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AND MANMADE FIBRE UNDERWEAR Report of the Panel
5.200 Costa Rica
considered that the reply to this question was to be found both
in the proposals made by the United States to Costa Rica and in
the agreements reached with the other countries called for consultations
in this category, and it was the following: what the United States
was seeking to do was to protect the domestic industry that produced
the fabric used in the production of underwear. For this purpose,
the United States had followed two routes: firstly, it had sought
to restrict access to its market for underwear made from fabric
not produced in the United States, and secondly, it had guaranteed
wider and substantial access to its market for underwear made
from fabric formed and cut in the United States. As the same
time as imports of underwear produced from non-US fabric were
restricted, a guaranteed broad level of access was provided for
imports using fabric formed and cut in the United States.
That was why the various proposals made by the United States
to Costa Rica to try to reach an agreement on the level of restriction
were two-fold in nature: a lower access level for nonconditional
or specific level (SL) trade - in the order of 1.5 to 4.5
million dozen versus the 14.4 million dozen which was the minimum
guaranteed for Costa Rica by the ATC - and a "generous"
level for conditional or GAL trade, amounting to as much as 40
million dozen depending on the specific proposal. That was also
why among the agreements reached with the other countries called
for consultation in this category, more than 80 per cent of the
negotiated restraint volumes - or access volumes - required the
use of United States formed fabric, while only the remaining 20
per cent may use nonUnited States formed fabric.
5.201 Costa Rica
stated that the United States may wish to promote the use of fabric
produced in that country; however, the problem lay in the mechanism
it had decided to use for this purpose. Imposing a restriction
on imports of underwear from a country in order to oblige that
country to use United States cloth for the production of the underwear
as a requirement for it to be able to enter the United States
market was not a condition provided for in Article 6 of the
ATC. The ATC did not allow imposition of a safeguard measure
on a clothing product in order to protect the fabric used to produce
it. The ATC only envisaged the safeguard governed by Article 6
of the Agreement to protect the domestic industry producing "like
and/or directly competitive products". Underwear was not
a like or directly competing product with respect to the fabric
used to produce it, since these were products which had different
characteristics from the standpoint of any objective or subjective
criterion. The fact that underwear and fabric were not like or
directly competitive products was recognized by the United States
itself. This was shown by the fact that the United States had
not even attempted to argue this openly, since in its reports
it had always argued that the domestic industry allegedly affected
was the underwear industry and did not mention the fabric industry
explicitly. However, the reason why the case was confusing was
that basically the United States was trying to justify an action
whose true objective was very different from its apparent objective
in order to try to bring it within the terms of a provision which
did not authorize action to attain the objective which the United
States was actually pursuing. By proceeding in this way, the
United States had affected not only Costa Rica but also all the
producers of this type of fabric, whose rights would be impaired
in so far as the action restricted and possibly hindered their
ability to become suppliers of this raw material.
5.202 The United States
argued that they had properly based their determination on damage
or threat to the domestic industry producing like or directly
competitive products. The United States had satisfied the Article 6
requirement that the serious damage, or actual threat thereof,
must be to the domestic industry producing like or directly competitive
products, as could be seen from the March 1995 Statement and further
confirmed by the US statements. Unlike agreements that permit
other safeguard actions, the ATC did not provide a definition
of domestic industry nor did it require that the importing member
apply a transitional safeguard that corresponded exactly to the
scope of the industry seriously damaged or actually threatened
by serious damage. While the US fabric industry may incidentally
benefit from the more favourable treatment provided for re-imports
incorporating US formed and cut fabric, it had been made clear
in the March 1995 Statement that the serious damage, or actual
threat thereof determination was made solely on the basis of the
situation in the US underwear industry, which included both vertically
integrated firms which manufactured their own fabric and domestic
firms that did not use offshore operations. There were approximately
220 underwear manufacturers in the United States, 85 of which
used outward processing operations and the remaining 60 per cent,
or 135 firms, which did not use offshore operations. In making
its determination under Article 6.2 of the ATC, the CITA
had examined the situation of the broad array of US underwear
producers, including the integrated firms which spun their own
yarn, knit fabric, and cut and assembled the finished product;
the large number of small "cut and sew" operators who
obtained their fabric and trim from a variety of independent sources,
and did not have offshore operations; and those operators who
knit fabric and cut pieces in the United States for final assembly
overseas. The fact that the underwear industry in the United
States was a diverse industry, and that some producers also made
their own fabric, did not change the fact that the CITA's determination
was based on the economic conditions in the underwear industry,
not the industry producing only fabric.
5.203 The United States
noted that many countries with outward processing programmes condition
participation in that programme on use of fabric manufactured
in their countries. They also maintain quantitative limits on
how much of that trade can be re-imported.
5.204 In the view of the United States,
the facts before the CITA and the record before the Panel demonstrated
that US underwear producers (including both those which did and
those which did not manufacture offshore) had been seriously damaged
or actually threatened with such damage from a surge in re-imports.
It was the responsibility of the United States to balance the
damage to and interests of many different types of domestic underwear
producers. The ATC permitted Members to impose a transitional
safeguard even if the damage did not extend to 100 per cent of
the industry. Any requirement that the damage must be sustained
by a percentage or majority of the industry or a certain size
or type of firm, was conspicuously omitted from the ATC. In other
WTO safeguard procedures, there were express requirements with
respect to the proportion of the affected industry represented.
Clearly, the negotiators of the ATC had been aware of those procedures,
but had chosen to continue the safeguard mechanism used under
the MFA system.
J. THE REQUIREMENT TO
HOLD CONSULTATIONS
5.205 Costa Rica
argued that even if, for illustration, it was considered that
the United States had fulfilled the substantive requirements needed
to have the right to apply a transitional safeguard measure to
Costa Rican trade in category 352/652, which, as they had
already shown, the United States had not done, the fact was
that the unilateral restriction imposed was fraught with its own
problems and in itself also violated the ATC. The adoption, maintenance
and renewal by the United States of this unilateral restriction
suffered from two serious flaws of different kinds. First, the
United States had adopted, maintained and renewed a measure unilaterally,
without having held consultations on the basis of the substantive
requirement on which the measure was supposedly based, thus violating
Articles 6.7 and 6.10 of the ATC. And second, it had
applied the measure retroactively to the date of the call for
consultations, thus violating Article 6.10 of the Agreement.
5.206 The request for consultations
made by the United States, the information presented in the Statement
on which the action taken was based, the consultations held with
Members and the unilateral restriction adopted in this case all
referred to the condition of the existence of serious damage to
the United States industry. In other words, the United States
made the call for consultations and proceeded thereafter until
it adopted the transitional safeguard in June 1995 on the basis
of the purported existence of serious damage to its industry.
5.207 Costa Rica
noted that, at its July meeting the TMB had determined that serious
damage did not exist. The United States should then have immediately
withdrawn the measure. Nevertheless, it did not do so, but rather
appeared to have interpreted that, as the TMB had not reached
a conclusion as to the existence or not of actual threat of serious
damage, it could continue maintaining the measure on that basis.
By proceeding in this way, the United States had violated Articles 6.7
and 6.10 of the ATC, in so far as they contained an obligation
to hold consultations during a 60-day period before a unilateral
restriction may be adopted. In other words, it was impossible
to adopt a unilateral restriction without having held consultations
with the Member affected, as provided for by the various paragraphs
of Article 6 of the ATC.
5.208 This meant that, in order
to have been able to adopt a measure on the basis of the existence
of actual threat of serious damage, the United States should have
made the call, presented the information and held consultations
on that basis. It could not be admitted that a unilateral restriction
may be imposed without specifically having had the opportunity
to rebut the alleged existence of a substantive requirement on
which the measure was allegedly based. To maintain the contrary
would imply leaving the exporting Member completely defenceless,
because there would not be a point in the proceedings at which
it could try to defend itself. In the case under consideration,
if the United States had considered that the basis for its call
was the existence of actual threat of serious damage, it should
have said so in its call for consultations, and should have presented
the factors and information required to demonstrate its existence,
and then should have imposed the unilateral restriction on that
basis.
5.209 The United States
pointed out that Article 6.10 of the ATC regulated the date
when, if consultations had failed to reach agreement, an importing
Member may move ahead unilaterally with implementation of the
textile restriction in question. Provision of such deadlines
was fully consistent with the scheme of Article 6 of the
ATC, which attempted to maximize the possibility that transitional
safeguards would be applied on a consensual basis; any negotiator
could appreciate that a lack of deadlines would mean lack of
any incentive for negotiation and agreement. However, Article 6.10
of the ATC did not regulate the effective date for a unilateral
transitional safeguard. The United States had applied its transitional
safeguard with respect to imports of underwear from Costa Rica
effective on 23 June 1995. This date fell within 30
days following the 60day period for consultations after
the initial call made on 27 March 1995. The reference
year for imports within the levels specified in this transitional
safeguard began on March 27. This reference year was fully consistent
with US obligations under Article 6.10 of the ATC.
5.210 Costa Rica
argued that, when the TMB determined that serious damage to the
United States industry did not exist in this case, what the
United States should properly have done was to withdraw the measure
adopted on that basis and, if there really were grounds justifying
the existence of actual threat of serious damage, begin the procedure
anew on that ground, to comply with Articles 6.7 and 6.10
of the ATC, and give Costa Rica a chance to defend itself. By
failing to do so, the United States violated the above-mentioned
provisions.
5.211 The United States
argued that they were not required by the ATC to choose between
serious damage and actual threat in making their determination.
The ATC standard allowed Members to assert, at the same time,
both serious damage or actual threat. The plain meaning of the
standard invoked merely the notion that there could be a determination
on the basis of serious damage, or actual threat. Neither was
exclusive of the other. There was no obligation in other safeguard
proceedings that one standard must be alleged instead of the other.
The ATC treated them equally, that is, without any special factors
to establish a case for one or the other. The simple fact was
that Members could allege both based on the same factors. In
addition, contrary to the assertion of Costa Rica, it did not
follow that if the TMB had found that there was no serious damage,
and reached no consensus on threat, there was no threat. No
consensus on threat was just that. No consensus on that finding,
therefore, no finding or decision on threat.
5.212 The United States
also stated that it held consultations with Costa Rica in
accordance with Article 6.7 of the ATC before placing a restriction.
It then applied the restraint, and referred the matter to the
TMB, pursuant to Article 6.10. Article 6.12 therefore
permitted the United States to maintain the restraint for
up to three years, without extension. Article 6.10
expressly allowed for the placement of a unilateral restraint
before TMB review. Nothing in the text indicated that the restraint
must be withdrawn in the absence of any recommendation to do so.
A lack of consensus in the TMB, or even a finding without a recommendation
to withdraw, did not obligate an importing Member to withdraw
a restraint. Even if there was a recommendation to withdraw a
restraint, Members must only "endeavour" to comply,
and provide reasons to the TMB if they could not comply with the
recommendation. In this case, the United States had complied
with the TMB recommendation.
K. EFFECTIVE DATE OF
THE RESTRICTION
5.213 Costa Rica
also argued that the United States had applied retroactively the
unilateral restriction imposed on trade with Costa Rica in
category 352/652, thereby violating Article 6.10 of the ATC.
This Article provided that:
5.214 In accordance with the
above, if the Members failed to reach agreement on the application
of the safeguard once the 60-day period fixed for holding consultations
had expired, the Member which proposed to take safeguard action
may do so unilaterally within the following 30 days. Thus, the
provision under consideration granted the importing Member the
power during a specified period to impose a unilateral restriction
on the imports after a certain number of days had passed. Nowhere,
in Costa Rica's view, did Article 6.10 of the
ATC authorize the imposition of a unilateral restriction retroactive
to the date of the call for consultations. The fact was that
retroactivity could not be assumed, but must be explicitly authorized,
as it was under the MFA. Article 3.5(i) of the MFA explicitly
stated that:
5.215 Costa Rica
further argued that, if retroactivity was not explicitly provided
for, as in the case of Article 6.10 of the ATC, the measure
in question must be applied "forwards". This was particularly
clear in the case of this provision of the ATC which, when establishing
a procedure similar to that provided for in the MFA for the imposition
of a unilateral restriction, differed from the latter in respect
of retroactivity, by eliminating the explicit provision the MFA
contained in this regard. This interpretation was bolstered by
the principles established in Article 6.1 of the ATC, according
to which:
5.216 Since any gaps or doubts
arising in the legal text governing the imposition of a transitional
safeguard must be interpreted on the basis of the principles and
spirit guiding the ATC, it was not possible to conclude that a
restriction adopted under the Agreement may be applied retroactively
in the absence of any explicit provision to that effect. This
interpretation was supported by other agreements that were an
integral part of the WTO Agreement and which therefore must also
serve as interpretative sources for the ATC in the absence of
any express provision in the latter. Thus, for example, Article XIII:3(b)
of GATT 1994, referring to import restrictions involving the fixing
of quotas, expressly authorized retroactive application of a restriction
only for products that were en route at the time at which public
notice was given of the restriction.
5.217 Accordingly, in the view
of Costa Rica, the only possible conclusion was that,
where Members had not reached agreement, the importing Member
may, within the following 30 days, adopt a unilateral restriction
which would begin to be applied as from the time when it was adopted,
and not before. This meant that the imposition of the restriction
by the United States should have begun as from 16 June 1995,
the date when the restriction was established, and could not be
made retroactive to 27 March 1995, the date of the request
for consultations, as the United States in fact had done. By
proceeding in this way, and by continuing to do so, the United
States had disregarded the very significant revisions of the information
presented as a basis for its action, disregarded all the aspects
discussed in the consultations, and the conclusions of the TMB
and had violated Article 6.10 of the ATC.
5.218 The United States
argued that the ATC was silent concerning the effective date of
safeguard measures, and did not prevent a Member from providing
that the effective date would be the date of the request for consultations.
The United States had held consultations with Costa Rica in accordance
with Article 6.7 of the ATC before placing a restriction;
had then applied the restraint at issue in this case; and had
referred the matter to the TMB, pursuant to Article 6.10
of the ATC. Article 6.12 of the ATC therefore, permitted
the United States to maintain the restraint for up to three years,
without extension. When asked by exporting countries including
Costa Rica to address this question, the TMB had responded recognizing
this fact. The TMB had noted that
The MFA explicitly recognized
the customary practice of counting imports during the consultation
period against restraint levels, and the ATC did not change this
practice. The universal application of textile restraints on
this basis and the recognition accorded to this practice generally
in the TSB and TMB, demonstrated that it was in fact a matter
of accepted custom which constitutes "subsequent practice
in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement
of the parties regarding its interpretation" in the sense
of Article 31.3(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (1969).
5.219 In this regard the United States
(and Costa Rica) were of the view that the reference in Article XVI:1
of the WTO Agreement to "decisions, procedures and customary
practices followed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947
and the bodies established in the framework of GATT 1947"
did not include the MFA. Costa Rica noted that GATT 1947
and the MFA were two independent, selfstanding agreements
while the United States pointed out that to some extent,
the MFA was an agreement relevant to the history of the ATC, as
even though the MFA had expired, many of the provisions of the
ATC were drawn from the MFA.
5.220 The United States
emphasized that the omission of an explicit reference to the effective
date of the restriction in the ATC could not be construed as an
attempt to prevent it. It was essential to the effective application
of transitional safeguard as an adjustment mechanism. Textile
restrictions would not work without the flexibility to set the
effective date. Without it, a flood of imports would vitiate
their adjustment function. Under Article XIX an importing
country could simply act when it had made its determination of
serious injury, but under the MFA and the ATC importing countries
had been required to wait for consultations before acting. It
was argued that the principle of effective treaty interpretation
requires that transitional safeguards under Article 6 of
the ATC must be permitted to have an effective date as of the
date of the request of consultations as any contrary position
would make the ATCconsistent transitional safeguards ineffective.
5.221 Along these same lines,
it was observed that restraints were normally applied effective
on the date of the call as a call would trigger speculative trade.
If traders believed that imports before completion of the consultation
process would not be counted, speculative imports would aggravate
injury or bankrupt the remaining industry. A transitional safeguard
was an adjustment measure which facilitated the ultimate accomplishment
of the tenyear programme of the ATC. A sudden flood of
speculative imports for stockpiling in warehouses could not be
permitted to frustrate this adjustment process. The widespread
recognition of application of textile restrictions as from the
date of the request reflected a commonsense appreciation
of the practical aspects of this larger policy imperative. As
a matter of treaty law, the principle of effective application
of treaties (ut res magis valeat quam pereat) argues that
restrictions must be permitted to have an effective date as of
the date of the request for consultations, as any contrary position
would make ATCconsistent transitional safeguards ineffective.
5.222 Article 6.10 of the
ATC expressly allowed for the placement of a unilateral restraint
before TMB review. Nothing in the text indicated that the restraint
must be withdrawn in the absence of any TMB recommendation to
do so. A lack of consensus in the TMB, or even a finding without
a recommendation to withdraw, did not obligate an importing Member
to withdraw a restraint. Even if there was a recommendation to
withdraw a restraint, Members must only "endeavour"
to comply, and provide reasons to the TMB if they could not comply
with the recommendation.
5.223 The United States
noted that the ATC provided for an absolute sunset of three years
for an Article 6 safeguard measure. Furthermore, it was
recalled that such safeguards were transitional and could only
be invoked until the ATC expired, eight and a half years from
now. The United States had continuously reviewed data on products
subject to restraint and monitored production and trade data on
a voluntary basis, even though the ATC did not so require. When
new data warranted review of a safeguard measure, the United States
considered whether it was necessary to maintain the restraint.
5.224 With respect to the Panel's
question to the United States concerning "retroactive
application of treaty obligations"; this could be read to
refer to Article 28 of the 1969 Vienna Convention. However,
this was not a case of retroactive application of a treaty to
events which took place before the treaty entered into force;
Article 28 was not relevant at all. All events which had
led to this dispute took place after entry into force of
the WTO Agreement, and in particular took place within the time
frame provided for under ATC Article 6, including Articles 6.7
and 6.8. It could not be argued that Costa Rica was unaware
of the applicable treaty rules at the time these events took place.
L. ARTICLE 2 OF
THE ATC
5.225 Costa Rica
argued that the United States had introduced a new restriction
on its trade in the clothing products classified in category 352/652,
without basing itself on the provisions of the ATC, and thereby
violated Article 2.4, of the said Agreement. As recalled
in the Preamble of the ATC, the terms of reference of the Uruguay Round
Negotiating Group on Textiles and Clothing had established that:
In order to carry out this mandate,
Article 1.1 of the ATC, provided that:
Costa Rica further
argued that for the purpose of attaining this objective, the ATC
strictly defined, inter alia, what type of restrictions
may be applied to trade in textiles and clothing under cover of
the safeguard clause. These restrictions must necessarily fall
within one of the following three categories:
(b) restrictions established
under the specific transitional safeguard mechanism governed by
Article 6 of the ATC, which may be applied, in accordance
with paragraph 1 of that Article, to all textile and clothing
products that had not yet been integrated into GATT 1994;
or
(c) restrictions established
in accordance with Article XIX of GATT 1994, in the
case of products already integrated into GATT 1994.
5.226 Thus, Article 2.4
of the ATC, provided very clearly that:
Conversely, it followed from
this provision that the introduction of new restriction in terms
of products or Members that had not been introduced in accordance
with the rules of the ATC or GATT 1994 infringed Article 2.4
of the ATC.
5.227 In the case in point, imports
into the United States from Costa Rica in category 352/652
were not subject to any quantitative restriction based on the
Multifibre Arrangement prior to the entry into force of the WTO
Agreement, and therefore the first option was ruled out. Furthermore,
cotton and man-made fibre underwear was not a product that the
United States had already incorporated into GATT 1994
and therefore Article XIX was likewise not applicable. Hence,
the only possibility open to the United States to restrict
the imports under consideration was to apply the specific transitional
safeguard mechanism in accordance with the criteria established
in Article 6 of the ATC. However, the United States
had failed to demonstrate the existence of the requirements laid
down in Article 6 of the ATC as an essential condition for
being able to apply a transitional safeguard. Consequently, the
United States had violated Article 2.4 of the ATC, as
it had applied to Costa Rica a new restriction on trade in
products classified in category 352/652 without complying
with the provisions of Article 6 of the ATC.
5.228 The United States
argued that because the safeguard action taken on imports of underwear
in category 352/652 from Costa Rica was fully consistent
with Article 6 of the ATC, there was no violation of Article 2
of the ATC.
M. A MEMBER MUST ENDEAVOUR
TO ACCEPT RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TMB
5.229 Costa Rica
argued that the United States had violated Article 8
of the ATC, which in its paragraphs 9 and 10, defined the nature
of the recommendations made by the TMB. Thus, the first of these
paragraphs provided that: "The Members shall endeavour to
accept in full the recommendations of the TMB ...". Paragraph
10 provided that:
5.230 In the view of Costa Rica,
it was clear from an analysis of these two provisions that the
TMB's recommendations were not binding. However, it was also
clear that the formulation of such recommendations must have some
purpose, because it was meaningless for the ATC to provide for
the TMB to carry out an exercise without any purpose. This aspect
became clear from the reading of paragraphs 9 and 10 of Article 8
of the ATC, from which it may be concluded that although Article 8
does not impose the obligation to abide by the recommendations
of the TMB, it does impose other obligations on Members. Article 8
of the ATC laid down two obligations on Members: firstly, in
paragraph 9 it imposed an obligation for Members to endeavour
to accept in full the recommendations of the TMB. This was a
"best-endeavours" obligation, in the sense that while
the TMB recommendations were not binding, there was an obligation
for Members to do their best to accept them. If, given the TMB's
recommendations, a Member did not even try to accept them, it
would be violating the bestendeavours obligation of Article 6.9
of the ATC.
5.231 Secondly, Article 8.10
of the ATC imposed on Members another obligation that complemented
the first, namely, that where a Member, having endeavoured to
accept the recommendations of the TMB, found itself unable to
conform with them, it shall provide the TMB with the reasons therefor.
The imperative character of the verb used in this Article clearly
indicated that, while the TMB recommendations may not be binding,
this provision did impose on a Member the obligation to justify,
"not later than one month after receipt of such recommendations",
the reasons why it was unable to conform with them.
5.232 Costa Rica
argued that in the case under consideration, the United States
not only had not tried to accept the TMB recommendations, but
furthermore did not submit to that body any document explaining
the reasons why it considered itself unable to conform with the
recommendations, and therefore it was in breach of Articles 8.9
and 8.10 of the ATC.
5.233 The United States
argued that Costa Rica's allegation that the US had violated
Article 6.9 of the ATC was without legal or factual foundation.
They had proceeded in good faith to reach mutual understanding
in consultations recommended by the TMB, consistent with obligations
inherent in Article 8 of the ATC. They also noted that the
TMB recommendation had been directed to both the United States
and Costa Rica. Contrary to the assertion of Costa Rica, the
United States had followed the TMB recommendation to consult and
to take into account the considerations it had cited. Therefore,
there was no need to invoke Article 8.10 of the ATC and provide
reasons to the TMB for not accepting its recommendation in this
case. As evidenced by the initiation of these Panel proceedings,
it was Costa Rica that could not ultimately comply with the TMB
recommendation. The TMB's response in October 1995 to the reports
of the United States and Costa Rica did not characterize the United
States as having failed to follow the TMB's recommendation. The
TMB stated that:
5.234 Costa Rica
argued that the violation by the United States of the best-endeavours
obligation imposed by Article 8.9 of the ATC was clearly
demonstrated by the following facts. In July 1995, the TMB, pursuant
to Article 6.10 of the ATC, had proceeded to examine the
unilateral restriction applied by the United States to Costa Rica
in category 352/652. On that occasion, the TMB had found that
"serious damage", as envisaged in Articles 6.2
and 6.3 of the ATC, "had not been demonstrated",
but "could not, however, reach consensus on the existence
of actual threat of serious damage". Therefore, the TMB
recommended:
Thus, the recommendation of the
TMB had been that Costa Rica and the United States should hold
new consultations, but also that these consultations should be
conducted on the basis of three considerations: (a) that
it was clear that the United States had not demonstrated the existence
of serious damage, but that a consensus had not been reached in
the TMB as to the existence of actual threat of serious damage;
(b) that trade in this category between the United States
and Costa Rica had some particular features, which should be borne
in mind; and (c) that equity considerations should be borne
in mind, with respect to the levels of restriction agreed by the
United States with other countries called for consultations on
this same category.
5.235 In the view of the United States,
the TMB recommendation went no further than a recommendation to
consult further and report back to the TMB. The TMB did not recommend
that the parties actually reach agreement, nor did it recommend
that the United States withdraw the safeguard measure, nor did
it recommend that the parties even discuss dropping the restriction.
Also, a lack of consensus in the TMB did not translate into a
recommendation to drop a restriction. In accordance with the
TMB's recommendation, the United States had duly consulted, and
duly reported back; thus, the United States had complied fully
with the TMB recommendation. In its note of October 1995, the
TMB had stated that the parties had reported no solution and that
it considered its review completed.
5.236 In Costa Rica's
view, what subsequently had occurred, however, showed that the
United States had not fulfilled the obligation imposed by Article 8.9
of the ATC in the sense of at least endeavouring to proceed in
accordance with the recommendations of the TMB. Firstly, the
United States did not even attempt to justify the adoption of
the safeguard measure on the basis of the alleged actual threat
of serious damage. Once the TMB had determined that serious damage
did not exist and that there was no consensus as to the existence
of actual threat of serious damage, the United States - as a minimum
at that stage of the proceedings - should have demonstrated the
existence of this latter hypothetical condition brought to light
by the TMB. However, the fact was that they did not even attempt
to do so, nor did it take into account the special characteristics
or trade between the two countries in this category - feigning
to ignore the overriding importance of so-called 807 trade - nor
did it take into account any considerations of equity because,
even if there were grounds for imposing the safeguard in question,
the levels of restriction proposed to Costa Rica were very
different to those offered and granted to other countries involved
in consultations.
5.237 The United States
argued that Costa Rica had misinterpreted the TMB recommendation
to mean that the TMB had asked the United States to reconsider,
in consultations, its determination that there was serious damage,
or actual threat thereof to the domestic underwear producing industry
which had been attributed to imports from Costa Rica. Further,
Costa Rica had misinterpreted the TMB recommendation to take into
account equity considerations in light of the specific case to
mean that the United States was to deem the re-import content
in Costa Rica's trade not to cause or actually threaten serious
damage to US industry. Based on these misinterpretations, Costa
Rica had asserted that the United States was required in consultations
to withdraw the restraint.
5.238 Costa Rica
held that if the United States genuinely had accepted to consider
the recommendations of the TMB, when taking into account that
the TMB had not reached a consensus as to the existence of actual
threat of serious damage it should have lifted the quota unilaterally
imposed on Costa Rica in category 352/652. This was because the
letter and spirit of the ATC were very clear: the ATC was conceived
as a transitional system whose essential function was to integrate
trade in textiles and clothing into the rules and the disciplines
of GATT 1994. From this statement, the transitional safeguard
provided for in Article 6 of the ATC was extraordinary by
nature and should be applied only in cases where it had been possible
to demonstrate the existence of the requirements laid down by
paragraphs 2 and 3 of that Article, and where consequently
the TMB had arrived at a consensus that the existence of the threat
had been demonstrated. Conversely, if the TMB had not arrived
at a consensus to that effect, a restriction that had been imposed
could not be maintained, because it would mean that the TMB had
not found the necessary justification for taking such action.
There was nothing in the ATC to establish a presumption that,
in the absence of consensus in the TMB, it should be presumed
that the importing Member had the necessary justification to impose
the measure. In the absence of any explicit provision to that
effect, following Article 6.1 of the ATC and the spirit of
the ATC it was necessary to proceed in the least restrictive manner,
that is to say, the imposed restriction should have been lifted
as there was no justification for adopting it.
5.239 In this respect, the United States
considered that Costa Rica had construed the TMB recommendation
to mean that the United States was to rescind the restraint on
Costa Rican exports by including an analysis of Article 6.1
of the ATC. Reference to integration and the taking of transitional
safeguard action and the re-import content of Costa Rican exports
supported the notion that the United States was required to rescind
the restraint when it consulted with Costa Rica. Costa Rica's
argument consistently depended on the assumption that the ATC
integration process must be read into Article 6 so as to
accelerate the pace of the integration. This was not the case.
It was clear in the ATC that integration was an independently
determined process, and that Article 6 applied only to products
not yet integrated. Article 2 of the ATC specifically allowed
Members to designate what products would be integrated and when,
as long as they were chosen from the Annex to the ATC, from certain
product groups and comprised the appropriate proportion of trade
indicated for each stage of the transition. Nothing in the ATC
required the United States or other Members to schedule sensitive
products at certain stages for integration. The negotiators had
specifically left that decision to the importing Members. Thus,
Costa Rica could not use this Panel proceeding to compel integration
of this category.
5.240 Costa Rica
also argued that, in accordance with the TMB's recommendations,
the United States was obliged to take into consideration the particular
features of the trade in this category between the two countries.
This meant that the United States should have borne in mind that,
given that virtually all exports from Costa Rica in category 352/652
were "807 trade" , the possibility that they should
have been causing serious damage or actual threat thereof was
really non-existent. If the United States had endeavoured
to accept the recommendation of the TMB to consider the particular
features of trade with Costa Rica in this category, it would clearly
have appreciated how absurd it was to impose a quota in such circumstances.
However, the United States had not made any effort to accept
the recommendation of the TMB.
5.241 The United States
further argued that the TMB recommendation did not say what Costa
Rica claimed it did. Again, the TMB had not, in its 25 October
1995 note, responded to Costa Rica's same assertions in their
report back to the TMB dated 24 August 1995. (G/TMB/SPEC/107)
The lack of TMB consensus on actual threat of serious damage
did not translate into a "recommendation" that a restraint
be withdrawn. Accordingly, there was no obligation on the United
States, in consultations, to assume such a proposition.
5.242 In the view of Costa Rica,
if the United States had insisted on adopting a safeguard measure
in these circumstances - when in fact it should have withdrawn
the measure - it should at least have borne in mind the obligation
to grant more favourable treatment to re-imports from Costa Rica,
as provided for in Article 6.6(d) of the ATC. In this regard,
however, the position of the United States appeared to have been
somewhat self-contradictory. On the one hand, it started from
the position that the rise in imports of these products was causing
serious damage to its industry, but on the other, the level of
these imports was of no importance whatsoever provided the product
in question was produced using fabric formed and cut in the United
States. The ATC established this obligation to grant more favourable
treatment to re-imports - which the United States had never tried
to fulfil in any of its proposals - but what it certainly
did not provide for was the establishment of new restrictions
in order to ensure that future trade consists solely of re-imports.
5.243 Costa Rica
noted that the TMB had also indicated that equity considerations
should be borne in mind, by which it was referring to the fact
that the same treatment should be accorded to those who were in
the same position. In this connection, apart from Costa Rica,
the United States had called for consultations six other countries
concerning this category, had withdrawn the call addressed to
one of them and had reached an agreement with the remaining five.
In the case of each of the latter, the United States had agreed
on specific level (SL) restraints that were much higher than the
respective "call" levels. Thus - and assuming that
the United States had the right to adopt a safeguard, which, in
the view of Costa Rica, was not the case - in order to comply
with the TMB's recommendation it should have made restraint proposals
to Costa Rica that reflected SL restraint levels which provided
for increases in relation to the call level, in the same way as
it had granted to the other countries. In none of the proposals
formulated by the United States to Costa Rica was this equity
factor taken into consideration, because not even in its last
proposal did the United States propose a SL restraint level approaching
the call level, still less exceeding it. In fact, the highest
level that the United States had offered at any time for the establishment
of the SL restraint was about 40 per cent below what should have
been the level for Costa Rica in accordance with the ATC itself
- assuming that the necessary requirements for imposing it had
been demonstrated, which was not the case.
5.244 Costa Rica
argued that, on the basis of the above explanation, it was clearly
demonstrated that the United States had completely disregarded
the recommendations adopted by the TMB in July 1995, without even
endeavouring to accept them as provided for in Article 8.9
of the ATC. Furthermore, the United States had violated Article 8.10
of the ATC, which imposed on Members another obligation that complemented
the obligation established in Article 8.9 of the ATC. That
is to say, the United States had not fulfilled the obligation
of presenting to the TMB its reasons explaining why it considered
itself unable to conform with the TMB's recommendations. Suffice
it to say that the United States had never at any time presented
to the TMB any document to that effect. Failure to comply with
this requirement imposed under Article 8.10 of the ATC may
be due to the fact that, since the United States had not even
attempted to follow the TMB's recommendations, it would be difficult,
if not impossible, for it to justify a hypothetical failure in
its attempt to accept those recommendations, since it had made
no such attempt.
5.245 Costa Rica
also noted that the United States had declared that they did not
agree with the finding of the TMB that the existence of serious
damage had not been demonstrated. Moreover, as in the US view
there was no provision in the ATC that made the TMB's findings
binding, the Panel was obliged to consider the question of serious
damage. In this connection, Costa Rica emphasized
that the United States had not contested at the appropriate
moment in the procedure the TMB's finding that the existence of
serious damage had not been demonstrated, as required by Articles 6.2
and 6.3 of the ATC. Costa Rica was, therefore, concerned
that contesting the action of the TMB at this stage of the procedure
and calling into question its decisions would mean divesting the
Body of any function related to monitoring the implementation
of the ATC.
5.246 The United States
argued that they had made efforts to reach a mutual understanding
with Costa Rica. As recommended by the TMB, the United States
had taken into account that the TMB could not reach consensus
on actual threat of serious damage (though they maintained that
they had demonstrated the existence of serious damage); had examined
the nature of trade from Costa Rica; and, in the interest
of equity, had again compared Costa Rica's trade with trade from
other countries to which the serious damage and actual threat
had been attributed. The record showed that Costa Rica had refused
to respond. In so doing, the United States had made a proposal
to Costa Rica that, in its view, took these factors into
account in an effort towards mutual understanding. The United States
stated that the record showed that Costa Rica had refused
to respond. The United States stated that there was no requirement
in the ATC that the United States respond to "findings"
but must "endeavour to comply" with TMB "recommendations".
The United States did comply with the TMB recommendation.
N. NULLIFICATION OR
IMPAIRMENT OF BENEFITS 5.247 Costa Rica argued that the unilateral restriction imposed by the United States on trade in clothing classified in category 352/652 from Costa Rica was a blatant violation of the obligations laid down in the ATC, in particular Articles 2, 6 and 8. On this basis, and given that the ATC was a "covered agreement" within the meaning of Article 1 of the DSU, the provisions of Article 3.8 of the DSU applied. That Article stated:
It clearly followed from the
above provision that in the case under consideration, given the
infringement of Articles 2, 6 and 8 by the United States, benefits
accruing to Costa Rica under the WTO Agreement, and in particular
under the ATC, had been nullified or impaired.
5.248 Considering that Article 3.1
of the DSU stipulated that
it was important to note that
these Articles had established that the benefits accruing under
the GATT Rules - and consequently the WTO Rules - did not comprise
exclusively those derived from the Agreement at the time when
a concession came into effect, but also the future trading opportunities
that would result from that concession. Thus, and by virtue of
the prima facie case of nullification or impairment of
benefits that existed in cases of infringement of the obligations
assumed under a covered agreement, such as the ATC, the claims
presented by one or more Members relating to the imposition of
infringing unilateral measures must be accepted even where statistical
evidence of commercial damage cannot exist.
5.249 It was also necessary to
emphasize that nullification or impairment should be considered
not only in relation to the effect which the violation in question
may have had on the volume of trade but also in relation to possible
increases in transaction costs and the creation of uncertainty
liable to affect investment plans.
5.250 As a result of all the
foregoing, Costa Rica considered that the Panel should
find that the unilateral restriction imposed by the United States
on the trade of Costa Rica in category 352/652 infringed
Articles 2, 6 and 8 of the ATC and that, consequently, these infringements
entailed the nullification or impairment of benefits accruing
to Costa Rica under the WTO Agreement. Accordingly, Costa Rica
urged the Panel to find in its report that the United States
should proceed to bring its measure into conformity with the ATC,
which implied immediately withdrawing it. 5.251 The United States argued that Costa Rica's rights and benefits under the ATC had not been nullified and impaired. The United States had demonstrated that they had not violated Articles 2, 6 or 8 of the ATC. Thus, nullification and impairment of any benefits and rights accruing to Costa Rica in this case could not be presumed.
* * * * * TO CONTINUE WITH USA - RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF COTTON AND MANMADE FIBRE UNDERWEAR
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