25 November 1987

1. At the requests of the delegations of Canada and the European Economic Community, the Council agreed to establish the Panel, on 4 March 1987, and authorized the Council Chairman to draw up the terms of reference and to designate the Chairman and members of the Panel in consultation with the Parties concerned and with interested delegations (C/M/207, item 6).

2. The following terms of reference and composition of the Panel were communicated by the Chairman of the Council on 27 May 1987 (C/147):

"To examine, in the light of the relevant GATT provisions, the matters referred to the CONTRACTING PARTIES by

(a) Canada in document L/6130;

(b) the European Economic Community in document L/6131;

and to make such findings as will assist the CONTRACTING PARTIES in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in Article XXIII:2".

3. The following is an understanding among the parties on the organization of the Panel's work:

"(i) The panel will organize its examination and present its findings to the Council in such a way that the procedural rights which the parties to the dispute would have enjoyed if separate panels had examined the complaints are in no way impaired. If one of the complainants so requests the Panel will submit a separate report on the complaint of that party.

"(ii) The written submission by each of the complainants will be made available to the other complainant and each complainant will have the right to be present when the other complainant presents its views to the Panel.

"(iii) The Panel will invite contracting parties having expressed an interest in this matter at the Council to present their views to the Panel".

4. At the Council meeting when the Panel was established, Australia, India, Indonesia on behalf of the ASEAN contracting parties, and Japan explicitly reserved their rights to make a submission to the Panel. In accordance with paragraph 15 of the Understanding regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance (26S/213), the Panel addressed letters to these contracting parties offering them the possibility to make a submission to or to be heard by the Panel. In the light of statements made in previous Council meetings (C/M/202, item 9; C/M/206, item 11), the Panel also gave Brazil, Chile, Hong Kong, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Sweden on behalf of the Nordic countries, and Switzerland this opportunity. Australia, Hong Kong, India, Japan, New Zealand, Peru and Singapore made use of this possibility. Their views are summarized below in paragraphs 61-67.

5. The Panel met on 3 June, 6-8 July, 15-18 September, 13-16 October and 10-14 November 1987. It met with the parties on 3 June, 7 July and 14 October and with interested third parties on 7 July 1987. It submitted its report to the parties to the dispute on 17 November 1987.

6. The Panel urged the parties to respect the need for confidentiality and requested them not to release any papers or make any statements in public regarding the dispute. The same was impressed upon the seven other delegations when they appeared before the Panel.

7. The term "customs user fee" refers to a number of fees imposed by the United States for the processing by the US Customs Service of passengers, conveyances and merchandise entering the United States. Only one of these fees is at issue in this dispute. It is the "merchandise processing fee", an ad valorem charge imposed for the processing of commercial merchandise entering the United States. The merchandise processing fee was enacted on 21 October 1986 in the Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1986 (OBRA) (Public Law 99-509). It was enacted as an amendment to an earlier provision, Section 13031(a) of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA) (Public Law 99-272). As first enacted, Section 13031(a) had imposed a series of eight other customs user fees, for the arrival of passengers and conveyances, for customs broker permits, and for certain dutiable mail. The October 1986 amendment added the merchandise processing fee, which went into effect on 1 December 1986.

8. From 1 December 1986 until 30 September 1987, the end of the 1987 fiscal year, the merchandise processing fee was 0.22 per cent of the customs value of the merchandise being entered. In fiscal years 1988 and 1989, the fee will be either 0.17 per cent or a lesser ad valorem rate determined by the Secretary of the Treasury to be sufficient to provide the amount of revenue needed to fund "commercial operations" of the United States Customs Service for the upcoming fiscal year. According to the authoritative explanation of the legislation by the legislative committee that drafted it, this "special formula would allow reduction of the fee if that became necessary to ensure that the fee structure and revenue derived therefrom in the [subsequent years] of the programme are consistent with the international obligations of the United States".

9. Unless extended, the merchandise processing fee and the other user fees in Section 13031(a) will expire on 30 September 1989. During the period when these fees are in effect, Customs is precluded from assessing any other charges for cargo inspection or clearance services or any other customs service performed or personnel provided in connection with the arrival or departure of any commercial vessel, vehicle or aircraft, its passengers, crew or cargo, including customs services performed outside of normal business hours on an overtime basis, and customs services performed outside the United States. The only fees that may be charged for these customs activities are the Section 13031(a) user fees described above. Section 13031(f) of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (as amended), provides that receipts from fees under Section 13031(a) shall be deposited into a "Customs User Fee Account". Two separate sub-accounts have been established within this Customs User Fee Account. Receipts from the merchandise processing fees are deposited in one sub-account which can only be used to fund "commercial operations" of the US Customs Service; receipts from other Section 13031(a) fees are deposited in the other sub-account which is used to fund miscellaneous overtime expenses. The sub-account containing the merchandise processing fee receipts remains isolated and earmarked until enactment of appropriations legislation directing that the funds be used in a given fiscal year.

10. The merchandise processing fee is collected at the port of entry by Customs Service officers. The fee is imposed only on merchandise covered by a "formal entry", and is based on the appraised value of the merchandise. Formal entries are normally required for dutiable or duty-free merchandise valued over $1,000, except for textiles, for which the threshold is $250.

11. The legislation does not define which activities of the US Customs Service are to be considered "commercial operations", but the term has been defined administratively in the Fiscal Year (FY) 1988 Budget to include certain commercial activities currently performed by three Customs Service programmes known as "Inspection and Control", "Tariff and Trade", and "Investigations", as well as a pro rata share of certain "Executive Management" and "Administration" expenses deemed allocable to these activities.

12. With regard to Inspection and Control, "commercial operations" include inspection and release of cargo (including the initial processing and clearance of cargo manifests supplied by carriers) and half the cost of airport passenger processing.

13. With regard to Tariff and Trade, "commercial operations" comprise the entire programme, including:

(a) Appraisement and Classification: Establishing the value and particular tariff classification of merchandise, collecting anti-dumping and countervailing duties pursuant to outstanding anti-dumping or countervailing orders, and providing commodity expertise to the importing public;

(b) Laboratories: Technical support for classification of merchandise and investigations of "commercial fraud" (fraudulent non-compliance by commercial importers with customs laws and other legal requirements pertaining to entry);

(c) Regulatory Audits: Facilitating entry processing by post-entry audits of importers, and providing support for detection of commercial fraud; and (d) Legal Rulings: Issuing decisions and rulings and promoting uniformity in application of customs laws.

14. With regard to Investigations, the activities classified as "commercial operations" are commercial fraud investigations.

15. With regard to the category of general expenses called Executive Management, "commercial operations" include approximately 60 per cent of the cost of all functions under this heading, which is the best estimate of the percentage that "commercial operations" bears to the entire operating budget of the US Customs Service. The functions listed under this category of expenses are Executive Management, International Affairs, Internal Affairs and Chief Counsel.

16. Each of the three operating programmes, as well as the Executive Management, contains a separate budget item for activities titled Administration. The "commercial operations" budget contains a single item for Administration which is approximately 64 per cent of all Administration expenses in the entire operating budget.

17. The United States FY 1987 budget did not contain a separate item for "commercial operations", and at the time this report was prepared, the FY 1988 budget had not yet been enacted. The United States did supply the Panel with figures showing an estimate of the costs incurred for "commercial operations" items in FY 1987, and showing what those costs would be in FY 1988 if 1987 levels of activity were maintained. The estimate of "commercial operations" expenses in FY 1987 totalled $505 million, and the projected expenses for FY 1988 were $535 million. A detailed breakdown of the United States estimates is presented in Annex I.

18. Section 13031(a)(9), as amended, exempts the following three classes of merchandise from the merchandise processing fee:

(a) Articles provided for in schedule 8 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States, i.e. articles exported and returned; personal exemptions; governmental importations; importations of religious, educational, scientific and other institutions; samples and articles admitted free of duty under bond; non-commercial importations of limited value; and other special classification provisions;

(b) Products of the insular possessions of the United States; and

(c) Products of countries listed in TSUS General Headnote 3(e)(vi) or (vii) (least developed developing countries, and beneficiary countries of the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA)).

19. Information provided by the United States showed that, of total 1986 imports of $369 billion, these three exemptions would have resulted in the merchandise processing fee not being applied to approximately $102 billion (approximately 28 per cent by value). The formula for calculating the fee in subsequent years is designed to recover the entire cost of "commercial operations" from the fees paid by non-exempt imports. The formula is to divide projected expenses of the commercial operations budget by the projected value of non-exempt imports for that year.

20. The United States reported that, according to the most recent data available, receipts from the merchandise processing fee for FY 1987 collected during the ten months it was in force (1 December 1986 to 30 September 1987) were $536 million. Estimated receipts for FY 1988 were $540 million, assuming application of the 0.17 per cent ad valorem fee provided for in the legislation and no change in any other provision of that law. The cost and revenue estimates supplied by the United States are summarized in Annex I of this report.

A. Summaries

21. Canada requested the Panel to find that the United States merchandise processing fee violated the General Agreement because:

22. Canada requested the Panel to find, therefore, that the ad valorem merchandise processing fee, as it was currently applied, was inconsistent with United States obligations under the General Agreement, and constituted a prima facie case of nullification or impairment of benefits accruing to Canada.

23. The European Economic Community requested the Panel to find that without prejudice to the conformity of the merchandise processing fee with other GATT provisions:

24. The United States requested the Panel to find that:

B. Arguments relating to the terms: "commensurate with the cost of services rendered" (Article II:2(c)) and "limited in amount to the approximate cost of services rendered" (Article VIII:1(a))

25. The meaning of the concept "cost of services rendered" in Articles II and VIII raised a number of separate, although overlapping issues. For presentational reasons, these issues are presented under a series of three more specific questions.

(i) To what extent does the "cost of services" limitation in Articles II:2(c) and VIII:1(a) require that the amount of the fee not exceed the approximate cost of the government activities performed with respect to the individual customs entry for which the fee is imposed?

26. Canada argued that the "cost of services" limitations did require that the fee not exceed the cost of the services rendered to the individual importer. The imposition of an unrestricted ad valorem user fee was in direct contravention of these obligations. The fee collected varied with the value of a specific shipment and, as the US fees had no upper limit, they could not, by definition, be "commensurate with the cost of services rendered" or "limited in amount to the approximate cost of services rendered". In fact, an instance where the fee charged has equivalent to the approximate cost of the services could occur only as the result of chance. It was not valid to contend that higher-value entries required more Customs effort than lower-value entries.

27. The European Economic Community argued that "cost of services rendered" in Articles II:2(c) and VIII:1(a) meant the cost of services provided to the individual importer paying the fee and not services which the authorities collecting the fee were empowered to provide to other importers of other products in other circumstances. A customs administration might have a wide variety of functions apart from collection of duties and administering quantitative restrictions, such as carrying out costly chemical analyses, or performing the other functions indicated in Article VIII of GATT. It would be contrary to Articles II and VIII if an importer importing an easily identifiable product which did not require detailed inspection or analysis should be required to contribute to the cost of administering a system of expensive controls applicable to different products or imposed for purposes unrelated to the goods which the importer in question was importing. An ad valorem fee without any limitation necessarily led to fee levels in excess of the cost of the individual service and was therefore inherently inconsistent with the requirements of Articles II and VIII. The cost of providing customs clearance to a given importer on a given transaction was determined by the time necessary to clear the shipment; it was not proportionate, except by coincidence, with the value of the goods. Likewise, the fact that the revenue from the fees was used to pay for technical laboratories and commercial customs fraud enforcement meant that importers importing products which did not need to be submitted to technical laboratories were contributing towards the cost of those laboratories, and that importers who were not and could not be suspected of customs fraud were contributing to the cost of fraud enforcement. Both of these features of the US fee system were contrary to the plain words of Articles II and VIII.

28. The United States did not agree that Articles II and VIII required contracting parties to match fee levels to the cost of services on a shipment-by-shipment basis. The United States argued that Articles II:2(c) and VIII:1(a) clearly permitted contracting parties to impose user fees that recovered the full costs of services rendered and were not in excess of such costs. Neither Article II nor Article VIII required that fees be "equal to" the cost of services rendered, but merely that they be "commensurate", or limited to the "approximate" cost. The legislative history of the merchandise processing fee indicated clearly the desire of Congress to conform to these provisions. The merchandise processing fee, as enacted, was commensurate with the cost of Customs commercial operations, as the total amount collected would approximately match salaries and expenses for such activities.

29. Canada did not agree that a user fee would be consistent with the GATT merely by virtue of the fact that the total revenue collected did not significantly exceed the total cost of services rendered. Such fees were levied, and charges are collected, on the basis of individual shipments. The "approximate cost" should therefore be calculated on the basis of the services rendered to individual shipments in connection with importation, and this calculated cost should represent an upper limit of the fee which could be charged. An indication that "approximate cost of services rendered" was intended to apply to an approximation of the cost of services for individual shipments was the inclusion of a list of services in Article VIII:4, some of which were applicable to only a limited number of shipments. For example, only a small percentage of imports into the United States were subject to quantitative restrictions or licensing requirements but, under the current ad valorem fee system, the cost of providing these "services" was spread across all imports. Similarly, the requirement for quarantine, sanitation and fumigation services would occur with respect to a limited number of imports, but the US divided these charges among all imports paying fees. Evidence that the drafters had intended that "cost of services" would relate to individual entries rather than the cost as a whole could also be found in the words of Article II:2 to the effect that "Nothing in this Article shall prevent any contracting party from imposing at any time on the importation of any product ..." (emphasis added). Therefore, the "total cost" method of calculating fees was inconsistent with both Articles II and VIII when the fee collected was higher than the cost of services rendered, for example in the case of high value or bulk shipments. Shipments of duty-free products, where the US Customs did not have to calculate or collect the applicable duty, could also be subject to fees higher than the cost of services rendered.

30. The European Economic Community maintained that a comparison of the total merchandise processing fees collected with the total cost of the US Customs' "commercial operations" was not the test to be applied under Articles II and VIII. If this were the only requirement, user fees could be imposed on any basis, on any range of products, in accordance with any rules, as long as the revenue from them covered the total cost of the customs service collecting them, e.g. by a system which imposed fees on agricultural but not industrial products. Yet clearly any range of products, however defined, should not have to bear a disproportionate share of the cost of operating the customs service in question. Moreover, if the US theory were correct in that total cost was the only relevant criterion, it would be necessary for the Panel to determine which activities of the US Customs could correctly be considered as commercial customs clearance, and then to carry out cost accountancy investigations to calculate objectively the total cost of these activities, separately from the cost of all the other activities of the US Customs. If the Panel considered that the EEC was correct in arguing that "cost of services rendered" meant the cost of the service rendered to the individual importers, the Panel would not need to decide these issues.

31. The United States replied that the GATT clearly permitted recovery of the costs of services rendered to importers; the problem was that of finding a fair and administrable allocation method that would avoid a protective effect and maximize stability and predictability in trade transactions. Both Articles II:2(c) and VIII:1(a) left it open to each contracting party how to collect user fees. These provisions did not rule out the use of a systematic method such as a flat fee or an ad valorem fee. The negotiating history confirmed this interpretation. ¹ The drafting of the initial GATT provisions on user fees had been conducted against a background of a number of countries maintaining ad valorem user fees. When the GATT had entered into force, the provisions of Article VIII:1(a) were only hortatory in nature. When Article VIII:1(a) was made obligatory in 1955 ad valorem user fees were still widely practiced. It was not reasonable to infer from the historical record that the countries imposing ad valorem fees had intended to make their own ad valorem fees GATT-illegal. The more reasonable inference was that at that time, ad valorem fees were not generally considered to be GATT-inconsistent. No ruling has ever been made rejecting an Article VIII fee because it was assessed on a basis linked to the value of merchandise. Such a finding would be surprising, in view of the significant number of contracting parties, including some EEC Member States, still using such fees. A 1986 survey by the United States Customs had shown that over 50 countries out of 79 countries surveyed charged some type of user fee; seventeen contracting parties had been found to charge on an ad valorem basis or a basis related to the value of imported merchandise. The results of this survey were communicated to the Panel. In the most recent GATT examination of border fees, contained in the Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Zaire) (18S/89), the aspect of the statistical fee objected to had been its level (3 per cent ad valorem), not its ad valorem nature. The United States hoped that the Panel would take into account the significance of its decision not only for the United States but also for many other contracting parties.

32. The United States argued that each of the options for a GATT-consistent user fee had its advantages and disadvantages. Any approach could produce arbitrary results in some cases. For instance, a transaction-based fee assessed at a flat rate per entry might avoid valuation of individual entries. However, countries sharing a land border with the United States would benefit disproportionately from a fee assessed on that basis, as they made extensive use of consolidated entry procedures permitting entry of multiple shipments on one entry form. Furthermore, the calculation and collection of duties amounted to a minor workload factor in entry processing; determination of the proper classification for a shipment was a more complex process, and was required for all entries regardless of the relevant rate of duty. The trend in US Customs operations was away from transaction-by-transaction accounting, and towards increased automation of operations, direct electronic data transfer and funds transfer between Customs, importers and brokers, and periodic settlement of accounts between Customs and importers. A transaction-based fee ran counter to this trend, which had been driven by the need to process increasing imports with limited Customs resources. In addition, a flat-rate or transaction-based fee made it impossible to know whether fees would exceed the cost of services rendered. Measuring the cost of each Customs transaction as it happened would create a trade barrier in itself, and setting a schedule of transaction fees would cause trade distortions as transactions were manipulated to minimize fees. Each fee-avoidance action would necessitate a fee-adjustment response by the Treasury Department or Congress. An ad valorem fee required no such action. It also adjusted revenue automatically when inflation rates caused overall increases in Customs costs whereas transaction-based fees would require constant change to reflect such costs. When numerous different transaction fees were set, both Customs and the public would be faced with complex, difficult and expensive adjustments, including reprogramming of computer software. Congress had chosen to solve the allocation problem by imposing the fee as a percentage of customs value. It had been the judgement of Congress that, as expressed in legislative history provided to the Panel, "an overall ad valorem fee is the only way to equitably distribute the cost of Customs commercial services". An ad valorem fee provided more certainty and was more administrable for the importing public, for foreign exporters and for Customs than were the alternatives.

33. The United States maintained that Article VIII did not require contracting parties to match fee levels to the cost of services on a shipment-by-shipment basis. By any commercial or accounting definition, the cost of a service included both the direct cost of the service and the indirect costs that the service-providing organization incurred to be in a position to render the service. If a customs service could charge fees only on those shipments which were actually inspected, those shipments would have to bear the entire direct and indirect costs. In the United States, about twenty per cent of entries were actually inspected, and less than two per cent of containers were emptied and fully inspected. The question could be asked as to whether only the inspected entries should pay the entire cost of Customs commercial operations, and if so, how importers were to deal with the uncertainty that would be created. For reasons such as this, United States' importers and customs brokers had now opposed changing to a transaction-based fee. The indirect general overhead costs of the Customs Service were real costs, which could not be ignored and which had to be paid. Requiring that they be excluded from the cost base of a user fee amounted to requiring that these costs be cross-subsidized from general tax revenues. There was no such requirement in Article VIII. As for quarantine, fumigation and sanitation of shipments of merchandise, while Customs might withhold release of such shipments, or in some cases, supervise such activities, any charges imposed for quarantine, sanitation or fumigation remained the responsibility of the individual importer. As a rule, the individual importer contracted with private firms for these services, which were not paid for from the merchandise processing fee or other user fees. Furthermore, as for the costs of enforcement against fraud committed by commercial importers, every importer could potentially be suspected of fraud; fraud had no limitations when money or import restrictions were involved.

34. Canada replied that its view of the "cost of services" limitation did not mean that it was necessary to calculate the cost of each individual entry. This could lead to delays in processing and could represent an obstruction to trade. The cost of processing similar types of entries could be calculated with reasonable accuracy and it could be expected that a significant portion of entries would have a similar cost of processing. The flexibility afforded by the words "approximate cost" would allow for the same upper limit of fee to be calculated for most shipments, with different upper limits for shipments of products requiring different levels or types of service. The United States ad valorem fee was inconsistent with this principle, because it made no distinction between types of shipments that required significantly different levels of service in connection with importation. It would be contrary to GATT principles to collect any amount in excess of these maximum limits. It was also inaccurate and misleading to argue that Canada would benefit disproportionately from a flat-rate fee. Like other contracting parties, it would pay less under a GATT-consistent fee system which levied charges based on an approximation of the services actually rendered on importation rather than a system based on the value of goods. To choose a fee because it was the easiest to administer was not a valid excuse for imposing a GATT-inconsistent fee. As this Panel was examining only the United States fees, actions taken by other countries were irrelevant to this case. With regard to the report of the Working Party on the accession of Zaire, Canada disagreed with the United States' interpretation. Canada noted that the Working Party had questioned the method of application as well as the level of tax, and that this appeared to show that unlimited ad valorem fees were not acceptable under Article VIII:1(a).

35. The European Economic Community replied that the cost in practice had to be estimated, approximately and in advance, on the basis of average costs. The EEC did not suggest that only consignments which were in fact inspected should pay, because inspections were made, either at random or on some appropriate selection basis, at the option of the customs service in question. The average cost of clearances per consignment could be calculated on the basis of inspection of any given percentage of the total number of consignments cleared. The average cost could likewise cover the overhead costs of the customs authority in question. The EEC had never suggested that indirect costs should be excluded from the cost base of a user fee or that they should be cross-subsidized from general tax revenue. However, if some importers were allowed to make a disproportionately small contribution to the cost of the whole Customs Service, and others were obliged to make a contribution which was more than the cost of providing services to them, the government concerned could not claim that the costs which were not paid for by under-contributing importers were "overhead costs". Any objective and bona fide method of estimating the average cost of clearance would normally be compatible with GATT. The EEC accepted that a customs user fee had to be allocated in some way. But Article VIII required fee levels to be matched approximately to the cost of providing the customs clearance on a shipment-by-shipment basis. The EEC did not say that only a flat rate fee was permitted under GATT. However, in the abstract, all other things being equal, it was clear that in a system where the cost of clearance was similar for all types of goods - and in which the national authorities had seen no reason to regard some kinds of clearance as more costly than others - a flat rate fee was much more likely to be consistent with GATT than an ad valorem fee, which automatically overcharged importers of high-value consignments and undercharged importers of low-value consignments. If the clearance of certain types of imports was more costly, e.g. because of the need for special testing, their clearance might be subjected to a higher fee. However, the cost for such special services should only be borne by those who used or caused them. Even if another system might have defects, that did not make the US system compatible with Articles II or VIII. The possibility that shipments across common land frontiers could be handled more cheaply than other shipments should not be considered a defect; if they were cheaper, Article VIII entitled the importers concerned to claim the benefit of the cost savings involved. This illustrated clearly why it was wrong to regard all revenues from ad valorem customs user fees merely as one pooled fund, since it inevitably resulted in some importers being arbitrarily compelled to cross-subsidize others. A flat rate fee per shipment was not a "disincentive" to consolidation. Importers could be relied on to try to save themselves costs if the system allowed them to do so and Customs officials could be instructed to save paperwork whenever possible and a reduced fee could be given for consolidated shipments, corresponding to the estimated cost saving.

36. The United States replied that there was no requirement in Article VIII, nor should Article VIII be interpreted to require, that the average cost of a transaction be calculated, and used as a ceiling on the total fee that could be charged. A major virtue of the ad valorem fee was that its incidence on small importations was so low that it did not have a protective effect. A dollar ceiling on the fee would mean that, in order to recover the cost of Customs "commercial operations", the rate itself would have to go up. The ceiling would benefit certain large volume imports at the expense of small volume imports that would be paying the higher rate. If the proposal was that the taxpayer should pay instead, this amounted to an assertion that the GATT required large-volume importations to be subsidized from general tax revenues, which was not the case. In addition, customs transactions in the United States were normally dealt with on the basis of entries of merchandise. There was no value or volume limit on goods that might be entered in a single entry. A dollar ceiling would lead to consolidation of entries, an increase in the average cost per entry and an increase of the fee itself. The best means to avoid this cycle of fee avoidance and fee adjustment, and the resulting uncertainty generated for importers and customs brokers, was to base a user fee purely on the one factor that could not be manipulated by the importer, i.e. the value of imports.

(ii) Do all the costs included in the "commercial operations" budget of the United States Customs Service constitute "cost of services rendered" to the commercial importers subject to the merchandise processing fee within the meaning of Articles II:2(c) and VIII:1(a)?

37. (a) The cost of certain Customs Service activities. Canada argued that the term "cost of services rendered" in connection with importation should be strictly interpreted and limited to activities necessary for entry of shipments, such as document processing, inspection, calculation and collection of duty, and special services such as quarantine. Canada stated that Article VIII:4 provided a list of the type of services in connection with importation for which fees might be charged. All of the services enumerated were specific actions/requirements for getting goods into, or out of, a country, such as licensing, analysis, inspection and quarantine. The decision to provide a limited list of services clearly showed that the drafters had not expected a country to defray completely all costs of providing customs clearances through the mechanism of fees charged to importers. Various additions to the list had been considered during the drafting of the ITO and the GATT. Some of these had been adopted and others rejected. For example, it had been agreed to include the phrase "such as consular invoices and certificates" (EPCT/C.II/54/Rev.1, page 25) but not the addition to the list of "(i) Port facilities" (EPCT/W/67). This showed clearly that the drafters had envisaged limits on the activities for which fees could be charged. Some programmes the United States had included under the heading "Commercial Operations", such as clearance of carriers, could not reasonably be considered as services rendered in connection with importation of products. Not only was the clearance of a carrier a different activity from the clearance of merchandise, but the United States was already charging each vehicle and vessel a flat fee for clearance under another user fee system. Additionally, included under "Commercial Operations" activities were enforcement of anti-dumping and countervailing duty orders, activities related to commercial fraud investigations, investigations related to counterfeit merchandise, legal activities, processing of passengers and controls on exports. These should not be considered services rendered in connection with importation of most products.

38. The European Economic Community also questioned whether a general customs user fee could ever be assessed to cover the cost of government activities such as enforcement of anti-dumping and countervailing duty orders, commercial customs fraud investigations, enforcement of export controls, or processing of passengers. The EEC also questioned the inclusion of those Executive Management functions called Internal Affairs, International Affairs, and Chief Counsel, arguing that these functions were too far removed from the process of customs clearance to be charged to importers. The EEC did not believe that the Panel was required to consider these questions, however. In its view they only needed to be answered if the Panel agreed with the global method of fee assessment by the United States, because it was clear that the global method meant that importers were charged for the cost of government activities which did not arise in connection with the customs clearance of the products they imported.

39. The United States called attention to the fact that "commercial operations", as defined in the FY 1988 budget, did not include export controls or enforcement; these were paid for out of general revenues. There was no routine Customs clearance of exports; the only export-related function in the "customs operations" budget was the collection and forwarding, without processing, of statistical documents filed regarding certain exports. The United States went on to point out that "commercial operations" included none of the non-commercial cargo activities in the Inspection and Control and the Investigations programmes (including drug and export performance), nor any part of the Tactical Interdiction programme (combatting drug and other smuggling activities), nor the Air Interdiction programme (combatting illegal entry of narcotics and other goods). These programmes were also paid from general revenues. Receipts from the passenger and conveyance user fees were kept in a separate sub-account, and did not fund the Customs Service's commercial operations; neither were those fees at issue in this case. The United States acknowledged that approximately 27 per cent of the total cost of passenger processing anticipated for FY 1988 was to be paid for from the merchandise processing fee, but stated that this accounted for only about 10 per cent of the total "commercial operations" budget (approximately $55 million). Concerning the clearance of commercial merchandise, the entire entry process had to be viewed as a whole. The number of formal entries of imported merchandise had increased from 4.6 million in FY 1981 to 6.8 million in FY 1985, and 7.3 million in FY 1986. The direct costs associated with each shipment included costs of opening, devanning and inspecting the shipment and filling out entry documentation, as well as later costs of determining classification and appraisement, and regulatory audit and commercial fraud enforcement, if any. Substantial indirect costs were also necessary in order for the entry process to take place: for instance, heating, lighting and maintaining Customs facilities, advice on issues such as classification from product specialists and laboratories, legal rulings, and general regulatory audit and commercial fraud enforcement. Regulatory audit, combined with policing of customs fraud, had made it possible to be very selective in devanning and inspecting shipments. Without this a substantially higher proportion of shipments would have had to be inspected, with increased processing time for all imports.

TO CONTINUE WITH UNITED STATES CUSTOMS USER FEE

¹ The United States provided the Panel with a detailed account of the negotiating history of Articles II:2(c) and VIII:1.