EC Measures concerning meat and meat products (hormones)
AB-1997-4
Report of the Appellate Body
(Continued)
5. Temporal Application of the SPS Agreement
19. The European Communities states that the Panel's conclusion that
the SPS Agreement applies to measures that were enacted before the
entry into force of the SPS Agreement but that did not cease to
exist after that date, is too sweeping. 20
According to the European Communities, the SPS Agreement shows a
different intention in some of its provisions, at least if these
provisions are interpreted in the way proposed by the Panel. Articles 5.1
to 5.5 require that certain preparatory actions and procedures be followed
before a measure is adopted and obligations of this kind are exhausted
once the measures under consideration are adopted. The European
Communities, therefore, concludes that the SPS Agreement does not
apply to the procedure for the elaboration of the EC measures at issue in
this dispute.
6. Article 3.1
20. The European Communities submits that the Panel erred in
interpreting the term "based on" in stating that Article 3.2
"equates" measures "based on" international standards
with measures which "conform to" such standards. 21
The European Communities asserts that these terms differ in their meaning.
21. It is pointed out by the European Communities that Article 3
employs the term "based on" in paragraphs 1 and 3, whereas it
uses the term "conform to" in paragraph 2. Also, Article 2
distinguishes between "based on" (paragraph 2) and "conform
to" (paragraph 4). This differing language in consecutive paragraphs
of different articles cannot be accidental.
22. To the European Communities, a measure may deviate -- but not
substantially -- from the content of a recommendation of the Codex and
still be considered as "based on" that recommendation for the
purposes of Article 3.1. However, what constitutes a
"substantial" deviation is not defined in the SPS Agreement.
The submission of the European Communities is that Article 3 of the SPS
Agreement accomplishes its object of furthering international
harmonization by allowing Members to choose one of three alternative
options. First, a Member may opt to conform its sanitary measures to the
Codex recommendations, in accordance with Article 3.2. Second, a Member
may wish merely to "base [its] sanitary ... measures on international
... recommendations", in accordance with Article 3.1, instead of
conforming to such recommendations. Third, a Member may decide, in
accordance with Article 3.3, to establish sanitary measures which provide
a "higher level of sanitary protection" than would measures
"based on" the Codex recommendations. As noted above22,
it is firm view of the European Communities that these three options are
of equal standing and that Article 3.3 cannot be qualified as an exception
to Article 3.1. The European Communities therefore objects to the Panel's
interpretation of and conclusions concerning Article 3.1.
7. Article 3.3
23. The European Communities contends that the Panel's finding that
whatever the difference might be between the two exceptions in Article
3.3, a sanitary measure can only be justified under this provision if it
is consistent with the requirements contained in Article 523,
in effect reduces the two alternative conditions in the first sentence of
Article 3.3 to "mere surplusage". According to the European
Communities, Article 3.3 defines the concept of the first condition
("scientific justification") in the footnote thereto without
making a direct reference to Article 5, paragraphs 1 to 8, as it does with
respect to the second condition ("as a consequence of choosing a
higher level of protection"). The absence in the footnote to Article
3.3 of language referring to Articles 5.1-5.8 is in itself sufficient
indication of the intention of the drafters to qualify the application of
Article 5 in the case of the first condition. Thus, the European
Communities asserts, the plain meaning and structure of Article 3.3 imply
that the risk assessment requirements of Article 5 apply only if the
second of these two alternative conditions is met.
8. Article 5.1
24. The European Communities contests the Panel's finding that Article
5.1 requires a Member imposing an SPS measure to submit evidence that it
"took into account" a risk assessment when it enacted or
maintained a measure24,
since neither the ordinary meaning of the words "based on", in
context, nor the object and purpose of Article 5, suggest a "minimum
procedural requirement" under Article 5.1.
25. The European Communities contends that to require concrete evidence
in the preamble of the EC Directives or some other evidence that the
European Communities actually considered the scientific studies in
enacting or maintaining the measures at issue is unreasonable and
arbitrary, and runs counter to the object and purpose of Article 5 and the
SPS Agreement. There is no legal authority for the Panel's
interpretation that risk assessment cannot be on-going and therefore no
reason for restricting risk assessment to "old evidence". The
European Communities asserts that there is a legitimate SPS goal of
providing an opportunity for potentially affected Members to produce
scientific evidence relevant to particular measures, and of ensuring
consideration of that evidence by the Member adopting the SPS measure.
Therefore, the European Communities submits that all parties and third
parties should have the right to present "new" relevant evidence
to the Panel.
26. With regard to the Panel's findings on the consistency of the
import prohibition with the substantive requirements of Article 5.1, the
European Communities claims that the Panel erred in its interpretation of
Article 5.1 in six separate respects. First, the Panel was incorrect in
distinguishing between studies that specifically address the hormones for
growth promotion purposes, such as the 1982 Report of the EC Scientific
Veterinary Committee 25
(the "Lamming Report") and the JECFA Reports26,
and studies which relate to hormones in general, such as the 1987 IARC
Monographs and articles and opinions of individual scientists referred to
by the European Communities. 27
The Panel's assumption that such a distinction makes a qualitative
difference in terms of risk assessment is wrong, and the distinction is
arbitrary. The European Communities argues that Articles 5.1 and 5.2
neither prescribe risk assessment techniques nor specify the requirements
of a risk assessment.
27. Second, the Panel's view of Article 5.1 as imposing a substantive
obligation on Members to conform their SPS measures to the conclusions
reflected in the JECFA Reports or the reports of other scientific
committees is manifestly incorrect. The "scientific basis" of
SPS measures cannot be confined to the formalized conclusions of
committees called upon to review or analyze the risks a substance may
pose. Those conclusions are just one of the elements to be taken into
account. The "available scientific evidence", referred to in
Article 5.2, includes both generally held or majority scientific views as
well as minority, or dissenting, scientific opinion (often first expressed
by individual scientists). The European Communities also controverts the
Panel's finding that the reports of the European Parliament are
"non-scientific"28,
and contends that this finding is manifestly wrong, certainly as regards
the so-called Pimenta Report. 29
28. Third, the Panel's interpretation that "based on" within
the meaning of Article 5.1 means "in conformity with" is
mistaken. 30 The European
Communities states that reports of scientific committees frequently say
practically nothing or very little on some of the factors indicated in
Articles 5.1 and 5.2. To the European Communities, Article 5.1 is designed
to compel Members to have some plausible scientific rationale as the
"basis" for their sanitary measures, but not to conform their
measures absolutely to the technical and scientific conclusions of the
reports.
29. Fourth, the European Communities contends that the "most
fundamental error of interpretation" of the Panel relates to the
concept of risk and risk assessment. 31
"Risk" does not mean "harm" or "adverse
effect". "Risk", for the purposes of the SPS Agreement,
is the "potential" for the harm or adverse effects arising and,
therefore, the mere possibility of risk arising suffices for the purposes
of Articles 5.1 and 5.2. A risk evaluated to be one in a million is
sufficient justification. If there is a potential for adverse effects (no
matter how small), then there is, according to the European Communities, a
risk. The concept of risk in the SPS Agreement is a qualitative,
not a quantitative concept. Any identified increase in cancer (whether
quantitative or qualitative) must be sufficient to constitute a risk
against which WTO Members are entitled to protect their population.
30. Fifth, the European Communities disputes the Panel's finding that
the problem of control is irrelevant to risk assessment32,
as contrary to common sense and to the express language of Article 5.2 and
Annex C of the SPS Agreement clarifies. The European Communities
also points out that the condition "in accordance with good
veterinary practice" is part of the content of the Codex
recommendation, and that effective control is necessary to ensure that the
hormones at issue are administered in accordance with good practice.
Evaluation of any potential risk arising from lack of observance of good
practice is an inherent part of the risk assessment exercise. Moreover, it
was for the European Communities, and not for the Panel, to determine
whether the control measures of an exporting Member are adequate to
achieve the EC's appropriate level of sanitary protection. The Panel has
disregarded the EC's arguments relating to the practical and technical
difficulties that are specific to control of the hormones at issue. The
European Communities also protests as an error in law the Panel's
conclusion that banning the use of a substance does not necessarily offer
better protection of human health than other means of merely regulating
its use.
31. Finally, the European Communities submits that the Panel was
manifestly wrong in finding that a risk assessment must be carried out for
each individual substance. 33
Nowhere in the SPS Agreement, and in particular in Articles 5.1 and
5.2, is there language requiring a risk assessment "for each
individual substance". In the view of the European Communities, there
is nothing to prevent classes or categories of substances from being
assessed together if this is scientifically justified.
9. Article 5.5
32. The European Communities argues that the Panel erred in its
interpretation of Article 5.5. With respect to the first element, namely,
the existence of different levels of protection in different situations,
the Panel erroneously interpreted Article 5.5 in holding that situations
involving the same health risk or substance are comparable situations for
the purposes of Article 5.5. 34
The European Communities submits that it is inappropriate to compare the
level of protection relating to hormones used for growth promotion
purposes with the level of protection relating to naturally-occurring
hormones. Science and the regulatory practices of Members do not treat
man-made risks, such as the risks created by hormones used for growth
promotion, and naturally-occurring risks, such as those arising from the
presence of hormones in meat, milk, cabbage or broccoli, in the same way.
The SPS Agreement applies only to man-made risks because the
naturally-occurring hormones in meat and other foodstuffs are not
"contaminants and toxins" within the meaning of the SPS
Agreement. Furthermore, the European Communities submits that,
contrary to what the Panel found35,
there is no difference, let alone a significant difference, in the EC
level of protection against naturally-occurring hormones and its level of
protection against added hormones. The EC measures provide for the same
level of protection against naturally-occurring hormones and added
hormones, namely, the risk determined by nature.
33. In respect of the second element of Article 5.5, namely, the
arbitrary or unjustifiable nature of distinctions in levels of protection,
the European Communities contends that the Panel has erroneously assumed
that the only factors relevant to determining what is an arbitrary or
unjustifiable distinction are "scientific" factors. Other
factors, such as public perception of what is dangerous and of what level
of risk is acceptable, and the benefit, if any, to be gained from
shouldering a risk, must also be relevant. Moreover, the European
Communities argues that, contrary to what the Panel found36,
the distinction between the level of protection adopted in respect of the
hormones at issue when used for growth promotion and the level of
protection adopted with respect to carbadox and olaquindox is not
arbitrary or unjustifiable.
34. As to the third element of Article 5.5, namely discrimination or a
disguised restriction on international trade resulting from the
distinction in the levels of protection, the European Communities objects
to the Panel's finding that it was sufficient to demonstrate "the
significance of the difference in levels of protection combined with the
arbitrariness thereof". 37
Article 5.5 makes a resultant "discrimination or a disguised
restriction on international trade" an additional element beyond
arbitrary and unjustifiable distinctions in the levels of protection a
Member considers appropriate. The European Communities does not consider
the approach developed by the Appellate Body in Japan - Taxes on
Alcoholic Beverages 38
("Japan - Alcoholic Beverages") and invoked by the Panel
in this case as appropriate for the very different problem in determining
discrimination (between countries) and a disguised restriction of trade in
a regulatory regime designed to protect human health.
35. Furthermore, it is argued by the European Communities that Article
5.5 must be interpreted together with Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement.
Accordingly, "discrimination" in Article 5.5 means
"discrimination between States where identical or similar conditions
prevail". The Panel ignored Article 2.3 and assumed that
discrimination can be between substances, risks and levels of protection.
This assumption cannot be correct since otherwise the term
"discrimination" would add nothing to "arbitrary and
unjustifiable distinctions", in the view of the European Communities.
36. The European Communities stresses that there is no import ban for
beef as such and that the restriction applies only to non-conforming
products. This is the inevitable consequence of any SPS measure, and
cannot be enough to establish a "disguised restriction on
international trade". The European Communities continued to import
the same amount of meat after the ban as before, and the prohibition of
hormones for growth promotion has no effect on the surpluses of beef. The
suggestion of the Panel that the reduction of beef surpluses in the
European Communities might have been a secondary motive, is, in any event,
not sufficient to establish the discrimination or disguised restriction on
international trade contemplated in Article 5.5. Finally, the European
Communities submits that the fact that 70% of the bovine meat produced in
the United States and Canada is from cattle to which hormones have been
administered for growth promotion is no indication of a disguised
restriction on trade.
10. Procedural Issues
37. The European Communities asserts that a number of procedural
decisions taken by the Panel were unfair and require review by the
Appellate Body. The European Communities objects to the Panel's view that
it need consider the EC's procedural objections only where the European
Communities could make a "precise claim" of prejudice. 39
The Panel should have asked itself whether its procedural decisions were
consistent with the DSU, not whether the European Communities could make a
precise claim of prejudice. It is asserted by the European Communities
that the Panel committed a legal procedural error in refusing to accept
the scientific assessments of the European Communities, declining to set
up an expert review group, and proceeding to decide itself a scientific
matter on which the Panel had no expertise. The Panel's decision to
receive a range of opinions from individual experts 40
deprived the European Communities of the procedural guarantees provided
for expert review groups in the DSU. By following this procedure, the
Panel put itself in a position to choose freely between different
scientific opinions. The European Communities contends that the selection
of scientific experts by the Panel violated Articles 11, 13.2 and Appendix
4 of the DSU as well as Article 13.2 of the SPS Agreement. The
European Communities objects to the selection of two experts on the
grounds that one of them was a national of a party or third party and had
links with the pharmaceutical industry, while the other was a member of
the Codex/JECFA group that had produced the report on the use of hormones
in animal growth promotion and was the "rapporteur" of this
study. Further, according to the European Communities, these two experts
lacked expertise in the field.
38. The European Communities also alleges that the Panel erred in
refusing to request that Canada and the United States provide the studies
on which their authorities had based their decisions to authorize the use
of MGA for growth promotion. In the view of the European Communities, the
Panel had a duty to carry out an objective assessment of the facts, and
declining to request the complainants to produce the evidence on which
they based their own domestic decisions is not compatible with this duty.
Moreover, Article 18.2 of the DSU provides safeguards for the protection
of confidential information. Thus, the allegedly confidential nature of
the information on MGA should have been no obstacle to its production and
use in the proceeding. The European Communities also asserts that the
Panel based the main part of its reasoning concerning Article 5.5 of the SPS
Agreement on a claim that the complainants had not made, i.e.
that there was a difference of treatment between artificially-added, or
exogenous, natural and synthetic hormones when used for growth promotion
purposes and the naturally-present endogenous hormones in untreated meat
and other foods (such as milk, cabbage, broccoli or eggs). In the view of
the European Communities, not only is this "claim" wrong in law
and in fact, but the Panel also violated the DSU in relying on it
especially since the United States expressly protested against the Panel's
use of such a "claim". The European Communities asserts that
panels are not entitled to make findings going beyond what has been
requested by the parties.
39. The European Communities submits further that the Panel took a
number of decisions granting "extended third party rights" to
Canada and the United States -- and not to other third parties -- that are
not justified by Article 9.3, and are contrary to Articles 7.1, 7.2, 18.2
and 10.3 of the DSU as well as the terms of reference of the Panel. These
decisions were: first, to give access to all of the information submitted
in the United States' proceeding to Canada; second, to give access to all
the information submitted in the Canadian proceeding to the United States;
third, to hold a joint meeting with the scientific experts; and fourth, to
invite the United States to observe and make a statement at the second
substantive meeting in the proceeding initiated by Canada.
B. Arguments by the United States - Appellee
1. Burden of Proof
40. With regard to the allocation of the burden of proof under Article
3.3 of the SPS Agreement, the United States refers to the Appellate
Body Report in United States - Shirts and Blouses 41
and argues that, like Articles XX and XI:2(c)(i) of the GATT 1994, Article
3.3 of the SPS Agreement is not a positive rule establishing an
obligation in itself. It is in the nature of an affirmative defence, and
the Panel was therefore correct in finding that the burden of proof under
Article 3.3 rests on the defending party. As to the burden of proof under
Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement, the United States contends that
the European Communities, in complaining that Canada and the United States
did not provide their confidential information concerning MGA, misses the
point that the Panel had to determine whether the European Communities had
based its import ban on a risk assessment.
2. Standard of Review
41. The United States submits that the deferential
"reasonableness" standard of review advocated by the European
Communities is without support in the text of either the DSU or the SPS
Agreement. The United States observes that, under Article 5.1, the
Panel was called upon to determine if the EC ban was "based on"
an assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, of the risks to human
health. Such a determination does not require a panel to conduct its own
risk assessment or substitute its own judgement regarding risks, but only
to determine if the measure is "based on" a risk assessment.
Under Article 2.2, the question for a panel is not whether it would have
come to a different conclusion "based on" the evidence, but
rather whether the scientific evidence submitted by the Member maintaining
the measure is "sufficient" as a basis for that measure. The
United States believes that in this sense, the European Communities is
correct in asserting that a panel is not to conduct a de novo
review of the scientific basis of the measure.
42. The United States argues, however, that nothing in the SPS
Agreement or the WTO Agreement requires a Panel to defer to the
Member maintaining the SPS measure. In examining measures under the Agreement
on Textiles and Clothing (the "ATC"), which, like the SPS
Agreement, does not provide for a particular standard of review, two
previous panels found that it would not be appropriate either to apply a de
novo standard of review or to grant undue deference to the
administrative findings of national authorities. 42
The United States cautions that the GATT panel reports cited by the
European Communities, involving anti-dumping and countervailing duty
disputes, do not support the existence of a deferential standard of review
in the SPS Agreement. Those GATT panel reports involved situations
where national authorities had taken anti-dumping or countervailing duty
measures pursuant to detailed national legislation and procedures mandated
by the Tokyo Round Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the "Tokyo Round
Anti-Dumping Code"). According to the United States, the Decision
on Review of Article 17.6 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 shows that Members
have yet to decide if the standard of review set out in Article 17.6 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement is capable of general application. The
United States asserts that the European Communities is mistaken in arguing
that this standard of review applies to the SPS Agreement.
3. The Precautionary Principle
43. In the view of the United States, the claim of the European
Communities that there is a generally-accepted principle of international
law which may be referred to as the "precautionary principle" is
erroneous as a matter of international law. The United States does not
consider that the "precautionary principle" represents a
principle of customary international law; rather, it may be characterized
as an "approach" -- the content of which may vary from context
to context. The SPS Agreement does recognize a precautionary
approach; indeed, Article 5.7 permits the provisional adoption of SPS
measures even where the relevant scientific evidence is insufficient.
Thus, the United States believes that there is no need to invoke a
"precautionary principle" in order to be risk-averse since the SPS
Agreement, by its terms, recognizes the discretion of Members to
determine their own level of sanitary protection. The European Communities
does not explain how "the precautionary principle" affects the
requirements in the SPS Agreement that a measure be "based
on" scientific principles and a risk assessment, and not maintained
without sufficient scientific evidence. The EC's invocation of a
"precautionary principle" cannot create a risk assessment where
there is none, nor can a "principle" create "sufficient
scientific evidence" where there is none.
4. Objective Assessment of the Facts
44. According to the United States, the European Communities improperly
requests the Appellate Body to review the Panel's factual findings to
determine whether they were either "inadequate" or "not
objective", and thus inconsistent with Article 11 of the DSU. The
United States submits that, according to Article 17.6 of the DSU, factual
findings are clearly beyond review by the Appellate Body. Furthermore, the
United States contends that the European Communities has not shown either
improper influence or conflict of interest that might warrant
consideration of the objectivity of the Panel.
5. Temporal Application of the SPS Agreement
45. The United States argues that the European Communities, in claiming
that Articles 5.1 to 5.5 do not apply to SPS measures adopted before the SPS
Agreement entered into force, has misread the SPS Agreement.
There is no support for this claim in the text, context or negotiating
history of the SPS Agreement. If the position of the European
Communities were accepted, this would, in the view of the United States,
leave a gaping exception to the disciplines of the SPS Agreement.
6. Article 3.1
46. According to the United States, since the EC measures are not
"based on" the Codex standards, even under the broad test of
"based on" proposed by the European Communities, there is no
need for the Appellate Body to address the alleged difference between
measures "based on" international standards and measures that
"conform to" international standards. The United States
recognizes that Article 3 of the SPS Agreement uses the two
different terms in Articles 3.1 and 3.2, but suggests that whether any
theoretical difference between those two terms would have any meaning in
practice is a question for another case.
7. Article 3.3
47. The United States believes that the European Communities is
incorrect in claiming that its ban need not be "based on" a risk
assessment under Article 5.1 in order to qualify under Article 3.3 as a
measure for which there is a "scientific justification" for
departing from an international standard. A risk assessment provides the
necessary "examination and evaluation of available scientific
information" required in the footnote to Article 3.3. The European
Communities provides no explanation why the "relevant
provisions" of the SPS Agreement, referred to in that
footnote, do not include Article 5.1. The context of the footnote to
Article 3.3 includes the definition of "risk assessment" in
Annex A of the SPS Agreement. According to the United States, the
fact that Articles 5.1 and 5.2 relate to conducting a risk assessment make
it clear that these Articles are "relevant provisions" of the SPS
Agreement for purposes of the footnote, and that any doubt regarding
the applicability of Article 5.1 is removed by the last sentence of
Article 3.3.
8. Article 5.1
48. The United States maintains that the Panel's finding that there is
a "procedural requirement" inherent in Article 5.1 is simply a
common sense reading of Article 5.1. It would be difficult to see how a
measure is "based on" a risk assessment if the Member did not
even know of the existence of the risk assessment or never considered the
risk assessment in enacting or maintaining the measure. Furthermore, the
Panel Report should not be read as imposing a rigid requirement to be
satisfied only by referring to the risk assessment in the preamble to the
measure. Such a reference, the United States contends, is simply one means
of demonstrating that a risk assessment was taken into account.
49. The Panel was correct, according to the United States, in finding
that in order that a measure may be "based on" a risk
assessment, the scientific principles underlying the measure must reflect
the scientific conclusions reached by the scientists conducting the risk
assessment. The United States submits that the European Communities did
not, at any time during the panel proceedings, produce a risk assessment
identifying any risk. In the case of the hormone MGA, it is even more
obvious that the EC ban is not "based on" a risk assessment.
50. With regard to the problems of control of correct use of the
hormones, the United States submits that the Panel correctly characterized
the argument of the European Communities as being a general statement that
there is no guarantee of 100 percent compliance with any system of laws.
Such a generalized concern is not an adequate basis for the EC ban.
Furthermore, there is no evidence that the control of the hormones at
issue is more difficult than the control of other veterinary drugs (the
use of which is allowed), or that control is more difficult under a regime
where hormones are allowed for growth promotion under specific conditions
than under a current regime where they are banned. During the oral
hearing, the United States observed that the scientific studies indicated
that the hormones are safe when used in accordance with good practice.
According to the United States, these studies do not address the question
of whether the hormones at issue are unsafe when not used in accordance
with good practice.
51. As to whether a separate risk assessment is necessary for each
particular substance, the United States submits that under Article 5.1,
the European Communities must base its ban with respect to MGA on an
"evaluation, as appropriate to the circumstances, of the potential
for adverse effects on human health arising from the presence of residues
of MGA in meat ...". The European Communities provided no such
evaluation of MGA. The scientific studies that the European Communities
referred to deal with a general class of compounds, and do not deal
specifically with MGA.
9. Article 5.5
52. The United States supports the finding that the situation involving
carbadox and the situation involving the six hormones at issue are
different situations which can nonetheless be compared for the purposes of
Article 5.5. To the United States, the Panel was correct in finding that
the EC distinction in the levels of protection involving carbadox and the
level of protection involving the hormones at issue was arbitrary and
resulted in a disguised restriction on international trade. In coming to
that conclusion, the Panel found that the hormones at issue, banned in the
European Communities, were used for growth promotion purpose in the bovine
meat sector where the European Communities wanted to limit supplies and
was arguably less concerned with international competitiveness while
carbadox, allowed in the European Communities, is used for growth
promotion purposes in the pork meat sector where the European Communities
has no domestic surpluses and where international competitiveness is a
high priority. The United States claims that this issue relates to factual
findings that are not reviewable by the Appellate Body.
Continue with EC Measures concerning meat and
meat products (hormones)
20 US Panel Report,
paras. 8.25 and 8.26; Canada Panel Report, paras. 8.28 and 8.29.
21 US Panel Report,
para. 8.72; Canada Panel Report, para. 8.75.
22 Para. 11 of this
Report.
23 US Panel Report,
para. 8.83; Canada Panel Report, para. 8.86.
24 US Panel Report,
para. 8.113; Canada Panel Report, para. 8.116.
25 1982 Report of the EC
Scientific Veterinary Committee, Scientific Committee for Animal Nutrition
and the Scientific Committee for Food on the basis of the Report of the
Scientific Group on Anabolic Agents in Animal Production.
26 Evaluation of certain
veterinary drug residues in food: Thirty-second Report of the Joint
FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Additives, Technical Report Series 763
(World Health Organization, 1988); and the evaluation of certain
veterinary drug residues in food: Thirty-fourth Report of the Joint
FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Additives, Technical Report Series 788
(World Health Organization, 1989).
27 US Panel Report,
paras. 8.127 and 8.130; Canada Panel Report, paras. 8.130 and 8.133.
28 US Panel Report,
para. 8.109; Canada Panel Report, para. 8.112.
29 European Parliament,
Session Documents, Report drawn up on behalf of the Committee of Inquiry
into the Problem of Quality in the Meat Sector, Rapporteur: Mr. Carlos
Pimenta, Document A2-11/891/PARTS A-B, March 1989 ("Pimenta
Report").
30 US Panel Report,
para. 8.117; Canada Panel Report, para. 8.120.
31 As reflected in para.
8.124 of the US Panel Report and para. 8.127 of the Canada Panel Report.
32 US Panel Report,
para. 8.146; Canada Panel Report, para. 8.149.
33 US Panel Report,
para. 8.257; Canada Panel Report, para. 8.260.
34 US Panel Report,
para. 8.176; Canada Panel Report, para. 8.179.
35 US Panel Report,
paras. 8.191 and 8.212; Canada Panel Report, paras. 8.194 and 8.215.
36 US Panel Report,
para. 8.238; Canada Panel Report, para. 8.241.
37 US Panel Report,
para. 8.184; Canada Panel Report, para. 8.187.
38 Adopted 1 November
1996, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R.
39 US Panel Report,
paras. 8.14-8.15; Canada Panel Report, paras. 8.18-8.19.
40 US Panel Report,
para. 8.7; Canada Panel Report, para. 8.7.
41 Adopted 23 May 1997,
WT/DS33/AB/R, pp. 14 and 16.
42 The United States
refers to: Panel Report, United States - Underwear, adopted 25
February 1997, WT/DS24/R; and Panel Report, United States - Shirts and
Blouses, adopted 23 May 1997, WT/DS33/R.
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