Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products
Report of the Panel
(Continued)
(b) Article XXIV:5(a)
- India recalled that, in the communication dated 9 January
1996 handed to the Indian authorities at Ankara, Turkey attempted to
justify its new restrictions with reference to Article XXIV:5(a) of
GATT. India submitted that obligations under Article XI:1 of GATT and
Article 2.4 of the ATC were not modified by Article XXIV:5(a) of GATT.
- India argued that any interpretation of Article XXIV:5(a) that would
entail an authorisation to impose, on the occasion of the formation of
a customs union, new barriers to the trade of third Members
inconsistently with Article XI:1 of GATT and Article 2.4 of the ATC on
the grounds that other barriers to imports had been voluntarily
reduced was excluded by the general principle set out in Article
XXIV:4, which provided a recognition of the purpose of a customs union
as "not to raise barriers to the trade" of other Members
with such territories.
- India noted that, according to Article XXIV:6 of GATT, Members
parties to a customs union wishing to raise tariffs beyond the rate
bound under Article II of GATT had to renegotiate them under the
procedure for the modification of tariff concessions in Article XXVIII
of GATT. India considered that, if tariff concessions under Article II
could not be ignored by Members forming a customs union, an
interpretation of Article XXIV permitting such Members to ignore their
obligations under Article XI:1 of GATT and Article 2.4 of the ATC was
not justified.
- India also recalled that the issue of the introduction of new QRs by
a party to a regional trade agreement had been discussed in detail in
the GATT Working Party on the Accession of Greece to the European
Communities. 105 Several
delegations stated their concern with the introduction of new
discriminatory QRs by Greece on imports from state-trading countries
of products, which they claimed were contrary to Articles XI and XIII
of the GATT and contravened their Protocols of Accession. The Working
Party Report recorded the response of the European Communities as
follows:
"With reference to Article XXIV:5 and against the background
of the very considerable liberalisation of restrictions which would
occur in Greece, it was hard to claim that barriers were being
created; even if it might be true for one or two products, the overall
situation was clearly the opposite. On the question of the alleged
inconsistency of this with Article XIII, the EC did not consider this
point relevant to the Article XXIV:5 exercise; the matter could be
further discussed in the context of the relevant Accession Protocols
for the countries concerned." 106
- The issue of new QRs was again discussed in detail in the GATT
Working Party on the Accession of Spain and Portugal to the European
Communities. 107
Several delegations expressed concern regarding Spain�s imposition
of new QRs on imports from third countries. The European Communities
defended the new restrictions with the argument that, on the whole,
the number of Spanish restrictions had declined. Those delegations
responded that newly established GATT-inconsistent measures could not
be traded off against the alleged reduction of other barriers. The
Working Party Report recorded the ensuing discussion as follows:
"Some members of the Working Party stated that since acceding
to the Communities, Spain had introduced discriminatory QRs which
contravened Articles XI, XIII and XXIV:4 as well as their countries�
Protocols of Accession to the GATT under which contracting parties
undertook not to increase the element of discrimination which they
maintained on these countries� imports. Before acceding to the
Communities, Spain had repeatedly notified the GATT that it maintained
no discriminatory QRs on their countries� imports and they had no
reason to doubt the validity of these notifications. Since Article
XXIV did not provide a waiver from obligations contained in Articles
XI and XIII and did not allow or require a country acceding to a
customs union to adopt the more restrictive trade regime of the
customs union, they called on the Communities and Spain to eliminate
all GATT-inconsistent measures, which in the case of one of these
countries affected one quarter of its total exports to Spain. The same
members of the Working Party considered that measures that were
inconsistent with the GATT could not be traded off against the alleged
reduction of other barriers and could not be included in the
assessment of incidence of changes in "other regulations of
commerce" required by Article XXIV:5(a) under which only
GATT-consistent measures should be taken into account. They did not
consider the Treaty of Accession was in conformity with the GATT and
reserved their rights under the General Agreement." 108
- India noted that, on the question of other regulations of commerce,
and in particular QRs, the European Communities agreed that Article
XXIV did not provide a waiver from other provisions of the GATT. By
the same token, however, the role of the Working Party in this context
was to examine the situation in the light of Article XXIV rather than
with respect to any other provision such as Articles XI or XIII.
Contracting parties were free to reserve their GATT rights and to have
recourse to other provisions on these questions. 109
- Turkey submitted that Article XXIV:5 of GATT authorized the
formation of a customs union, as defined by Article XXIV:8(a),
provided that the conditions of Article XXIV:5(a) were met. If it had
been the intention of the Members to ban the imposition of new QRs
whenever a customs union was being instituted, Article XXIV:5 would
have been a redundant provision.
- Turkey considered that provisions of Article XXIV:5(a) should be
read as permitting, at the time of the completion of a customs union,
the introduction of restrictive regulations of commerce to the trade
of third countries, provided that the overall incidence of duties and
other regulations of commerce was not higher or more restrictive after
the completion of the customs union than before. Further clarification
was brought to the expression "on the whole" used in Article
XXIV:5, in paragraph 2 of the Understanding on the Interpretation of
Article XXIV of GATT 1994 ("Understanding on Article XXIV").
The view that a total prohibition on new restrictions was not
intended, found its confirmation in the last sentence of that
paragraph, which stated, inter alia, that "for the
purposes of the overall assessment of the incidence of other
regulations of commerce for which quantification and aggregation are
difficult, the examination of individual measures, regulations,
products covered and trade flows affected may be required"
(emphasis added). In Turkey's view, such a provision would not be
meaningful if it had been the intention to totally prohibit the
imposition of new restrictions by one party to the customs union. 110
- Turkey noted that this point had been made very effectively by the
European Communities at a meeting of the Working Party on the
Accession of Spain and Portugal, as follows:
"The task was general, namely to reach a view on whether the
general incidence of customs duties and regulations after enlargement
was on the whole more or less restrictive than before. Even if a
negative incidence were shown to be the case for certain items, such
as when duties were increased or replaced by variable levies, one had
to consider whether these effects were not balanced by the effects of
other changes in the tariff sector taken as a whole. An overall
appreciation of effects of changes in tariffs and regulations of
commerce had to be made. In assessing general incidence, one had to
avoid too static an analysis and to take into account the
trade-creating effects of the establishment or enlargement of a
customs union." 111
In its conclusions, the Working Party had noted that:
"Because of the divergent views expressed, [it] was unable to
reach agreed conclusions as to the consistency of the Treaty with the
General Agreement. It decided to forward to the Council, this report
which summarizes the views expressed by its members during the
discussion. It noted the fact that many members of the Working Party
had reserved their rights under the General Agreement and that these
rights would not be prejudiced by submission of the report." 112
- Nevertheless, problems which might have arisen in connection with
the accession of Spain and Portugal to the European Communities were
settled under the procedures of Article XXIV:6 and no contracting
party chose to invoke Articles XXII and XXIII in relation to the
question of whether the obligations arising out of Articles XXIV:4 and
XXIV:5(a) had been met.
- Turkey noted further that, if it had been the intention of WTO
Members to prohibit the imposition of new restrictions at the time of
the formation or enlargement of customs unions, they would no doubt
have seized the opportunity provided by the Uruguay Round to do so.
- Turkey also recalled that, despite regular examinations of the
Association Agreements between Turkey and the European Communities,
both prior to and subsequent to the completion of the Turkey-EC
customs union, no recommendations had ever been addressed to the
parties to the agreement under Article XXIV:7(b). In the absence of
such recommendations, it could not be argued that the Association
Agreement and the Turkey-EC customs union to which it had led were
inconsistent with obligations arising out of Article XXIV.
- In Turkey's view, therefore, Article XI:1 had to be read in
conjunction with Article XXIV, concluding that measures whose
application constituted a requirement of the Turkey-EC customs union
were deemed to be justified under Article XXIV. 113
- In support of its argument, Turkey also recalled changes in its
import regime vis-�-vis third countries triggered by the
completion of the Turkey-EC customs union, which led to an incidence
of tariff levels much lower than that of Turkey's previous tariff and
to a process of alignment of its external trade policy with that of
the European Communities resulting in the Turkish market becoming as
open as the EC market to products of third countries. Turkey also
referred to developments in its imports of textiles and clothing
products in this respect, stressing that the lower level of tariff
protection had led to a more open access to the Turkish market in
these products despite the introduction of a system based on QRs, and
recalled that the restrictions in question were of a temporary nature
and would be phased out as foreseen in the ATC.
- Turkey concluded that, overall, the Turkey-EC customs union had
resulted in the lowering of the general incidence of duties and other
regulations of commerce and, consequently, the requirements of Article
XXIV:5(a) had been met.
- Turkey explained that there were basically only three options open
to the parties to a customs union when setting up a single set of
external trade rules, in accordance with Article XXIV:8(a)(ii)
requirements, both for reasons of logic and for practical purposes.
Supposing that WTO Member A and WTO Member B formed a customs union,
the options for establishing single external trade rules could be:
- to extend the external trade rules of Member A to the entire
customs union;
- to extend the external trade rules of Member B to the entire
customs union; or
- to develop an external trade regime for the entire customs union
somewhere in the middle between options (i) and (ii).
- For this reason, Article XXIV:6 provided for the procedure to give
compensatory adjustment in case of increased bound customs duties,
which clearly indicated that the otherwise stringent rules of Article
II were in this case applied in a more flexible way in order not to
stand in the way of the creation of a customs union. However, the
special rules contained in Article XXIV:5-8 did not only provide
increased flexibility in the application of Article II. For example,
although not specifically spelled out anywhere in these provisions,
Turkey stated that it would simply make no sense if they did not
authorize a derogation from Article I as well, and this had never been
contested.
- Turkey argued that the derogation authorized by Article XXIV:5 was
not limited to a particular GATT rule, but encompassed all those rules
from which a derogation was necessary to permit the formation of
customs unions. In support of this argument, Turkey noted that the
opening clause of Article XXIV:5 was drafted in language that was
similar to the language used in the opening clause of Article XX,
which demonstrated that the derogation referred to all the provisions
of the GATT, and not just from those contained in Article II, more
specifically mentioned in Article XXIV:6. 114
In this context, Turkey recalled that it had offered to enter into
negotiations to address India�s concerns with regard to the change
in its external trade regime, but India had not wished to participate
in such negotiations.
- India endeavoured, following the provisions of Article 3.2 of
the DSU and the consistent jurisprudence of the Appellate Body, to
interpret Article XXIV:5 of the GATT, which Turkey invoked as a
defense, in accordance with the principles of interpretation set out
in Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT. These principles required an
interpretation in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to
the terms of Article XXIV:5 in their context and in the light of the
object and purpose of the GATT.
- India could not see how the terms of Article XXIV:5 could provide
for a justification of the measures taken by Turkey. This provision
authorized merely the formation of a customs union or free trade area,
nothing else. Its terms consequently exempted from the other
obligations under the GATT only measures inherent in the formation of
a customs union. For instance, a customs union or a free trade area
could only be formed by the granting of preferential treatment
inconsistent with Article I and Article XXIV therefore clearly
provided a justification for it. However, customs unions and free
trade areas could be formed without the introduction of new QRs on
imports from third Members inconsistent with Article XI of GATT. There
was, in particular, nothing that required Members forming a customs
union to impose new restrictions on imports from one particular third
Member inconsistently with Article XIII of GATT and Article 2.4 of the
ATC. Article XXIV:4, according to which the purpose of customs unions
and free trade areas should not be to raise barriers to the trade of
third Members, was drafted on that assumption. The terms of Article
XXIV therefore could not be interpreted to provide a legal basis for
discriminatory restrictions against a third Member inconsistent with
Articles XI and XIII of GATT and Article 2.4 of the ATC.
- In this regard, India referred to the GATT panel on the EEC-Member
States� Import Regimes for Bananas, which summarized the legal
implications of the text of Article XXIV as follows:
"The Panel noted the argument of the EEC that the restrictions
and prohibitions on imports of bananas, even if inconsistent with
Article XI:1, were nonetheless consistent with the General Agreement
because they were covered under the provisions of Article XXIV. The
Panel noted that Article XXIV:5 to 8 permitted the contracting parties
to deviate from their obligations under other provisions of the
General Agreement for the purpose of forming a customs union or free
trade-area, or adopting an interim agreement leading to the formation
of a customs union or free trade area, but not for any other purpose.
Article XXIV:5 to 8 therefore did not provide contracting parties for
a justification for restrictive import measures as such; it merely
provided them - within the limits set out in this provision - with a
justification for not applying to imports originating in such a union
or area the restrictive measures that they were permitted to impose
under other provisions of the General Agreement. The Panel
therefore considered that the import restrictions on bananas could not
be justified by Article XXIV." 115
- Though the report of this panel was not adopted, the Appellate Body
recognized that the reasoning in a not-adopted panel report could
provide useful guidance. 116
In India's view, the succinct and clear exposition of the legal
situation flowing from the terms of Article XXIV in the above
quotation was such an example.
- With reference to the next element to be considered under the
principles of interpretation of the VCLT, i.e. the context in which
the terms set out in Article XXIV:5 appeared, India noted that, since
the preceding paragraph, Article XXIV:4, stated why customs unions and
free trade areas were permitted and which purposes they were to serve,
Article XXIV:5 had to be interpreted consistently with the principles
set out therein. This meant that, in the absence of any clear
indication to the contrary, Article XXIV:5 could not be interpreted as
providing a justification for measures raising barriers to the trade
of third Members.
- India noted further that Article XXIV:6 was also part of the context
of Article XXIV:5. Both according to the terms of this provision and
the consistent practice under it, it applied only to custom duties
bound under Article II, and the related paragraphs 5 and 6 of the
Understanding on Article XXIV, also referred only to customs duties.
There was no corresponding mechanism for renegotiation and
compensation following an increase in QRs. India considered this a
logical consequence of the principle that tariffs were negotiable (and
renegotiable under Article XXVIII) while QRs might only be imposed in
narrow circumstances defined in the WTO agreements. Given that rules
governing quotas were fundamentally different from the rules governing
tariffs, there was no basis to apply Article XXIV:6 by analogy to
quotas, as Turkey had claimed. Moreover, paragraph 4 of the
Understanding on Article XXIV made it explicit that paragraph 6 of
Article XXIV established the procedures to be followed when a Member
forming a custom union proposed to increase a bound rate of duty. Had
the Uruguay Round negotiators meant to extend Article XXIV:6 to
quotas, they would have formulated this provision accordingly.
- India noted that two important conclusions for the interpretation of
Article XXIV:5 could be drawn from Article XXIV:6. Firstly, if Members
forming a customs union could not ignore their obligations under
Article II and any duty increased by such Members was to be brought
into conformity through a renegotiation under Article XXVIII, it could
reasonably be concluded that they could also not ignore such
obligations in respect of quotas. Secondly, Members adversely affected
by a duty increase had to be compensated under the procedures of
Article XXVIII; since Article XXIV did not provide for any form of
compensation for Members adversely affected by the imposition of a new
quota, it could logically be concluded that Article XXIV was not meant
to authorize the imposition of quotas.
- Turning to analyze, in accordance with Article 31:3(b) of the VCLT,
subsequent practice in the application of Article XXIV:5, India could
not find any which would lend support to Turkey�s interpretation of
this provision.
- India recalled that the claim that Article XXIV:5 of GATT authorized
QRs inconsistent with Article XI was made by the six members of the
EEC in 1957 when the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947 examined the
Treaty of Rome. The Report of the Sub-Group considering the EEC�s
restrictions recorded the following:
"Most members of the sub-group could not accept the
interpretation of the Six of paragraph 5(a) ... The notion that
paragraph 5(a) would require that temporary QRs should be treated in
the same way as normal protective measures such as tariffs in
determining the trade relations between countries in a customs union
and third countries would be contrary to the basic provision of the
Agreement which precludes the use of QRs as an acceptable protective
instrument." 117
- India noted that this had been the position of third countries in
all cases in which the claim that Article XXIV:5 justified
restrictions had been made. 118
More recently the European Communities had accepted this position
since it stated during the GATT examination of Portugal and Spain�s
Accession to the European Communities as follows:
"On the question of the other regulations of commerce, and in
particular QRs, the Communities agreed that Article XXIV did not
provide a waiver from other provisions of the GATT." 119
- India also considered that it was on the basis of such
interpretation of Article XXIV that the EC-Turkey Association Council
Decision 1/95 had been drafted. Referring to paragraphs 2 and 3 of
Article 12 of the Decision, it noted that the provisions described the
adoption of the same policy in the textile sector as an
"objective" and recognized that "cooperation"
between the European Communities and Turkey was required to achieve
this objective. Moreover, the provisions made it clear that the
drafters envisaged the possibility that Turkey would not succeed in
negotiating restraint agreements identical to those of the European
Communities because they explicitly agreed that in this case the
European Communities would continue to apply the system of
certificates of origin to prevent the circumvention of its policies
through shipments into the European Communities via Turkey. The
parties, when drafting these provisions, thus recognized that Turkey
could not, simply by invoking Article XXIV, unilaterally impose the
import restrictions which the European Communities was entitled to
impose under the transitional provisions of the ATC.
- India recognized that the pronouncements listed above might not be
sufficiently "concordant, common and consistent" to
constitute subsequent practice within the meaning of Article 31:3(b)
of the VCLT; 120
however, they demonstrated that the claim that Article XXIV:5 provided
a waiver from the general prohibition of QRs had never been accepted
and that the European Communities and Turkey had themselves not
proceeded on the assumption that it did provide such a waiver. Turkey
negotiated restraint agreements similar to those of the European
Communities with 24 countries; it imposed unilateral restrictions or
surveillance regimes to imports from 28 countries with which it was
not possible to reach agreements, among them India. India noted that
the interpretation of Article XXIV which the European Communities and
Turkey had adopted in response to their failure to conclude restraint
agreements with all exporting countries was in complete contradiction
with the legal assumption on which their original decision to
negotiate such agreements was based.
- Turkey disagreed with India's argument according to which, if
the Turkey-EC customs union could put in place a common regulation of
commerce determined by restrictive measures applied by the European
Communities, the obligations under Article XI:1 of GATT and Article
2.4 ATC would be ignored. Turkey pointed out that, while the GATT
expressly stated that its provisions "shall not prevent the
formation of a customs union" (the chapeau of Article
XXIV:5), it took account of the pre-existing obligations of members of
a customs union vis-�-vis other GATT contracting parties by
the requirements in Article XXIV:5(a) relating to the customs tariff
and the common regulation of commerce of the customs union.
- Turkey also disagreed with India's argument that, unlike in the case
of the raising of customs duties rates for certain items that might
result from the establishment of a common customs tariff, there was no
procedure on compensatory adjustment for QRs and that as a result
Article XI obligations could be ignored. According to Turkey, it could
not be inferred from the fact that Article XXIV:6 only referred to
increases of customs duty rates that the intention behind Article
XXIV:5(a) was to prohibit restrictive measures of a common regulation
of commerce of a customs union, determined by one of the parties to
such customs union. Such interpretation would be difficult to
reconcile with Article XXIV:5(a) providing a test for the GATT
consistency of a customs union with the GATT establishing, inter
alia, that a regulation of commerce of a customs union could not on
the whole be more restrictive than the regulation of commerce
applicable in the constituent territories prior to the formation of
the customs union.
- Turkey noted that Article XXIV:6 did not exclude compensatory
adjustments, where the common regulation of commerce of a customs
union applied a restrictive measure taking account of the application
of such a measure by a party to a customs union prior to the formation
of that customs union. In agreeing to the Understanding on Article
XXIV, WTO Members made this clear. In paragraph 2 of that
Understanding they agreed on further rules on the evaluation under
Article XXIV:5(a) of the general incidence of duties and other
regulations of commerce applicable before and after the formation of a
customs union, when recognizing "that for the purpose of the
overall assessment of the incidence of other regulations of commerce
for which quantification and aggregation are difficult, the
examination of individual measures, regulations, products covered and
trade flows affected may be required".
- Turkey submitted that it would make little sense to provide for an
evaluation of the overall incidence of other regulations of commerce
if, as India asserted, the regulation of commerce of the Turkey-EC
customs union could not be determined by pre-existing restrictive
measures applied by the European Communities. It would equally make
little sense to provide for an examination of individual measures,
with a view of the evaluation of their incidence if, as India
asserted, GATT did not permit the regulation of commerce of the
Turkey-EC customs union to be determined by pre-existing restrictive
measures applied by the European Communities. Why evaluate the
incidence of a measure which would be prohibited? It would also make
little sense to provide for an evaluation of the incidence of
individual measures of a regulation of commerce of a customs union, if
this would not to give rise, where appropriate, to a duty to offer a
compensatory adjustment. In this context, Turkey drew attention to the
steps taken by Turkey in this sense. In respect of textiles and
clothing products, Turkey had negotiated adjustments with 24
countries. Turkey had also, repeatedly but in vain, offered to India
to negotiate adjustments.
To continue with Article XXIV:8(a)
105 See BISD 30S/168,
paras. 25-33.
106 Ibid., para. 32.
107 See BISD 35S/293,
paras. 19-21.
108 Ibid., paras.
19-20.
109 Ibid., para. 45.
110 In its Report on US
- Gasoline, the Appellate Body had made clear that an interpretation
might not result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs to redundancy or
inutility (p. 22).
111 Appellate Body
Report on US - Gasoline, para. 6.
112 Ibid., para. 49.
113 In this context,
Turkey recalled that the accession of Sweden to the European Union on 1
January 1995 had led it to adopt the EC's common commercial policy in
textiles and clothing, which had resulted in the replacement of a
tariff-based system by QRs similar to those applied by Turkey since the
completion of the Turkey-EC customs union, without the relevant procedures
of the MFA being observed. No country had however invoked Article XXII or
Article XXIII rights in connection with the adoption of those measures by
Sweden despite the fact that Sweden was not applying quantitative
restrictions to imports of textiles and clothing before. Moreover, the
formula used in the calculation of the quota levels to be applied by
Turkey after completion of the Turkey-EC customs union was the same as the
one used in the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden.
114 Of course, as
required by Article XXIV:5(a), the overall impact of the creation of the
customs union should not be such as to be on the whole more
trade-restrictive than the general incidence of the duties and regulations
of commerce applicable to the constituent territories prior to the
formation of the customs union. As demonstrated before, however, this was
not the case in the Turkey-EC customs union.
115 Panel Report (not
adopted) on EEC - Member States' Import Regimes for Bananas, DS32/R
("EEC - Bananas I"), para. 358 (emphasis added).
116 Appellate Body
Report on Japan - Alcoholic Beverages, section E.
117 Reports on the
European Economic Community, adopted on 29 November 1957, BISD 6S/70,
para. 5.
118 See detailed
references to past discussions in the GATT on the use of QRs by Members
forming a customs union in the third-party submission of Thailand (para.
7.84 below).
119 Report of the
Working Party on the Accession of Portugal and Spain to the EC,
adopted on 19-20 October 1988 (BISD 35S/293).
120 See the Appellate
Body Report on Japan - Alcoholic Beverages, Section E, on this
issue.
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