Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products
Report of the Panel
(Continued)
D. Scope of the Dispute
- We note that, at least initially, both parties argued explicitly
that the Panel should not assess the compatibility of the Turkey-EC
regional trade agreement with the provisions of Article XXIV. In its
second submission, however, Turkey argues that the Panel cannot assess
the WTO compatibility of any specific measure adopted in the context
of the formation of a regional trade agreement, separately and in
isolation from an assessment of the overall compatibility of this
regional trade agreement with Article XXIV of GATT.
- Turkey's main defense to India's claims of discriminatory
quantitative restrictions is that the measures at issue were adopted
as a consequence of its regional trade agreement with the European
Communities which, it argues, is a fully complete customs union
explicitly authorized and favoured by Article XXIV of GATT. For
Turkey, Article XXIV of GATT, in allowing the formation of customs
unions, necessarily authorizes measures such as those adopted by
Turkey and challenged by India. For Turkey, the alignment of its
textiles and trade policy with that of the European Communities is not
only an integral part of such Turkey-EC customs union but is inherent
and necessary for its formation in view of the important share of the
textile and clothing sector in its trade with the European
Communities. Turkey argues that the WTO compatibility of an Article
XXIV type agreement, and all its related measures, is to be determined
exclusively with reference to Article XXIV of GATT (and the 1994
Understanding on Article XXIV) and not by any other provisions of the
WTO Agreement.
- In response to Turkey's defense, India argues that the provisions of
Article XXIV do not constitute a waiver from other WTO obligations,
including the general prohibition against discriminatory import
restrictions contained in Articles XI and XIII of GATT and Article 2.4
of the ATC.
- Turkey's argument has both procedural and substantive aspects.
Firstly, we must decide whether the WTO dispute settlement proceedings
can be used to challenge measures adopted by one or more Members on
the occasion of the formation of a customs union in which it (or they)
participate. Secondly, if so, we must consider the extent to which a
panel is authorized or needs to examine the overall consistency of the
customs union with WTO provisions. Finally, we must determine whether
the test for assessing the WTO compatibility of these specific
measures is provided for in the provisions of Article XXIV only. If
this is not the case, we will then need to examine the meaning of the
provisions of Article XXIV to assess whether Article XXIV authorizes
measures like those under examination. We deal with this final
determination later in Section G below.
- As to the first issue of whether the WTO dispute settlement
procedures can be invoked to challenge a measure adopted on the
occasion of the formation of a customs union, we note paragraph 12 of
the Understanding on Article XXIV of GATT 1994 which provides:
"12. The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994 as
elaborated and applied by the Dispute Settlement Understanding may be
invoked with respect to any matters arising from the application
of those provisions of Article XXIV relating to customs unions,
free-trade areas or interim agreement leading to the formation of a
customs union or free-trade area." (Emphasis added.)
- We understand from the wording of paragraph 12 of the WTO
Understanding on Article XXIV, that panels have jurisdiction to
examine "any matters 'arising from' the application of those
provisions of Article XXIV". For us, this confirms that a panel
can examine the WTO compatibility of one or several measures
"arising from" Article XXIV types of agreement, as also
argued by the United States in its third-party submission. 277
This indicates that, although the right of WTO Members to form
regional trade arrangements is "an integral part" of the set
of multilateral disciplines of GATT and now WTO, 278
the DSU procedures can be used to obtain a ruling by a panel on the
WTO compatibility of any matters arising from such regional trade
arrangements. For us, the term "any matters" clearly
includes specific measures adopted on the occasion of the formation of
a customs union or in the ambit of a customs union.
- Thus, we consider that a panel can assess the WTO compatibility of
any specific measure adopted by WTO Members at any time and we cannot
find anything in the DSU, Article XXIV or the 1994 GATT Understanding
on Article XXIV that would suspend or condition the right of Members
to challenge measures adopted on the occasion of the formation of a
custom union.
- As to the second question of how far-reaching a panel's examination
should be of the regional trade agreement underlying the challenged
measure, we note that the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements
(CRTA) has been established, inter alia, to assess the GATT/WTO
compatibility of regional trade agreements entered into by Members, a
very complex undertaking which involves consideration by the CRTA,
from the economic, legal and political perspectives of different
Members, of the numerous facets of a regional trade agreement in
relation to the provisions of the WTO. 279
It appears to us that the issue regarding the GATT/WTO compatibility
of a customs union, as such, is generally a matter for the CRTA since,
as noted above, it involves a broad multilateral assessment of any
such custom union, i.e. a matter which concerns the WTO membership as
a whole.
- As to whether panels also have the jurisdiction to assess the
overall WTO compatibility of a customs union, we recall that the
Appellate Body stated 280
that the terms of reference of panels must refer explicitly to the
"measures" to be examined by panels. We consider that
regional trade agreements may contain numerous measures, all of which
could potentially be examined by panels, before, during or after the
CRTA examination, if the requirements laid down in the DSU are met.
However, it is arguable that a customs union (or a free-trade area) as
a whole would logically not be a "measure" as such, subject
to challenge under the DSU. 281
- We consider that the question of whether panels have the
jurisdiction to assess the overall compatibility of a customs union is
not in any event an issue on which it is necessary for us to reach a
decision in this case; we reach this conclusion in light of paragraphs
9.51 to 9.53 above and in recognition of the principle of judicial
economy, as initially developed in the US � Wool Shirts 282
case and qualified by the Appellate Body in the recent Australia
� Salmon case, 283
under which panels do not need to address all the claims and arguments
raised by the parties to the dispute. We recall the distinction
between claims and arguments (EC � Hormones284)
and understand that some latitude is left to panels to address only
arguments that they consider are relevant to resolve the dispute
between the parties, which is the main purpose of DSU proceedings.
Accordingly, we find that, in order to address the claims of India, it
will not be necessary for us to assess the compatibility of the
Turkey-EC customs union agreement with Article XXIV as such (in the
sense of addressing all aspects of the customs union and all the
measures adopted by Turkey and the European Communities in the context
of their customs union agreement).
- In our view, it will be sufficient for us to address the
relationship between the provisions of Article XXIV and those of
Articles XI and XIII of GATT and Article 2.4 of the ATC. We shall have
to do so as India's claims are based on an alleged violation of those
articles, and Turkey's defense is based on the application, and, in
its view, the "primacy", of Article XXIV over those
provisions. Our examination will be limited to the question whether in
this case, on the occasion of the formation of the Turkey-EC customs
union, Turkey is permitted to introduce WTO incompatible quantitative
restrictions against imports from a third country, assuming arguendo
that the customs union in question is otherwise compatible with
Article XXIV of GATT. We shall thus limit ourselves to addressing
the parties' arguments submitted in this context only and refrain from
any discussion as to how an overall compatibility assessment of a
customs union should be performed. Our analysis of Article XXIV is
limited to defining, in particular, its relationship with Articles XI
and XIII of GATT (and Article 2.4 of the ATC) and to ensuring that our
interpretation of the WTO provisions applicable to the present
dispute, does not prevent Turkey from exercising its right to form a
customs union.
- We reject therefore Turkey 's argument, in paragraph 9.45 above, to
the extent that it would oblige us to assess the GATT/WTO
compatibility of the Turkey-EC customs union in order to assess the
compatibility of the specific measures at issue. 285
E. Burden of Proof
- The rules on burden of proof are now well established in the WTO and
can be summed up as follows:
(a) it is for the complaining party to establish the violation it
alleges;
(b) it is for the party invoking an exception or an affirmative
defense to prove that the conditions contained therein are met; and
(c) it is for the party asserting a fact to prove it. 286
- It is therefore for India to demonstrate prima facie that
Turkey's measures violate the provisions of Articles XI and XIII of
GATT and Article 2.4 of the ATC. Turkey does not deny the existence of
quantitative restrictions but submits an affirmative defense based on
the application of Article XXIV of GATT. In response to a direct
question by the Panel, Turkey stated that it does not invoke any
defense other than that based on Article XXIV in support of its claim
that it is not violating Articles XI or XIII of GATT, or Article 2.4
of the ATC. We note in this context that Hong Kong, China has argued
that since Article XXIV was an exception invoked by Turkey, it was for
Turkey to bear the burden of proof. 287
- Accordingly, we will first examine India's claims and the GATT/WTO
treatment of import restrictions generally, and then more specifically
in the sector of textiles and clothing. Secondly, we shall examine the
applicability of Article XXIV and Turkey's defense based, in
particular, on paragraphs 4, 5(a) and 8(a)(ii) of Article XXIV of
GATT.
F. Claims under Articles XI and XIII of
GATT and Article 2.4 of the ATC
- India claims that the Turkish measures violate the provisions of
Articles XI and XIII of GATT and Article 2.4 of the ATC. Turkey claims
that its rights pursuant to Article XXIV of GATT prevail over any
obligations contained in Articles XI and XIII of GATT and Article 2.4
of the ATC, and therefore India's claims should be rejected.
1. Articles XI and XIII of GATT
- The wording of Articles XI and XIII is clear. Article XI provides
that as a general rule (we note the wording of the title of Article
XI: "General Elimination of Quantitative
Restrictions"), WTO Members shall not use quantitative
restrictions against imports or exports.
"Article XI
General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions
1. No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or
other charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export
licences or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any
Member on the importation of any product of the territory of any other
Member or on the exportation or sale for export of any product
destined for the territory of any other Member."
- Article XIII provides that if and when quantitative restrictions are
allowed by the GATT/WTO, they must, in addition, be imposed on a
non-discriminatory basis.
"Article XIII
Non-discriminatory Administration of Quantitative Restrictions
1. No prohibition or restriction shall be applied by any Member on
the importation of any product of the territory of any other Member or
on the exportation of any product destined for the territory of any
other Member, unless the importation of the like product of all third
countries or the exportation of the like product to all third
countries is similarly prohibited or restricted."
- The prohibition on the use of quantitative restrictions forms one of
the cornerstones of the GATT system. A basic principle of the GATT
system is that tariffs are the preferred and acceptable form of
protection. Tariffs, to be reduced through reciprocal concessions,
ought to be applied in a non-discriminatory manner independent of the
origin of the goods (the "most-favoured-nation" (MFN)
clause). Article I, which requires MFN treatment, and Article II,
which specifies that tariffs must not exceed bound rates, constitute
Part I of GATT. Part II contains other related obligations, inter
alia to ensure that Members do not evade the obligations of Part
I. Two fundamental obligations contained in Part II are the national
treatment clause and the prohibition against quantitative
restrictions. The prohibition against quantitative restrictions is a
reflection that tariffs are GATT's border protection "of
choice". Quantitative restrictions impose absolute limits on
imports, while tariffs do not. In contrast to MFN tariffs which permit
the most efficient competitor to supply imports, quantitative
restrictions usually have a trade distorting effect, their allocation
can be problematic and their administration may not be transparent.
- Notwithstanding this broad prohibition against quantitative
restrictions, GATT contracting parties over many years failed to
respect completely this obligation. From early in the GATT, in sectors
such as agriculture, quantitative restrictions were maintained and
even increased to the extent that the need to restrict their use
became central to the Uruguay Round negotiations. In the sector of
textiles and clothing, quantitative restrictions were maintained under
the Multifibre Agreement (further discussed below). Certain
contracting parties were even of the view that quantitative
restrictions had gradually been tolerated and accepted as negotiable
and that Article XI could not be and had never been considered to be,
a provision prohibiting such restrictions irrespective of the
circumstances specific to each case. This argument was, however,
rejected in an adopted panel report EEC � Imports from Hong Kong.
288
- Participants in the Uruguay Round recognized the overall detrimental
effects of non-tariff border restrictions (whether applied to imports
or exports) and the need to favour more transparent price-based, i.e.
tariff-based, measures; to this end they devised mechanisms to
phase-out quantitative restrictions in the sectors of agriculture and
textiles and clothing. This recognition is reflected in the GATT 1994
Understanding on Balance-of-Payments Provisions, 289
the Agreement on Safeguards, 290
the Agreement on Agriculture where quantitative restrictions were
eliminated 291 and
the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (further discussed below) where
MFA derived restrictions are to be completely eliminated by 2005.
- The measures at issue, on their face, impose quantitative
restrictions on imports and are applicable only to India. 292
We consider that, given the absence of a defense by Turkey (other than
its defense based on Article XXIV of GATT) to India's claims that
discriminatory import restrictions have been imposed, India has made a
prima facie case of violation of Articles XI 293
and XIII of GATT.
2. Article 2.4 of the ATC294
- India claims that the measures under examination violate Article 2.4
of the ATC, in that they constitute new measures not authorized by the
ATC and for which there is no GATT justification. Turkey claims that
the measures under examination are not new, since the European
Communities had similar restrictions in place when Turkey and the
European Communities formed their customs union, and such restrictions
are justified by Article XXIV of GATT.
(a) Regulatory framework of the ATC
- The ATC provides for a maximum transitional period of ten years for
the integration of all remaining quantitative restrictions in the
sector of textiles and clothing that had been maintained under the old
Multifibre Arrangement ("MFA"). Article 2 is the core of the
ATC 295 and contains two key
requirements for the transitional process that leads to the
re-integration of the textiles and clothing sector into the general
rules of GATT 1994. Paragraph 1 of Article 2 of the ATC requires that
all former MFA or MFA-type restraints be notified to the TMB in order
to be carried over into the ATC. Article 2.6 to 2.11, sets out the
procedures for the progressive integration of the products covered by
the ATC into GATT 1994 rules and disciplines. The ATC provides
therefore exceptions to the general prohibitions contained in Articles
XI and XIII against discriminatory quantitative restrictions in
allowing some Members (those who had MFA restrictions in place and who
have notified the TMB within 60 days of the entry into force of the
WTO Agreement) to maintain such restrictions for a maximum period of
10 years. In that sense the MFA defined the reach of the general
prohibition against quantitative restrictions in the area of textiles
and clothing.
- The lists of restrictions notified pursuant to Article 2.1 set the
starting point for the treatment of the restraints carried over from
the former MFA regime. Four WTO Members notified the TMB pursuant to
Article 2.1 of the ATC: Canada, the European Communities, Norway and
the United States. We consider that the notification requirement of 60
days referred to in Article 2.1 of the ATC is mandatory both for
formal and substantive reasons. The wording of Article 2.1 is
unequivocal with the use of the term "shall". Moreover,
since the purpose of the ATC is to provide exceptions to the general
application of Articles XI and XIII of GATT during an integration
period to be completed by 1 January 2005, these exceptions should be
interpreted narrowly. 296
Stemming from this provision, only the four Members above had the
right to and did notify measures which allowed them to maintain
MFA-derived quantitative restrictions for a maximum period of 10 years
during which import quotas must increase annually until the products
they cover are integrated into GATT. In the absence of an exception
under the ATC or a justification under GATT, no new quantitative
restrictions introduced by a Member can benefit from the exceptions
provided for in Article 2.1 of the ATC after this 60 day period.
- Article 2.4 of the ATC provides that:
"4. The restrictions notified under paragraph 1 shall be
deemed to constitute the totality of such restrictions applied by the
respective Members on the day before the entry into force of the WTO
Agreement. No new restrictions in terms of products or Members shall
be introduced except under the provisions of this Agreement or
relevant GATT 1994 provisions. 297
Restrictions not notified within 60 days of the date of entry into
force of the WTO Agreement shall be terminated forthwith."
- The prohibition on "new restrictions" must be interpreted
taking into account the preceding sentence: "The restrictions
notified under paragraph 1 shall be deemed to constitutes the totality
of such restrictions applied by the respective Members on the day
before the entry into force of the WTO Agreement". The ordinary
meaning of the words indicates that WTO Members intended that as of 1
January 1995, the incidence of restrictions under the ATC could only
be reduced. We are of the view that any legal fiction whereby an
existing restriction could simply be increased and not constitute a
"new restriction", would defeat the clear purpose of the ATC
which is to reduce the scope of such restrictions, starting from 1
January 1995 (but for the exceptional situations referred to in
Article 2.4 of the ATC). Thus, we consider that, setting aside the
possibility of exceptions and justifications mentioned in Article 2.4
of the ATC, any increase of an ATC compatible quantitative restriction
notified under Article 2.1 of the ATC, constitutes a "new"
restriction.
- On 28 February 1995 (therefore within the 60 day period of Article
2.1 of the ATC), the European Communities notified its previous
restrictions maintained under the MFA. 298
This notification referred to restrictions applicable only to EC
territory. After the period of 60 days (under Article 2 of the ATC)
the European Communities is prohibited from notifying any new
restrictions or changes to existing and notified restrictions, except
adopted in compliance with the ATC or any other provisions of GATT
1994. Apart from these special cases the European Communities is not
entitled to notify any increase of its MFA derived restrictions.
Immediately before the date of the entry into force of the ATC, Turkey
was a member of the Multifibre Arrangement (as an exporting country)
and did not maintain any restrictions pursuant to Article 4 of the MFA
or notified under Article 7 or 8 of the MFA in force on the day before
the entry into force of the WTO Agreement. Since Turkey did not have
any MFA restrictions in place, it could therefore not make any
notification pursuant to Article 2.1 of the ATC. Accordingly, any
restrictions on textiles and clothing applied by Turkey appear on
their face to be "new", as defined in Article 2.4 of the ATC
with reference to those countries who had MFA restrictions and
notified them within 60 days.
To continue with Quantitative restrictions
permitted under the ATC
277 See paras. 7.116
to 7.118 above.
278 See a similar
parallel drawn by the Appellate Body in United States � Measures
Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, adopted
on 23 May 1997, WT/DS33/AB/R ("US � Shirts and Blouses")
at page 16, concerning the right to use transitional safeguard measures
under the ATC.
279 The mandate of the
CRTA can be found in WT/L/127. See para. 2.7 above.
280 Appellate Body
Report on Guatemala � Anti-Dumping Investigation regarding Portland
Cement From Mexico, adopted on 25 November 1998, WT/DS60/AB/R ("Guatemala
� Cement"), paras. 76, 86.
281 We are aware of
the EC proposal contained in MTN.TNC/W/125 and the report of the 36th
Meeting of the Trade Negotiating Committee MTN.TNC/40.
282 Appellate Body
Report on US � Shirts and Blouses, page 17.
283 Appellate Body
Report on Australia � Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon,
adopted on 6 November 1998, WT/DS18/AB/R, para 223: "The principle of
judicial economy has to be applied keeping in mind the aim of the dispute
settlement system. This aim is to resolve the matter at issue and "to
secure a positive solution to a dispute". To provide only a partial
resolution of the matter at issue would be false judicial economy. A
panel has to address those claims on which a finding is necessary in order
to enable the DSB to make sufficiently precise recommendations and rulings
so as to allow for prompt compliance by a Member with those
recommendations and rulings "in order to ensure effective resolution
of disputes to the benefit of all Members." (emphasis added).
284 Appellate Body
Report on European Communities � Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products ("EC � Hormones"), adopted on 13 February
1998, WT/DS26, 48/AB/R, paras. 155-156; see also the Appellate Body Report
on EC - Bananas III, paras. 145-147.
285 We consider that
this Turkey-EC regional trade agreement falls under the ambit of Article
XXIV for the purpose of the CRTA's examination. We are of the view that,
for our purposes, we do not have to assess the precise relationship of the
Turkey-EC agreement with Article XXIV, e.g. whether it is a free-trade
agreement or a customs union or an interim agreement leading to a
free-trade area or customs union. We recall that in this report, we shall
refer to the Turkey-EC customs union without any assessment of the WTO
nature of this Article XXIV type of arrangement.
286 Panel Report on Argentina
- Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other
Items, adopted on 22 April 1998, WT/DS56/R, paras. 6.34 - 6.40.
287 See para. 7.7
above. We note that Japan, Thailand and the Philippines also identified
Article XXIV as an exception: see Japan's arguments in para. 7.23,
Thailand's arguments in para. 7.100 and the Philippines' arguments in
para. 7.36 above.
288 Panel Report on EEC
� Quantitative Restrictions Against Imports of Certain Products from
Hong Kong, adopted on 12 July 1983, BISD 30S/129, ("EEC �
Imports from Hong Kong").
289 See for instance
paras. 2 and 3 of the GATT 1994 Understanding on the Balance-of-Payments
Provisions which provide that Members shall seek to avoid the imposition
of new quantitative restrictions for balance-of-payments purposes.
290 The Agreement on
Safeguards also evidences a preference for the use of tariffs. Article 6
provides that provisional safeguard measures "should take the form of
tariff increases" and Article 11 prohibits the use of voluntary
export restraints.
291 Under the
Agreement on Agriculture, notwithstanding the fact that contracting
parties, for over 48 years, had been relying a great deal on import
restrictions and other non-tariff measures, the use of quantitative
restrictions and other non-tariff measures was prohibited and Members had
to proceed to a "tariffication" exercise to transform
quantitative restrictions into tariff based measures.
292 We note, however,
that Turkey maintains other quantitative restrictions against textiles and
clothing imports from other countries on the same and/or other products;
see para. 6.12 above. See also WT/REG22/7.
293 We note that the
measures at issue do not qualify for any of the exceptions under Article
XI of GATT.
294 In interpreting
the ATC and its importance in the WTO Agreement, it should also be clear
from the object and purpose of the ATC, and from the well-known
circumstances of the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, that the phasing out
of the textile and clothing restrictions was a fundamental component of
the WTO Agreement for developing countries.
295 As discussed in
paras. 2.25 to 2.30 above, trade in this sector of textile and clothing
products was governed by special regimes outside the normal GATT rules:
the Short Term Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Cotton
Textiles (STA) in 1961, the Long Term Arrangement Regarding International
Trade in Cotton Textiles (LTA) from 1962 to 1973 and the Arrangement
Regarding International Trade in Textiles, also known as the Multifibre
Arrangement or MFA, from 1974 to 1994. These special regimes essentially
allowed for an extensive and complex system of bilateral import and export
restrictions. The ATC provides for a set of rules, the purpose of which is
that through a transitional process, embodied in the ATC, this sector is
to be fully integrated into WTO rules by 1 January 2005. The two main
avenues used by the ATC are 1) mandatory annual level increases of
remaining quantitative restriction and 2) and an integration process by
stages of all textile and clothing products into the general GATT rules.
296 See for instance
in Panel Report on Indonesia � Certain Measures Affecting the
Automobile Industry, adopted 23 July 1998, WT/DS54, 55, 59 and 64/R,
("Indonesia � Autos") (Not appealed), para. 14.92,
where the period allowed for notification to the TRIMS Committee under
Article 5 of the TRIMS Agreement, in order for a Member to benefit from
the transition provisions of the TRIMS Agreement, was considered
mandatory.
297 [Footnote
original]The relevant GATT 1994 provisions shall not include Article XIX
in respect of products not yet integrated into GATT 1994, except as
specifically provided in paragraph 3 of the Annex.
298 G/TMB/N/60.
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