Despite the many authorities relied upon by Camco as support for their argument, this Panel is not persuaded that the decision of Madame Justice Hansen in the interlocutory motion was one which finally determined the issues between the parties to the application for judicial review. The only issue before Madame Justice Hansen was whether a stay of the Preliminary Determination was warranted pending a determination on the merits of the application for judicial review. The application for judicial review continued to proceed following the dismissal of the interlocutory motion and was discontinued by Whirlpool and Inglis on September 1, 2000 before the Federal Court had an opportunity to determine the issues raised therein. Thus, the second part of the test for issue estoppel, that the judicial decision which is said to create the estoppel must be final, has not been met. Having determined that the finality aspect of the test for issue estoppel has not been met, it is not necessary for this Panel to review in any detail the other two portions of that test as all three parts of the test must be met before issue estoppel may apply.
 
Camco has also failed to convince this Panel that Whirlpool and Inglis have engaged in abuse of process by relitigation by requesting a NAFTA Panel review of the Commissioner’s Final Determination. The discretionary jurisdiction to stay or dismiss an action on the ground that the action is an abuse of the process will only be exercised by a court, or by this Panel, in the clearest of cases where it is plain and obvious the case cannot succeed.^[20] Given that Camco failed to address this test at all in its arguments, and given this Panel’s finding that the decision of Madame Justice Hansen of the Federal Court was not determinative of the issues raised in the application for judicial review, this Panel rejects Camco’s abuse of process arguments.

2. Standing
 
Maytag raised the argument in its participant’s brief that Whirlpool and Inglis have no standing to request that this Panel compel the Commissioner to expand its investigation to include exporters that Camco did not include in its original antidumping complaint.

Subsection 77.011(2) of the SIMA provides as follows:

(2) Any person who, but for section 77.012, would be entitled to apply under the Federal Court Act or section 96.1 of this Act, or to appeal under section 61 of this Act, in respect of a definitive decision may, in accordance with paragraph 4 of Article 1904 of the North American Free Trade Agreement, file with the Canadian Secretary a request that the definitive decision be reviewed by a panel.
 
Subsection 96.1(3) of the SIMA reads as follows:
 
(3) Subject to subsection 77.012(2), an application may be made under this section by any person directly affected by the determination, decision, order or finding by filing a notice of the application in the Federal Court of Appeal within thirty days after the time the determination, decision, order or finding was first communicated to that person by the Commissioner or the Tribunal, or within such further time as the Federal Court of Appeal or a judge thereof may, before or after the expiration of those thirty days, fix or allow. [emphasis added]

It is clear that Whirlpool and Inglis are parties directly affected by the Final Determination. They are, therefore, entitled to utilize the complaint process set out in the SIMA to request a review of that Final Determination. Having determined that Whirlpool and Inglis are entitled to request a review, they are free to request that this Panel review the Final Determination based on any of the aforementioned grounds set out in subsection 18.1(4) of the Federal Court Act. In asking this Panel to compel the Commissioner to expand its investigation to include exporters that Camco did not include in its antidumping complaint, Whirlpool and Inglis have suggested, inter alia, that the Commissioner failed to observe procedural requirements under law or that it otherwise erred in law, two grounds explicitly set out in subsection 18.1(4) of the Federal Court Act.
 
3. Mootness
 
Camco has also argued that the complaint of Whirlpool and Inglis became moot in light of the findings of the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (the “CITT”) during its injury inquiry following the Final Determination.
 
This Panel points out that the statutory right to request a review of the Final Determination exists notwithstanding, and without reference to, any decision of the CITT following the injury inquiry. This Panel’s review of the Final Determination has not become moot, and Whirlpool and Inglis have not lost their statutory right to request a review of the Final Determination because of the decision of the CITT in the subsequent injury inquiry.
 

(b) The Targeting Issue -- Scope of the Investigation, Improper Targeting and Abdication of Investigative Responsibility

Whirlpool and Inglis have challenged the manner in which, according to their allegations, the Commissioner confined the scope of its investigation to the four corners of Camco’s dumping complaint, without any independent investigation of other potential sources of injurious dumping. Whirlpool and Inglis allege that the Commissioner’s focusing of its investigation to the specific companies set out in Camco’s complaint is contrary to the Commissioner’s obligation to initiate a country-specific investigation rather than a company-specific investigation. Specifically, Whirlpool and Inglis have asked this Panel to decide whether the Commissioner has committed reviewable errors of jurisdiction, of law or of fact when, according to Whirlpool and Inglis, it:

(i) refused to conduct an independent analysis of the existence of other source of injurious dumping and refused to extend its investigation to all exporters of subject goods from the United States of America, including those with which the Canadian industry had corporate or commercial affiliation; and
 
(ii) refused to conduct a country-specific, as opposed to a company-specific, investigation.

As discussed above, in their briefs and in their arguments before this Panel, Whirlpool and Inglis grouped issues (i) and (ii) above into one issue which they referred to as the “targeting issue”. This Panel will deal similarly with these two issues and will refer to them together as the “targeting issue”.
 
In support of their arguments in respect of the targeting issue, Whirlpool and Inglis point to the SIMA, the SIMR and the SIMA Handbook as well as the Commissioner’s past and contemporary practice, Canada’s international obligations and their own interpretation of certain amendments to the SIMA passed by the Canadian Parliament in 1994.
 
Among the provisions in the SIMA upon which Whirlpool and Inglis rely is subsection 41(1) which deals with Final Determinations. Subsection 41(1) of the SIMA reads as follows:

41. (1) Within ninety days after making a preliminary determination under subsection 38(1) in respect of goods of a country or countries, the Commissioner shall
 
(a) if, on available evidence, the Commissioner is satisfied, in relation to the goods of that country or countries in respect of which the investigation is made, that

(i) the goods have been dumped or subsidized, and
 
(ii) the margin of dumping of, or the amount of subsidy on, the goods of that country or any of those countries is not insignificant,

make a final determination of dumping or subsidizing with respect to the goods after specifying, in relation to each exporter of goods of that country or countries in respect of which the investigation is made…
 
(b) where, on the available evidence, there is no exporter described in paragraph (a) with respect to whom the Commissioner is satisfied in accordance with that paragraph, cause the investigation to be terminated with respect to the goods.

Whirlpool and Inglis, in their briefs, have argued that subsection 41(1) of the SIMA requires the Commissioner to conduct a country-specific rather than company-specific investigation. They argue that the references in subsection 41(1) of the SIMA to “goods” of a “country or countries” can only be interpreted to mean that the Commissioner must conduct an investigation into all goods of a country or countries and not just those goods of a particular exporter from that country or countries. This Panel is not convinced that the narrow interpretation of subsection 41(1) of the SIMA advocated by Whirlpool and Inglis is necessary, nor that such a limited reading should be extended to the SIMA generally. In fact, the way in which the words “country or countries” are used throughout subsection 41(1) seems to be just as, or more consistent with the concept of limiting the outside scope of the Commissioner’s investigation, rather than defining the investigation’s starting point. In other words, subsection 41(1) of the SIMA provides a ceiling, but not a floor. A reading of paragraph 41(1)(b) of the SIMA implies that paragraph 41(1)(a) is describing investigations in respect of particular exporters rather than particular countries. Rather than requiring that a “country” be the minimum unit of reference when initiating an investigation, this Panel believes that the better interpretation of subsection 41(1) of the SIMA, or at least an interpretation of subsection 41(1) which is equally as plausible as that put forward by Whirlpool and Inglis, is that it requires that a “country” be the maximum unit of reference when initiating an investigation.
 
In further support of their arguments that the SIMA mandates a country-specific rather than a company-specific investigation by the Commissioner, Whirlpool and Inglis point to a series of amendments to the SIMA passed by the Canadian Parliament in 1994^[21] and which came into force in 1995. Whirlpool and Inglis rely on these amendments as conclusive evidence of Parliament’s intention to require that the Commissioner perform only country-specific investigations. However, aside from pointing to the amendments themselves, Whirlpool and Inglis have failed to provide any evidence of Parliament’s intentions. This Panel was not directed to any evidence of commission reports, legislative debates, briefs or other materials forming part of the legislative history of the amendment upon which it could reasonably base an opinion as to Parliament’s intent. This Panel believes that if Parliament’s intention had truly been to prevent the Commissioner from performing company-specific investigations, something that the Commissioner had done on multiple occasions, it would have made such intention explicit, or in the very least, Parliament would have made its intention much more evident than can be found in the amendments upon which Whirlpool and Inglis rely. In the absence of any additional evidence as to Parliamentary intention, this Panel does not accept the submission that the 1994/1995 amendments to the SIMA were intended by Parliament to require country-specific investigations.
 
Whirlpool and Inglis also argue that the Commissioner committed a reviewable error by abdicating its jurisdiction through its reliance on Camco’s dumping complaint to dictate the scope of the investigation and by, according to Whirlpool and Inglis, refusing to conduct an independent analysis of the existence of other source of injurious dumping and refusing to extend its investigation to all exporters of subject goods from the United States of America. In response, Camco and the Commissioner have referred this Panel to subsection 31(1) of the SIMA as authority for the
proposition that once the Commissioner receives a properly documented complaint, it is required to launch an investigation into the dumping or subsidizing that is the subject of the complaint. Subsections 31(1) and 31(2) of the SIMA read as follows:

31. (1) The Commissioner shall cause an investigation to be initiated respecting the dumping or subsidizing of any goods and whether there is a reasonable indication that such dumping or subsidizing has caused injury or retardation or is threatening to cause injury, forthwith on the Commissioner’s own initiative or, subject to subsection (2), where the Commissioner receives a written complaint respecting the dumping or subsidizing of the goods, within thirty days after the date on which written notice is given by or on behalf of the Commissioner to the complainant that the complaint is properly documented, if the Commissioner is of the opinion that there is evidence
 
a) that the goods have been dumped or subsidized; and
 
(b) that discloses a reasonable indication that the dumping or subsidizing has      caused injury or retardation or is threatening to cause injury.
 
(2) No investigation may be initiated under subsection (1) as a result of a
complaint unless
 
a) the complaint is supported by domestic producers whose production represents more than fifty per cent of the total production of like goods by those domestic producers who express either support for or opposition to the complaint; and
 
(b) the production of the domestic producers who support the complaint represents twenty-five per cent or more of the total production of like goods by the domestic industry.

The Commissioner contends that it had no discretion under subsection 31(1) once it determined that Camco’s dumping complaint was properly documented and that it was required to launch an investigation into the dumping disclosed in Camco’s complaint. This Panel agrees with the Commissioner that it is required to cause an investigation upon receipt of a properly documented complaint that meets all of the requirements of subsection 31(1) of the SIMA. This Panel does not, however, agree that subsection 31(1) mandates that the Commissioner limit the scope of its investigation to the scope of the properly documented complaint.
 
The scope of the investigation to be performed pursuant to subsection 31(1) of the SIMA is a matter of some discretion on the part of the Commissioner, based on the evidence contained in the complaint and upon other evidence that it gathers of its own accord. The investigation could, for example, be launched with a scope that is broader than that which is found in the properly documented complaint. Nevertheless, the SIMA does not oblige the Commissioner to expand that scope.
 
On this issue, Camco and the Commissioner referred this Panel to the decision of the Federal Court of Canada in Hyundai Motor Co. v. Canada (Attorney General)^[22]. The Hyundai case dealt with a complaint with respect to dumping of automobiles imported into Canada by Hyundai Motor Co. The complaints of Hyundai Motor Co. included allegations that the then Deputy Minister of National Revenue for Customs and Excise had committed reviewable errors by (i) failing to inform Hyundai Motor Co. prior to deciding to launch an investigation, (ii) by deciding to initiate an investigation only against the goods of Hyundai Motor Co. without including those of other importers or without including all automobiles imported from Korea, the country of origin for the goods of Hyundai Motor Co., and (iii) by relying heavily on the terms of the complaint for the purpose of defining the subject-goods and for the information upon which the Deputy Minister relied to launch the investigation. The parallels to the present situation are significant. Whirlpool and Inglis have argued that the decision in Hyundai is no longer persuasive by pointing out that it was handed down prior to the 1994/1995 amendments to the SIMA. Whirlpool and Inglis have argued that, through those amendments, Parliament has expressed a contrary intention to that of the Federal Court in Hyundai. As stated above, this Panel is not persuaded of that interpretation of the 1994/1995 amendments to the SIMA and is not convinced that they were intended by Parliament to require country-specific investigations. Therefore, this Panel finds that the decision of the Federal Court in Hyundai is binding and persuasive on the proceedings herein.
 
The decision of this Panel that the Commissioner has some amount of discretion in launching an investigation is supported by the decision in Hyundai. Strayer J. wrote in Hyundai that:

 …the decision whether or not to launch an investigation is a “threshold” decision for the Deputy Minister, an administrative act in respect of which he can fix his own procedure subject to any requirements of the Act.^[23]

This Panel adopts the reasoning of Strayer J in the above passage and finds that the Commissioner had discretion as to the scope and subject of the investigation. The Commissioner had no statutory obligation to perform any research or supplemental investigation prior to launching the investigation and the Commissioner had no obligation to request submissions from Whirlpool or Inglis prior the launching of the investigation.
 
Further support for this Panel’s decision on this issue can be found within subsection 31(2) of the SIMA. Subsection 31(2) requires, as a precondition to the launching of an investigation, that the complaint is supported by domestic producers whose production represents more than fifty per cent of the total production of like goods by those domestic producers who express either support for or opposition to the complaint, and the production of the domestic producers who support the complaint represents twenty-five per cent or more of the total production of like goods by the domestic industry. No person or company would be in a better position to determine the existence and effects of dumping in the Canadian market than the Canadian domestic producers themselves. If producers of at least twenty-five per cent of the total production of like goods in the Canadian domestic industry support the dumping complaint, the complaint carries with it a certain level of credibility that it may not otherwise have. As it was put by Strayer J. in Hyundai:

It is not entirely surprising that an investigation was launched on the basis of the particular complaint which has been made. The whole purpose of the investigation is to determine whether the complaint is supportable in fact and law…
 
At most, what the applicants have demonstrated is that the Deputy Minister might have defined the class of goods differently or might have taken into account other evidence, some of which was inconsistent with the evidence he apparently relied on and some of which was not really inconsistent… But he clearly had some evidence before him upon which he could base his conclusion that an investigation should be initiated and there was certainly no basis for saying that he acted on clearly irrelevant considerations.^[24]

In the present situation, Camco is the only Canadian producer of the subject goods. Camco’s dumping complaint, therefore, met the threshold tests of subsections 31(1) and 31(2) of the SIMA. The Commissioner was required to launch an investigation into the alleged dumping activities. The scope of the investigation was subject to the discretion of the Commissioner, and it was not unreasonable for the Commissioner to limit the investigation to the alleged dumping activities and to the companies set out in the properly documented complaint.
 
In respect of the arguments of Whirlpool and Inglis that a company-specific investigation is contrary to the Commissioner’s past and contemporary practices, a number of cases have been raised
by Camco and the Commissioner in which, they argue, the Commissioner has launched company-specific rather than country-specific investigations. Again, Whirlpool and Inglis rely on the argument that the cases raised in this regard are distinguishable from the present situation in light of the 1994/1995 amendments to the SIMA. It is not necessary for the Panel to restate its opinion in respect of the 1994/1995 amendments to the SIMA except to say that it is not convinced that the cases cited by Camco and the Commissioner are distinguishable from the present case simply by reason of those amendments. While this Panel notes that a number of the cases cited by Camco and the Commissioner are in fact distinguishable from the present case on their facts and circumstances, and as such this Panel did not rely on all of the cases so cited, the cases cited by Camco and the Commissioner do establish enough of a history to convince this Panel that company-specific investigations, while not standard practice, are not uncommon.
 
Whirlpool and Inglis, in their briefs and in argument before this Panel, have gone to great lengths to point out that if Canada allows company-specific dumping investigations, it is alone or in the minority in doing so among other industrialized countries. Whirlpool and Inglis have also pointed to Canada’s international obligations as a source of authority for their assertion that a country-specific investigation is mandatory. However, as each of Camco and the Commissioner has pointed out, the Commissioner is bound by the laws of Canada currently in effect. Likewise, this Panel is required by NAFTA Article 1911 to rely on Canadian domestic statutes, legislative history, regulations, administrative practice and judicial precedents to the extent that a court of Canada would rely on such materials in reviewing a final determination of the Commissioner^[25]. Therefore, this Panel must work on the basis that Canadian anti-dumping laws are the foremost authority and it may only look to Canada’s international obligations to the extent that they have been incorporated into Canadian statute, or to the extent that they do not conflict with or limit the application of existing Canadian laws.
 
To summarize this Panel’s decision on the targeting issue raised by Whirlpool and Inglis, this Panel finds that there was no obligation in Canadian law for the Commissioner to launch a country-specific rather than a company-specific investigation, and the reliance by the Commissioner on the terms of Camco’s complaint was within its discretion and, thus, this Panel will not remand on this issue.
 

(c) The Scope of the Investigation, Definition of Subject Goods

The second major issue raised by Whirlpool and Inglis is their submission that the Commissioner committed a jurisdictional error or alternatively, erred in law, in conducting a single investigation and issuing a single Preliminary Determination and Final Determination with respect to three disparate products, namely top-mount refrigerators, dishwashers and dryers. Whirlpool and Inglis argue that the Commissioner is required to limit its dumping investigations to a single product, defined as narrowly as possible.
 
In the alternative, Whirlpool and Inglis argue that if the Commissioner is permitted to group three disparate goods into one dumping investigation, the Commissioner should have determined one margin of profit to be applied to all subject goods, rather than determining separate profitability factors for each of refrigerators, dishwashers and dryers.
 
This Panel will deal with the main argument of Whirlpool and Inglis first and then will turn to the alternative argument.
 
Whirlpool and Inglis argue that the Commissioner was required to conduct a separate investigation into each of the three subject goods. However, they have failed to point to a single Canadian legislative or other binding authority that, in the view of this Panel, supports their position in this regard. Whirlpool and Inglis rely on provisions in the SIMA Handbook and the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement to support their arguments. Specifically, in the SIMA Handbook, Whirlpool and Inglis rely on section 4.1.3.1 which provides as follows:

The product covered by the complaint must be clearly defined for the purpose of the investigation. It is important that the product description be well defined in order to avoid any ambiguity or uncertainty in the course of the investigation, should one be initiated. Product definitions that are to broad or are ambiguous will inevitably lead to difficulties in the investigation as well as in the CITT’s examination of injury.
 
Similarly, under the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement, Whirlpool and Inglis point to Article 5.2 which provides as follows:
 
…a complete description of the allegedly dumped product, the names of the country or countries of origin or export in question, the identity of each known exporter or foreign producer and a list of known persons importing the product in question.

This Panel would not interpret either provision as prohibiting the Commissioner from conducting a single investigation into more than one distinct product. The two provisions relied upon by Whirlpool and Inglis are more akin to instructions to potential complainants in dumping cases that they should be careful to clearly define the allegedly dumped goods. If the definition of the allegedly dumped goods set out in a dumping complaint is not clear, the Commissioner may have difficulty in establishing the scope if the investigation. These provisions do not prevent the Commissioner from launching one investigation if it is reasonable to do so following the receipt of a single dumping complaint that alleges dumping in respect of three separate categories of clearly defined goods.
 
In the present case, there was good reason for Camco to frame its complaint in respect of the three separate goods, and there was equally good reason for the Commissioner to combine those goods into one investigation. As Camco points out in its respondent’s brief, these three goods are often sold together as part of a package of appliances and all three categories of subject goods were sold through the same channels of distribution by the same companies and the same importers.
 
It was not argued before this Panel that the single investigation into three categories of subject goods directly resulted in any error in calculations or otherwise. In fact, Whirlpool and Inglis acknowledge at paragraph 140 of their complainants’ brief that the Commissioner and the CITT effectively managed to conduct three separate investigations in one.^[26]
 
Given the failure by Whirlpool and Inglis to point to a single Canadian authority that, in the opinion of this Panel, supports their position, this Panel finds that the Commissioner’s combination of these three goods into one investigation is not a reviewable error of law. There is nothing unreasonable or illegal about the Commissioner’s investigation of these three goods under the “umbrella” of a single investigation so long as the Commissioner was able to segregate each of the goods within the investigation and perform all of the processes involved in parallel for each good. This is what appears to have been done by the Commissioner, and later by the CITT, in this instance.
 
The Panel also considered the alternative argument of Whirlpool and Inglis that if the Commissioner is permitted to conduct an investigation into three disparate goods, it must apply a
single margin of profit to all subject goods, rather than determining separate profitability factors for each of refrigerators, dishwashers and dryers. Whirlpool and Inglis suggest that the only way in which the Commissioner could investigate into dumping in respect of refrigerators, dishwashers and dryers under one investigation would be to define those three goods as “like goods”. If the three goods are “like goods”, Whirlpool and Inglis argue, the SIMA and the SIMR require that the Commissioner generate a single margin of profit to be applied to all.

Whirlpool and Inglis have argued that the SIMR only provides for the use of one amount of profit. They rely on paragraph 11(1)(b) of the SIMR which reads as follows:
 
(b) the expression "a reasonable amount for profits", in relation to any goods, means an amount equal to…

Whirlpool and Inglis suggest that the reference to “a” reasonable amount for profit in the above referenced paragraph is conclusive evidence that only one amount for profit must be used. This Panel is not convinced that paragraph 11(1)(b) of the SIMR could not be used to calculate “a” reasonable amount for profit for each of the three separate goods that were the subject of the Commissioner’s investigation in this case. Again, that appears to be exactly what the Commissioner did, by the admission of Whirlpool and Inglis themselves.
 
Whirlpool and Inglis have not convinced this Panel that if three separate categories of subject goods are combined under one investigation they must be “like goods” and that a single amount for profit must be used.
 
This Panel finds that the combination of three categories of subject goods into one investigation, and the use of three separate sets of calculations in respect of those goods, including three different amounts for profit, are not reviewable errors by the Commissioner and this Panel will not remand on this issue.