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ARTICLE
1904
BINATIONAL PANEL REVIEW
UNDER
NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
IN THE MATTER OF:
Certain Refrigerators, Dishwashers and
Dryers Originating in or Exported from
The United States of America and
Produced by, or on Behalf of, White
Consolidated Industries, Inc. and Whirlpool
Corporation, their Respective Affiliates,
Successors and Assigns
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Secretariat File No.
CDA-USA-2000-1904-04
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Alan S. Alexandroff, Chair
John M. Peterson
Daniel A. Pinkus
Saul L. Sherman
Professor Gilbert R. Winham
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DECISION OF THE
PANEL
(January 16, 2002)
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| Appearances:
Riyaz Dattu and John W. Boscariol, appearing for the Complainant, Camco
Inc.
C.J. Michael Flavell, Q.C. and Geoffrey C. Kubrick, appearing for the
Complainants, Inglis Limited and Whirlpool Corporation
Richard S. Gottlieb and Darrel Pearson, appearing for the Complainants,
WCI Canada Inc. and White Consolidated Industries Inc.
Richard G. Dearden and Scott P. Little, appearing for the Respondent,
Maytag Corporation
Gerry H. Stobo, Reagan Walker and Marie-France Dagenais, appearing for the
Investigating Authority (the Canadian International Trade Tribunal) |
INTRODUCTION
This is the Panel decision of binational panel review CDA-USA-2000-1904-04
conducted pursuant to Article 1904 of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) and Part I.1 of the Special Import Measures Act (SIMA).1 The Request for
a Panel Review of the finding made by the Canadian International Trade Tribunal
(CITT) on August 1, 2000 in Inquiry No. NQ-2000-001 was filed with the NAFTA
Secretariat – Canadian Section by counsel for Whirlpool Corporation (Whirlpool)
and Inglis Limited (Inglis)2 on September 22, 2000 in accordance with Part II of
the NAFTA Rules of Procedure for Article 1904.
The products that are the subject of this panel review are described as
top-mount electric refrigerators, in sizes greater than 14.5 cubic feet (410.59
litres) and less than 22 cubic feet (622.97 litres) (the “subject
refrigerators”), electric household dishwashers, built-in or portable, greater
than 18 inches (45.72 centimetres) in width (the “subject dishwashers”), and gas
or electric laundry dryers (the “subject dryers”), originating in or exported
from the United States of America and produced by, or on behalf of, White
Consolidated Industries, Inc. (WCI) and Whirlpool, their respective affiliates,
successors and assigns.3
The parties to this Panel review include Whirlpool, WCI, and Camco Inc. (Camco)
as complainants; and Maytag Corporation (Maytag) and the CITT as respondents.
BACKGROUND
In accordance with SIMA subsection 33(1), on November 30, 1999 the Commissioner
of the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA) commenced an investigation at
the request of Camco into alleged dumping by WCI and Whirlpool of the subject
refrigerators, dishwashers and dryers over the period running from October 1,
1998 to September 30, 1999.
After this investigation was initiated, counsel for WCI referred to the CITT the
question of whether evidence before the Commissioner disclosed a reasonable
indication that the dumping of the subject goods had caused injury or
retardation or was threatening to cause material injury to the domestic
industry. On January 24, 2000, the CITT found that the evidence did in fact
disclose a reasonable indication that the dumping of the subject goods from the
named exporters had caused or was threatening to cause material injury to the
domestic industry.
On April 3, 2000 the Commissioner made a preliminary determination pursuant to
subsection 38(1) of SIMA finding that the subject refrigerators, dishwashers and
dryers had been dumped and that there was evidence which disclosed a reasonable
indication that the dumping had caused injury or was threatening to cause injury
to the Canadian industry.
The investigation activity of the Commissioner of the CCRA with respect to the
subject goods continued after the preliminary determination of April 3, 2000. At
the conclusion of this further period of investigation, the Commissioner was
satisfied that the margins of dumping on the subject goods were not
insignificant and that the volumes of dumped goods were not negligible.
Consequently, the CCRA made a final determination on June 30, 2000 that the
subject goods had in fact been dumped under SIMA subsection 41(1)(a).4
As a result of the Commissioner’s preliminary determination that the subject
goods had been dumped, the CITT commenced Inquiry No. NQ-2000-001. To facilitate
this inquiry, on June 26-30, 2000 and July 4 and 5, 2000 the CITT held public
and in camera hearings in Ottawa, Ontario. Represented at the hearing were,
inter alia, Camco, Whirlpool, Inglis, WCI, WCI Canada Inc., Maytag, Maytag
Canada, Sears Canada Inc. (Sears) and the Commissioner. At these hearings the
CITT also heard testimony from four witnesses who appeared at the CITT’s request
plus one subpoenaed witness from General Electric Appliances. The witnesses who
appeared at the hearings at CITT’s request appeared on behalf of The Brick
Warehouse Corporation, Appliance Canada, Brault et Martineau, and Midnorthern
Appliance Inc., respectively.
A number of background features to the Canadian market and the scope of the
inquiries previously undertaken are worth noting. Camco, for example, is the
sole domestic producer concerned with the specific appliances subject to the
dumping inquiry. The investigation covered all imports of the subject goods
during the period from October 1, 1998 to September 30, 1999. The inquiry,
however, was limited to the American producer-exporters WCI and Whirlpool, their
respective affiliates, successors and assigns5. In other words it did not cover
all United States producer-exporters of these certain appliances into Canada.
Further it did not include producers from Europe that also export to the
Canadian market.
On August 1, 2000 the CITT issued its findings in Inquiry No. NQ-2000-001 and
fifteen days later, on August 16, 2000, released its Statement of Reasons (SOR).
The CITT’s final determination stated that:
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The dumping in Canada of the subject refrigerators, excluding those with a
capacity greater than 18.5 cubic feet and those destined for use in the
Habitat for Humanity Program, had caused material injury to the domestic
industry;
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The dumping in Canada of the subject dishwashers, excluding those with
stainless steel interiors or those destined for use in the Habitat for
Humanity Program, had caused material injury to the domestic industry;
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The dumping in Canada of the subject dryers, excluding those with controls at
the front, removable tops and chassis designed to be stacked on top of
washers or those destined for use in the Habitat for Humanity Program, had
caused material injury to the domestic industry;
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The requirements for a finding under SIMA subsection 42(1)(b) of massive
importation had not been met; and
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The requirements under SIMA section 46 with respect to advising the
Commissioner to consider undertaking an investigation into other allegedly
dumped goods from the United States had not been met.
Public hearings were held before all members of this Panel on October 3, 2001 in
Ottawa, Ontario, at which counsel for all parties appeared and presented oral
argument.
The primary issues raised by the Complainants’ briefs and oral arguments
included the following:
1. What are the appropriate standards of review that should be applied by
the Panel in determining whether the CITT has committed a reviewable error with
respect to each of the contested issues?
2. Did the CITT commit a reviewable error in finding that injury had been
caused to the domestic industry via dumping? Did post-hearing data analyses made
by the CITT to the financial evidence, without providing clear guidance to the
parties as to what this data transformation entailed and/or not giving the
parties an opportunity to make submissions regarding this transformation,
constitute reviewable error?
3. Did the CITT commit a reviewable error by not considering Camco’s
export performance in evaluating Camco’s alleged injury?
4. Did the CITT commit a reviewable error in concluding that SIMA subsection
42(3) makes allowance for a cumulative finding of injury with respect to
specific producers?
5. Did the CITT commit a reviewable error in granting exclusions to
certain of the subject refrigerators, dryers, and dishwashers and not others?
Did the CITT adequately disclose its reasons for granting and not granting the
various exclusions requested by the parties?
6. Did the CITT commit a reviewable error by failing to advise the
Commissioner of the CCRA to consider undertaking a dumping investigation under
SIMA section 46 with respect to the goods of certain non-targeted US exporters
of the subject goods?
For the reasons set out below, which are made on the basis of the administrative
record, the applicable law, the written submissions of the participants, and the
public hearing held in Ottawa, Ontario on October 3, 2001, this Panel hereby
decides unanimously not to remand the decision of the CITT.
OPINION
1) STANDARD OF REVIEW
The statutory authority for panel review is found in the relevant provisions of
the NAFTA and the Federal Court Act.6 Binational panels are directed pursuant to
1904(3) to apply:
…the standard of review set out in Annex 1911 and the general legal principles
that a court of the importing Party otherwise would apply to a review of a
determination of the competent investigating authority.
In the present case the general legal principles of Canadian law are to be
applied in this review. This Panel must apply the general jurisprudence that
would be applicable to the Federal Court in its review of a decision made by the
CITT.
NAFTA Annex 1911 defines the standard of review as the grounds set forth in
subsection 18.1(4) if the Federal Court Act. Subsection 18.1(4) provides that
the Tribunal’s decisions will be reviewed on the grounds that it:
a) Acted without jurisdiction, acted beyond its jurisdiction or refused to
exercise its jurisdiction;
b) Failed to observe a principal of natural justice, procedural fairness or
other procedure that it was required in law to observe;
c) Erred in law in making a decision or order, whether or not the error appears
on the face of the record;
d) Based its decision or order on an erroneous finding of fact that it made in a
perverse or capricious manner or without regard for the material before it;
e) Acted, or failed to act, by reason of fraud or perjured evidence; or
f) Acted in any other way that was contrary to law.
These grounds for review need to be read in the light of the standard of review
developed by the Supreme Court of Canada. A determination of the appropriate
standard of review in respect of a decision of an administrative tribunal such
as the CITT calls for the application of the pragmatic and functional approach
first adopted by the Supreme Court in U.E.S., Local 298 v. Bibeault7
and further developed in subsequent decisions8. Most recently the Supreme Court
has rendered a unanimous decision in Canada (Deputy Minister of National
Revenue-M.N.R.) v. Mattel Canada Inc. (Mattel)9 where it once again described the
standard of review. In this decision the Supreme Court was asked to review a
decision of the CITT although in Mattel, it involved interpretations by the CITT
of various sections of the Customs Act.
The Supreme Court has identified the standards of review as points occurring on
a spectrum of curial deference that ranges from patent unreasonableness at one
end of the continuum – that of greatest deference, through reasonableness
simpliciter to correctness at the other end of the spectrum where the least
deference is accorded the decision of the administrative tribunal. As Mr.
Justice Iacobucci stated in the Southam case:
…the standard may fall somewhere between correctness, at the more exacting end
of the spectrum, and patently unreasonable, at the more deferential end.10
Further, in applying the functional and pragmatic approach a reviewing court
must examine a number of factors. Mr. Justice Major speaking for the Supreme
Court in Mattel stated that:
In any given case, the focus of the inquiry is on the particular provision at
issue, and the central analysis is whether the question raised is one that was
intended by the legislators to be left to the exclusive decision of the
administrative tribunal. The factors to be considered include: the purpose and
objective of the Act and provision at issue, the specific language of the
provision at issue and any privative clauses in the tribunal’s constitutive
statute, the nature of the decision made by the tribunal, and the relative
expertise of the tribunal compared to that of the courts in deciding such
matters. None of these factors alone is dispositive.11
To summarize, the appropriate standard of review will reside somewhere on a
spectrum from ‘correctness’ to ‘patently unreasonable’ depending on the relative
weight given to the factors identified by the Court:
1. the existence of a privative clause;
2. the purpose of the Act and the provision at issue;
3. the relative expertise of the tribunal; and
4. the nature of the issue under consideration.
While no factor is dispositive, Mr. Justice Major in Mattel states, (relying on
the Southam case in part) that it is the Tribunal’s ‘relative expertise’ that is
the most important of the factors that a court must consider in settling on a
standard of review.12 In determining that expertise the court may undertake the
following inquiry:
The central inquiry in an assessment of the expertise factor is whether a
tribunal has been constituted with a particular expertise with respect to
achieving the aims of an Act: Pushpanathan, supra, at para. 32. This may involve
several considerations, including the specialized knowledge of its
decision-makers, whether any special procedures or non-judicial means of
implementing the Act apply, and whether the tribunal plays a role in policy
development.13
Turning to such a pragmatic and functional review, a number of the factors can
be examined generally, e.g. the presence or absence of a privative clause, while
other factors, such as the nature of the issue raised by complainants, must be
specifically examined.
i. Privative Clause
Previously, a form of a privative clause shielded the CITT but this protection
was repealed by Parliament in the 1993 statutory amendments implementing NAFTA.
There is a right of judicial review pursuant to SIMA section 76. The absence, or
in this instance, the removal of a privative clause would seem to suggest that
less deference ought to be accorded decisions of the CITT.14 Parliament did not
intend that decisions of the CITT were to be left to the CITT exclusively.
However, as the Supreme Court has indicated, the absence of a privative clause
does not settle the question.15
ii. Purpose of the Act
SIMA is a trade statute designed to protect Canadian domestic industries from
the negative effects associated with ‘dumped’ goods and subsidies provided to
exporters who import goods into Canada. In addition the legislation is designed
to implement Canada’s international trade obligations under the General
Agreement of Tariffs and Trade and now the World Trade Organization. Thus, the
legislation bears some passing similarity to the Competition Act16, examined for
example in the Southam case. As indicated in the Southam case the Competition
Act includes an economic and not purely legal purpose. Parliament established
the CITT to protect Canada’s domestic industries from possible harm caused by
foreign companies. As in Southam17, then, the statute and the Tribunal
established for these ‘economic’ purposes underlines the expertise of the
Tribunal and warrants some heightened degree of deference for the decisions of
the Tribunal. All this would suggest, in general, that Parliament intended to
grant at least some deference to CITT decisions.
iii. The Relative Expertise of the CITT
As noted above, the determination of the expertise of the CITT relative to the
courts is the most important of the factors that a court must consider in
settling upon the appropriate standard of review. In addition, it is evident
that the relative expertise of the Tribunal and the nature of the problem are
closely interrelated and close attention should be paid to the following section
on the nature of the issue under consideration.
In determining the tribunal’s expertise in relationship to the reviewing court,
the court must examine whether the tribunal has been constituted with a
particular expertise in achieving the general purposes of the Act. To do so, the
Panel examined several considerations including the specialized knowledge of its
decision-makers, whether any special procedures or non-judicial means of
implementing the Act apply and whether the CITT plays a role in policy
development.
With respect to the specialized knowledge of the members of the CITT, as noted
in Mattel, the Canadian International Trade Tribunal Act18 does not require its
members to be expert in any particular field. Nevertheless the tribunal members
do acquire experience in trade questions they consider over the course of their
appointment.19 In the abstract then the tribunal members can be characterized as
experts though it is necessary to examine the closely related factor of the
nature of the issue being considered by panel members. The CITT is an
adjudicative body but additionally, as noted in the Mattel case, and by Counsel
for the CITT, the CITT has a policy role:
…s. 18 of the Canadian International Trade Tribunal Act, which requires the CITT
to "inquire into and report to the Governor in Council on any matter in relation
to the economic, trade or commercial interests of Canada with respect to any
goods or services or any class thereof that the Governor in Council refers to
the Tribunal for inquiry”. Although the present appeal does not implicate s. 18,
the section indicates that Parliament generally considers the CITT to be expert
in some economic, trade or commercial matters. As in Pezim, supra, this is a
basis for deference, however, it is important to note that the CITT’s
policy-making role is limited in that its function is primarily research
oriented, and the CITT cannot elevate its policy recommendations to the status
of law.20
In general it would appear that the CITT is recognized as a Tribunal with
developed expertise of its commissioners. Again in the abstract, and without
reference to the specific issues, this would point to a significant degree of
deference that would need to be accorded its decisions.
iv. The Nature of the Issue under Consideration
Thus, reflecting the analysis just examined some considerable deference would
accompany decisions of the CITT, yet it still is essential to examine the
particular issues before this Panel to determine the standard of review on an
issue-by-issue basis. Thus, the Panel needs to assess whether the issue is a
matter of fact and evidence, or a matter of mixed fact and law, or whether the
issue is a matter of legislative interpretation – a matter of law alone. Matters
of fact are generally given wide deference to the Tribunal by reviewing courts.
Courts will not normally interfere unless the Tribunal’s conclusions are
patently unreasonable. However, where issues are matters of mixed fact and law
or matters of law, reviewing courts will accord less deference to the Tribunal.
In examining the issues of law, however, the Panel further must examine whether
the issue is a matter of general statutory interpretation or a matter of law
with highly technical content. Matters of general statutory interpretation are
matters that courts are competent to review and less deference is accorded to
the Tribunal. In general a standard of correctness would be applied to such an
issue. However, where the Panel was asked to examine a question of law that was
technical or scientific in nature then greater deference would be accorded the
Tribunal.
In the end this Panel is required pursuant to the pragmatic and functional test,
to examine all the pertinent factors in arriving at a standard of review. Where
the expertise of the Tribunal is engaged and putting all the factors of the
pragmatic and functional approach together, substantial deference, along the
spectrum of the standard of review to ‘patent unreasonableness’ would be
accorded the decisions of this Tribunal. If however, the issues fall outside the
specific expertise of the CITT say, for example an issue that could be assessed
as a pure matter of law not within the expertise of the CITT, the standard of
review would shift towards correctness. The Panel has undertaken such an
analysis on an issue-by-issue basis and the standard of review is identified for
each issue raised by the Complainants.
2) INJURY AND CAUSATION
SIMA subsection 42(1)(a)(i), from which the Tribunal derives its authority to
conduct an injury inquiry, provides that:
(1) The Tribunal, forthwith after receipt by the Secretary pursuant to
subsection 38(3) of a notice of a preliminary determination, shall make inquiry
with respect to such of the following matters as is appropriate in the
circumstances:
(a) in the case of any goods to which the preliminary determination applies, as
to whether the dumping or subsidizing of the goods
(i) has caused injury or retardation or is threatening to cause injury, or ...
Section 37.1(1) of the Special Import Measures Regulations21, prescribes factors
which the Tribunal is required to consider in determining whether the dumping of
goods has caused injury. These factors are:
(a) the volume of the dumped or subsidized goods and, in particular, whether
there has been a significant increase in the volume of imports of the dumped or
subsidized goods, either in absolute terms or relative to the production or
consumption of like goods;
(b) the effect of the dumped or subsidized goods on the price of like goods and,
in particular, whether the dumped or subsidized goods have significantly
(i) undercut the price of like goods,
(ii) depressed the price of like goods, or
(iii) suppressed the price of like goods by preventing the price increases for
those like goods that would otherwise likely have occurred;
(c) the resulting impact of the dumped or subsidized goods on the state of the
domestic industry and, in particular, all relevant economic factors and indices
that have a bearing on the state of the domestic industry, including
(i) any actual or potential decline in output, sales, market share, profits,
productivity, return on investments or the utilization of industrial capacity,
(ii) any actual or potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories,
employment, wages, growth or the ability to raise capital,
(ii.1) the magnitude of the margin of dumping or amount of subsidy in respect of
the dumped or subsidized goods, and
…
(d) any other factors that are relevant in the circumstances.
The Tribunal is also required to determine in SIM Regulations subsection
37.1(3)(b):
(b) whether any factors other than the dumping or subsidizing of the goods have
caused injury or retardation or are threatening to cause injury, …
With regard to ‘injury’, Whirlpool and WCI argue that the Tribunal conducted a
faulty gross margins analysis by erroneously accepting inappropriate data from
Camco, by introducing errors
in further 'reworking' the data, and by breaching the rules of natural justice
by not disclosing its calculations to the parties. With respect to price
suppression/price erosion, Whirlpool and WCI claim that the Tribunal erred by
using average prices as evidence of injurious dumping, and by adopting an
inconsistent approach to the comparability of subject goods within model
groupings.
With regard to ‘causation’, Whirlpool and WCI argue that the use of average
prices included goods purchased for non-dumping reasons and therefore the
Tribunal had no reliable evidence linking injury to dumping; that the Tribunal
failed to consider significant non-dumping factors in its analysis of injury and
causation, such as the quality of Camco’s goods and the effect of the bundling
of products; that a proper gross margin analysis would show no connection
between the injury and dumping; that in the analysis of price suppression/price
erosion the elimination of “un-dumped” factors would remove support for any
relationship between dumping and injury; and that further to the causal analysis
of price suppression, the actual account-specific evidence of displacement of
Camco product based on data provided by Camco must be shown, and not merely
reduced sales volumes based on data reworked by the CITT. Finally, in the
analysis of the impact of lost market share the Tribunal relied on goods
purchased for non-dumping reasons and further there is not even evidence of
displacement of Camco goods by imports, let alone a demonstration of causation.
The Tribunal's analysis surrounding these issues is clearly within its
specialized competence. These are issues concerning the existence and cause of
injury. These questions are precisely the questions that the Tribunal has been
empowered to decide, and are within its expertise. Furthermore, the issues are
factually driven, and the issues that the complainants raise under this heading
are all issues of mixed fact and law. Where there are sub issues of law, the
issues concern the interpretation of the Tribunal's own statute, and the
appropriate ways to exercise its own mandate. Thus, the Panel finds that the
applicable standard of review for these issues is one of considerable deference;
i.e. at least reasonableness simpliciter or higher.
Essentially, the arguments of Whirlpool and WCI can be distilled down to five
issues: i) an allegedly faulty gross margin analysis; ii) the alleged duty to
give reasons; (iii) the allegedly inappropriate use of average price data; iv)
the failure to consider significant non-dumping factors; and v) the failure to
conduct separate analyses and provide separate conclusions on each of the three
categories of subject goods.
i. Gross Margin Analysis
The complainants argue that the gross margin analysis of Camco's financial
statements was faulty, and was incapable of supporting a conclusion that there
was injury. They take issue with the information that the Tribunal accepted as
part of the financial records of Camco, the way that the Tribunal reworked the
data, and the way that the Tribunal disclosed how they reworked the data. The
data that Camco provided was presented to the Tribunal, and the parties had an
opportunity to comment on it. The Tribunal found that the gross margin analysis
was flawed. At that point, it took the data and conducted a further analysis of
the numbers in the financial statements. The Tribunal employed its expert staff,
some of whom are accountants, to re-work the financial information. The Tribunal
chose a certain methodology to reallocate costs. Whirlpool and WCI proposed an
alternative method, but before this Panel they did not make a convincing case
that the method employed by the Tribunal was unreasonable.
The analysis of financial information, the appropriate allocation of costs
between exports and domestic sales, and the determination of injury on the basis
of the effect of dumping, are all areas within the expertise of the Tribunal as
laid out in SIMA subsection 42(1). In this technical analysis, which is
conducted within the Tribunal’s expertise, it is clear that a reviewing court or
panel would owe the Tribunal a great deal of deference. Taking all the factors
of the pragmatic and functional test into account the standard of review here
approaches patent unreasonableness.
The Tribunal is in a much better position than this Panel to determine the most
appropriate method of allocating costs between domestic sales and exports. All
that Whirlpool and WCI were able to do was to propose another, albeit plausible,
method of allocating costs. Neither Whirlpool nor WCI were able to point to
sufficient evidence or legal argument to sustain their argument that the
Tribunal’s reworking of the data was unreasonable. To do this, the complainants
would have had to show that the Tribunal’s method was one that a court would say
was patently unreasonable. The Complainants have not succeeded in making this
case.
ii. Duty to Give Reasons
Turning to the issue of giving reasons, Whirlpool and WCI have failed to show
any statutory authority for a duty of the Tribunal to give reasons. The Panel,
suggests that there is a statutory obligation. Where a tribunal has made a
determination of injurious dumping pursuant to Section 42, it is required to
make an order or finding with respect to the specified goods. In addition,
pursuant to SIMA subsection 43.(2), the following must be done:
(2) The Secretary [of the Tribunal] shall forward by registered mail to the
Commissioner, the importer, the exporter and such other persons as may be
specified by the rules of the Tribunal
(a) forthwith after it is made, a copy of each order or finding made by the
Tribunal pursuant to this section; and
(b) not later than fifteen days after the making of an order or finding by the
Tribunal pursuant to this section, a copy of the reasons for making the order or finding.[Emphasis added]
In addition, the Parties in the NAFTA have underlined the commitment to give
reasons. In Article 1907.3 of NAFTA:
… the Parties agree that it is desirable in the administration of the
antidumping and countervailing duty laws to:
(h) provide disclosure of relevant information, including an explanation of the
calculation or the methodology used to determine the margin of dumping or the
amount of the subsidy, on which any preliminary or final determination of
dumping or subsidization is based, within a reasonable time after a request by
interested parties;
(i) provide a statement of reasons concerning the final determination of dumping
or subsidization; and
(j) provide a statement of reasons for final determinations concerning material
injury to a domestic industry,…threat…or…retardation…
Article 1911 provides:
For purposes of this Chapter:
administrative record means…:
(b) a copy of the final determination of the competent investigating authority,
including reasons for the determination…
Although applicable in terms only to Mexican cases, further illumination of the
intent of the draftsmen is to be found in the Schedule of Mexico in Annex
1904.15, Amendments to Domestic Laws. It will be recalled that when Canada and
the U.S. revised the agreement to include Mexico, they found that due to
differences in legal systems and traditions, various matters that were taken for
granted between the original Parties needed to be spelled out. Thus the expanded
pact included an undertaking by Mexico that its laws would be amended to
require:
(r) a detailed statement of reasons and the legal basis for final determinations
in a manner sufficient to permit interested parties to make an informed decision
as to whether to seek judicial or panel review, including an explanation of
methodological or policy issues raised in the calculation of dumping or
subsidization…
It seems clear that this requirement was not intended to apply alone to Mexico,
but rather that it was deemed already to be a part of Canadian and U.S. law.
This Panel found, without defining the extent of the duty, that the Tribunal is
obligated to provide reasons at least sufficient enough to allow the Panel to
review a decision of the CITT. This duty was reflected in the decision of this
Panel, dated March 22, 2001, regarding the request of Whirlpool and WCI for an
Order to compel the CITT to produce its working papers related to the
post-hearing analysis of Camco’s financial statements. In that Order, this Panel
stated:
...the Investigating Agency carries the burden to fully explain what it has done
and how it reached the conclusions of material injury...
Without precisely deciding on the extent of this duty in the context of the CITT
and SIMA, this Panel finds that the reasons the Tribunal has given were
sufficient to indicate that they found: 1) the financial statements provided by
Camco were inaccurate; 2) the problem with them was clear; 3) the Tribunal chose
to rework the data; and 4) the Tribunal chose a method to rework the data that
it felt was reasonable and relevant to the situation. The Panel notes that the
reasons of the Tribunal for reworking the data are briefly described in the
Tribunal’s SOR, and are more fully elaborated in the Tribunal's brief submitted
to this Binational Panel. The Panel finds that this combined explanation is
sufficient to provide a reasonably detailed explanation of its actions to the
parties in this case. However, the Panel would underline vigorously the
importance in the Tribunal providing adequate reasoning in any initial Statement
of Reasons, without the prodding provided by this Panel in this case, so any
reviewing body, and more importantly the parties, can properly assess the
Tribunal’s decision.
Furthermore, it is clear that the reworked financial data, as long as that data
were merely part of a post-hearing analysis of data that were already on the
administrative record, do not form part of the administrative record and
therefore do not need to be disclosed. This principle has been made very clear
in Toshiba Corp. v. Canada.22 A previous Panel Corrosion Resistant Steel Sheet23 has
faced an analogous situation, and its reasoning is intrinsically persuasive:
...the analyses in question were supported by information on the record. Any
tribunal must be free to do whatever analyses it requires to come to its
decision, provided it does not use information not on the record and not
available to the parties.24
iii. Average Price Data
The Tribunal, in its analysis, used average price data in determining injury.
This is a compilation of all of the prices of like goods that are sold in the
marketplace. The complainants take issue with this practice because, as they
argue, the use of average price data is incapable of showing the necessary
causal connection between injury and dumping. It is true, as counsel for
Whirlpool and WCI argue, that the Tribunal must find pursuant to the statutory
requirement, that it was the dumping that caused the injury. However, the
statement that the Tribunal must have evidence of account specific incidents of
price-based switching, has no foundation in the legislation or the
jurisprudence. Subsection 42(1) of SIMA gives the Tribunal a broad discretion in
its choice of how to find injury and causation. No methodology or type of proof
has been laid out in the statute or the regulations. Furthermore, Whirlpool and
WCI have not been able to cite case law or legislation indicating that the use
of average price data is unacceptable. The Tribunal indicated that it was an
imperfect tool, but that it felt it was accurate enough in the context of the
data in this case to make a finding of injury, under the head price
suppression/price erosion, as well as causation.
The use of average price data in determining injury is a question of fact, or
perhaps mixed fact and law. The finding is within the expertise of the Tribunal
and it is strictly within the mandate of the Tribunal, as granted under SIMA. On
this question also the Tribunal should be given
considerable deference by the Panel. In looking at all the factors including
that the specific issue is a matter of fact or perhaps mixed fact and law, the
standard of review is at least reasonableness if not patent unreasonableness.
The Panel is not persuaded by Whirlpool or WCI that the use of average price
data is either illegal or inappropriate in the circumstances. Therefore this
Panel will not disturb the use of average price data in the finding of injury
and causation.
Whirlpool and WCI further argue that the Tribunal has included some non-dumped
goods in its average pricing analysis such that the findings on gross margins,
price suppression/price erosion and loss of market share are unreliable. The
decision to include or not include certain goods in the average pricing analysis
is a decision squarely within the expertise of the Tribunal, and again is a
matter of fact or mixed fact and law. Again, the standard of review is at least
reasonableness and the Panel will defer to any reasonable decision of the
Tribunal on this question. Although it would certainly have been preferable, in
the Panel’s opinion that the prices of non-dumped goods not be included in the
average price analysis, the Panel finds that the methodology of the Tribunal was
reasonable. Given the standard of review the Panel will not disturb the findings
of the Tribunal.
iv. Consideration of Non Dumping Factors
Whirlpool and WCI both argue that the Tribunal failed to consider the effect of
certain non-dumping factors in its analysis of injury and causation, and that in
fact, much of the injury suffered by Camco was due to non-dumped goods. The
Panel recognizes that the Tribunal is under a duty, as set out in SIM
Regulations subsection 37.1(3), to consider whether any factors other than
dumping or subsidizing may have caused the injury:
(3) For the purpose of determining whether the dumping or subsidizing of any
goods has caused injury...the following additional factors are prescribed: ...
(b) whether any factors other than the dumping or subsidizing of the
goods have caused injury or retardation or are threatening to cause injury,
on the basis of...
The section then goes on to list several factors that must be considered, to
determine if injury has been caused by some factor other than the dumping. These
factors include, in subsection (3)(b)(vii) "any other factors that are relevant
in the circumstances.” Starting at page 27 of the SOR, under the heading “Other
Factors”, the Tribunal does carry out the analysis that is required by the
Regulations. The CITT recognizes the arguments by several of the parties that
there were factors other than dumping that may have caused injury to Camco. The
Tribunal also recognized its duty to not attribute injury caused by these
factors to dumping. Further, the Tribunal noted that dumping need not be the
only or the principal cause of injury, but the injury from dumping must be
material. The Tribunal noted the following “other factors” in its decision:
product quality, performance, style and innovation; selling and marketing
practices; Camco’s business strategies and decisions; Camco’s selling directly
to builders; Camco’s lack of investment and later rationalization; the decision
to stop producing 16 and 18 cubic foot refrigerators; and Camco’s export
performance for dishwashers. The Tribunal also recognized the important position
that Sears played in the market, and that Camco’s lack of success at that
account was due to many factors.
The Panel finds that the Tribunal in fact discharged its duty under SIM
Regulations subsection 37.1(3) to consider the possible injurious effect of
non-dumping factors. The weight to be given to the evidence on each of these
factors, and the ultimate conclusion of the Tribunal as to whether injury was
caused by them, is a core element of the duties of the Tribunal, within its
scope of expertise, and is a matter of fact or mixed fact and law. Again taking
into account all the factors of the pragmatic and functional test, the standard
of review in this issue of non-dumping factors is at least reasonableness. The
Tribunal, therefore, is owed a high level of deference on the issue. The Panel
holds that in this case the Tribunal’s findings with regard to the non-dumping
factors enumerated by Whirlpool and WCI was reasonable.
v. The Failure to Conduct Separate Analyses and Provide Separate Conclusions
The duty to make a separate analysis and finding for each of the subject goods
is implicit in SIMA subsection 42(1) and in SIM Regulations subsection 37.1. The
Tribunal acknowledged, at SOR, page 23 that it had to make a separate finding
with respect to each of the categories of subject goods. The Tribunal goes on to
say that a parallel analysis is possible, and that where there are distinctions
between the subject goods, it would highlight them. Thus, the Tribunal was aware
of its duty to make a separate finding for each of the categories of subject
goods. The Tribunal did in places indicate that it had done a different analysis
for each of the categories of subject goods. An example of the Tribunal’s
separate analysis can be seen in the SOR at page 26:
The Tribunal examined the evidence on the record regarding the sales volumes and
prices for certain refrigerators, dishwashers and dryers to major accounts in
Canada as reported in the pre-hearing staff report. The overall pricing data for
dishwashers and dryers do not generally show major decreasing trends...
Furthermore, it is clear in the SOR at page 36 that the Tribunal made separate
findings of injury and causation for each of the categories of subject goods.
Thus, the Tribunal did do a separate analysis, and came to separate conclusions
for the three categories of subject goods. These conclusions are again mixed
fact and law. The standard of review is at least reasonableness simpliciter. The
Tribunal did exercise its jurisdiction to make separate analyses and did make
separate findings for each of the subject goods. The Tribunal conclusions are
reasonable and the Panel will not disturb the Tribunal's findings.
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