Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products
Report of the Panel
(Continued)
(b) Quantitative restrictions permitted
under the ATC
- The ATC allows new restrictions in the case of safeguard measures
(Article 6 of the ATC) or pursuant to Articles 2.14 and 7 of the ATC
when a Member does not comply with the requirements of the agreement.
We note that there is no provision in the ATC for general exceptions
or security exceptions nor any other provisions on regional trade
agreements.
- We note that on 27 February 1995 299
Turkey notified the first stage of its integration programme to the
TMB; in doing so Turkey is entitled, pursuant to Article 6.1 of the
ATC, to make use of the special safeguard mechanism. It should be
noted that under the ATC the right to maintain MFA derived
quantitative restrictions and the integration process by stages are
not related. The provisions of the ATC make clear that the fact that a
product has not yet been re-integrated into the general GATT rules
does not in any manner imply a right to introduce new import
restrictions under Article 2.1 of the ATC on such products. The main
benefit for Members resulting from the notification of an integration
programme within 6 months of the entry into force of the WTO
Agreement, is the use of the special safeguard mechanism under the
ATC. There is no relation between the safeguard provisions of the ATC
and the right to introduce new quantitative restrictions under Article
2.1 of the ATC. On 27 December 1996, Turkey notified the second stage
of its integration programme300
to take effect on 1 January 1998. On the same day, Turkey also
notified, early, the provisions of the third stage of its integration
programme 301 to take
effect on 1 January 2003. All these notifications relate to imports of
textiles and clothing into Turkey only. (We also note that the
products covered by the measures at issue are not listed therein.)
(c) The Turkish measures under the ATC -
are these new measures?
- Article 3.3 of the ATC provides for notification of "new
restrictions" or "changes in existing restrictions". It
reads as follows:
"3. During the duration of this Agreement, Members shall
provide to the TMB, for its information, notifications submitted to
any other WTO bodies with respect to any new restrictions or
changes in existing restrictions on textile and clothing products,
taken under any GATT 1994 provision, within 60 days of their coming
into effect." (emphasis added)
- In their joint communication dated 7 November 1997, 302
Turkey and the European Communities notified the TMB pursuant to
Article 3.3 of the ATC:
"In addition Turkey and the European Communities have the
honour to copy to the Chairman of the Textiles Monitoring Body for
information a communication to the Chairman of the Committee on
Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) annexed to which are details of
certain quantitative limits introduced by Turkey in respect of
imports of certain textile and clothing products into Turkey from
certain WTO Members, and necessary to give effect to the Customs Union
in conformity with the provisions of Article XXIV of GATT 1994."
(emphasis added)
- On 6 May 1998, the European Communities and Turkey sent a second
notification under Article 3.3 of the ATC to the TMB, 303
which reads as follows:
"Turkey and the European Communities � concerning details of
changes in respect of the quantitative limits applied by Turkey
in respect of imports of certain textile and clothing products from
certain WTO Members in conformity with its commitments arising out of
the customs union and with the provisions of Article XXIV of GATT
1994." (Emphasis added.)
- In light of Article 3.3 of the ATC, Turkey (and the European
Communities) must consider that these measures are either
"new" or "changes" to existing restrictions. As
discussed above, 304
the measures at issue can only be considered to be, in WTO terms,
Turkish measures. Since Turkey did not have any restrictions in place
on 1 January 1995 that it could change, any such import restriction
is, by definition, "new" for Turkey in the sense of the ATC.
In this regard we cannot accept Turkey's argument that its measures
are not new because the European Communities (its customs union
partner) had a similar measure in place. Conceivably, a change of
geographical coverage could constitute a "change" to an
"existing" restriction (as could be the case on the occasion
of an enlargement of a customs union - an issue which in this case we
do not need to address). But since the measures at issue were
introduced and are applied by Turkey, 305
and in view of our previous conclusion that the measures at issue are
not EC measures but Turkish measures, 306
Turkey's quantitative restrictions cannot be considered to be changes
to the existing EC restrictions.
- We need, however, to examine the possibility of exceptions or
justifications under Article 2.4 of the ATC and whether, any such
Turkish measures could otherwise be legitimized in the context of the
application of an Article XXIV type of agreement, escaping thereby the
prohibition of Article 2.4 of the ATC against the introduction of new
restrictions.
- In the absence of any ATC justification claimed for the Turkish
measures and given the reference to Article XXIV in the Article 3.3
notification, it would seem that any such justification must be based
on Article XXIV. We address below whether the formation of a customs
union presents an opportunity to adopt measures which would otherwise
be WTO incompatible, (unless, as noted by India, these are inherent to
the very conclusion of the customs union.) We also consider the
argument that if a WTO compatible measure was already in place for one
Member forming the customs union, the other constituent member(s), in
an effort to harmonize their trade policies, may be authorized to
introduce a similar restriction, thereby legitimizing what would
otherwise constitute a new restriction in the sense of the ATC. In
Section G below, we shall develop our interpretation of the language
of Article XXIV and the flexibility it may provide to Members forming
such a customs union, namely in their efforts to adopt
"substantially the same duties and other regulations of
commerce". This possibility would not, in our view, change the
nature of the restrictions at issue as being "new
restrictions" in the sense of Article 2.4 of the ATC, in so far
as Turkey is concerned. It remains to be decided whether Article XXIV
authorizes the introduction of such new ATC restrictions.
- Therefore, at this stage of our analysis, we consider that the
measures at issue are new measures in the sense of Article 2.4 of the
ATC.
(d) Jurisdiction of the TMB versus that
of the Panel
- We refer to our preliminary ruling on the jurisdiction of the TMB in
paragraph 9.15 above. In order to consider the claim of India under
Article 2.4 of the ATC (and following our preliminary ruling of 25
September 1998), we now address further the issue of the relationship
between the jurisdiction of the Panel and that of the TMB. We
consider, based on the interpretation by the Appellate Body in Guatemala
� Cement 307 with
regard to the relationship between the DSU and the Antidumping
Agreement, that the provisions of the ATC (providing jurisdiction to
the TMB to examine measures applied pursuant to the ATC) and the
provisions of the DSU (providing jurisdiction for panels to interpret
any covered agreement, including the ATC) may both apply together.
Therefore even if the TMB has jurisdiction to determine what
constitutes a "new" measure in the sense of the ATC and
whether a violation of the ATC has taken place, we remain convinced
that a panel is entitled to interpret the ATC to the extent necessary
to ascertain whether Turkey benefits from a defense to India's claims
under Articles XI and XIII of GATT based on the provisions of the ATC.
- We consider, in any case, that the measures under examination are
not measures applied pursuant to the ATC itself and therefore the ATC
cannot provide such a defense. As discussed above, the ATC authorizes
some exceptions to the general prohibitions against import
restrictions contained in Articles XI and XIII of GATT (e.g., existing
MFA restrictions notified within 60 days of the entry into force of
the WTO Agreement (Article 2), safeguard measures pursuant to Article
6 of the ATC and measures adopted in the context of Articles 7 and
2.14 of the ATC).
- On their face, the introduction of the Turkish measures do not
correspond to any of the above situations, as noted also by Thailand
in its third party submission. 308
We note that the ATC does not contain any provision dealing with
regional trade agreements or any other general or specific exceptions.
We conclude that in the present case, as acknowledged by the parties, 309
the measures at issue do not benefit from any circumstances specified
in the ATC that would prevent the application of Article 2.4 of the
ATC or Articles XI and XIII of GATT. We note also that Turkey has
notified the said import restrictions to the TMB under Article 3.3 of
the ATC which refers explicitly to "new restrictions or changes
� taken under any GATT 1994 provision". Article 3.4 of the ATC
suggests that the ATC envisages that non-ATC matters (such as those
notified under Article 3.3 and the reverse notification pursuant to
Article 3.4) will be dealt with "under relevant GATT 1994
provisions or procedures in the appropriate WTO body". Turkey
does not claim that it benefits from an exemption to the prohibitions
of Articles XI and XIII of GATT that is contained in the ATC, but
rather one that derives from Article XXIV. It appears to us that the
matter at issue involves a GATT provision rather than the ATC. The
fact that the products under examination are textiles and clothing
does not imply that it is the ATC exclusively which deals with the
measures at issue. In fact GATT rules are generally applicable to all
textile and clothing products and the ATC is applicable by exception
principally to allow the maintenance for a limited period of time of
MFA-derived quantitative restrictions and the use of the special
safeguard mechanism.
- Turkey's main defense is that its measures were adopted in the
context of the formation of a customs union and are compatible with
Article XXIV which is the only applicable provision. Clearly the
interpretation of Article XXIV is not a matter covered by the
provisions of the ATC, and could not fall under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the TMB. 310
Having decided that the measures under examination are Turkish
measures and not EC measures, we find that the ATC does not provide
any exception to the prohibitions against quantitative restrictions
contained in Articles XI and XIII of GATT.
3. Conclusions on India's claims under
Articles XI and XIII of GATT, and Article 2.4 of the ATC
- Consequently, unless the measures under examination are justified by
Article XXIV (Turkey's defense that we examine below) they are
inconsistent with the provisions of Articles XI and XIII of GATT and
they would necessarily violate also Article 2.4 of the ATC. 311
G. Turkey's Defense Based on Article XXIV
of GATT
- We shall now proceed to examine Turkey's defense based on the
application of Article XXIV and determine whether it rebuts what
appears to be prima facie evidence of violations of Articles XI
and XIII of GATT and Article 2.4 of the ATC.
- Turkey argues that the measures at issue do not violate Articles XI
and XIII of GATT or Article 2.4 of the ATC because they were
implemented in relation to the formation of its customs union with the
European Communities, which it considers to be compatible with the
provisions of Article XXIV of GATT. For Turkey, the provisions of
Article XXIV are concerned with the scope of application of GATT, both
generally and in particular circumstances. As such, Article XXIV
should not be regarded as a "justification", a
"defense", an "exception" or a "waiver".
In Turkey's view, the special nature of Article XXIV is evidenced by
the fact that Article XXIV is in Part III of GATT, and not in Part II
together with other provisions on commercial policies. For Turkey,
Article XXIV, paragraphs 5 to 9, is to be viewed as lex specialis
for the rights and obligations of WTO Members at the time of formation
of a regional trade agreement. In other words, in Turkey's view, the
WTO consistency of the measures challenged by India depends on the WTO
consistency of the Turkey-EC customs union (of which they are an
integral part) and the WTO consistency of both the customs union and
its measures is to be determined with reference to the provisions of
paragraphs 5 to 9 of Article XXIV only and no other GATT provisions.
- India considers that all GATT rules define the limits of
applicability of the GATT. India is of the view that, if Turkey�s
argument were accepted, Members forming a customs union could legally
circumvent the WTO procedural and substantive requirements with
respect to quantitative restrictions, which the signatories of the WTO
agreements agreed to permit only in exceptional circumstances. In
respect of such Members, the WTO agreements could no longer operate as
a legal framework providing effective assurances of market access and
the WTO dispute settlement procedures would be rendered ineffective.
- In order to analyze Turkey's arguments, which we consider are
properly labelled a defense 312
to India's claims, we firstly recall certain basic interpretative
principles applicable in WTO dispute settlement proceedings. Secondly,
we examine the provisions of Article XXIV generally. Thirdly, we
consider the meaning of Article XXIV:5 and, finally that of Article
XXIV:8, which constitute the heart of Turkey's defense to India's
claims.
1. General Interpretative Principles
(a) Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties
- In its examination of Article XXIV, the Panel is guided by the
principles of interpretation of public international law (Article 3.2
of the DSU) which include Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). As provided for in these articles and
as applied by panels and the Appellate Body, we interpret the
provisions of Article XXIV using first the ordinary meaning of the
terms of that provision, as elaborated upon by the 1994 Understanding
on Article XXIV, in their context and in light of the object and
purpose of the relevant WTO agreements. If need be, to clarify or
confirm the meaning of these provisions, we may refer to the
negotiating history, including the historical circumstances that led
to the drafting of Article XXIV of GATT. We note also the prescription
of Article XVI:1 of the WTO Agreement which provides that "�
the WTO shall be guided by the decisions, procedures and customary
practices followed by CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947 and the bodies
established in the framework of GATT 1947".313
(b) WTO rules on conflicts
- As a general principle, WTO obligations are cumulative and Members
must comply with all of them at all times unless there is a formal
"conflict" between them. This flows from the fact that the
WTO Agreement is a "Single Undertaking". 314
On the definition of conflict, it should be noted that:
"� a conflict of law-making treaties arises only where
simultaneous compliance with the obligations of different instruments
is impossible. ... There is no conflict if the obligations of one
instrument are stricter than, but not incompatible with, those of
another, or if it is possible to comply with the obligations of one
instrument by refraining from exercising a privilege or discretion
accorded by another." 315
- This principle, also referred to by Japan in its third party
submission, 316 is in
conformity with the public international law presumption against
conflicts which was applied by the Appellate Body in Canada �
Periodicals 317
and in EC � Bananas III, 318
when dealing with potential overlapping coverage of GATT 1994 and
GATS, and by the panel in Indonesia � Autos, 319
in respect of the provisions of Article III of GATT, the TRIMs
Agreement 320 and the
SCM Agreement. 321 In
Guatemala � Cement, 322
the Appellate Body when discussing the possibility of conflicts
between the provisions of the Anti-dumping Agreement 323
and the DSU, stated: "A special or additional provision should
only be found to prevail over a provision of the DSU in a
situation where adherence to the one provision will lead to a
violation of the other provision, that is, in the case of a conflict
between them."
- We recall the Panel's finding in Indonesia � Autos, a
dispute where Indonesia was arguing that the measures under
examination were subsidies and therefore the SCM Agreement being lex
specialis, was the only "applicable law" (to the
exclusion of other WTO provisions):
"14.28 In considering Indonesia�s defence that there is a
general conflict between the provisions of the SCM Agreement and those
of Article III of GATT, and consequently that the SCM Agreement is the
only applicable law, we recall first that in public international law
there is a presumption against conflict. 324
This presumption is especially relevant in the WTO context 325
since all WTO agreements, including GATT 1994 which was modified by
Understandings when judged necessary, were negotiated at the same
time, by the same Members and in the same forum. In this context we
recall the principle of effective interpretation 326
pursuant to which all provisions of a treaty (and in the WTO system
all agreements) must be given meaning, using the ordinary meaning of
words."
- In light of this general principle, we will consider whether Article
XXIV authorizes measures which Articles XI and XIII of GATT and
Article 2.4 of the ATC otherwise prohibit. In view of the presumption
against conflicts, as recognized by panels and the Appellate Body, we
bear in mind that to the extent possible, any interpretation of these
provisions that would lead to a conflict between them should be
avoided.
(c) Principle of effective interpretation
- Finally we would also like to recall the principle of effective
interpretation 327 whereby
all provisions of a treaty must be, to the extent possible, given
their full meaning so that parties to such a treaty can enforce their
rights and obligations effectively. We note that the Appellate Body
has referred to this principle on several occasions. 328
We understand that this principle of interpretation prevents us from
reaching a conclusion on the claims of India or the defense of Turkey,
or on the related provisions invoked by the parties, that would lead
to a denial of either party's rights or obligations.
To continue with Overview of Article XXIV of GATT
299 G/TMB/N/44.
300 G/TMB/N/228.
301 G/TMB/N/240.
302 G/TMB/N/308.
303 G/TMB/N/326.
304 See para. 9.44
above.
305 See also the
European Communities' responses to the Panel's questions, referred to in
footnote 268 above and paras. 4.2 and 4.3 above, where it was said by the
European Communities that Turkey itself ensures the surveillance of its
own quantitative restrictions at the Turkey/India border.
306 See paras. 9.33 to
9.44 above.
307 Appellate Body
Report on Guatemala � Cement, para. 75.
308 See paras. 7.76
and 7.77 above.
309 See para. 6.26
(for Turkey) and paras. 3.47 and 3.48 (for India) above.
310 We recall the
provisions of Article 8.1 of the ATC: " In order to supervise the
implementation of this Agreement, to examine all measures taken under this
Agreement and their conformity therewith, and to take the actions
specifically required of it by this Agreement, the Textiles Monitoring
Body ("TMB") is hereby established �".
311 The Panel is aware
of the Appellate Body statement in EC - Bananas III that when two
provisions are both applicable, a panel should proceed to apply the more
specific provision first. However, such an exercise is not necessary here
as what is examined is the relationship between Article XXIV and
quantitative restrictions (either under Articles XI and XIII of GATT or
the ATC).
312 We note, from our
research, that during the negotiation of Article XXIV, participants
typically referred to Article XXIV as an "exception" for customs
unions and free-trade areas. See also footnote 287 above.
313 See Appellate Body
Report on Japan � Alcoholic Beverages, p. 14.
314 See the Appellate
Body statement in Brazil � Desiccated Coconut, page 12. The WTO
is a single undertaking except for the plurilateral agreements for the
non-signatories.
315 Wilfred Jenks,
"The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties", The British Yearbook
of International Law (1953) at p. 426-427.
316 See para. 7.22
above.
317 Appellate Body
Report on Canada � Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals,
adopted on 30 July 1997, WT/DS31/AB/R, ("Canada - Periodicals"),
page 19.
318 Appellate Body
Report on EC - Bananas III, paras. 219-222.
319 Panel Report on Indonesia
� Autos, para. 14.28.
320 The Agreement on
Trade-Related Investment Measures.
321 The Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.
322 Appellate Body
Report on Guatemala � Cement, para.65.
323 The Agreement on
the Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994.
324 [Footnote
original]In international law for a conflict to exist between two
treaties, three conditions have to be satisfied. First, the treaties
concerned must have the same parties. Second, the treaties must cover the
same substantive subject matter. Were it otherwise, there would be no
possibility for conflict. Third, the provisions must conflict, in the
sense that the provisions must impose mutually exclusive obligations.
"... [T]echnically speaking, there is a conflict when two (or more)
treaty instruments contain obligations which cannot be complied with
simultaneously. ... Not every such divergence constitutes a conflict,
however. ... Incompatibility of contents is an essential condition of
conflict". (7 Encyclop�dia of Public International Law
(North-Holland 1984), page 468). The lex specialis derogat legi
generali principle "which [is] inseparably linked with the
question of conflict"(Idem., page 469) between two treaties or
between two provisions (one arguably being more specific than the other),
does not apply if the two treaties ".. deal with the same subject
from different points of view or [is] applicable in different
circumstances, or one provision is more far-reaching than but not
inconsistent with, those of the other" (Wilfred Jenks, "The
Conflict of Law-Making Treaties", The British Yearbook of
International Law (BYIL) 1953, at 425 et seq.). For in such a
case it is possible for a state which is a signatory of both treaties to
comply with both treaties at the same time. The presumption against
conflict is especially reinforced in cases where separate agreements are
concluded between the same parties, since it can be presumed that they are
meant to be consistent with themselves, failing any evidence to the
contrary. See also E.W. Vierdag, "The Time of the
"Conclusion" of a Multilateral Treaty: Article 30 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties and Related Provisions ", BYIL,
1988, at 100; Sir Robert Jennings/Sir Arthur Watts (ed.), Oppenheim's
International Law, Vol. I., Parts 2 to 4, 1992, at 1280; Sir Gerald
Fitzmaurice, "The Law and procedure of the International Court of
Justice", BYIL , 1957, at 237; Sir Ian Sinclair, The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1984, at 97.
325 [Footnote
original]In this context we note that the WTO Agreement contains a
specific rule on conflicts which is however limited to conflicts between a
specific provision of GATT 1994 and a provision of another agreement of
Annex 1A. We do not consider this interpretative note in this section of
the report because we are dealing with Indonesia�s argument that there
is a general conflict between Article III and the SCM Agreement, while the
note is concerned with specific conflicts between a provision of GATT 1994
and a specific provision of another agreement of Annex 1A.
326 [Footnote
original]"This would correspond to the ruling of the Appellate Body
when it stated that a treaty may not be interpreted so as to reduce whole
clauses to "inutility". See footnote 649 supra."
327 The principle of
effective interpretation or "l'effet utile" or in latin ut
res magis valeat quam pereat reflects the general rule of
interpretation which requires that a treaty be interpreted to give meaning
and effect to all the terms of the treaty. For instance one provision
should not be given an interpretation that will result in nullifying the
effect of another provision of the same treaty. For a discussion of this
principle see also the Yearbook of the International Law Commission,
1966, Vol II A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1 p. 219 and following. See also E.g.,
Corfu Channel Case, (1949) I.C.J. Reports, p. 24; Territorial
Dispute Case (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad), (1994) I.C.J.
Reports, p. 23; Oppenheim's International Law (9th ed.,
Jennings and Watts eds., 1992), Volume 1, 1280-1281; P. Dallier and A.
Pellet, Droit International Public, 5� �d. (1994) para. 17.2; D.
Carreau, Droit International (1994), para. 369.
328 See for instance
the statement of the Appellate Body in United States � Standards for
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, adopted on 20 May 1996,
WT/DS2/AB/R ("US � Gasoline"):"An interpreter is
not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or
paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility"; also the
Appellate Body Report on Japan � Alcoholic Beverages, p. 12;
Appellate Body Report on United States � Restrictions on Imports of
Cotton and Man-Fibre Underwear, adopted on 25 February 1997,
WT/DS24/AB/R, p. 16.
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