treaty, the WTO Agreement. As its full title indicates, the
Anti-Dumping Agreement is an "Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994". Accordingly, Article VI must be
read in conjunction with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement , including
Article 9.
115. Article 9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement states in relevant part:
It is desirable that the imposition [of an anti-dumping duty] be permissive in
the territory of all Members, and that the duty be less than the margin if such
lesser duty would be adequate to remove the injury to the domestic industry.
116. In light of this provision, the verb "may" in Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994
is, in our
opinion, properly understood as giving Members a choice between imposing an
anti-dumping duty or not, as well as a choice between imposing an anti-dumping
duty equal to the dumping margin or imposing a lower duty. We find no support in
Article VI:2, read in conjunction with Article 9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement ,
for the United States' argument that the verb "may" indicates that Members, to
counteract dumping, are permitted to take measures other than the imposition of
anti-dumping duties.
117. As a result of the above reasoning, it appears to us that the text of
Article VI is inconclusive as to whether Article VI regulates all possible
measures which Members may take to counteract dumping, or whether it regulates
only the imposition of anti-dumping duties.
118. As we have stated, Article VI of the GATT 1994 must be read together with
the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement . Article 1 of that Agreement
provides:
An anti-dumping measure shall be applied only under the circumstances provided
for in Article VI of GATT 1994 and pursuant to investigations initiated and
conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. The following
provisions govern the application of Article VI of GATT 1994 in so far as action
is taken under anti-dumping legislation or regulations.
119. The first sentence of Article 1 states that "an anti-dumping measure" must
be consistent with Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the provisions of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement . However, as the United States concedes, the meaning of
an "anti-dumping measure" in this sentence is "not immediately clear".64 The
United States argues, on the basis of the history of this provision, that the
phrase "anti-dumping measure" refers only to definitive anti-dumping duties,
price undertakings and provisional measures. However, the ordinary meaning of
the phrase "an anti-dumping measure"
seems to encompass all measures taken against dumping. We do not see in the
words "an
anti-dumping measure" any explicit limitation to particular types of measure.65
120. Since "an anti-dumping measure" must, according to Article 1 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement , be consistent with Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the
provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement , it seems to follow that Article VI
would apply to "an anti-dumping measure", i.e., a measure against dumping.
121. We consider that the scope of application of Article VI is clarified, in
particular, by Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement . Article 18.1 states:
No specific action against dumping of exports from another Member can be taken
except in accordance with the provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted by this
Agreement. (emphasis added)
122. In our view, the ordinary meaning of the phrase "specific action against
dumping" of exports within the meaning of Article 18.1 is action that is taken
in response to situations presenting the constituent elements of "dumping".
"Specific action against dumping" of exports must, at a minimum, encompass
action that may be taken only when the constituent elements of "dumping" are
present.66 Since intent is not a constituent element of "dumping", the
intent with
which action against dumping is taken is not relevant to the determination of
whether such action is "specific action against dumping" of exports within the
meaning of Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement .
123. Footnote 24 to Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement states:
This is not intended to preclude action under other relevant provisions of GATT
1994, as appropriate.
We note that footnote 24 refers generally to "action" and not, as does Article
18.1, to "specific action against dumping" of exports. "Action" within the
meaning of footnote 24 is to be distinguished from "specific action against
dumping" of exports, which is governed by Article 18.1 itself.
124. Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement contains a prohibition on the
taking of any "specific action against dumping" of exports when such specific
action is not "in accordance with the provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted by
this Agreement". Since the only provisions of the GATT 1994 "interpreted" by the
Anti-Dumping Agreement are those provisions of Article VI concerning dumping,
Article 18.1 should be read as requiring that any "specific action against
dumping" of exports from another Member be in accordance with the relevant
provisions of Article VI of the GATT 1994, as interpreted by the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.
125. We recall that footnote 24 to Article 18.1 refers to "other relevant
provisions of GATT 1994" (emphasis added). These terms can only refer to
provisions other than the provisions of Article VI concerning dumping. Footnote
24 thus confirms that the "provisions of GATT 1994" referred to in Article 18.1
are in fact the provisions of Article VI of the GATT 1994 concerning dumping.
126. We have found that Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires that
any "specific action against dumping" be in accordance with the provisions of
Article VI of the GATT 1994 concerning dumping, as those provisions are
interpreted by the Anti-Dumping Agreement . It follows that Article VI is
applicable to any "specific action against dumping" of exports, i.e., action
that is taken in response to situations presenting the constituent elements of
"dumping".
127. We now turn to the question whether the 1916 Act provides for "specific
action against dumping" of exports from another Member and, thus, falls within
the scope of application of Article VI of the GATT 1994.
128. As mentioned above, the United States contends that the 1916 Act does not
fall within the scope of application of Article VI of the GATT 1994 because it
does not "specifically target" dumping. According to the United States, the
activity targeted by the 1916 Act is "predatory pricing; that is, sales at
predatorily low price levels with the intent to destroy, injure, or prevent the
establishment of an American industry, or to restrain trade in or monopolize a
particular market."67 Although one element of liability under the 1916 Act is the
existence of price differences between national markets, this element is,
according to the United States, "simply one indicia of whether the U.S.
importers pricing practices are predatory in nature."68
129. The 1916 Act states in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person importing or assisting in importing any
articles from any foreign country into the United States, commonly and
systematically to import, sell or cause to be imported or sold such articles
within the United States at a price substantially less than the actual market
value or wholesale price of such articles, at the time of exportation to the
United States, in the principal markets of the country of their production, or
of other foreign countries to which they are commonly exported after adding to
such market value or wholesale price, freight, duty, and other charges and
expenses necessarily incident to the importation and sale thereof in the United
States: Provided, That such act or acts be done with the intent of destroying or
injuring an industry in the United States, or of preventing the establishment of
an industry in the United States, or of restraining or monopolizing any part of
trade and commerce in such articles in the United States.
Any person who violates or combines or conspires with any other person to
violate this section is guilty of a misdemeanour, and, on conviction thereof,
shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $5,000, or imprisonment not exceeding
one year, or both, in the discretion of the court.
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of any violation of, or
combination or conspiracy to violate, this section, may sue therefor in the
district court of the United States for the district in which the defendant
resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in
controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages sustained, and the cost of
the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.69
130. On the basis of the wording of the 1916 Act, it is clear that the 1916 Act
provides for civil and criminal proceedings and penalties when persons import
products from another country into the territory of the United States, and sell
or offer such products for sale at a price less than the price for which the
like products are sold or offered for sale in the country of export or, in
certain cases, a third country market. In other words, in the light of the
definition of "dumping" set out in Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994, as elaborated
in Article 2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement , the civil and criminal proceedings
and penalties contemplated by the 1916 Act require the presence of the
constituent elements of "dumping". The constituent elements of "dumping" are
built into the essential elements of civil and criminal liability under the 1916
Act. The wording of the 1916 Act also makes clear that these actions can be
taken only with respect to conduct which presents the constituent elements of
"dumping". It follows that the civil and criminal proceedings and penalties
provided for in the 1916 Act are "specific action against dumping". We find,
therefore, that Article VI of the GATT 1994 applies to the 1916 Act.
131. We note that the United States places much emphasis on the "intent"
requirement of the 1916 Act, i.e., the stipulation that dumping is "unlawful"
when it is:
� done with the intent of destroying or injuring an industry in the United
States, or of preventing the establishment of an industry in the United States,
or of restraining or monopolizing any part of trade and commerce in such
Articles in the United States.70
132. This requirement of intent to destroy, injure, or prevent the establishment
of an American industry, or to restrain or monopolize any part of trade, does
not affect the applicability of Article VI of the GATT 1994 to the 1916 Act. As
already noted, action may be taken under the 1916 Act only when the constituent
elements of dumping are present. The fact that an importer can only be found to
have violated the 1916 Act when the sales of dumped products in the United
States were carried out with a certain intent does not mean that the actions
under the 1916 Act are not "specific action against dumping". Proof of a
requisite intent under the 1916 Act only constitutes an additional requirement
for the imposition of the civil and criminal penalties set out in that Act. Even
if the 1916 Act allowed the imposition of penalties only if the intent proven
were an intent to monopolize or an intent to restrain trade (i.e., an
"antitrust"-type intent), this would not transform the 1916 Act into a statute
which does not provide for "specific action against dumping", and, thus, would
not remove the 1916 Act from the scope of application of Article VI.
133. For all these reasons, we agree with the Panel's conclusion that Article VI
of the GATT 1994 applies to the 1916 Act. We also agree with the Panel that,
having regard to the relationship between Article VI and the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, "the applicability of Article VI to the 1916 Act also implies the
applicability of the Anti-Dumping Agreement " to the 1916 Act.71
41 While the Panel used the phrase "non-mandatory legislation"
to describe legislation that does not mandate a violation of a relevant
obligation, we prefer the phrase "discretionary legislation".
42 EC Panel Report, para. 6.82. See also Japan Panel Report,
para. 6.95.
43 EC Panel Report, para. 6.84. See also Japan Panel Report,
para. 6.97.
44 EC Panel Report, para. 6.169. See also Japan Panel Report,
para. 6.191.
45 The reason it must be possible to find legislation as such to
be inconsistent with a Contracting Party's GATT 1947 obligations was explained
as follows:
[the provisions of the GATT 1947] are not only to
protect current trade but also to create the predictability needed to
plan future trade. That objective could not be attained if contracting
parties could not challenge existing legislation mandating actions at
variance with the General Agreement until the administrative acts
implementing it had actually been applied to their trade.
Panel Report, United States - Superfund, supra,
footnote 34, para. 5.2.2.
46 Panel Report, supra, footnote 16.
47
Ibid., para. 118, referring in footnote to: Panel Report,
United States - Superfund, supra, footnote 34, p. 160; Panel
Report, EEC - Parts and Components, supra, footnote 20, pp.
198-199; Panel Report, Thailand - Cigarettes, supra, footnote 34,
pp. 227-228; Panel Report, United States - Malt Beverages, supra,
footnote 34, pp. 281-282 and 289-290; Panel Report, United States - Denial of
Most-Favoured Nation Treatment as to Non-Rubber Footwear from Brazil,
adopted 19 June 1992, BISD 39S/128, p. 152.
48 The Panel noted that the United States did not allege that
any discretion of the executive branch of government in relation to the civil
proceedings would make the 1916 Act discretionary. EC Panel Report, footnote 350
to para. 6.82; Japan Panel Report, footnote 482 to para. 6.95.
49 EC Panel Report, para. 6.169; Japan Panel Report, para.
6.191.
50 See, in particular the reasoning in the Panel Report,
United States - Malt Beverages, supra, footnote 34, para. 5.60.
51 EC Panel Report, para. 6.89; Japan Panel Report, para. 6.103.
52 EC Panel Report, paras. 6.86 - 6.87; Japan Panel Report,
paras. 6.100 - 6.101.
53 Japan Panel Report, para. 6.192. See also EC Panel Report,
para. 6.170.
54 Appellate Body Report, WT/DS33/AB/R, adopted 23 May 1997, pp.
14 - 17.
55 Appellate Body Report, supra, footnote 24, para. 109.
56 EC Panel Report, paras. 6.37 - 6.38; Japan Panel Report,
paras. 6.24 - 6.25.
57 EC Panel Report, paras. 6.86 - 6.90; Japan Panel Report,
paras. 6.100 - 6.104.
58 Japan Panel Report, para. 6.189.
59 We note that in a recent case, a panel found that even
discretionary legislation may violate certain WTO obligations. See Panel Report,
United States - Section 301, supra, footnote 23, paras. 7.53 -
7.54.
60 We note that, in the EC Panel Report, the Panel reached the
same results as in the Japan Panel Report without making any finding that the
notion of mandatory/discretionary legislation "is no longer relevant".
61 EC Panel Report, para. 6.84; Japan Panel Report, para. 6.97.
62 EC Panel Report, para. 6.163; Japan Panel Report, para.
6.182.
63 Japan Panel Report, para. 6.184. See also EC Panel Report,
para. 6.165.
64 United States' appellant's submission, para. 85.
65 We consider that the second sentence of Article 1 merely
indicates that the Anti-Dumping Agreement
implements only those provisions of Article VI of the GATT
1994 that concern dumping, as distinguished from the provisions of Article VI of
the GATT 1994 that concern countervailing duties imposed to offset subsidies.
66 We do not find it necessary, in the present cases, to decide
whether the concept of "specific action against dumping" may be broader.
67 United States' appellant's submission, para. 133.
68
Ibid.
69
Supra, footnote 4.
70
Supra, footnote 4.
71 EC Panel Report, para. 6.165. See also Japan Panel Report,
para. 6.184. We note that the Panel frequently referred to the concept of
"transnational price discrimination". It should be stressed that "transnational
price discrimination", i.e., a difference in price between two markets, is a
broader concept than "dumping" as defined in Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994.
Unlike transnational discrimination, "dumping" requires importation,
and a lower price in the import market
than in the export market or relevant third country
market. Dumping is always transnational price discrimination, but transnational
price discrimination is not always dumping. We are, therefore, of the opinion
that the Panel's use of the term "transnational price discrimination" in its
findings is problematic, and deserves specific mention.
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