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AND MANMADE FIBRE UNDERWEAR
Report of the Panel
III FINDINGS REQUESTED
3.1 Costa Rica requested
the Panel to find specifically, inter alia, on the following
aspects:
2. That the increase in "807
trade" could not be considered to constitute increased imports,
within the meaning of Article 6.2 of the ATC;
3. That if, the above notwithstanding,
it was considered that these increased imports did fall within
the provisions of Article 6.2 of the ATC, the fact was that
this showed the US industry manufacturing underwear cut pieces
to be in excellent condition and not to be in need of any protection;
4. That serious damage and actual
threat of serious damage were two different concepts which, to
be demonstrated, required the submission of separate information
and a different analysis;
5. That the finding of the TMB
to the effect that the United States had not demonstrated serious
damage to its underwear-manufacturing industry should be upheld;
6. That, given the unreliable,
erroneous, contradictory and incomplete nature of the information
submitted by the United States in an attempt to justify its account
of the situation of its industry, that country had failed to fulfil
its obligation to demonstrate serious damage;
7. That the United States, having
changed the ostensible basis for its measure, had nonetheless
never submitted the information required or provided the analysis
necessary to demonstrate the existence of actual threat of serious
damage to its underwearmanufacturing industry;
8. That, even assuming the existence
of increased imports and serious damage or actual threat of serious
damage, the United States had not demonstrated the existence of
a causal link between the two, and indeed that the agreements
which it had reached with the other countries called to consultations
in this category confirmed the non-existence of such a causal
link;
9. That, even supposing that
the United States had met the three basic requirements for entitlement
to resort to the special transitional safeguard mechanism, it
had never submitted the information necessary nor carried out
the analysis required to attribute the alleged damage or threat
to imports from Costa Rica;
10. That the various factors
present in this case and, in particular, the proposals for restraint
made by the United States to Costa Rica and the quota levels which
it had negotiated with the other countries called to consultations
in this category, indicated that what the United States was really
seeking was to protect not the underwear-manufacturing industry
but rather the branch of the domestic industry which manufactured
the cloth used in underwear production;
11. That the ATC did not permit
the imposition of a safeguard measure on an imported clothing
product in order to protect the cloth used to produce it;
12. That the United States had
imposed and renewed the restriction on the basis of the existence
of an actual threat of serious damage, despite never having held
consultations on the subject;
13. That in June 1995 the United
States had imposed a unilateral restriction on Costa Rica, making
it retroactive to March of that year, despite the fact that under
the ATC it had no authority to do so; and
14. That the United States violated
the spirit and the letter of Article 8 of the ATC by refusing,
without any justification, to follow the recommendations made
by the TMB, in particular, that it should hold consultations with
Costa Rica bearing in mind that serious damage had not been demonstrated,
that no consensus could be reached on the existence of actual
threat of serious damage, that the trade concerned had particular
features and that there were equity considerations which should
be taken into account, and by failing to submit a report explaining
its inability to conform with those recommendations.
3.2 Costa Rica further
requested the Panel, on the basis of the above considerations
and in view of the fact that the United States had proceeded
in violation of the ATC, to find in its report that the Government
of the United States should ensure that the unilateral restriction
adopted against Costa Rica should comply with the ATC and
that in this particular case compliance should be through the
immediate withdrawal of the measure. Costa Rica based its
request on Article 19.1 of the DSU, which authorized the
Panel to specify the appropriate way of applying its recommendations.
3.3 The United States
requested the Panel to find that:
3.4 With respect to Costa Rica's
request that the Panel find
and also to find in its report
the United States considered
that the heterogeneity of phrasing left Costa Rica's objective
in doubt, but argued that if the request was for a Panel recommendation
that specific actions should be taken, or for findings that would
amount in effect to such a recommendation, the request was inconsistent
with Article 19.1 of the DSU.
3.5 In the view of the United
States, the DSU gave WTO panels explicit instructions with
respect to the one and only recommendation that properly may be
offered if the measures of a Member were found to be inconsistent
with its obligations: to bring the measures into conformity with
its obligations. The avoidance of granting specific remedies,
such as the withdrawal or modification of a measure, was a wellestablished
practice under the GATT, and had been codified in Article 19.1
of the DSU, which provided:
The Panel need to make no recommendations
at all, as the measures at issue were fully consistent with US
obligations under the ATC; however, if any recommendation was
made, in their view, the Panel was not authorized to make any
recommendation other than that provided for in Article 19.1
of the DSU.
3.6 Costa Rica replied
that, Article 19.1 of the DSU, contrary to the statement
made by the United States, authorized the Panel to specify
the appropriate way of applying its recommendations by providing
that:
* * * * *
Other Issues
3.7 On 21 June 1996,
the United States requested the Panel's attention to breaches
in confidentiality by Costa Rica concerning proposals made by
the United States in consultations, and Costa Rica's use of that
information in this proceeding to prejudice the United States
case. On 24 June 1996, Costa Rica had responded in
the first substantive meeting of the Panel with information concerning
disclosures made by the US embassy in San Jose, Costa Rica, concerning
US proposals in consultations with Costa Rica. Subsequently,
the US had investigated those disclosures and discovered that
they were made in response to the numerous press statements in
San Jose by journalists and members of the Costa Rican Government.
US embassy statements had been made solely in response to this
press offensive by Costa Rica.
3.8 Costa Rica emphasized
that publication of any article prior to the initiation of the
dispute settlement procedure under the DSU, which in any case
was at the initiative of the United States as part of their strategy
to exert pressure on the Government of Costa Rica, was irrelevant
from the point of view of the confidentiality prescribed by Article 4.6
of the DSU because this applied to consultations initiated under
the dispute settlement mechanism of the DSU and not to any event
that occurred prior to that time. Accordingly, one of the documents
referred to by the United States was irrelevant as it was published
prior to the initiation of the consultation procedure under the
DSU. The other two articles were replies to public declarations
by representatives of the United States Government or by the enterprise
which the United States was seeking to protect. Moreover, Costa Rica
indicated that the fact that Article 4.6 stated that consultations
were confidential could not be interpreted as a limitation on
the rights of parties at the Panel stage. On the contrary, confidentiality
must be understood as referring to parties not involved in the
dispute and to the public, but not in any way to the Panel itself.
It was not the intention of Article 4.6 to limit the possibilities
available to the Panel to be apprised of information on the dispute
before it because this would be to the detriment of the procedure
itself.
3.9 The United States
accepted that since the US embassy was responsible for some of
the disclosures, they withdrew the request. This withdrawal was
made without prejudice to the other points made concerning Costa
Rica's misuse and distortion of information on consultations in
this case.
* * * * *
IV THIRD PARTY SUBMISSION:
INDIA
4.1 India had indicated
their interest in the matter and their desire to participate in
the Panel process as an interested third party pursuant to Article 10
of the DSU. Accordingly, India was invited to present their views
to the Panel at its first meeting on 25 June 1996.
In their submission India reviewed the measure taken by the United
States and provided views on various aspects. In particular,
India requested the Panel to include in its findings:
(b) that all the data necessary
to be provided to Costa Rica in terms of the provisions of
Article 6 of ATC had not been provided by the United States
and some of the data provided was not compiled objectively and
therefore lacked reliability;
(c) that the data available had
not indicated that there had been either a situation of serious
damage or one of actual threat of serious damage to the domestic
industry of the United States, attributable to imports;
(d) that imports from Costa Rica
which had been almost entirely from US components supplied by
the US industry producing underwear and mostly produced in Costa Rica
by units established by US underwear manufacturers could not have
contributed to serious damage of actual threat thereof to the
same US industry which engaged voluntarily in such co-production
activities;
(e) that the US action actually
sought to protect the US industry producing fabrics for underwear
and not the industry producing underwear and this was inconsistent
with the provisions of the Article 6 of the ATC;
(f) that a temporary safeguard
action under Article 6 of the ATC had to be pursued by the
importing country and reviewed by the TMB entirely on the basis
of data that had been available to the importing country at the
time they made a determination that there was a situation of serious
damage or actual threat thereof;
(g) that the importing country
had to choose between the grounds of serious damage and of actual
threat of serious damage at the time of determination of the market
situation before initiating the safeguard action and the data
requirements for these two grounds was different in nature and
not in degree;
(h) that there was no provision
in the ATC for retroactive restraints; and
(i) that if not endorsed by the
TMB after the mandatory review, a safeguard action would not survive.
4.2 With reference to the submission
by India, the United States expressed the view that
the ATC did not require the importing country to choose between
serious damage and actual threat when making its determination
and so the United States had relied upon both, and referred
to both, in their request for consultations. Also, Article 6.3
of the ATC did not provide any separate criteria for evaluating
serious damage on the one hand, and actual threat thereof on the
other. The ATC also had no provisions specifically addressing
actual threat (unlike the WTO legal provisions concerning anti-dumping
duties, countervailing duties, or GATT Article XIX safeguards).
India had also referred to "sharp and substantial"
and "imminent" increases in their submission. However,
in the view of the United States, those standards
applied to a determination of attribution under Article 6.4
of the ATC, and were irrelevant to a determination under Article 6.2
of the ATC.
4.3 Costa Rica endorsed
and formally incorporated in its submission the arguments and
observations contained in the submission made by India and took
the view that the Panel should make reference in its written report
to the points it had developed and to rule on each of them.
* * * * *
V MAIN ARGUMENTS BY
THE PARTIES
A. THE SAFEGUARD ACTION
TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES
Statement of Serious Damage:
Category 352/652 (March 1995 Market Statement)
5.1 Costa Rica noted
that the March Market Statement of the United States (annexed
to this report) had said nothing about the percentage of "807
trade" in the production and import data and made no attempt
to analyze the impact of this factor on the trade in this category.
Accordingly, there was no way of determining whether domestic
production really grew or not; what the actual market share of
the United States industry was; and the true ratio of imports
to domestic production.
5.2 The United States
explained by way of background that their Office of Textiles and
Apparel (OTEXA) at the Department of Commerce was responsible
for collecting data and producing statements of serious damage
or actual threat thereof for consideration by the CITA. In early
1995, the CITA had reviewed the data on total imports of cotton
and man-made fibre underwear (category 352/652) into the United
States in accordance with Article 6.2 of the ATC. Following
the criteria in that Article, the United States had looked at
total imports of category 352/652. In so doing, they had found
that such imports had surged from 65,507,000 dozen in 1992 to
79,962,000 dozen in 1993. The CITA had found that total imports
continued to surge in 1994, reaching 97,375,000 dozen, 22 per
cent above the 1993 level and 49 per cent above the 1992 level.
These data included re-imports.
5.3 The CITA had estimated that
approximately 395 establishments in the United States manufacturing
underwear employed about 6 per cent of total US apparel workers,
and had annual shipments of $3.2 billion, accounting for
approximately 5 per cent of total annual apparel shipments. The
concentration of firms in this industry was higher in the men's
underwear segment than in the women's segment. In the men's segment,
four firms had accounted for over 60 per cent of the shipments.
The production of women's underwear was more subject to fashion
changes. As a result, production was less standardized, requiring
different types of knitting machines and a greater number of workers
being employed. There was, however, a large number of smaller
producers which generally did not have integrated operations but
usually purchased fabrics and then cut and sewed them.
5.4 The CITA had then examined
factors listed in Article 6.3 of the ATC, such as US production,
market share loss, employment, domestic prices, profits and investment,
production capacity and sales. The CITA had found that US production
in category 352/652 had declined from 175,542,000 dozen in 1992
to 168,802,000 dozen in 1993, representing a 4 per cent decline.
Production had continued to decline in 1994 falling to 126,962,000
dozen during the first 9 months of 1994, four per cent below the
JanuarySeptember 1993 production level. US manufacturers'
domestic market share had dropped from 73 per cent in 1992 to
68 per cent in 1993, a decline of 5 percentage points. During
the first 9 months of 1994 that share had dropped to 65 percent.
As a per cent of US production, imports had increased from 37
per cent in 1992 to 47 per cent in 1993, and had grown by 54 per
cent in the first nine months of 1994.
5.5 Costa Rica questioned
if the data on employment and manhours were a special situation
linked to increased imports or if they reflected a continuing
trend within the industry. It was also observed that no numbers
were given for layoffs; there was no causal link made between
imports and job losses; and no basis was given for the statements
about postponed investment or disinvestment, nor was consideration
given to the possibility that these might represent economically
rational decisions on the part of the companies concerned and
might have no causal relationship at all with the trend or level
of imports. The comment was also made that shifting production
capacity to other product lines should be regarded as a positive
trend, favouring the interests of the United States companies
themselves.
5.6 Costa Rica affirmed
that the United States had not satisfactorily established
the existence of problems affecting employment, sales and profits,
investment or capacity in its industry inasmuch as it was not
possible to establish clearly the state of the industry on the
basis of evidence from one or two enterprises. The United States
had not properly established either the facts related to imports,
domestic production and market size, especially because of the
total absence of any analysis of the question of 807 trade
in its March statement.
5.7 The United States
also pointed out that the CITA had found that the number of production
workers in the US underwear industry had dropped from 46,377 in
1992 to 44,056 in 1994, declining by 5 per cent, resulting
in the loss of 2,321 workers. Average annual man-hours worked
had dropped from 86.2 million in 1992 to 81.5 million in 1994.
Based on a survey of individual firms producing cotton and man-made
fibre underwear, the following conditions were reported: individual
firms had reported layoffs, import-related plant closings and
slowed sales; one firm had reported a decline in sales of 17 per
cent in 1994 and a decline in profits by 18 per cent and there
was pressure on the bottom line throughout the industry due to
rising costs and stiff import competition. The uncertainty due
to the increasing imports had caused US companies to postpone
investment in this industry. Some companies had also closed plants
permanently or shifted production capacity offshore, and additional
disinvestment of this nature was contemplated by underwear manufacturing
firms. Import prices were very low and placed considerable pressure
on domestic producers.
5.8 Costa Rica did
not accept that an increase in raw cotton prices had affected
the producers of cotton fabric or yarn or the producers of cotton
or manmade fibre underwear. As to the priceedge which
imports enjoyed over domestically produced goods, there was no
indication whether this meant all imports or some imports were
produced with lower priced fabric and no justification was given
for these assertions. Also, these statements did not take into
consideration the fact that most of the growth in "imports"
of the products in question was concentrated in those assembled
outside the United States from US components. This meant
that the domestic industry used the same raw material as the "imports"
of products assembled from US components, so that the cotton price
increases mentioned should have had no effect at all on import
levels.
5.9 The United States,
however, argued that competing imports had enjoyed a price edge
over domestically produced goods because the imports were produced
with lower-priced foreign fabric. As a result of the increased
market share in underwear held by imports, average retail prices
of underwear in the United States had generally declined during
the past two years, at a time when US manufacturers' costs, particularly
for raw cotton, had increased substantially. This development
had seriously eroded the profitability of US underwear manufacturers.
Based on the above factors and in accordance with Articles 6.2
and 6.3 of the ATC, the CITA had determined that there was serious
damage, or actual threat thereof, to the US underwear industry.
The United States then proceeded to identify Member countries
to whom this damage could be attributed, as required by Article 6.4
of the ATC.
Attribution to Exporting
Countries
5.10 Costa Rica noted
that data on their exports to the US made no reference to the
process of production sharing between the two countries, even
though all the increase in imports could be attributed precisely
to such coproduction.
5.11 The United States
explained that in applying the criteria in Article 6.4 of
the ATC, the CITA had attributed the serious damage, or actual
threat thereof, to imports from five WTO member countries
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Thailand, and Turkey
- and to two countries that had not yet become WTO Members - Colombia
and El Salvador. Total imports from the five WTO countries had
increased from 22,675,508 dozen in 1992 to 40,293,259 dozen in
1994. This increase had represented a collective sharp and substantial
increase of 78 per cent. Together, imports from these countries
had increased 32 per cent in 1994 over their 1993 level. Imports
in 1992 for these countries were 35 per cent of total US
imports in cotton and man-made fibre underwear. In 1994, their
share had increased to 41 per cent.
5.12 In the case of Costa Rica,
the CITA had found that the increase in imports from Costa Rica
alone was higher than the level of imports of category 352/652
from at least 85 other countries and had exceeded the levels of
six other suppliers whose imports were under quota. Costa Rica
was the second largest supplier to the United States. Consistent
with the criteria in Article 6.4 of the ATC, the CITA had
found that there was a sharp and substantial increase of low-priced
imports from Costa Rica, as imports of cotton and man-made fibre
underwear had reached 14,423,178 dozen in 1994, a 22 per cent
increase above the 1993 level of 11,844,331 dozen and 61 per cent
above the 1992 level. Such imports had entered the United States
from Costa Rica at an average landed duty-paid value of $9.39
per dozen, 69 per cent below the US producers' average price for
the product. The CITA had also found that imports from Costa
Rica were equivalent to 8.8 per cent of US production of category
352/652 in the year ending September 1994.
Consultations with Costa Rica
5.13 The United States
advised that, based on their findings, the CITA had requested
consultations with Costa Rica. In accordance with Article 6.7
of the ATC, the request was accompanied by a statement (the March Market
Statement) complying with Articles 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4
of the ATC. Further, as required by Article 6.7 of the ATC,
the United States had proposed a level of restraint for underwear
imports from Costa Rica which would be at a level not less than
the level existing at 12 of the 14 months preceding
the month of the request for consultations.
5.14 During the first round of
consultations, on 12 June 1995, the United States
had discussed the basis for its request for consultations and
the high level of estimated re-imports in Costa Rican trade, approximately
94 per cent of their total trade of 14,423,178 dozen at the time
of the call. Taking its estimates of re-imports from Costa Rica
into account, the United States had proposed a specific limit
(SL) of 1.25 million dozen to cover the portion of imports
not qualifying for more favourable treatment that would have grown
to 1,488,770 dozen in the final year of the three-year restraint
period specified in the ATC. Re-imports had represented a significant
portion of Costa Rica's total underwear exports to the United
States. Accordingly, consistent with US policy and its obligation
under Article 6.6(d) of the ATC to provide more favourable
treatment to such re-imports, the United States had proposed a
guaranteed access level (GAL) of 20,000,000 dozen. Costa Rica
did not make a counterproposal, but maintained that the request
for consultations was unsubstantiated.
5.15 With respect to the first
bilateral consultations, Costa Rica said that they had
drawn attention to a series of inconsistencies, defects and omissions
in the March Market Statement, raising numerous points with a
view to questioning the compatibility of the Statement with the
parameters established by Article 6 of the ATC and hence
showing that the Statement could not serve as a basis for the
imposition of a restriction.
5.16 Costa Rica also
observed that the remedy being proposed by the United States (21.25 million dozen)
consisted of an extra dose (30 per cent or more) of
the level they claimed to be attacking (14.4 million dozen).
Although 14.4 million dozen was supposed to be causing serious
damage, the United States had proposed that trade be restricted
to 21.52 million dozen. From that point on, a serious
question had arisen as to the objective being pursued by the United
States in their attempt to establish new restrictions: was it
to protect the underwear manufacturers by guaranteeing
them a further increase in imports, or was it to benefit the US
makers of the cloth used for manufacturing the product? Without
having replied to any of the questions raised by Costa Rica
in connection with the March Market Statement, on 22 June 1995
the United States had made a new proposal for the establishment
of a quantitative restriction, this time offering 1.3 million
dozen SL and 20 million GAL for the period from
1 January 1996 to 31 December 1996, with an
increase of 6 per cent on the quota for subsequent periods.
Again, Costa Rica rejected this proposal as the United States
was still not complying with the requirements of the ATC for the
application of a transitional safeguard.
B. REVIEW BY THE TEXTILES
MONITORING BODY
Determining Domestic Market
Data
5.17 In its review (see paragraphs 2.15
to 2.18), the TMB members had inquired concerning double-counting
in the data presented by the United States because in official
US data, re-imports had appeared in both imports and production.
Such double-counting had resulted in an overstatement of the
size of the domestic market. The United States pointed
out that the US Census Bureau counted domestic apparel production
by collecting data on unassembled garment parts cut in the United
States before they were assembled domestically or shipped offshore
for assembly. As a result, Census statistics reflected re-imports
as apparel which was cut in the US, sent outside the country to
be sewn, and then returned under the tariff provision for re-imports
as a finished garment. Re-imports were included as domestic output
(cut parts), exports (unassembled cut parts), and imports (finished
garments).
5.18 Since export quantity data
were generally less reliable than import data, the domestic market
for textile and apparel categories as derived by the United States
for quota purposes, was: production + imports. As the TMB had
requested export data, the United States was now defining
the domestic market as: production + imports - exports. Consequently,
the domestic market was overstated by the amount of the re-imported
products, since re-imported products were counted as production
(before assembled) and imports (when finished). In an attempt
to remove the double-counting from the US market, the United States
had subtracted the re-imports from domestic production. Costa Rica
had claimed during the TMB proceeding that such overstatement
should be resolved by deducting re-imports from import data instead
of production data. However, as an exception the general rule,
the Harmonized Tariff Schedule identified re-imported textile
and apparel articles as foreign goods. Therefore, the re-imports
were properly counted in import data. After adjusting for the
overstatement of the size of the market, the US producers' share
of the domestic market had fallen from 69 per cent in 1992 to
62 per cent in 1993 and to 55 per cent in 1994, a 14 percentage
point drop in two years. 5.19 Costa Rica highlighted that in the case of imports of cut pieces for assembly in the United States, the United States Government had been treating the product as originating in the country in which the pieces were cut. Thus, for example, fabric cut in China and then assembled in Costa Rica had been treated as a product of China on entering the United States market. At the same time, the US Census Bureau considered that fabric cut, for example in Alabama for assembly in Costa Rica was United States domestic production. That was why "re-imports" were considered to be domestic production by that US statistical office and why the United States included them as such in its March Statement. However, it was also clear that the United States treated the same garments as "imports" when entered under heading 9802 of its tariff, for the purpose of collecting duty on the value added abroad and preventing the use of the "Made in the United States" label.
5.20 The United States
also said that when the TMB had suggested later in the proceeding
that the overstatement in the US domestic market should be adjusted
by introducing US export data, they had pointed out to the TMB
that the data derived from this formula would still be flawed
because export data were generally less reliable than import data.
Despite its concerns about the validity of the available export
data, the United States had supplied the TMB with the requested
export data. The introduction of export data had left the import/production
ratio unchanged from the ratio in the March Market Statement,
demonstrating the same picture of declining domestic production
and surging imports. Data showing the value of exports had been
first presented because of their greater reliability. Data in
quantity terms had also been presented in a revised market calculation.
The US producers' share of the domestic market had shown a drop
from 70 per cent in 1992 to 63 per cent in 1993 and to 57 per cent
in 1994, a 13 percentage point drop in two years.
5.21 Costa Rica recalled
that they had asserted on numerous occasions that the requirements
of "actual threat of serious damage" had not been evaluated
in the March Statement, nor was it included in the publications
in the Federal Register nor alleged by the United States
in the first four proposals of restriction it presented to Costa Rica.
The July 1995 Market
Statement
5.22 Costa Rica considered
that the updated data presented by the US was not relevant information
intended to develop the information contained in the March Market
Statement but was information which openly and expressly contradicted
it. The United States was endeavouring to submit completely
revised and adjusted information in an attempt to justify the
adoption of a restriction which it had already adopted. The introduction
of a new statement at that point was unacceptable to Costa Rica
inasmuch as the data and determinations contained in the March
Market Statement had been those which had served to initiate the
consultations, impose a unilateral restriction and provide the
grounds for the review by the TMB.
5.23 The United States
noted that they had supplied updated data and new relevant information
at the July 1995 TMB proceeding. Although not required, these
submissions had been provided to the TMB consistent with Article 6.10
of the ATC and as part of the practice of the CITA to bring the
data up-to-date, to make them as consistent as possible with the
reference period for the March 1995 Market Statement, and to provide
further information demonstrating that the finding of serious
damage, or actual threat thereof remained justified in light of
the additional information continually becoming available. The
CITA had based its determinations of serious damage, or actual
threat thereof on publicly available information from official
US Government sources. There was no need to independently verify
this information. The production, import, and market share data
on which cases were based were published quarterly by the OTEXA
and available to all interested parties. The collection and analysis
of this data were part of a longstanding process that had been
in place for as long as there had been a comprehensive international
textile trade agreement, i.e., since the MFA began in 1974.
5.24 The additional relevant
information supplied at the time had concerned trade adjustment
assistance for US companies adversely impacted by imports and
import prices. All of the information provided at the time of
the July TMB session had supported and was consistent with the
March 1995 Market Statement and the basic justification for the
United States safeguard action with respect to underwear imports
from Costa Rica remained fully warranted.
5.25 Costa Rica pointed
out that, in the July Market Statement there were 302 establishments
in the United States that manufactured garments classified in
category 352/652, whereas according to the March Market Statement
the number of establishments was 395. The March and July Statements
indicated that annual shipments had amounted to $3.2 billion,
although the data on which it was based (domestic production and
the US producers' average price) were not the same in the two
Statements. According to the July Statement, in 1992 employment
in the sector was 35,191, falling in 1994 to 33,309. According
to the March Statement, employment in the sector was 46,377 in
1992, dropping to 44,056 in 1994. The July Statement did not
explain why there should be this difference of about 10,000 between
the figures given in the two Statements. Nor did the data for
annual man-hours coincide, inasmuch as the July Statement gave
a figure of 65.4 million in 1992 falling to 61.6 million
in 1994, whereas the corresponding figures in the March Statement
were 86.2 million and 81.5 million respectively.
5.26 Costa Rica also
noted that the July Market Statement included a section on trade
adjustment assistance for United States companies adversely impacted
by imports, giving data on the current US federal programmes for
assisting industries and workers that had been unfavourably impacted
by imports. It was questioned how these programmes could be put
forward as additional justification for imposing a quantitative
restriction when their purpose was precisely to provide alternatives
to the imposition of a restriction on imports. The fourth section
of the July Statement which concerned the countries contributing
to serious damage described the price difference between US underwear
production and underwear production in other countries. It was
noted that this section contained a discrepancy between the July
and March Statements, namely whereas in March the average United
States producers' price was said to be $30 per dozen, the July
Statement indicated that that price varied between $16 and $20
per dozen, depending on where the product was assembled. No information
had been given to explain the reason for such a substantial error
in the March Statement. 5.27 The United States commented that Costa Rica was incorrect in its characterization of the Trade Adjustment Assistance programme as an "alternative" to safeguard action under the ATC. The United States had not created the programme to replace US rights and obligations under the ATC, Section 204, or similar actions under US law and the WTO. As regards the differences in price and other figures between the March and July Statements, the United States noted that even though there were differences in the updated data, the CITA's determination of serious damage or actual threat thereof was still sustainable.
Outcome of the TMB Review
5.28 At the conclusion of its
examination, the TMB had decided that the United States had not
demonstrated serious damage, but it could not reach consensus
on the existence of actual threat of serious damage (G/TMB/R/2).
As a result, the TMB had not reached the issue of attribution.
The TMB had, however, recommended that the United States, Costa
Rica and Honduras consult further,
5.29 According to Costa Rica,
at the new round of consultations as recommended by the TMB, held
on 1718 August 1995, they had asked the United States to
clarify the difference between serious damage and actual threat
of serious damage and for relevant factual information in support
of the latter. They had also urged the United States to
explain why, having a market supposedly threatened by the importation
of 14.4 million dozen garments from Costa Rica, they
had proposed to establish a quantitative restriction which would
allow imports of Costa Rican underwear to rise to 33 million dozen.
The United States had not offered any explanation, at least at
that meeting, which ended without a satisfactory solution having
been reached. The two parties then submitted their reports to
the TMB for review purposes.
5.30 Costa Rica also
pointed out that in October 1995, the OTEXA had published
new statistics for the category in question which showed the production
situation to be different from that indicated in the March and
July Statements. Whereas according to the March Statement production
had declined by 4 per cent between 1992 and 1993 and by 4 per
cent between 1993 and 1994, the July data indicated that the decline
was 4 per cent for the first period and almost non-existent in
the second, while according to the October information the percentage
decreases were of the order of 1.5 per cent and 2.6 per cent respectively.
5.31 At its meeting on 1620 October 1995,
the TMB received reports from Costa Rica and the United States
on the bilateral consultations they had held following the TMB recommendation.
It took note of the reports and of the fact that the two parties
had not reached a mutual understanding during the consultations.
The TMB's discussions confirmed the Body's previous findings
in this matter; there being no further requests by the parties
involved, the TMB considered its review of the matter completed
(G/TMB/R/5).
C. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
AND BURDEN OF PROOF
Standard of Review
The "Fur Felt Hat" Case2
5.32 The United States
considered that the appropriate standard to apply to the importing
country's determination was a standard of reasonableness. Article 6
of the ATC referred to "a determination by a Member,"
based on weighing of evidence on certain factors. The standard
for panel evaluation of such determinations should follow established
GATT practice, which was based on the GATT 1947 case concerning
the withdrawal by the United States under Article XIX of
a tariff concession on women's fur felt hats and hat bodies.
In the Fur Felt Hat case, the Czechoslovak Government had sought
a determination that the US invocation of Article XIX had
been improper, and asserted that the United States had not met
certain conditions under Article XIX to take the action,
seeking revocation of the measure. The Working Party rejected
the Czechoslovak argument and stated:
5.33 The United States
recalled that the US action involved in the 1951 GATT working
party Report had been taken under GATT Article XIX:1, which
referred to the factual existence of increased imports under conditions
The legal standard, and the facts
required to be found, were similar to those involved in the case
of transitional safeguards under Article 6.2 of the ATC.
5.34 In October 1950, just before
the Fifth Session of the CONTRACTING PARTIES, the United States
had announced its intention to withdraw the concession in question
under Article XIX. The US Government had entered into consultation
with the contracting party with which the concessions had been
negotiated and with several contracting parties having a substantial
supplying interest. The following month, Czechoslovakia brought
a complaint claiming that the action taken did not meet the criteria
of Article XIX:1, and sought a determination by the CONTRACTING
PARTIES that this action was inconsistent with Article XIX.
The complaint was referred to a working party for study. The
working party had examined separately each of the conditions for
invocation of Article XIX, and presented a report in March
1951 which embodied the findings of the members other than the
two parties to the dispute. This report was then adopted at the
Sixth Session in 1951. The report had found that the United States
had satisfied these conditions.
5.35 The United States
suggested that the information used by the "Fur Felt Hat"
working party as a basis for its conclusions should be noted,
that is GATT notifications, summary records of discussions at
the Fifth Session, some additional data submitted at the working
party's request, and the report made by the US Tariff Commission
in connection with its determination of serious injury. However,
in examining whether serious injury and the other conditions in
Article XIX:1 existed, the working party chose to rely mainly
on the data in the Tariff Commission report. These data were
not perfect; for instance, they failed to separate figures on
production of men's and women's hat bodies. However, they were
the data available at the point in time determined by the working
party to be legally relevant in evaluating compliance with Article XIX.
As the report stated:
5.36 The working party then examined
the data and found them inconclusive. It stated that:
5.37 The working party members,
excluding the two disputants, concluded that they were satisfied
that the US authorities had investigated the matter thoroughly
on the basis of the data available to them at the time of their
inquiry, and had reached in good faith the conclusion that the
proposed action fell within the terms of Article XIX. If
the working party in its appraisal of the facts naturally gave
weight to international factors, and the US authorities would
normally give more weight to domestic factors,
Thus, the working party concluded
that there was no conclusive evidence that the safeguard measure
in question constituted a breach of obligations under the GATT.
Applying the "Fur
Felt Hat" Case to the Present Case
5.38 The United States
argued that the reasoning of the "Fur Felt Hat" case
applied equally to the present case. Both the working party in
that case and the present Panel have been charged with determining
whether a safeguard action was properly taken at the time that
the decision was made. In the case of Article XIX,
the working party had examined the information collected by the
Tariff Commission in the investigation which was the basis for
the decision, and whether the Commission's evaluation of that
information had been unreasonable. In the present case, the Panel
had been asked to evaluate the consistency of the CITA determination
under Article 6.2 of the ATC with the requirements of Articles 6.2
and 6.3 of the ATC. Article 6.2 of the ATC referred
to certain facts to be demonstrated "on the basis of a determination
by a Member" and Article 6.3 of the ATC required that
certain analyses be carried out in making such a determination.
Thus, in the view of the United States the focus of
the Panel's examination should be not the question of whether
serious damage or threat of serious damage exists now, but whether
the CITA could reasonably determine that it existed at the time
of the CITA determination in March 1995 and whether, after giving
the CITA the benefit of any reasonable doubt, Costa Rica had established
that no serious damage or threat thereof existed at that time.
5.39 The CITA determination could
therefore only be evaluated on the basis of data existing at the
time of its original determination. The data presented later
to the TMB in fact corroborated the analysis done in March 1995,
but they were not legally relevant in evaluating US conformity
with Articles 6.2 and 6.3 of the ATC. Article 6.10
of the ATC provided for later refinement of data and for response
to TMB requests for additional information, consistent with the
TMB spirit of conciliation, compromise and negotiation. However,
it was the March data that were legally relevant for evaluating
the determination, not the later data. The data recorded in the
March Market Statement formed the entire basis of the CITA's determination.
TO CONTINUE WITH USA - RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF COTTON AND MANMADE FIBRE UNDERWEAR
2 Report on the Withdrawal by the United States of a Tariff Concession under Article XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Concerning Women's Fur Felt Hats and Hat Bodies, 27 March 1951 - CP/106. |
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