World Trade Organization
|
WT/DS79/R
24 August 1998
(98-3091)
Original: English |
India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical
Products
Complaint by the European Communities and their member States
Report of the Panel
Article 70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement
4.21 The European Communities and their member States argued
that, in view of the fact that the Panel and the Appellate Body had
already found in the earlier dispute that the present Indian domestic r�gime
concerning the patent protection of pharmaceutical and agricultural
chemical products was inconsistent with India's obligations under Article
70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement, it followed pursuant to Article 3.8 of the
DSU that there was a presumption according to which this breach of the
relevant WTO rules by India had an adverse affect on the European
Communities and their member States as the other party to this dispute. In
these circumstances, the burden was on India to rebut the presumption
according to which India's present domestic r�gime for the patent
protection of pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products nullified
or impaired benefits accruing to the European Communities and their member
States under Article 70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement.
4.22 India argued that the interpretation of Article 70.9 of the
TRIPS Agreement by the Panel in the earlier case had not been based on
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the Panel
had incorrectly interpreted Article 70.9 as requiring implementation of
its provisions before specified events had occurred.
The terms of Article 70.9
- According to Article 70.9, exclusive marketing rights must be
granted by India to a pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical product
for which a patent application had been made in accordance with
Article 70.8(a) only after the following events had occurred:
(a) a patent application had been filed in respect of that product
in another Member of the WTO after 1 January 1995;
(b) the other Member of the WTO had granted the patent;
(c) the other Member had approved the marketing of the product;
(d) India had approved the marketing of the product.
- There was nothing in the text of Article 70.9 that set out the
obligation to make a "system" for the grant of exclusive
marketing rights generally available in the domestic law before the
events listed in this provision had occurred. The terms of Article
70.9 stipulated that exclusive marketing rights "shall be
granted" to specified products. The Panel, however, had
interpreted this provision as if it read: "the competent
authorities of the Members shall have the authority to grant exclusive
marketing rights", i.e. whether or not such rights had to be
granted.
- India had not denied the grant of exclusive marketing rights to any
product meeting the above conditions. The Panel had faced the same
fact in the earlier dispute but had nevertheless concluded that India
did not comply with its obligations under Article 70.9 of the TRIPS
Agreement because it had failed to establish under its domestic law
"a system" that enabled the executive branch of India to
grant exclusive marketing rights as of the entry into force of the WTO
Agreement.60
Context
- That the previous panel had expanded the meaning of Article 70.9
beyond its terms became obvious when the text of Article 70.9 was read
in its context. There were many provisions in the TRIPS Agreement
which explicitly obliged Members to change their domestic law to
permit their authorities to take certain action in favour of
interested parties. Thus, according to Articles 42-48 of the TRIPS
Agreement, the judicial authorities of Members "shall have the
authority" to grant certain rights. Article 51 obliged Members to
"adopt procedures" to enable right holders to prevent the
release of counterfeited or pirated products from customs. Article
39.2 required Members to give natural and legal persons "the
possibility of preventing" the disclosure of information.
According to Article 25.1, "Members shall provide for the
protection" of certain industrial designs and Article 22.2
obliged Members to "provide the legal means for interested
parties to prevent" certain misuses of geographical indications.
The terms of all these provisions of the TRIPS Agreement clearly
created an obligation to empower the executive authorities to take
specified actions before the need to take such actions actually arose.
The question for the Panel therefore was: if the drafters had intended
Article 70.9 to entail the obligation to create in the domestic law
the legal authority for the grant of exclusive marketing rights, why
had they not repeated the wording used in one of the numerous
provisions that explicitly provided for the creation of the authority
to grant rights to interested parties?
- A comparison of the terms of Article 70.9 with those of Article 27
according to which "patents shall be available" for
inventions was also revealing. The ordinary meaning of
"available" was "obtainable". Article 27 thus
clearly created the obligation to make patents obtainable under
domestic law before any application for a patent must be accepted.
Article 70.9, by contrast, merely stipulated that "exclusive
marketing rights shall be granted" to specific products after the
occurrence of specified events. There was nothing in these terms that
suggested that such rights must be obtainable in the domestic law.
- The Panel had examined Article 70.9 only in the context of Article
27, not any of the other provisions cited above. The relevance of the
distinction between "shall be available" and "shall be
granted" in the wording of these related provisions was tersely
dismissed by the Panel as follows: "The implementation of Article
70.9 requires a system under which applications for exclusive
marketing rights can be made"61
because "an exclusive marketing right cannot be 'granted' in a
specific case unless it is 'available' in the first place".62
- The Panel was of course factually correct when pointing out that, after
the events set out in Article 70.9 had occurred with respect to a
particular product, the distinction between "shall be
available" and "shall be granted" lost its practical
relevance because a change in domestic law might then in any case be
required. However, this begged the question that was before the Panel,
namely: does a Member have to make exclusive marketing rights
available in its domestic legislation before these events have
occurred? It was simply not logical to conclude that exclusive
marketing rights must be made available in the domestic legislation before
these events because such availability was in any case necessary once
the events had occurred.
- There were numerous transitional provisions throughout the various
WTO agreements that required action at some point in the future,
either when a date had arrived or an event had occurred. Tariff
concessions must be reduced in stages.63
Import restrictions on textiles must be removed after a ten-year
transitional period.64
Developing countries must phase out export subsidies for any product
that had reached a certain share of world trade.65
These were all obligations that were, just like those under Article
70.8 and 70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement, contingent upon a date or event.
If the logic applied by the Panel to Article 70.9 was correct, then
all the transitional provisions under the WTO Agreement imposing an
obligation as from a future date or event would have to be interpreted
to comprise the additional obligation to change the domestic law in
anticipation of the future date or event. This was, however, obviously
not intended by any of these transitional provisions.
- The Panel, though repeatedly urged to do so by India, had not
examined the context of Article 70.9 fully. No reference was made in
the Panel's findings to, for instance, Articles 42-48 of the TRIPS
Agreement, according to which the judicial authorities of Members
"shall have the authority" to grant certain rights and which
thus clearly expressed the notion that the Panel had discovered in
Article 70.9. The Panel's failure to examine this central
interpretative issue was impermissible. The question therefore
remained: if the drafters had intended Article 70.9 to entail the
obligation to create in the domestic law the legal authority for the
grant of exclusive marketing rights, why had they not repeated the
wording used in one of the numerous provisions that explicitly
provided for the creation of authority to grant rights?
Object and Purpose
- The Panel was of the view that the purpose of Article 70.9 was to
oblige the developing countries concerned to establish as of the entry
into force of the WTO Agreement in their domestic law the authority to
grant exclusive marketing rights. However, this had not been, and
could not possibly have been, the intention of the drafters. The
products covered by Article 70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement were mainly
pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products. It took
considerable time - often more than ten years - to obtain a patent for
such products and the necessary marketing approvals, first in the
country of origin and then in the country in which an exclusive
marketing right was sought. There was therefore no need to require
immediate legislative action and there could therefore not have been
cause for urgency in the minds of the developed countries.
- Moreover, Article 70.9 was part of the transitional arrangements of
the TRIPS Agreement whose very function was to enable developing
countries to postpone legislative changes. Patent protection for
pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products was the most
sensitive TRIPS issue in many developing countries. The Panel's
interpretation of Article 70.9 had the absurd consequence that the
transitional arrangements would allow developing countries to postpone
legislative changes in all fields of technology except in the most
sensitive ones. Neither developed countries nor developing countries
could, therefore, realistically be presumed to have sought an
immediate change of domestic law to provide for exclusive marketing
rights when negotiating the text of Article 70.9. When the drafters
had agreed to stipulate that exclusive marketing rights "shall be
granted" after certain events had occurred rather than
stipulating that they "shall be made available" immediately,
they had clearly meant that legal action ensuring the grant of such
rights would be required only in respect of products that had
completed the five time-consuming procedural steps listed in Article
70.9.
4.23 India further argued that the Panel had, in the previous case,
interpreted Article 70.9 on the basis of the concept of the predictability
of conditions of competition and, although it had rejected this concept as
a basis for interpreting the TRIPS Agreement, the Appellate Body had
failed to reverse the Panel's interpretation.
The concept of predictability of conditions of competition did not
justify an interpretation of Article 70.9 according to which there must be
a mechanism in place to provide for the grant of exclusive marketing
rights before such rights were due
- The Panel claimed that it had interpreted the TRIPS Agreement in
accordance with the customary rules of treaty interpretation.66
In fact, however, the Panel had neither based its interpretation on
the terms of Article 70.9, nor had it taken into account the context
and the transitional nature and purpose of this provision.
Instead, it had based its expansive approach essentially on the idea
that the function of Article 70.9 was to create predictability as to
the future conditions of competition. The Panel had expressed this
idea as follows:
"The protection of legitimate expectations is central to
creating security and predictability in the multilateral trading
system ... When interpreting the TRIPS Agreement, the legitimate
expectations of WTO Members concerning the TRIPS Agreement must be
taken into account, as well as standards of interpretation developed
in past panel reports in the GATT framework ... laying down the
principle of the protection of conditions of competition from
multilateral trade agreements."67
- In justifying its broad interpretation of Article 70.9, the Panel
had referred to its findings on Article 70.8(a) where it had found
that the achievement of "security and predictability ... is one
of the central goals of the dispute settlement mechanism" and
that the function of the TRIPS Agreement was to create "the
predictability needed to plan future trade". If a system for the
grant of exclusive marketing rights was non-existent, so the Panel had
argued, there was a lack of legal security that was likely to
discourage applications for exclusive marketing rights.68
The notion of predictability of conditions of competition had thus
been the logical foundation of the Panel's decision to turn an
obligation which, by its terms, only required actions after certain
events had occurred into an obligation to take action immediately.
- In examining India's appeal from the report of the Panel, the
Appellate Body had rejected the Panel's reliance on the notion of
conditions of competition as a means to expand the obligations under
the TRIPS Agreement.69
It had ruled:
"In the context of violation complaints made under Article
XXIII:1(a), it is true that panels examining claims under Articles III
and XI of the GATT have frequently stated that the purpose of these
articles is to protect the expectations of Members concerning the
competitive relationship between imported and domestic products, as
opposed to expectations concerning trade volumes. However, this
statement is often made after a panel has found a violation of,
for example, Article III or Article XI that establishes a prima facie
case of nullification or impairment.70
At that point in its reasoning, the panel is examining whether the
defending party has been able to rebut the charge of nullification or
impairment. It is in this context that panels have referred to the
expectations of Members concerning the conditions of competition.
[...]
"In addition to relying on the GATT acquis, the Panel
relies also on the customary rules of interpretation of public
international law as a basis for the interpretative principle it
offers for the TRIPS Agreement. Specifically, the Panel relies
on Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, which provides in part:
""1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose."
"With this customary rule of interpretation in mind, the Panel
stated that:
""In our view, good faith interpretation requires the
protection of legitimate expectations derived from the protection of
intellectual property rights provided for in the Agreement."71
"The Panel misapplies Article 31 of the Vienna Convention.
The Panel misunderstands the concept of legitimate expectations in the
context of the customary rules of interpretation of public
international law. The legitimate expectations of the parties to a
treaty are reflected in the language of the treaty itself. The duty of
a treaty interpreter is to examine the words of the treaty to
determine the intentions of the parties. This should be done in
accordance with the principles of treaty interpretation set out in
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. But these principles of
interpretation neither require nor condone the imputation into a
treaty of words that are not there or the importation into a treaty of
concepts that were not intended.
"In United States - Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline72,
we set out the proper approach to be applied in interpreting the WTO
Agreement in accordance with the rules in Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention. These rules must be respected and applied in
interpreting the TRIPS Agreement or any other covered
agreement. The Panel in this case has created its own interpretative
principle, which is consistent with neither the customary rules of
interpretation of public international law nor established GATT/WTO
practice. Both panels and the Appellate Body must be guided by the
rules of treaty interpretation set out in the Vienna Convention,
and must not add to or diminish rights and obligations provided in the
WTO Agreement."73
The Appellate Body had failed to reverse the interpretation of
Article 70.9 by the Panel even though that interpretation had been based
on the notion of predictability of conditions of competition which the
Appellate Body had rejected as a basis for interpreting the TRIPS
Agreement
- As to Article 70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement, India had submitted the
following legal issues to the Appellate Body in accordance with
Article 17.6 of the DSU:
"India respectfully requests the Appellate Body to address the
following issues:
"- Is the interpretation of Article 70.9 made by the Panel
consistent with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms
of Article 70.9 in their context, in particular the context of other
provisions which - unlike Article 70.9 - explicitly provide for the
creation of the authority to grant rights, such as Articles 42-48?
"- If so, can it be reasonably assumed that the object
and purpose of Article 70.9 was the creation of an obligation to
provide for the availability of exclusive marketing rights in the
domestic law as from the date of entry into force of the WTO
Agreement given the fact that it can take ten years or more to
complete the procedural steps required to obtain an exclusive
marketing right and that Article 70.9 forms part of a series of
transitional provisions designed to enable developing countries to
postpone legislative actions?
"- If not, does the principle of predictability of
competitive relationships justify the Panel�s interpretation
of Article 70.9?
"- If so, does the principle of predictability of
competitive relationships imply that all transitional obligations
applicable as from a future date or event entail the immediate
obligation to empower the executive authority to meet those
obligations? If not, what justifies the creation of this
obligation only in respect of Article 70.9?"
- Article 17.12 of the DSU stipulated that "the Appellate Body
shall address each of the issues raised in accordance with paragraph 6
during the appellate proceeding". The Appellate Body had carried
out this task by making the following findings:
"India's arguments must be examined in the light of Article
XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement, which requires that:
""Each Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws,
regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as
provided in the annexed Agreements."
"Moreover, India acknowledged before the Panel and in this
appeal that, under Indian law, it is necessary to enact legislation in
order to grant exclusive marketing rights in compliance with the
provisions of Article 70.9.
"Given India's admissions that legislation is necessary in
order to grant exclusive marketing rights in compliance with Article
70.9 and that it does not currently have such legislation, the issue
for us to consider in this appeal is whether a failure to have in
place a mechanism ready for the grant of exclusive marketing rights,
effective as from the date of entry into force of the WTO
Agreement, constitutes a violation of India's obligations under
Article 70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement.
"By its terms, Article 70.9 applies only in situations where a
product patent application is filed under Article 70.8(a). Like
Article 70.8(a), Article 70.9 applies 'notwithstanding the provisions
of Part VI'. Article 70.9 specifically refers to Article 70.8(a), and
they operate in tandem to provide a package of rights and obligations
that apply during the transitional periods contemplated in
Article 65. It is obvious, therefore, that both Article 70.8(a) and
Article 70.9 are intended to apply as from the date of entry into
force of the WTO Agreement.
"India has an obligation to implement the provisions of
Article 70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement effective as from the date
of entry into force of the WTO Agreement, that is, 1 January
1995. India concedes that legislation is needed to implement this
obligation. India has not enacted such legislation. To give meaning
and effect to the rights and obligations under Article 70.9 of the TRIPS
Agreement, such legislation should have been in effect since 1
January 1995."
- The Appellate Body's ruling did not contain a single reference to
India's extensive argumentation based on the text, context and
objective of Article 70.9. Having rejected the notion of
predictability of conditions of competition as a basis for expanding
the obligations under the TRIPS Agreement beyond its terms, it would
have been logical for the Appellate Body to reverse the Panel's ruling
on Article 70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement in the previous case because it
was founded on that very notion. Instead, the Appellate Body had made
findings that were either unexplained or concerned matters which were
not in dispute, thereby denying India its procedural rights under
Article 17.12 of the DSU.
- The Appellate Body did not explain how Article XVI:4 of the WTO
Agreement could determine the scope of the obligations under Article
70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement. Article XVI:4 merely stated how the
obligations under the WTO agreements were to be implemented and was
therefore relevant only once it had been determined that there was an
obligation under one of the WTO agreements that required
implementation. The issue before the Appellate Body had been whether
there was such an obligation. India had pointed out that there were
numerous transitional provisions throughout the various WTO agreements
that required action at some point in the future, either when a date
had arrived or an event had occurred. If Article XVI:4 of the WTO
Agreement was relevant for the interpretation of Article 70.9 of the
TRIPS Agreement, then all transitional provisions under the WTO
Agreement imposing an obligation as from a future date or event would
have to be interpreted to comprise the additional obligation to change
the domestic law in anticipation of the future date or event. This was
however obviously not intended by any of these transitional
provisions. India had specifically requested the Appellate Body to
address this issue but the Appellate Body had failed to do so.
- Contrary to what the Appellate Body suggested, the parties to the
previous dispute agreed that Article 70.9 entered into effect on the
date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement. However, India had
claimed that Article 70.9 set out an obligation to accord exclusive
marketing rights that was triggered by events which had not yet
occurred. At issue before the Appellate Body had thus been the content
of Article 70.9, not the date of its entry into force. When the
Appellate Body wrote that "India has an obligation to implement
the provisions of Article 70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement effective
as from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement, that
is, 1 January 1995" it turned the issue of content (on which the
parties disagreed) into a question of entry into force (on which they
agreed).
- From the standpoint of developing country Members, it was
distressing that the Appellate Body had not considered it necessary to
deal with India's argument that the Panel's interpretation of Article
70.9 had the consequence that the transitional arrangements would
allow developing countries to postpone legislative changes in all
fields of technology except in the most sensitive ones. It was also
regrettable that the Appellate Body had not taken into account that
the Panel's ruling ignored the implicit option available in the TRIPS
Agreement to developing countries to cut short the transitional
period, if they so chose, and provide for product patents even before
the end of the transitional period instead of having to accept the
obligation of providing exclusive marketing rights.
Continuation: Article 70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement
60 Document WT/DS50/R,
paragraph 8.1
61 Document WT/DS50/R,
paragraph 7.56
62 Document WT/DS50/R,
footnote 112
63 Paragraph 2 of the
Marrakesh Protocol to the GATT 1994
64 Article 9 of the
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
65 Article 27.5 and 27.6
of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("SCM
Agreement")
66 Document WT/DS50/R,
paragraph 7.60
67 Document WT/DS50/R,
paragraph 7.22
68 See the references to
paragraphs 7.30 and 7.41 in paragraph 7.62 of document WT/DS50/R.
69 "The legitimate
expectations of the parties to a treaty are reflected in the language of
the treaty itself." (See document WT/DS50/AB/R, paragraph 45.)
70 See, for example, the
report of the Working Party on Brazilian Internal Taxes, adopted 30 June
1949, BISD II/181, paragraph 16; Panel Report, United States - Taxes on
Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, adopted 17 June 1987, BISD
34S/136, paragraph 5.1.9; Panel Report, Canada - Administration of the
Foreign Investment Review Act, adopted 7 February 1984, BISD 30S/140,
paragraph 6.6; Panel Report, Japanese Measures on Imports of Leather,
adopted 15/16 May 1984, BISD 31S/94, paragraph 55; Panel Report, Japan -
Customs Duties, Taxes and Labeling Practices on Imported Wines and
Alcoholic Beverages, adopted 10 November 1987, BISD 34S/83, paragraph
5.11; Panel Report, European Economic Community - Restrictions on Imports
of Apples, adopted 22 June 1989, BISD 36S/135, paragraph 5.25; and Panel
Report, United States - Measures Affecting the Importation, Internal Sale
and Use of Tobacco, adopted 4 October 1994, DS44/R, paragraph 99.
71 Document WT/DS50/R,
paragraph 7.18
72 Document WT/DS2/AB/R,
adopted 20 May 1996, pages 16-17
73 Document
WT/DS50/AB/R, paragraphs 40 and 43 |