A. Law, Regulation or Requirement Affecting the Internal Use of Imported and Like Domestic Products

207. The United States contests the Panel's finding that the measure "affects" the internal use of like imported products, and argues that there is no "necessary relationship" between the fair market value rule and the internal use of imported products. The United States emphasizes that the fair market value rule is a "measure of general application that is not directed against imports".¹⁷⁹ In such a situation, the United States argues, the word "affecting" in Article III:4 must be given a narrow scope. However, the United States does not contest the Panel's finding that the fair market value rule is a "law, regulation or requirement" within the meaning of Article III:4 of the GATT 1994.

208. We observe that the clause in which the word "affecting" appears – "in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use" – serves to define the scope of application of Article III:4. (emphasis added) Within this phrase, the word "affecting" operates as a link between identified types of government action ("laws, regulations and requirements") and specific transactions, activities and uses relating to products in the marketplace ("internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use"). It is, therefore, not any "laws, regulations and requirements" which are covered by Article III:4, but only those which "affect" the specific transactions, activities and uses mentioned in that provision. Thus, the word "affecting" assists in defining the types of measure that must conform to the obligation not to accord "less favourable treatment" to like imported products, which is set out in Article III:4.

209. The word "affecting" serves a similar function in Article I:1 of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (the "GATS"), where it also defines the types of measure that are subject to the disciplines set forth elsewhere in the GATS but does not, in itself, impose any obligation.¹⁸⁰ In
EC – Bananas III, we considered the meaning of the word "affecting" in that provision of GATS. We stated:

[t]he ordinary meaning of the word "affecting" implies a measure that has "an effect on", which indicates a broad scope of application. This interpretation is further reinforced by the conclusions of previous panels that the term "affecting" in the context of Article III of the GATT is wider in scope than such terms as "regulating" or "governing".¹⁸¹ (emphasis added, footnote omitted)

210. In view of the similar function of the identical word, "affecting", in Article III:4 of the GATT 1994, we also interpret this word, in this provision, as having a "broad scope of application".

211. Turning to the fair market value rule, we recall that, under the ETI measure, a taxpayer producing property in the United States will be eligible to obtain a tax exemption in respect of income derived from an export-sale of such property on the condition that, inter alia, not more than 50 percent of the fair market value of the product is attributable to articles produced outside the United States or to direct costs for labour performed outside the United States. The United States regards the fair market value of property as the sales price of the property in the marketplace. Fair market value is attributable to three different elements: (i) inputs used to produce the property;
(ii) direct labour used to produce the property, and (iii) "non-tangible elements, including intellectual property rights, goodwill, capital, marketing, distribution, and other services".¹⁸²

212. Any taxpayer that seeks to obtain a tax exemption under the ETI measure must ensure that, in the manufacture of qualifying property, it does not "use" imported input products, whose value comprises more than 50 percent of the fair market value of the end-product. The fair market value rule, thus, places an express maximum limit on the extent to which the value of qualifying property can be attributable to imported input products. A manufacturer's use of imported input products always counts against the 50 percent ceiling in the fair market value rule, while in contrast, the same manufacturer's use of like domestic input products has no such negative implication. Manufacturers wishing to obtain the ETI tax exemption are not restricted, in any way, on the use they make of domestic inputs. The fair market value rule, therefore, influences the manufacturer's choice between like imported and domestic input products if it wishes to obtain the tax exemption under the ETI measure.

213. Accordingly, we agree with the Panel's finding, in paragraph 8.149 of its Report, that the fair market value rule "affects" the "internal … use" of imported products, within the meaning of Article III:4 of the GATT 1994, as compared with like domestic products.

B. "Less Favourable Treatment"

214. We now come to the second part of the United States' appeal of this issue, namely, its argument that the Panel erred in finding that the fair market value rule accords less favourable treatment to like imported products. The United States asserts that it is possible for a manufacturer to satisfy the fair market value rule without using as inputs any goods produced in the United States, and that the Panel could not, therefore, have found that the fair market value rule involves de jure discrimination against imports.

215. The examination of whether a measure involves "less favourable treatment" of imported products within the meaning of Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 must be grounded in close scrutiny of the "fundamental thrust and effect of the measure itself".¹⁸³ This examination cannot rest on simple assertion, but must be founded on a careful analysis of the contested measure and of its implications in the marketplace. At the same time, however, the examination need not be based on the actual effects of the contested measure in the marketplace.¹⁸⁴

216. If a United States citizen or resident fulfills the prescribed conditions of grant, it obtains a clearly significant financial benefit in the form of a tax exemption.¹⁸⁵ The availability of such a tax exemption depends upon the taxpayer organizing its business affairs in such a way as to comply with the prescribed conditions of grant.

217. One of these conditions is the fair market value rule which places, as we have said, an express maximum limit on the extent to which the value of qualifying property can be attributable to imported input products. No such limit exists for like domestic input products. The fair market value rule, therefore, draws a formal distinction, on its face, between the treatment of like domestic and imported input products.¹⁸⁶ This formal difference also has substantive importance because, on its face, the fair market value rule constrains the use of like imported input products.

218. In situations where the use of imported input products in the manufacture of qualifying property may breach the 50 percent limit and thereby render a manufacturer ineligible to obtain a tax exemption, the manufacturer will avoid the use of like imported input products if it wishes to obtain a tax exemption. As the 50 percent limit is approached, the manufacturer will be increasingly sensitive to the value of the imported input products it can use and to the contribution these products will make to the fair market value of the property being manufactured. Before making purchasing decisions, the manufacturer will weigh the choice between domestic and imported input product, in the light of the anticipated value of the end-product, to ensure that the purchases of imported products do not adversely affect the availability of the tax exemption. These same considerations will never apply if the manufacturer opts to purchase domestic input products. Thus, for purposes of satisfying the fair market value rule and ensuring the availability of the tax benefit, a real and substantive advantage attaches to the use of domestic input products, and a corresponding disadvantage to the use of like imported products.

219. The difference in resulting treatment between like domestic and imported products becomes very clear where the manufacturing process is product input-intensive and the value of input products typically constitutes more than 50 percent of the fair market value of the qualifying property.¹⁸⁷ In these situations, the measure in effect precludes United States manufacturers who desire the tax benefit, from making a free choice between like domestic and imported input-products on the basis of purely commercial considerations.

220. In sum, if the manufacturer wishes to obtain the beneficial tax exemption under the ETI measure, the fair market value rule provides a considerable impetus, and, in some circumstances, in effect, a requirement, for manufacturers to use domestic input products, rather than like imported ones. As such, the fair market value rule treats imported products less favourably than like domestic products.

221. In our view, the above conclusion is not nullified by the fact that the fair market value rule will not give rise to less favourable treatment for like imported products in each and every case. There may well be, as the United States maintains, property which does not require extensive material and labour inputs such that the fair market value rule would not, in those cases, bear upon the input choices manufacturers make. Even so, the fact remains that in an indefinite number of other cases, the fair market value rule operates, by its terms, as a significant constraint upon the use of imported input products. We are not entitled to disregard that fact.

222. For the above reasons, we uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 8.154 and 9.1(d) of its Report that, by virtue of the fair market value rule, the measure accords less favourable treatment within the meaning of Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 to imported products than to like products of United States origin.

X. Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement: Withdrawal of FSC Subsidies

223. The United States appeals the Panel's finding that:

… the United States has not fully withdrawn the FSC subsidies found to be prohibited export subsidies inconsistent with Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement and has therefore failed to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB made pursuant to Article 4.7 SCM Agreement.¹⁸⁸

224. The United States notes that the ETI Act repeals the FSC provisions and provides that no corporation can elect to be treated as an FSC after 30 September 2000. The ETI Act also contains certain transitional rules that, in the view of the United States, ensure taxpayers a degree of certainty in their tax planning and that are essential to the orderly passage from one set of tax rules to another. The United States submits that, in requiring a Member to change its tax rules, WTO rules cannot be intended to require such a Member to deny its taxpayers the right to an orderly transition. Thus, the United States reasons, the Panel's finding that the United States has acted inconsistently with Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement should be reversed.

225. We recall that, in our Report in US – FSC, we upheld the panel's finding "that the FSC measure constitutes a prohibited export subsidy under Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement".¹⁸⁹ In its report, the panel recommended, pursuant to Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement, that the United States withdraw the FSC subsidies found to be prohibited export subsidies under Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement by 1 October 2000".¹⁹⁰ On 12 October 2000, the DSB acceded to the United States' request "that the DSB modify the time-period in this dispute so as to expire on 1 November 2000".¹⁹¹

226. Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement reads:

If the measure in question is found to be a prohibited subsidy, the panel shall recommend that the subsidizing Member withdraw the subsidy without delay. In this regard, the panel shall specify in its recommendation the time period within which the measure must be withdrawn. (emphasis added)

227. In examining this provision in Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada), we said:
Turning to the ordinary meaning of "withdraw", we observe first that this word has been defined as "remove" or "take away" , and as "to take away what has been enjoyed; to take from." This definition suggests that "withdrawal" of a subsidy, under Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement, refers to the "removal" or "taking away" of that subsidy.¹⁹² (footnotes omitted)

228. Under the ETI Act, no corporation may elect to be treated as an FSC after 30 September 2000.¹⁹³ However, for FSCs in existence as of that date, the repeal of the original FSC measure "shall not apply" to any transaction which occurs before 1 January 2002.¹⁹⁴ Moreover, even after that date, existing FSCs can continue to use the original FSC measure for transactions pursuant to a binding contract between the FSC and any unrelated person that was in effect on and after 30 September 2000.¹⁹⁵ Thus, by the United States' own acknowledgement, the original FSC measure continues to apply, unmodified, to existing FSCs in respect of a defined set of transactions.¹⁹⁶ The success of the United States' appeal depends on the success of its argument that prohibited FSC subsidies can continue to be granted to protect the contractual interests of private parties and to ensure an orderly transition to the regime of the new measure. In short, on the basis of these arguments, the United States seeks to have the time-period for the full withdrawal of the prohibited FSC subsidies extended, in some circumstances, indefinitely.

229. Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement requires prohibited subsidies to be withdrawn "without delay", and provides that a time-period for such withdrawal shall be specified by the panel. We can see no basis in Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement for extending the time-period prescribed for withdrawal of prohibited subsidies for the reasons cited by the United States. In that respect, we recall that, in Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada), Brazil made a similar argument to the one made by the United States in these proceedings. Brazil argued that, after the expiration of the time-period for withdrawal of the prohibited export subsidies, it should be permitted to continue to grant certain of these subsidies because it had assumed contractual obligations, under municipal law, to do so.¹⁹⁷ We rejected this argument, and observed that:

… to continue to make payments under an export subsidy measure found to be prohibited is not consistent with the obligation to "withdraw" prohibited export subsidies, in the sense of "removing" or "taking away".¹⁹⁸

230. Thus, as we indicated in that appeal, a Member's obligation under Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement to withdraw prohibited subsidies "without delay" is unaffected by contractual obligations that the Member itself may have assumed under municipal law. Likewise, a Member's obligation to withdraw prohibited export subsidies, under Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement, cannot be affected by contractual obligations which private parties may have assumed inter se in reliance on laws conferring prohibited export subsidies. Accordingly, we see no legal basis for extending the time-period for the United States to withdraw fully the prohibited FSC subsidies.

231. Accordingly, we uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 8.170 and 9.1(e) of its Report, that the United States has not fully withdrawn the FSC subsidies found to be prohibited export subsidies under Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement and has therefore failed to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB made pursuant to Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement.

XI. Article 10.3 of the DSU

232. In its first written submission to the Panel, the European Communities requested:

… the Panel to make a preliminary ruling to the effect that third parties are entitled to receive all written submissions of the parties submitted prior to the meeting of the Panel and to make this preliminary ruling and communicate it to the parties and the third parties as soon as possible after receipt of the US first written submission and before the date for the presentation of the second written submissions.¹⁹⁹ (footnote omitted)

233. The United States requested the Panel to reject the European Communities' request and to find, on the basis of reasoning employed by previous panels proceeding under Article 21.5 of the DSU, "that the third parties in this proceeding do not have a right to the parties' rebuttal submissions."²⁰⁰

234. On 21 February 2001, the Panel issued a decision to the parties refusing the request of the European Communities and stating that:

… we do not consider that Article 10.3 DSU requires that third parties receive all pre-meeting submissions of the parties (including rebuttal submissions) in the context of an accelerated proceeding under Article 21.5 DSU that involves only one meeting of the parties and third parties with the panel.²⁰¹

235. The European Communities appeals this interpretive preliminary ruling by the Panel. In the view of the European Communities, Rule 9 of the working procedures adopted by the Panel in this case (the "Working Procedures") conflicts with Article 10.3 of the DSU and does not respect the rights afforded to third parties under the DSU. According to the European Communities, although panels have a certain discretion to establish their own working procedures, they may not derogate from binding provisions of the DSU, including the requirement in Article 10.3 of the DSU that "[t]hird parties shall receive the submissions of the parties to the dispute to the first meeting of the panel." (emphasis added) In the view of the European Communities, this requirement means that third parties are entitled to receive all written submissions made prior to the first meeting of the panel – even if, as in many proceedings under Article 21.5 of the DSU, there is only one meeting with the panel.

236. We review briefly the factual background against which this appeal is made. The Working Procedures provide for two written submissions by each party to be made to the Panel, followed by a single meeting of the Panel. The Panel communicated its proposed Working Procedures to the parties on 20 December 2000, and requested that the parties comment on them at the organizational meeting of the Panel to be held the following day. The proposed Rule 9 provided, in relevant part, that:

Third parties shall receive copies of the parties' first written submissions. Any party may decide to provide the third parties with a copy of its rebuttal or other submissions. (emphasis added)

237. Neither of the parties commented on the proposed Rule 9 at the organizational meeting.²⁰² The Working Procedures adopted by the Panel – including the above-quoted portion of Rule 9 – were communicated to the parties on 22 December 2000, and to the third parties on 4 January 2001.

238. In its first written submission to the Panel, submitted on 17 January 2001, the European Communities requested the Panel to amend Rule 9 of the Working Procedures to provide that third parties shall receive copies of all the submissions filed by the parties prior to the single meeting of the Panel.²⁰³ The United States opposed the request in its first written submission, submitted to the Panel on 7 February 2001. On 21 February 2001, the Panel issued its decision denying the request of the European Communities.

239. We also note that in proceedings under Article 21.5, which are subject to considerably shorter time-frames than apply under Article 12.8 of the DSU ²⁰⁴, panels have adopted the practice of holding a single meeting with the parties, rather than two meetings. At the same time, Article 21.5 panels uniformly have maintained the practice of requiring parties to file two written submissions.

240. We begin our examination of the European Communities' appeal with Article 12.1 of the DSU, which states that panels "shall" follow the working procedure set out in Appendix 3 to the DSU "unless the panel decides otherwise after consulting the parties to the dispute". We observe, first, that the DSU and, in particular, paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of Appendix 3 to the DSU, "contemplate two distinguishable stages in a proceeding before a panel."²⁰⁵ The "first stage" comprises the first written submissions by the parties and the first meeting of the panel, while the "second stage" consists of the second written submissions – or "rebuttal" submissions – and the second meeting with the panel.²⁰⁶ However, no provision of the DSU explicitly requires panels to hold two meetings with the parties, or to oblige the parties to submit two written submissions.

241. We have already observed that:

[a]lthough panels enjoy some discretion in establishing their own working procedures, this discretion does not extend to modifying the substantive provisions of the DSU. … Nothing in the DSU gives a panel the authority either to disregard or to modify other explicit provisions of the DSU.²⁰⁷

242. In this appeal, we must determine whether, in refusing to require that the third parties be given access to the second, "rebuttal", submissions filed prior to the sole substantive meeting with the Panel, the Panel acted inconsistently with any provision of the DSU.

243. In respect of the provisions of the DSU governing third party rights, we have already observed that, as the DSU currently stands, the rights of third parties in panel proceedings are limited to the rights granted under Article 10 and Appendix 3 to the DSU.²⁰⁸ Beyond those minimum guarantees, panels enjoy a discretion to grant additional participatory rights to third parties in particular cases, as long as such "enhanced" rights are consistent with the provisions of the DSU and the principles of due process.²⁰⁹ However, panels have no discretion to circumscribe the rights guaranteed to third parties by the provisions of the DSU.

244. In this appeal, the European Communities alleges that the Working Procedures adopted by the Panel are inconsistent with the rights afforded to third parties pursuant to Article 10.3 of the DSU, which provides:

Third parties shall receive the submissions of the parties to the dispute to the first meeting of the panel. (emphasis added)

245. Article 10.3 of the DSU is couched in mandatory language. By its terms, third parties "shall" receive "the submissions of the parties to the first meeting of the panels". (emphasis added) Article 10.3 does not say that third parties shall receive "the first submissions" of the parties, but rather that they shall receive "the submissions" of the parties. (emphasis added) The number of submissions that third parties are entitled to receive is not stated. Rather, Article 10.3 defines the submissions that third parties are entitled to receive by reference to a specific step in the proceedings – the first meeting of the panel.²¹⁰ It follows, in our view, that, under this provision, third parties must be given all of the submissions that have been made by the parties to the panel up to the first meeting of the panel, irrespective of the number of such submissions which are made, including any rebuttal submissions filed in advance of the first meeting.²¹¹

246. The Panel, however, reasoned that the use of the word "first" in Article 10.3 "presupposes a context where there is more than one meeting of a Panel."²¹² The Panel concluded, from this "presupposition", that in proceedings involving a single panel meeting, Article 10.3 "must be understood as limiting third party rights in these proceedings to access to the first written submissions only, and as not including access to the written rebuttals."²¹³

247. In our view, the interpretation of Article 10.3 of the DSU must start from the express wording of the provision. We have noted that the text of Article 10.3 does not limit the number of submissions which third parties may receive prior to the "first meeting". We do not see any reason to "presuppose" that such a limitation applies in cases where the "first meeting" with the Panel proves to be the only meeting. The DSU allows panels the flexibility, in determining their procedures, to request more than one submission in advance of the first meeting, and the DSU also allows for the possibility that panels may, ultimately, hold only one meeting. The text of Article 10.3 applies the same rule in each case – third parties are entitled to receive the submissions to the first meeting.

248. We read the reference to the "first meeting" as reflecting the flexibility that exists in panel proceedings under the DSU. Thus, in any proceedings, even if only one meeting with the parties is initially scheduled, it cannot be excluded that a second will not be held later. Panels have the discretion to request such an additional meeting with the parties, and the parties can also request such a meeting with the panel at the stage of interim review.²¹⁴ The wording of Article 10.3 provides for this flexibility by referring generically to the "first meeting", which may be one of a series of meetings or may be the only meeting.

249. Our interpretation of Article 10.3 is also consistent with the context of that provision. Article 10.1 directs panels "fully" to take into account the interests of Members other than the parties to the dispute, and Article 10.2 requires panels to grant to third parties "an opportunity to be heard". Article 10.3 ensures that, up to a defined stage in the panel proceedings, third parties can participate fully in the proceedings, on the basis of the same written submissions as the parties themselves. Article 10.3 thereby seeks to guarantee that the third parties can participate at a session of the first meeting with the panel in a full and meaningful fashion that would not be possible if the third parties were denied written submissions made to the panel before that meeting. Moreover, panels themselves will thereby benefit more from the contributions made by third parties and will, therefore, be better able "fully" to take into account the interests of Members, as directed by Article 10.1 of the DSU.

250. In this regard, we observe that we agree with the panel in Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US), which reasoned that:

Third parties can only [participate in an informed and, hence, meaningful, manner] if they have received all the information exchanged between the parties before that session. Otherwise, third parties might find themselves in a situation where their oral statements at the meeting become partially or totally irrelevant or moot in the light of second submissions by the parties to which third parties did not have access. Without access to all the submissions by the parties to the dispute to the first meeting of the panel, uninformed third party submissions could unduly delay panel proceedings and … prevent the Panel from receiving "the benefit of a useful contribution by third parties which could help the Panel to make the objective assessment that it is required to make under Article 11 of the DSU.²¹⁵ (footnote omitted)

251. For these reasons, we believe that Article 10.3 requires that third parties be provided with all of the submissions made by the parties up to the time of the first panel meeting in which the third parties participate – whether that meeting is the first of two panel meetings, or the first and only panel meeting. Read in this way, Article 10.3 has the same meaning, and can be applied in the same way, regardless of the number of panel meetings that are held in a particular case.

252. We, therefore, find that, in its decision refusing the European Communities' request to modify Rule 9 of the Panel's Working Procedures, the Panel erred in its interpretation of Article 10.3 of the DSU.

XII. Conditional Appeals

253. The European Communities makes four conditional appeals requesting us to consider claims in respect of which the Panel exercised judicial economy.²¹⁶ It declares that these appeals are made only "in case [the Appellate Body] should reverse those of the Panel’s findings that led the Panel to exercise judicial economy."²¹⁷ The European Communities states explicitly that it is not challenging the Panel's exercise of judicial economy as such, and that it considers that "the Panel has effectively ruled on all elements of the subsidy scheme under review and has, accordingly, already given sufficiently precise guidance … ".²¹⁸

254. The United States observes that "the conditions that would trigger the Appellate Body’s consideration of any of these claims is not clear".²¹⁹

255. In this Report, we have upheld all of the Panel's findings under appeal. Therefore, in any event, none of the conditions on which the European Communities' appeal is predicated arise, and there is no need for us to examine any of the conditional appeals.

XIII. Findings and Conclusions

256. For the reasons set out in this Report, the Appellate Body:

(a) upholds the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 8.30 and 8.43 of the Panel Report, that the ETI measure involves the foregoing of revenue which is "otherwise due" and thus gives rise to a "financial contribution" within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the SCM Agreement;

(b) upholds the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 8.75 and 9.1(a) of the Panel Report, that the ETI measure includes subsidies "contingent … upon export performance" within the meaning of Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement;

(c) upholds the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 8.107 and 9.1(a) of the Panel Report, that the ETI measure, viewed as a whole, does not fall within the scope of footnote 59 of the SCM Agreement as a measure taken to avoid the double taxation of foreign-source income;

(d) upholds the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 8.122 and 9.1(c) of the Panel Report, that the ETI measure involves export subsidies inconsistent with the United States' obligations under Articles 3.3, 8 and 10.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture;

(e) upholds the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 8.158 and 9.1(d) of the Panel Report, that the ETI measure is inconsistent with the United States' obligations under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 because it accords less favourable treatment to imported products as compared with like products of United States origin;

(f) upholds the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 8.170 and 9.1(e) of the Panel Report, that the United States has not fully withdrawn the subsidies found, in the original proceedings, to be prohibited export subsidies under Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement, and that the United States has, therefore, failed fully to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB made pursuant to Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement; and

(g) finds that the Panel erred in its interpretation of Article 10.3 of the DSU in declining, in its decision of 21 February 2001, reproduced in paragraph 6.3 of the Panel Report, to rule that all the written submissions of the parties filed prior to the only meeting of the Panel must be provided to the third parties.

257. The Appellate Body recommends that the DSB request the United States to bring the ETI measure, found in this Report, and in the Panel Report as modified by this Report, to be inconsistent with its obligations under Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement, under Articles 3.3, 8 and 10.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture, and under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994, into conformity with its obligations under those Agreements, and that the DSB request the United States to implement fully the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in US – FSC, made pursuant to Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement.



Signed in the original at Geneva this 21st day of December 2001 by:
 

_________________________
Florentino P. Feliciano
Presiding Member


 

Notes