USA-MEX-98-2008-01

NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT ARBITRAL PANEL
ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO CHAPTER TWENTY

IN THE MATTER OF
CROSS-BORDER TRUCKING SERVICES

(Secretariat File No. USA-MEX-98-2008-01)

Continuation

B. The United States' Contentions

According to the United States:

[t]he Mexican safety regime lacks core components, such as comprehensive truck equipment standards and fully functioning roadside inspection or on-site review systems. In light of these important differences in circumstances, and given the experience to-date with the safety compliance record of Mexican trucks operating in the U.S. border zone, the United States decision to delay processing Mexican carriers' applications for operating authority until further progress is made on cooperative safety efforts is both prudent and consistent with U.S. obligations under the NAFTA.¹⁴²
Thus, the United States is not obligated to grant Mexican trucking firms operating authority when there are not yet adequate regulatory measures in place in Mexico to ensure U.S. highway safety.¹⁴³ The United States asserts "that NAFTA contains no such requirement. To the contrary, under NAFTA's national treatment and most-favored-nation obligations, a NAFTA Party may treat service providers differently in order to address a legitimate regulatory objective."¹⁴⁴
According to the United States, Mexican carrier safety cannot be assured on a case by case basis: "A carrier-by-carrier approach, however, cannot effectively ensure safety compliance by Mexican motor carriers operating in the United States. Rather, as the United States has explained, highway safety can only be assured through a comprehensive, integrated safety regime. It is for this reason that the United States is working with Mexican officials to develop comparable motor carrier safety systems."¹⁴⁵ Nor can the United States, as a practical matter, inspect every truck as it crosses the border.¹⁴⁶
The United States notes the deficiencies of the Mexican oversight system:
The Government of Mexico cannot identify its carriers and drivers so that unsafe conduct can be properly assigned and reviewed. While we understand that the Government of Mexico is engaged in an extensive effort to register all of its motor carriers and place them in a database that would facilitate the assignment of safety data, that database does not contain any safety data. Therefore, Mexico cannot track the safety fitness of its carriers and drivers. . . . Without such carrier safety performance history, the United States cannot conduct a meaningful safety fitness review of Mexican carriers at the application stage.¹⁴⁷
The United States also contends that it would be futile to try to perform inspections of Mexican carriers in Mexico because "Mexican carriers are not required to keep the types of records that are typically reviewed in these inspections." Even if an effort were made, it "could not be corroborated until the Government of Mexico develops and implements information systems to collect and make available that information."¹⁴⁸ Nor has there been any U.S. verification experience in Mexico: "The United States has never performed a compliance review or any other type of carrier or truck inspection in Mexico or issued any 'qualification or approval' to a Mexican carrier based on a visit to a carrier's offices."¹⁴⁹
The United States also disagrees with Mexico's reliance on Article 105. According to the United States,"the intent of Article 105 is simply to clarify that each NAFTA Party is responsible for ensuring that its state and provincial governments are in compliance with NAFTA obligations." Moreover, "Nothing in Article 105 suggests that measures entailing cooperation between NAFTA Parties are somehow forbidden or excluded."¹⁵⁰
The United States (and Canadian) truck safety programs are the key to providing like circumstances in which trucks operate: they "provide a high degree of assurance that U.S. and Canadian trucks operating on U.S. highways each day meet minimum safety standards." The principal elements of the U.S. truck safety program include:

a comprehensive system of rigorous vehicle and operator safety standards; enforcement through road side inspections and on-site compliance reviews; strict record-keeping rules; electronic databases that promptly provide inspectors in the field with safety-related data on drivers and motor carriers; and a substantial commitment of enforcement resources and personnel.¹⁵¹
According to the United States,"Adequate assurances of safety also require that Mexico, as Canada has done, adopt safety controls within its own borders. The United States has been engaged in extensive cooperative efforts with Mexico to assist in the development of the Mexican safety system. Although Mexico has made substantial progress, work remains undone." Under these factual circumstances, "NAFTA's national treatment and most-favored-nation obligations do not, as Mexico argues, require the United States to treat Mexican trucking firms in the same manner as U.S. and Canadian firms."¹⁵²
In particular, NAFTA does not obligate:

the United States to license the operation of Mexican trucking firms in circumstances in which: (1) serious concerns persist regarding their overall safety record; (2) Mexico is still developing first-line regulatory and enforcement measures needed to address trucking safety standards; and (3) essential bilateral cooperative arrangements are not fully in place.¹⁵³
Moreover, the United States contends that under Rule 33 of the Chapter Twenty Rules of Procedure, the burden of proving violations of Article 1202 and 1203, is on Mexico, Aincluding the burden of proving relevant regulatory circumstances and demonstrating that those circumstances are 'like'."¹⁵⁴
The United States suggests that:

to prove that a particular measure adopted or maintained by another NAFTA Party is inconsistent with Articles 1202 and 1203, the complaining Party must demonstrate each of the material elements of those [a]rticles. Those include showing: 1) the existence of one or more measures adopted or maintained by a Party; 2) that the measure(s) relate to cross-border trade in services; 3) the treatment accorded by the measure(s); 4) the extent to which that treatment may favor domestic, or certain foreign, service providers over the providers of the complaining Party; 5) the relevant "circumstances" under which that treatment is accorded; and 6) whether those circumstances are "like".'¹⁵⁵
Mexico is faulted for failing to address all of these elements:

Most importantly, it has failed to describe the "circumstances" under which the United States is treating Mexican Firms for safety purposes. Moreover, Mexico has also neglected to demonstrate that those circumstances are "like" the circumstances that pertain to the regulation of U.S. and Canadian trucking companies.¹⁵⁶
The inclusion of the qualifying "like circumstances" language "permits NAFTA Parties to accord differential, and even less favorable, treatment where appropriate to meet legitimate regulatory objectives."¹⁵⁷ The United States quotes with approval from Mexico's opening submission, "even if Mexican carriers were somehow not exactly 'like' U.S. and Canadian carriers, it was within the power of the United States to impose requirements that would make them 'like.'"¹⁵⁸ However, the United States differs with Mexico on the fundamental issue of whether "Mexican carriers are 'like' U.S. and Canadian carriers for purposes of applying NAFTA's national treatment and MFN provisions."¹⁵⁹
The United States reviews the use of the term "like circumstances" in U.S. bilateral investment treaties, arguing that NAFTA language is derived from them, even though the BIT language is "in like situations."¹⁶⁰ Here and in the FTA, national treatment does not mean that a particular measure must in every case accord exactly the same treatment to U.S. and Canadian Service providers. Under paragraph three of FTA Article 1402, covered service providers from the two countries may be treated differently to the extent necessary for prudential, fiduciary, health and safety, or consumer protection reasons, as long as the treatment is equivalent in effect to that accorded to domestic service providers and the party adopting the measure provides advance notice to the other in conformity with Article 1803." ¹⁶¹
According to the United States, NAFTA negotiating history confirms this earlier approach to the "in like circumstances" language, adopting Ain like circumstances" on the understanding that it had similar meaning to "like services and services providers," as preferred originally by Canada and Mexico.¹⁶²
Further support for the U.S. position is found in the U.S. Statement of Administration Action, which provides in pertinent part that "Foreign service providers can be treated differently if circumstances warrant. For example, a state may impose special requirements on Canadian and Mexican service providers if necessary to protect consumers to the same degree as they are protected in respect of local firms."¹⁶³ Similarly, the Canadian Statement of Implementation provides that "a Party may impose different legal requirements on other NAFTA service providers to ensure that domestic consumers are protected to the same degree as they are in respect of domestic firms."¹⁶⁴ Thus, "the 'like circumstances' language of Articles 1202 and 1203 makes clear that the United States may make and apply legitimate regulatory distinctions for purposes of ensuring the safety of U.S. roadways."¹⁶⁵
The United States also contends that "The regulatory environment in which U.S., Canadian, and Mexican trucking firms operate is a critical 'circumstance' relevant to U.S. treatment of those firms because it helps to establish industry safety practices in the three countries. As elaborated in the Statement of Facts [of the U.S. submission], Mexican carriers in fact operate within a less stringent regulatory regime than that in place in either Canada or the United States."¹⁶⁶ The problem areas include driver hours of service: "U.S. and Canadian safety rules strictly limit drivers' hours of service. Mexican truck drivers are only governed by the more general rules of Mexican labor laws, with no safety regulation directly applicable to the time a driver may spend behind the wheel."¹⁶⁷
Also, "U.S. and Canadian safety regulations require drivers to keep logbooks, the only practicable way to enforce hours of service regulations. Other than for hazardous materials, Mexico has no logbook requirements."¹⁶⁸ Moreover, "U.S. and Canadian safety regulations include exhaustive equipment regulations address to truck safety. Mexico, however, lacks specific regulations governing the condition and maintenance of CMV safety equipment."¹⁶⁹ Other problematic aspects of Mexico's motor carrier regulatory system relate to inspections by the motor carrier itself and government safety inspections.¹⁷⁰
The United States observes that "[a]nother circumstance relevant to the treatment of U.S., Canadian, and Mexican trucking firms is the ability of U.S. transportation safety authorities to enforce U.S. safety regulations with respect to those carriers."¹⁷¹ While the "maintenance of government databases of accident and safety records, with respect to both firms and drivers, is an important element of safety regulation in the United States (and Canada) . . . the United States has no access to similar data for Mexican firms or drivers."¹⁷² Moreover, "U.S. highway safety regulators rely in part on their ability to conduct on-site audits and inspections of U.S. firms and, where appropriate, to impose civil or criminal penalties." However, "U.S. regulators have no right to conduct inspections or audits in Mexico, only limited and recent experience with Mexico on joint inspections (by contrast with a long track record with Canada), and limited ability to impose and collect civil or criminal penalties with respect to Mexican firms that might ignore U.S. safety regulations."¹⁷³
A further major U.S. concern regarding "treatment of U.S., Canadian, and Mexican carriers is available evidence regarding the comparative safety records of firms operating in the United States. . . . Mexican trucks operating in the United States have a significantly higher incidence of being placed out of service for safety problems uncovered in random inspections. In particular, the available data show that the out-of-service rate for Mexican carriers is over 50 percent higher than the rate for U.S. carriers."¹⁷⁴
In contrast to Mexico's system, the United States notes that "Canada's truck safety rules and regulations are highly compatible with those of the United States."¹⁷⁵ Thus, "when Canadian-based commercial trucks cross into the United States, federal and state transportation authorities can have a high level of confidence that those trucks comply with U.S. standards and requirements at least to the same degree as U.S.-based trucks. That confidence level is bolstered by a fully functioning, computerized bilateral data exchange program."¹⁷⁶ Under these circumstances, "when Mexican trucks cross into the United States, there is no assurance that, based on the regulatory regime in place in Mexico, those trucks already meet U.S. highway safety standards."¹⁷⁷
Given all of these considerations, the AUnited States has . . . concluded that the 'circumstances' relevant to the treatment of Mexican-based trucking firms for safety purposes are not 'like' those applicable to the treatment of Canadian and U.S. carriers."¹⁷⁸ Accordingly, "the United States may apply more favorable treatment to U.S. and Canadian trucking firms than to their Mexican counterparts without running afoul of Chapter Twelve's national treatment or most-favored-nation rules."¹⁷⁹
The United States further notes that Mexico has presented no data on truck safety enforcement in Mexico, and states that although "Mexico does allege that 'it was within the power of the United States to impose requirements' that make Mexican carriers 'like' U.S. and Canadian carriers," Mexico has failed to explain "what those requirements might be nor how such requirements would be practicable or effective."¹⁸⁰ According to the United States, Athis absence of contrary evidence reinforces that the United States, in delaying the processing of Mexican applications until truck safety can be ensured, is acting reasonably, appropriately, and consistently with its NAFTA obligations."¹⁸¹
With regard to the question of whether high out-of-service rates for Mexican drayage trucks in the border zone are relevant to long-haul experience, the United States contends that "In terms of safety, the service provided by drayage trucks is no different from that provided by long-haul trucks - they haul goods on the same roads, through the same cities and towns through which long-haul trucks operate."¹⁸² In any event, Mexico has not demonstrated that their long-haul trucks are safer. Issuance by the United States of long-haul authority to Mexican trucks "would not, standing alone, prevent a defective drayage truck from operating in the United States beyond the border commercial zone."¹⁸³
The United States explains certain carriers are permitted to "transit" U.S. territory from Mexico to Canada because

the Congress has not granted the U.S. Department of Transportation ("DOT" or "Department") the authority to require such transit carriers to seek operating authority. Therefore, transit operations are unaffected by the moratorium on the issuance of operating authority to Mexican motor carriers for operations outside the commercial zone. All firms operating in the United States, however, regardless of whether they are subject to such registration requirements, are subject to DOT's safety jurisdiction.¹⁸⁴

U.S.-owned, Mexican-domiciled carriers and "grandfathered" carriers are unaffected by the statutory moratorium and thus are also permitted to transport goods from Mexico to the United States beyond the border zone.¹⁸⁵
However, the United States does not believe that the exemption of these groups from the moratorium "demonstrates that the United States does not have authentic safety concerns about Mexican carriers."¹⁸⁶ AThe number of carriers entitled to these exemptions represents only a small fraction -about two percent - of Mexican firms engaged in cross-border operations. Specifically, 8,400 Mexican firms have authority to operate in the commercial zones, while a total of only 168 Mexican carriers are entitled to the above-discussed exemptions."¹⁸⁷
Mexican motor carriers operating in the border commercial zones are required to obtain special certificates of registration. These carriers are fully subject to all U.S. safety regulations. They must also have trip insurance, must carry evidence of the insurance in their trucks, and must have U.S. registered agents.¹⁸⁸ The United States denies that the use of trip insurance instead of continuous insurance reflects any lack of concern over differences in the safety of U.S. and Mexican carriers operating in the commercial zones. Rather, "[a]n insurer's potential liability arising from trip insurance is just the same as that arising from continuous insurance, and in both cases the insurer has the same incentives to reduce its potential liability."¹⁸⁹
The United States also explains its alleged lack of concern with trailers: "In practice, however, the safety of Mexican trailer components has not been a major issue, because eighty to ninety percent of the trailers used in cross-border trade are in fact U.S.-owned."¹⁹⁰
With regard to national treatment and most-favored-nation obligations, according to the United States,

the relevant issue is whether the U.S. actions are consistent with its Chapter Twelve national treatment and MFN obligations in light of the different circumstances applicable to U.S. and Canadian trucking firms, on the one hand, and Mexican trucking firms on the other . . . it is acting reasonably and appropriately by delaying the processing of Mexican firms' applications for operating authority while U.S. and Mexican transportation officials work cooperatively to establish adequate safety enforcement tools to ensure that the grant of additional operating authority to Mexican firms does not undermine highway safety. Applying NAFTA's national treatment and MFN obligations to this set of facts turns on a close analysis of highway safety issues, not abstract arguments regarding "conditionality"¹⁹¹
According to the United States, Mexico has failed to meet its burden of proof regarding denial of investment benefits, "because Mexico had not shown that any Mexican national meets the definition of 'investor' in Chapter Eleven."¹⁹² In this respect, the United States disagrees with Mexican reliance on WTO doctrines under which a complaining Party does not have to show trade impact. Moreover, the United States believes under WTO principles "complaining parties bear the burden of proving an alleged violation by a WTO Member of its WTO obligations."¹⁹³
The United States, which emphasizes that it has not raised Chapter Nine as a defense,¹⁹⁴ also expresses its disagreement with Mexico's relating of the "in like circumstances" language to Chapter Nine. A NAFTA Party, according to the United States, does not need any NAFTA provision to serve as a "vehicle for" (which, presumably, Mexico means "to authorize") any particular governmental regulation. In applying governmental regulations, NAFTA only comes into play when a particular NAFTA obligation is relevant to the regulation at issue. Chapter Nine imposes certain obligations (such as MFN and national treatment obligations) with respect to standards-related measures, but Chapter Nine is not "the vehicle for application" of standards.
According to the United States, if Mexico's argument is predicated on the theory that only NAFTA Chapter Nine could "permit" differential treatment between domestic and foreign service providers, the argument is both circular and inconsistent with the plain text of the agreement.
Also, the United States contends that the Parties could not, as Mexico suggests, have intended Chapter Nine to serve as the exclusive "vehicle" for applying standards-related measures because the scope of Chapter Nine is limited to goods and only two services sectors: telecommunications and land transportation services. Chapter Nine does not apply to measures affecting any other services nor to measures affecting investment. Mexico's interpretation would lead to the untenable result that the Parties neglected to provide any "vehicle" for the application of standards-related measures applicable to most services covered by NAFTA and to all investments covered by NAFTA.¹⁹⁵
The United States contends that its position is confirmed by Article 2101, one of the general exceptions, which provides:
that 'nothing in . . . Chapter Twelve (Cross-Border Trade in Services) . . . shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any Party of measures necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations that are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including those relating to health and safety and consumer protection.¹⁹⁶
Similarly, in the Preamble to NAFTA, the Parties explicitly state their resolve under NAFTA to "preserve their flexibility to safeguard the public welfare."¹⁹⁷ "These provisions illustrate that NAFTA Parties contemplated that their regulatory authorities would retain their ability to make regulatory distinctions with regard to cross-border services trade necessary to protect human health and safety in their territories."¹⁹⁸
The United States also contests Mexico's assertion that a government may not "condition[] . . . market access of its goods and services on the exporting country's adoption of the rules and laws of the importing country.¹⁹⁹ " The United States disclaims the applicability of the unadopted GATT Panel report in Tuna,²⁰⁰ and argues that the controlling case is the Appellate Body Report in United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products. It appears to the United States, however, that conditioning access to a Member's domestic market on whether exporting Members comply with, or adopt, a policy or policies unilaterally prescribed by the importing Member may, to some degree, be a common aspect of measures falling within the scope of one or another of the exceptions (a) to (j) of Article XX of GATT 1994.²⁰¹
The United States concludes, "Mexico has no support for its proposition that some general principle of international law prohibits the United States from taking account of the exporting Party's regulatory regime."²⁰²
The United States also asserts that Mexico has made no case for nullification or impairment under NAFTA Annex 2004, noting some similarity to the Korean Procurement case in the WTO.²⁰³ According to the United States, Mexico has the burden of showing nullification or impairment and has made no such argument. Also, the United States declares that under NAFTA, a nullification or impairment claim may not be made if it

would be subject to an Article 2101 exception. As the United States has shown, differential treatment for Mexican carriers is warranted by safety concerns, and is thus consistent with the U.S. obligations under the national treatment and MFN provisions of Chapter Twelve. For the very same reasons, (and in the event that the Panel had needed to examine this issue in response to a nullification or impairment claim), the U.S. measure would fall squarely within the scope of Article 2101(2).²⁰⁴
The United States asserts that the "subjective" motivation for the alleged U.S. violations - as argued by Mexico - should not be the basis for the Panel's analysis. WTO Appellate Body decisions support the position of the United States that the pertinent issue here is whether safety concerns warrant the differential treatment provided to Mexican carriers, and not - as Mexico claims - the subjective motivations of U.S. decision-makers in December 1995.²⁰⁵
The United States cites to Japan - Alcoholic Beverages,²⁰⁶ where the Appellate Body determined that "This is not an issue of intent" and determined "an examination in any case of whether dissimilar taxation has been applied so as to afford protection requires a comprehensive and objective analysis of the structure and application of the measure in question on domestic as compared to imported products."²⁰⁷
Also, in Chile - Alcoholic Beverages,²⁰⁸ the Appellate Body noted that The subjective intentions inhabiting the minds of individual legislators or regulators do not bear upon the inquiry, if only because they are not accessible to treaty interpreters. It does not follow, however, that the statutory purposes or objectives - that is, the purpose or objectives of a Member's legislature and government as a whole - to the extent that they are given objective expression in the statute itself, are not pertinent.²⁰⁹
Consequently, the Panel in this case should "likewise examine U.S. compliance with national treatment obligations based on a fact-specific analysis of the U.S. measure and all of the relevant circumstances, and not - as the Appellate Body wrote - on the 'subjective intentions inhabiting the minds of individual . . . regulators.'"²¹⁰

C. Canada's Contentions

Canada, exercising its right to participate in the Panel proceeding under Article 2013, avoids comment on the specific facts of the case.²¹¹
Canada contends that the key issue in interpreting the requirements of Article 1202 (national treatment for cross-border services) is "a comparison between a service provider providing services cross-border, and a service provider providing services locally." Under those circumstances, Canada submits:
A blanket refusal to permit a person of Mexico to obtain operating authority to provide cross-border truck services . . . would, on its face, be less favorable than the treatment accorded to United States truck service providers in like circumstances.²¹²
Canada takes a similar position with respect to Article 1102 (national treatment for investment).²¹³
Canada also challenges the U.S. refusal to allow Mexican investors to invest in the U.S. trucking market. Canada contends that under Article 1102:
Unless there is a difference in circumstances between a Mexican investor seeking a license in the United States and a United States investor seeking a similar license, the Mexican investor is entitled to like treatment. [Therefore, m]aintaining a regulation that requires the licensing authority to deny a license to a Mexican investor because the investor is Mexican accords less favorable treatment to a Mexican investor than to a like [United States] investor.²¹⁴
Anticipating that the United States would rely on Chapter Nine (standards), Canada argues that Article 904(2), which permits a Party to "establish the levels of protection that it considers appropriate" applies only to the other provisions of Chapter Nine. These limits cannot be applied to any of the other chapters, such as Chapter Eleven.
With regard to Chapter Twelve, Canada contends that despite the requirement in Article 904(3) that each Party in regard to standards related measures accord national treatment in accordance with Article 1202, this requirement permits a Party only to establish a legitimate level of protection. It does not "excuse a discriminatory measure purporting to achieve the appropriate level of protection." .²¹⁵

Back to the Table of Contents

Continue here with V. The United States' request for a Scientific Review Board

142	USPHS at 2-3.
143	USCS at 2.
144	USCS at 2.
145	USPHS at 3.
146	USPHS at 4.
147	USPHS at 5.
148	USPHS at 6.
149	USPHS at 7. Although the United States asserts that it has never been able to perform compliance reviews in Mexico, Mexico disputes this fact. In its initial submission, Mexico observed that in 1997, USDOT officials, accompanied by Mexican officials, did indeed make visits to several Mexican motor carriers. According to Mexico, these U.S. officials were satisfied with the conditions they found during these inspections. MIS at 44-45.
150	USSS at 19-20.
151	USCS at 2.
152	USCS at 2-3.
153	USCS at 35.
154	USCS at 42.
155	USCS at 39.
156	USCS at 39.
157	USCS at 39.
158	MRS at 13.
159	USSS at 6.
160	USSS at 6-7.
161	USSS at 9-10, citation omitted.
162	USSS at 11-12.
163	USCS at 40-41, emphasis supplied by U.S.
164	USCS at 41.
165	USCS at 42.
166	USCS at 43.
167	USCS at 43.
168	USCS at 44.
169	USCS at 44.
170	USCS at 44.
171	USCS at 45.
172	USCS at 45.
173	USCS at 45.
174	USCS at 45-46.
175	USCS at 47.
176	USCS at 47-48.
177	USCS at 48.
178	USCS at 49.
179	USCS at 49.
180	USSS at 3-4.
181	USSS at 4.
182	USPHS at 7.
183	USPHS at 8.
184	USSS at 20-21.
185	USSS at 21-22, citations omitted.
186	USSS at 22.
187	USSS at 22.
188	USSS at 24.
189	USSS at 24-25.
190	USSS at 25-26.
191	USSS at 17.
192	USSS at 26.
193	USSS at 26-27, quotation and citation omitted.
194	Comments of the United States on the Initial Report of the Panel, December 19, 2000, at 2.
195	USSS at 14-16, citations omitted.
196	NAFTA Article 2101(2).
197	USCS at 40.
198	USCS at 40.
199	USPHS at 17, quoting Mexico.
200	United States - Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada (Report of the Panel adopted on Feb. 22, 1982, L/5198-29S/91 [hereinafter Tuna].
201	USPHS at 17-18.
202	USPHS at 18.
203	USPHS at 10-11.
204	USPHS at 13.
205	USPHS at 14-17.
206	Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Panel Report adopted Oct. 4, 1996, WT/DS8/AB/R.
207	Id. at 28-29, as cited in USPHS at 16.
208	Chile- Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Panel Report adopted Dec. 13, 1999, WT/DS87/AB/R.
209	Id. at para. 62, as cited in USPHS at 16, emphasis in original.
210	USPHS at 17.
211	CS at 2.
212	CS at 3.
213	CS at 3.
214	TR at 133.
215	CS at 4.

	What's New? - Sitemap - Calendar Trade Agreements - FTAA Process - Trade Issues	espa�ol - fran�ais - portugu�s
		Search