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BINATIONAL PANEL REVIEW |
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Secretariat File No. MEX-94-1904-01 |
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IN THE MATTER OF: Antidumping Investigation of Mexico into Imports of Flat Coated Steel Products from the United States of America
III. COMPETENCE OF OFFICIALS BEFORE APRIL 1, 1993 50. In their Complaints, Bethlehem, Inland, LTV and USX each claimed that the officials who carried out the anti-dumping proceeding between December 24, 1992 and April 1, 1993 lacked competence. During the Panel review (but not in its Complaint), New Process also raised this issue. However, since New Process did not raise the claim of lack of competence in its Complaint, this Panel lacks jurisdiction under Rule 7 of the NAFTA Panel Rules to consider this claim by New Process. As discussed above, under Rule 7 of the NAFTA Panel Rules, our jurisdiction is to look individually at each Complaint, and individually at each issue in each Complaint. 51. USX, Bethlehem, Inland and LTV raised issues of competence individually through their Complaints in this Binational Panel proceeding. These U.S. exporters say that officials who carried out the anti-dumping proceeding between December 24, 1992 and April 1, 1993 performed certain administrative acts in the conduct of the proceeding at a time when they lacked competence to carry out those acts. They claim that under Article 16 of the Mexican Constitution the official carrying out those actions must have competence to do so. Under Article 16, that competence requires that the acting authority be legally created by law or regulation and that the entity must only act in accordance with the express authority granted by Mexican law. They argue that since these requirements were not fulfilled in this situation, the Final Determination should be declared illegal under Article 238/I of the Federal Fiscal Code. 52. The challenge to the jurisdiction (competence) of the investigating authority raised by the U.S. respondents has a dual dimension: a constitutional dimension and a legal dimension. Mexican courts have drawn this distinction. The "constitutional competence" is derived from the provisions of the Constitution and is protected by the amparo trial implementing the constitutional guaranty established by Article 16. 19 "Legal competence" relates to ordinary legal provisions or decrees issued by the Legislative Power ("Ley Reglamentaria"). Since the Panel sits in place of the Federal Fiscal Tribunal (not an amparo court), it considers violations of legal competence arising under Article 238(1) of the Federal Fiscal Code and any laws or regulations relevant to SECOFI that establish the competence of SECOFI officials, but only "indirectly" violations of the individual guarantees recognized in Article 16(1) of the Constitution.20 53. In view of this dual dimension of competence, one question is whether this Panel is empowered to decide constitutional issues raised by the parties.21 Neither NAFTA, Chapter 19 nor the NAFTA Panel Rules provide a clear answer to this question. Nevertheless, as the Panel may apply Mexican law "to the extent that a court of the importing party would rely on such materials", the Panel may reasonably look for guidance to the regulations, administrative practice and judicial precedents in which a party has raised constitutional arguments before the Federal Fiscal Tribunal. 54. The Federal Fiscal Tribunal is not authorized by the Constitution or the Organic Law of the Federal Fiscal Tribunal or the Federal Fiscal Code, to directly decide on the constitutionality of an act, because the Federal Fiscal Tribunal is a tribunal of an administrative character.22 On the other hand, two theses issued by the Federal Fiscal Tribunal that have been provided to this Panel, establish that in order to determine the nullity of action of an administrative entity, the Federal Fiscal Tribunal should support its decision by reference to the Constitution.23 However, this Panel need not decide whether it has the authority to review constitutional issues under Mexican law, because the standard of review set out in Article 238 limits the review to issues of legality. 55. As we attempt to apply Article 238, we note that the issues of competence presented to this Panel raise new and complex questions involving anti-dumping proceedings under Mexican law. Most of the precedents in fiscal and administrative matters involve proceedings against a single person or company. There are some precedents involving recent amparo proceedings. These decisions, however, have not addressed all of the legal considerations that this Panel believes are relevant to the analysis. Similarly, the decisions of the Binational Panels in Cases Nos. MEX-94-1904-02 and MEX-94-1904-03, do not fully address these considerations. 56. The Panel believes that the issues of competence presented to us require an analysis of (A) the specific administrative acts that occurred before April 1, 1993, (B) the competence of the officials who performed these administrative acts, © the legal duties and interests of exporters in an antidumping proceeding that exist independently of any incompetent acts, including the right of exporters to present evidence and to have the evidence considered by the Investigating Authority, (D) the guidance from past amparo and Panel decisions, and (E) whether any "administrative determinations" within the Final Determination were derived from or based on proceedings carried out by incompetent officials. As discussed below, this analysis requires that the claim of competence presented by Inland be decided differently from the claims of competence presented by the other U.S. exporters. A. THE SPECIFIC ACTS AT ISSUE 57. The anti-dumping proceeding was initiated by the provisional resolution published in the Diario Oficial on December 24, 1992. Before December 24, 1992, there were no "proceedings" within the meaning of Article 238, Section I, of the Federal Fiscal Code. Therefore, the Panel did not consider any of the acts that occurred before December 24, 1992. Also, the U.S. exporters agree that the act initiating the proceeding on December 24, 1992 was performed by an official of SECOFI who was competent. Therefore, the act of initiating the proceeding also is not challenged. 58. On April 1, 1993 SECOFI published in the Diario Oficial an Internal Regulation establishing the competence of new units within SECOFI. We review here those official acts that occurred between December 24, 1992 and April 1, 1993. The specific acts as shown in the administrative record are of the following types:
2. There was a series of notifications sent to 26 U.S. Exporters on February 8, 1993. 25 These notifications informed U.S. exporters of the initiation of the anti-dumping proceeding and enclosed an anti-dumping questionnaire. In addition, these notifications purported to state a deadline by which responses to the questionnaire must be submitted and warned of certain consequences if responses were not submitted. 3. The last type of official act during this period were documents denying a procedural request from a particular party. Generally, these were denials of requests for an extension of time in which to submit responses to the questionnaires.26 59. The U.S. exporters have focused on the second and third categories. All of the above documents in these categories begin by identifying the following General Directorate and Area Directorate of SECOFI: DIRECCION GENERAL DE PRACTICAS COMERCIALES INTERNACIONALES. DIRECCION DE CUOTAS COMPENSATORIAS. 60. Almost all of these documents were signed by Miguel Angel Velázquez Elizarrarás as "the Director," and on behalf of either the Dirección General de Prácticas Comerciales Internacionales ("DGPCI") or the Dirección de Cuotas Compensatorias ("DCC"). B. COMPETENCE OF THE OFFICIAL ACTING FOR DGPCI AND DCC 61. The U.S. exporters claim that neither DGPCI or DCC existed before April 1, 1993, and that, therefore, Mr. Velázquez (who claimed to be acting on behalf of DGPCI or DCC) was incompetent. In its brief, SECOFI does not deny that DGPCI did not lawfully exist. Instead, SECOFI argues that the existence of DGPCI is irrelevant, because DCC was lawfully created and because the director of DCC was the person who processed the investigation administratively.27 62. The parties differ about the legal status of DCC. The U.S. exporters claim that DCC, like DGCPI, was never legally established. SECOFI claims that DCC was properly established as an Area Directorate under a General Directorate different than DGPCI, through a 1988 General Manual of Organization published in the Diario Oficial. 63. 1. It is important to understand the legal context of this issue of competence. The Ley Orgánica de la Administración Pública Federal ("LOAPF"), which establishes the different departments and ministries, including SECOFI, specifies the jurisdiction and powers of subordinate entities within each ministry and secretariat. Articles 14, 16 and 18 of this Law stated, at the relevant time:
64. Thus, if an administrative unit within SECOFI is exercising powers, the functions of the unit must come from a "law" or from an "internal regulation" issued by the President of the Republic.28 . A delegation of powers to an administrative unit must be published in the Diario Oficial. 29 Secretaries of State may delegate their powers, except those that must be exercised personally, to the heads of administrative units that have been lawfully created and to other officials within those same units.30 65. The LOAPF is based on, and implements, Article 90 of the Federal Constitution of Mexico, which states: "Federal Public Administration shall be centralized and decentralized according to the Organic Law issued by Congress, which shall distribute the business of the administrative order of the Federal Government, which shall be under the charge of the Secretaries of State and Administrative Departments...." 66. In addition, Article 89 of the Constitution confers related powers on the President of the Republic:
67. Mexico’s Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation has ruled that only a Law, or the President of Mexico acting through an Internal Regulation, may create those internal units in each ministry or secretariat in charge of exercising the powers bestowed on a public body:31
68. Under this jurisprudence, there is a serious question of whether DCC was lawfully created as an "authority" that could carry out any portion of the anti-dumping investigation with respect to third persons. DCC is not mentioned in any Law or in any Internal Regulation issued by the President of the Republic. Similarly, DGPCI was not established by any Law or Internal Regulation. Thus, neither of the two entities listed on the documents issued on behalf of the Investigating Authority before April 1, 1993 was lawfully established in the manner prescribed by the LAOPF. 69. 2. SECOFI argues that DCC was established by a General Manual of Organization published in the Diario Oficial in 1988 ("1988 Manual"). This 1988 Manual describes DCC as an Area Directorate not under DGPCI, but under a different General Directorate called the Dirección General de Servicios al Comercio Exterior ("DGSCE"). SECOFI claims that when the director of DCC (Mr. Velazquez) signed the various administrative acts between December 24, 1992, and April 1, 1993, DCC was a legally created authority of DGSCE. In this regard, DGSCE was properly established by an Internal Regulation. Article 16, Section 12 of the 1989 Internal Regulation of SECOFI (published in the Diario Oficial on June 5, 1989) states that DGSCE had the powers to:
70. One problem with this argument is that it is doubtful whether a General Manual of Organization may lawfully create an administrative "authority" that may externally perform administrative acts that affect the interests of private persons. Article 19 of the Ley Organica de Administracion Publica Federal (LOAPF) discusses manuals of organization:
71. There is a thesis that suggests that a General Manual of Organization may create administrative units at least internally within a ministry:32
72. The following thesis indicates that although a Manual may create administrative units internally, an Internal Regulation may be necessary for an administrative unit like DCC to act in its own name externally.33
73. Another precedent also supports this view:34
74. There is a second problem with the argument that the 1988 Manual gave DCC the authority to act externally. The 1988 Manual, which listed DCC as an Area Directorate under DGSCE, was abrogated by a 1989 General Manual of Organization ("1989 Manual"). The second transitory provision of the 1989 Manual, published in the Diario Oficial on June 5, 1989, states:
75. Thus, the only organizational document that referred to DCC was repealed. 76. One may argue that the word "abrogated" should not be read literally. The 1989 Manual did not list any Area Directorates. Certainly, it was not the intent of the 1989 Manual to abolish all of SECOFI’s Area Directorates from the 1988 Manual. In fact, many Area Directorates continued to function internally within SECOFI. However, the Mexican legal system requires that competence toward third parties be based on certain formal legal acts. These formal legal acts are a first line of protection for private citizens against abuses of governmental authority.35 When the 1989 Manual was "abrogated," there was no longer any published document that even purported to create DCC. Although DCC may have existed internally within SECOFI, it was no longer legally established by any legislative or regulatory act. It could not act externally in its own name as an "authority." 77. There is a final argument. Although DCC did not exist as an independent "authority" within SECOFI, DCC could be viewed as an informal part of DGSCE. Its "director," when administering this anti-dumping proceeding, was simply acting as a delegate for the director of DGSCE. As discussed in Part IV/A/2 of this Opinion, there is an "Acuerdo Delegatorio" that SECOFI published in the Diario Oficial on September 12, 1985 and that delegates certain powers to Area Directors and other persons. 78. The problem with saying that Mr. Velázquez acted as a delegate of the Director of DGSCE is that there is no evidence that DGSCE did anything in this anti-dumping proceeding. No document lists the name or initials of DGSCE. The administrative file does not even refer to DGSCE. At the hearing and in its brief, SECOFI did not argue that DGSCE or its director was actually involved in this anti-dumping proceeding. SECOFI attached as an annex to its brief two documents appointing Mr. Velázquez as an Area Director of DCC and later as an Adjunct Director of the Unidad de Prácticas Comerciales Internacionales.36 These appointment documents, however, also do not mention DGSCE. Thus, it cannot be said that, before April 1, 1993, Mr. Velázquez was acting as an official of DGSCE. 79. For these reasons, the administrative acts in question between December 24, 1992 and April 1, 1993 were not by a competent official, because the administrative unit that purported to act was not lawfully created.37 As discussed above, the most important of these administrative acts were the February 8, 1993 notifications and questionnaires sent to the U.S. exporters, and certain later acts denying extensions of time (particularly to Inland).
Continue on to Subsection C: The Legal duties and interests of the U.S. Exporters
19 Article 16(1) of the Constitution provides that "No person shall be disturbed (‘molestado’) in his person, family, domicile, documents or possessions, except by virtue of a written order issued by a competent authority stating the legal grounds and justification for the action taken." 20 See judicial precedent: "Nullity hearing before the Tax Court of the Federation, Resource must be exhausted before placing the matter before a Constitutional hearing ... ". Tercer Tribunal Colegiado en materia administrativa del Primer Circuito. Semanario Judicial de la Federación, 7a. época, vols. 121-126, sexta parte, p. 109. Amparo en revisión 1049/78. Alicia Bernal Sánchez. 8 de marzo e 1979. Unanimidad de votos. Ponente: Sergio Hugo Chapital Gutiérrez. 21 In the United States, Panels do not have such jurisdiction. See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(4)(B), NAFTA, Statement of Administrative Action 101. Where a participant in an antidumping or countervailing duty proceeding wishes to contest a final determination on constitutional grounds, the statute reserves jurisdiction over such issues to a three-judge panel of the Court of International Trade. This is done to ensure that binational panels do not decide constitutional issues, and thereby raise the concern that such issues be decided other than by an Article III court. 22 See Article I of the Ley Orgánica del Tribunal Fiscal de la Federación, Diario Oficial, December 15, 1995. 23 See Review 1649/87, Boletín del Tribunal Fiscal de la Federación, 3a. época, año III, num. 26, Feb. 1990, p. 30; Review 310/86, Boletín del Tribunal Fiscal de la Federación,, 3a. época, año I, num. 4, Apr. 1988, p. 11. 24 See Administrative Record (VC) Nos. 10, 13, 17, 19, 21, 58, 60, 62, 65, 67, 71, 73, 76, 78, 83, 88, 94, 96, 99, 101, 104, 107, 111, 113 and 119. 25 Id. Nos. 32-57. 26 These are identified in the administrative record as Nos. 64 and 75. 27 As discussed in Part III/D of this Opinion, previous amparo decisions state that DGPCI was the administrative unit that carried out this part of the investigation, and conclude that DGPCI was not lawfully created. 28 LOAPF, Article 16, 18. 29 LOAPF, Article 16. 30 LOAPF, Article, 14, 16. 31 Segunda Sala. Semanario Judicial de la Federación. 8a. época, tomo III, primera parte, p. 277. Amparo en revisión 6458/85. Francisco Javier Vázquez Balderas. 10. de febrero de 1989. 5 votos. Ponente: Manuel Gutiérrez de Velasco. Secretaria: Rosalba Becerril Velázquez. Amparo en revisión 1129/88. Compañía Mexicana de Ingeniería, Sociedad Anónima. 8 de junio de 1988. Unanimidad de votos. Ponente: Atanasio González Martínez. Secretaria: Alicia Rodríguez Cruz de Blanco (8a. época, tomo I, primera parte 1, p. 223). Amparo en revisión 480/84. Compañía Minera Río Colorado, S. A. 23 de agosto de 1984. Unanimidad de 4 votos. Ausente: Santiago Rodríguez Roldán. Ponente: Carlos del Río Rodríguez. Secretaria: Diana Bernal Ladrón Guevara (7a. época, vols. 187-192, tercera parte, p. 65) 32 Cuarto Tribunal Colegiado en Materia Administrativa del Primer Circuito. Semanario Judicial de la Federación. 8a. época, tomo III, segunda parte-1, p. 141. Amparo en revisión 673/85. Porfirio Mayorquín Ibarra. 12 de enero de 1988. Unanimidd de voto. Ponente: Gerardo David Góngora Pimentel. Secretaria: Adriana Leticia Campuzano Gallegos. 33 Cuarto Tribunal Colegiado en Materia Administrativa del Primer Circuito. Semanario Judicial de la Federación. 8a. época, tomo III, segunda parte 2, p. 654. Amparo en revisión 474/89. Ciba Geigy Mexicana, S.A. de C.V. 16 de marzo de 1989. Unanimidad de votos. Ponente: Hilario Bárcenas Chávez. Secretario: Emiliano Hernández Salazar. 34 Cuarto Tribunal Colegiado en Materia Administrativa del Primer Circuito. Semanario Judicial de la Federacion. 8a. época, tomo X, octubre, p. 373 Amparo directo 654/92. Ganaderos y Productores de Leche Pura, S.A. de C.V. 4 de junio de 1992. Unanimidad de votos. Ponente: José Méndez Calderón. Secretaria: Silvia Martínez Saavedra. 35 See José Ovalle Favela, Los Derechos del Pueblo Mexicano a través de su Constitución, 4a. ed., Cámara de Diputados-Porrúa, 1994, pp. 163-171, y Efraín Polo Bernal, Breviario de Garantías Individuales, México, Porrúa, 1993 pp. 172-173. 36 See Constancia Única de Movimiento de Personal dated October 1, 1990 and Constancia Única de Movimiento de Personal dated March 1, 1993 in the Annex to the Brief of the Investigating Authority, March 3, 1995. 37 Panelist Vega has decided to concur with the other members of this Panel in recognizing that the administrative actions taken by the DCC between December 24, 1992 and April 1, 1993 were not by a competent official, despite the fact that in a previous opinion he had argued the opposite. See his dissenting vote in case MEX-94- 1904-02. His view changed mainly because he became persuaded that according to the strict interpretation of NAFTA Article 1911 and Annex 1911, which defines as a "competent investigating authority" in the case of Mexico the "designated authority within the Secretariat of Trade and Industrial Development", it was the DGPCI, and Mr. Velázquez as its delegate, that actually conducted the antidumping investigation during the period at issue, and not the DGSCE, that had formally the powers to do so, but did not participate. |
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