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ARTICLE 1904
BINATIONAL PANEL REVIEW PANEL: Louis S.
Mastriani, Chairman. Gustavo Vega
Canovas. Mark R. Joelson. Kevin C.
Kennedy. Ruperto Patino
Manffer.
COUNSEL:
For CEMEX, S.A. de C.V. ("CEMEX"): Manatt, Phelps & Phillips (Irwin P.
Altschuler, Esq., Jeffrey S. Neeley, Esq., and Kasey L. Iovino, Esq.)
For Cementos de Chihuahua, S.A. de C.V.: White & Case (Walter J. Spak,
Esq., Gregory J. Spak, Esq., and Kristina Zissis, Esq.)
For The Southern Tier Cement Committee: King & Spalding (Joseph W.
Dorn, Esq. and Michael P. Mabile, Esq., and J. Michael Taylor, Esq.)
For the Investigating Authority: U.S. Department of Commerce, Office
of the
Chief Counsel for Import Administration ( David W. Richardson, Esq.)
2
On May 27, 2003, the Department of Commerce ("Commerce") issued its
Final Results of Redetermination in this matter.1 Two
issues are challenged before
this Panel: (1) CEMEX, S.A. de C.V. ("CEMEX") challenges Commerce's
application
of Cementos de Chihuahua, S.A. de C.V.'s ("CDC's") sales of NOM I Cement to
CEMEX's Hidalgo sales; and (2) CDC challenges Commerce's decision to apply
adverse facts available to CDC in calculating CDC's importer-specific rate.
As to the first issue, this Panel unanimously rejects CEMEX's challenge, and
affirms Commerce's redetermination on remand. The Panel finds Commerce's
application of CDC's sales of NOM I Cement to CEMEX's Hidalgo sales to be
supported by substantial evidence and otherwise in accordance with law. The
Panel
notes that Commerce used the exact same methodology and obtained the exact
same choice of adverse facts available in the Final Results, the first
remand, and
the second remand. Given this Panel's prior affirmance of Commerce's
selection of
adverse facts available, we find Commerce's methodology for choosing facts
available to be the law of the case. See In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co., 160
U.S. 247,
255 (1895); Briggs v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 334 U.S. 304, 306 (1948). In
reaching
this decision, the Panel affirms Commerce's acceptance of The Southern Tier
Cement Committee's ("STCC's") May 16, 2003, submission in which it asserts
that
there is a clerical error in Commerce's margin calculations. See, e.g.,
Neenah
Foundry Co. v. United States, 142 F. Supp.2d 1008, 1018 (Ct. Int'l Trade
2001) ("[I]t is always within the discretion of a[n] . . . administrative
agency to relax or modify its procedural rules adopted for the orderly
transaction of business before it when in a given case the ends of justice
require it.") (quoting American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Service,
397 U.S. 532 (1970).
As to the second issue, this Panel remands Commerce's decision to apply adverse
facts available to CDC in calculating CDC's importer-specific rate.2 It is
undisputed that CDC fully cooperated with Commerce in the seventh
administrative review. CDC responded fully and accurately to all requests for
information, was available for verification, participated in Commerce's
hearing, and
cooperated in all respects during this review. It is Commerce's practice to
decline to
apply the most adverse facts available to a cooperative party, even when a
cooperative party has some connection to an uncooperative party. For example,
in
Live Cattle from Canada, 64 Fed. Reg. 56739 (October 21, 1999), Commerce did
not
impose adverse facts available on those companies in a group that cooperated,
when
one of the companies in the group did not cooperate. Instead, Commerce
applied
partial adverse facts to those companies in the group that cooperated. See 64
Fed.
Reg. at 56745. See also Fresh Cut Flowers from Mexico, USA-95-1904-05 ("The
Panel determines that the Department [of Commerce] properly determined that
the
Complainants provided misleading and evasive statements concerning their
respective tax statuses and that the Department [of Commerce] properly
invoked BIA given the substantial evidence on the record in this action. However, the
firsttier
BIA rate imposed by the Department is not justified by substantial evidence on
the record and is not otherwise in accordance with law. Based upon the
substantial evidence on the record, the Panel remands the action with
instructions to assign a second-tier rate of 18.20 percent, which is taken from
the Department's original investigation and takes into account the substantial
cooperation provided by the Ranches.).
In addition to Live Cattle from Canada, we note that the other cases cited by STCC for the proposition that this Panel should apply facts available against
CDC
are inapposite to the factual situation to the instant case. Specifically, in
Welded
Large Diameter Line Pipe for Mexico, 67 Fed. Reg. 566 (January 4, 2002), and
in
Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from Taiwan, 66 Fed. Reg. 49618
(September
28, 2001), both respondents were found by Commerce to be
uncooperative.
Meanwhile, in Circular Welded Non-Alloy Steel Pipe from the Republic of
Korea, 63
Fed. Reg. 32833 (June 16, 1998), the two collapsed companies failed to report
certain information in a single response.3
In short, no case – or statute or regulation -- supports the proposition that
the
most adverse facts available should be applied to a cooperative company that
is
collapsed with an uncooperative company. We, therefore, remand this issue to
Commerce, as we find Commerce's decision on this issue to be demonstrably arbitrary and capricious and not in accordance with law. In remanding this
issue,
we note that Commerce's discretion when drawing adverse inferences is not
unbounded. See, e.g., Kao Hsing Chang Iron & Steel Corp. v. United States,
206 F.
Supp.2d 1297, 1304 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2002); Nippon Steel Corp. v. United
States, 146
F. Supp.2d 835, 845 (CT. Int'l Trade 2001). We also note that the policy and
purpose underlying adverse facts available – to provide respondents with an
incentive to cooperate in the future and to ensure future compliance4– would not be
served by applying adverse facts available to CDC. CDC and CEMEX were separate
companies – with, among other things, different management, financial statements
and questionnaire responses -- during the seventh administrative review.
Applying adverse facts available to CDC would not serve the underlying purposes
of adverse facts available since CDC, as explained above, was fully cooperative
during this review.
On remand, we instruct Commerce to apply non-adverse facts available to
CDC for the Hidalgo plant sales. That is, we instruct Commerce to apply CEMEX's
sales of ASTM Type V cement sold as Type I cement for the Hidalgo plant. In
so
doing, we observe that CDC calls the application of non-adverse facts
available "fair
and consistent with Department [of Commerce] and CIT cases for the
application of facts available to cooperative companies that are collapsed with companies to
which
adverse facts available is applied," see CDC's July 14, 2003, Rebuttal
Comments at
7, and says "[s]uch an amount would be representative of Type V sales for
matching purposes, and, at the same time, would not penalize CDC. The Department
[of Commerce] can achieve this easily through a simple change in the programming
language, which is provided in Exhibit 2." See CDC's June 16, 2003, Comments
at 9.
This Panel remands to Commerce its decision to apply adverse facts available
to CDC in calculating CDC's importer-specific rate for resolution within 30
days
from the date of this Panel opinion.
Dissenting View of Panelists Joelson and Kennedy Concerning the Majority
Opinion to Remand to Commerce Its Decision to Apply Adverse Facts
Available to the Collapsed CEMEX/CDC Entity
Under the first step, this Panel must review Commerce's construction of a
statutory provision to determine whether "Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue." Id. at 842. "To ascertain whether Congress had an
intention on the precise question at issue . . . [this Panel] . . . employ[s]
the
'traditional tools of statutory construction.'" Timex V.I., Inc. v. United
States, 157
F.3d 879, 882 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9). "The
first and
foremost 'tool' to be used is the statute's text, giving its plain meaning.
Because a
statute's text is Congress's final expression of its intent, if the text
answers the
question, that is the end of the matter." Id. (quoted in Windmill Int'l Pte.,
Ltd. v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 2d 1303,1305-06 (Ct. Int'l Trade
2002)). Beyond the statute's text, "the tools of statutory construction
include the statute's legislative history, the statute's structure, and the
canons of statutory construction." Steel Auth. of India, Ltd. v. United
States, 146 F. Supp. 2d 900, 905 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2001).
If, after undertaking the first step, the Panel concludes that the statute is
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the panel will proceed to the
second
step. Id. at 906. Under the second step, "the narrow legal question is
whether the
agency's statutory interpretation is a permissible construction of the
statute." Id.
This involves an inquiry into the reasonableness of Commerce's
interpretation.
Windmill, 193 F. Supp. 2d at 1306. If Commerce has acted rationally, this
Panel
may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Id. Rather, the Panel
must
defer to Commerce's reasonable interpretation, Steel Authority, 146 F. Supp.
2d at
906, and must "sustain the determination if it is reasonable and supported by
the
record as a whole, including whatever fairly detracts from the substantiality
of the
evidence." Windmill, 193 F. Supp. 2d at 1306. In determining whether
Commerce's
interpretation is reasonable, this Panel "considers the following
non-exclusive list of
factors: the express terms of the provisions at issue, the objectives of
those
provisions and the objectives of the antidumping scheme as a whole." Id.
Based on the foregoing principles, the applicable standard of review requires
that
this Panel uphold Commerce's remand redetermination if it is (a) supported by
substantial evidence on the record and (b) not contrary to law, even if this
Panel
would have reached a different conclusion had it considered the case de novo.
Applying Chevron deference in this case, we believe that Commerce has acted
rationally by treating the collapsed CEMEX/CDC entity as a single entity for
purposes of applying partial adverse facts available. In the context of a
collapsed
entity situation, Commerce's decision to attribute to CDC CEMEX's inadequate
response with respect to CEMEX’s Hidalgo plant sales cannot be deemed to be
beyond the bounds of reason.
Commerce's collapsing practice is codified at 19 C.F.R. 351.401(f), and
provides in part:
[T]he Secretary will treat two or more affiliated producers as a
single entity where those producers have production facilities for
similar or identical products that would not require substantial
retooling of either facility in order to restructure manufacturing
priorities and the Secretary concludes that there is significant
potential for the manipulation of price or production. [Emphasis added.]
Commerce's practice of treating closely related parties as a single exporter or producer for purposes of an antidumping inquiry is long standing and has been consistently affirmed by the courts under the Chevron principle that the agency may fill in the interstices of the statutory scheme. See, e.g., AK Steel Corp. v. United States, 34 F. Supp. 2d 756, 764-65 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1998), rev'd in part on other grounds, 226 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Koenig & Bauer-Albert AG v. United States, 90 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1286-88 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2000). In this case, Commerce made the necessary findings under the law for purposes of collapsing CEMEX and CDC. See 64 Fed. Reg. 13148, 13152 (March 17, 1999). The propriety of collapsing CEMEX and CDC is not before this Panel. Indeed, CDC is not presently challenging Commerce’s decision to collapse it wi th CEMEX. On the contrary, CDC successfully obtained a remand from the Panel and then a subsequent remand redetermination from Commerce that enabled it to obtain the benefit of the collapse by having its U.S. sales matched with CEMEX's Mexican sales. Prior to CDC's seeking the benefit of the collapse, Commerce had matched CDC's U.S. sales with CDC’s Mexican sales and had not attributed partial adverse facts available to CDC. Now, in the course of the second remand of this seventh administrative review panel proceeding, Commerce granted CDC's request by matching CDC's U.S. sales with CEMEX's home market sales of Type V cement. As part of this changed approach, Commerce also applied partial adverse facts available to the collapsed CEMEX/CDC entity (the occasion for applying partial adverse facts available in the first place was Commerce’s inability to verify information concerning the cement sold at CEMEX's Hidalgo plant). We do not see how this decision can be considered an abuse of discretion by Commerce or how this Panel can reverse Commerce in light of the deference that we must give the agency's practice and judgment. In our view, the precedents that the majority cites do not control this issue, one way or the other. The case law relied upon by the majority establishes that Commerce's discretion in the application of facts available is not unbounded or unbridled. We have no quarrel with that proposition. However, the cases do not shed any light on the precise question we face here of applying adverse facts available to a collapsed entity where one respondent has been cooperative and the other has not. Nor is Commerce’s past practice in this area particularly illuminating. For example, in Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from Taiwan, 65 F.R. 13,943 (March 15, 2000), as the majority points out, Commerce found that both collapsed respondents had been uncooperative in applying adverse facts available to the collapsed entity. However, that determination does not make the converse proposition true, namely, that a cooperative respondent may not have adverse facts available applied to it because of the conduct of an uncooperative, collapsed co-respondent. Furthermore, Live Cattle from Canada, 64 F.R. 56,739 (Oct. 21, 1999), is not dispositive agency practice either. What Commerce did there was to apply only partial, as opposed to total, adverse facts available against the uncooperative party in recognition of the fact that the other collapsed parties had been cooperative. In other words, the uncooperative party benefited from the cooperation of the other collapsed parties. In the end, however, the sins of the uncooperative party were in fact visited upon the cooperative parties, albeit in a somewhat diluted form as result of the averaging of dumping margins. The fact remains that the cooperative parties did not escape unscathed from their co-respondent's lack of cooperation. Moreover, the Live Cattle from Canada case involved a situation where each affiliated company’s U.S. sales were matched with its own home market sales and not with those of another party. That is precisely the situation that CDC successfully avoided in the second remand by convincing Commerce to match its U.S. sales with CEMEX's home market sales. Now that CDC’s U.S. sales have been matched with CEMEX's home market sales, a goal that it so persistently sought, it seems eminently reasonable that it also suffer the disadvantage of CEMEX's failure to properly provide the necessary data to Commerce. In order to accomplish the same result in our case as was reached in Live Cattle from Canada, CDC's U.S. sales would have to be compared to CDC's home market sales, which is precisely the matching methodology used prior to the remand, precisely the matching methodology that CDC complained about, and precisely the matching methodology that Commerce agreed to change in the second remand. In our view, CDC wants it both ways, i.e., to have the benefit of a product match with CEMEX, but not to have partial adverse facts available applied to it. In sum, if there were settled case law or a settled administrative practice on the issue, that, of course, would be controlling. But we discern no such definitive law or practice supporting the majority’s viewpoint and, therefore, cannot characterize Commerce's decision here as an abuse of discretion or as unreasonable, at least not consistently with the governing standard of review. It is, after all, not for us, the Panel, to fine-tune the antidumping law according to what we think is the best approach. We respectfully dissent.
September 4, 2003, Date Issued.
Footnotes 1 This is Commerce's second remand determination. Commerce's first remand determination was issued September 27, 2002. 2 Panelists Joelson and Kennedy dissent on this issue. See pages 6 to 12, infra. 3 In spite of this non-reporting, Commerce applied non-adverse facts available to the collapsed entity – not adverse facts available. 4 See, e.g., F.lli De Cecco di Filippo Fara S. Martino S.p.A. v. United States, 216 F.3d 1027, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting the purpose of adverse facts available is to "provide respondents with an incentive to cooperate"); Allied-Signal Aerospace Co. v. United States, 996 F.2d 1185 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (noting that Commerce's policy of not applying the same harsh adverse facts available to those companies that cooperate is long standing and is aimed at "encouraging future compliance").
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