World Trade Organization
|
WT/DS79/R
24 August 1998
(98-3091)
Original: English |
India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical
Products
Complaint by the European Communities and their member States
Report of the Panel
4.3 The European Communities and their member States disagreed
with India on the interpretation of Articles 9 and 10 of the DSU and
advanced the following arguments in this regard:
- Article 9 addressed a situation where there was more than one
complainant in a dispute settlement procedure. It did not, however,
contain any obligation on WTO Members to make a complaint at a given
point in time. Nor did it address the situation of a WTO Member that
had requested to be a third party in a given dispute settlement
procedure. This situation was addressed exclusively in Article 10.
Article 10.4, which was relevant for the present case, specifically
provided that a third party might become a complainant on the measure
already the subject of a panel proceeding. It was obvious from this
language that Article 10.4 addressed a situation with successive panel
proceedings, like in the present case, since a WTO Member could not
possibly be a complainant and a third party in one and the same
procedure. Moreover, there was no provision in Article 10.4, neither
explicit nor implied, which would prevent a third party from
requesting the establishment of a panel after the conclusion of the
earlier panel proceeding.
- There might be good reasons why a WTO Member wished to become a
complainant with regard to a measure already the subject of a panel
proceeding after having been a third party to that earlier panel.19
The procedural rights of third parties were much more limited than
those of complainants. In particular, pursuant to Article 10.3 of the
DSU, third parties shall receive the submissions of the (other)
parties to the dispute to the first meeting of the panel. This implied
that third parties did not have access to any other submission of the
parties to the dispute. Pursuant to paragraphs 6 and 12(b) of Appendix
3 to the DSU, third parties were heard in a separate session, but did
not participate otherwise in the meetings of the panel with the
parties to the dispute. Pursuant to Article 17.4 of the DSU, only
parties to the dispute, not third parties, may appeal a panel report.
Finally, pursuant to Article 22.2 of the DSU, under the conditions set
out in that provision, "any party having invoked the dispute
settlement procedures may request authorization from the DSB to
suspend the application to the Member concerned of concessions or
other obligations under the covered agreements". As was apparent
from this provision, the DSB could not grant such authorization to a
third party, since it had not "invoked the dispute settlement
procedures". If a third party wished to be released from these
limitations, its only option was to become a complainant in its own
right.
- Moreover, contrary to India's position in the present dispute, the
DSU did not contain any obligation for a WTO Member to request dispute
settlement procedures at a given point in time, at least as long as
the measures at issue giving rise to the dispute continued to apply.
Article 3.7 of the DSU specifically provided that "[b]efore
bringing a case, Members shall exercise their judgement as to whether
action under these procedures would be fruitful". On the basis of
this provision, the Appellate Body had found in European
Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas20 that WTO
Members enjoyed broad discretion whether to bring a case against
another Member under the DSU. This discretion necessarily also
included the choice of the appropriate timing of a complaint.
Launching a dispute settlement procedure was an important policy
decision that was influenced by a large number of factors. The WTO was
a Members-driven organization where Members enjoyed discretion whether
or not to resort to a particular form of action under the covered
agreements. Members might follow different strategies concerning the
appropriate action in case of violations of WTO obligations by other
Members. On this basis, a Member might choose a different timing of a
complaint under the DSU for a measure already the subject of an
earlier panel proceeding. This possibility was specifically addressed
and recognized in Article 10.4 of the DSU, which would be stripped of
any useful meaning if India's approach, according to which Members had
an obligation to join a complaint under Article 9 if they wanted to
bring a dispute on measures on which another Member was already
complaining, were correct. As the Appellate Body had found in United
States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline21,
one of the corollaries of the "general rule of
interpretation" contained in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties was that "interpretation must give meaning
and effect to all terms of a treaty. An interpreter was not free to
adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or
paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility".
- Contrary to India's allegations, the present case could not be
compared with cases in which other WTO Members had been acting as
multiple complainants rather than third parties. Moreover, by contrast
to the situation in the Bananas dispute, where Panama had
attempted to get involved in the implementation of the DSB
recommendations and rulings of a dispute settlement procedure in which
it had not participated, the EC did not claim to be entitled to a
particular role with regard to the implementation of the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB in the earlier dispute launched
by the United States in which they were a third party (WT/DS50). The
present case was in fact as yet without precedent in WTO practice.
However, this situation was specifically addressed and resolved in
Article 10.4 of the DSU.
4.4 India, in response, recalled that it had explicitly
recognized that Members had the right to decide whether and when to bring
a complaint, including Members that had been a third party in a previous
proceeding. However, India's argument had been that the purpose of the
second sentences of Articles 9.1 and 10.4 of the DSU was to ensure that
different Members with similar complaints submit them concurrently to the
same panel and that this purpose could not be achieved if these provisions
were interpreted as addressing only the situation in which such Members
had already decided to submit their complaints concurrently. The EC did
not respond to this point at all. It also did not explain why it could not
bring its complaint jointly with the United States. It merely stated that
it had made different procedural choices. Implicit in the EC's contention
was the claim that Articles 9.1 and 10.4, notwithstanding the explicit
wording of their second sentences, were no bar to the institution of a
successive complaint in respect of a measure which had been the
subject-matter of an earlier proceeding. However, it was India's
contention that this claim of the EC in respect of Articles 9.1 and 10.4
would encourage unnecessary and avoidable litigation, which the present
complaint of the EC clearly did. The EC attempted to distinguish the case
of the successive complaint by Panama on the EC's banana r�gime from the
present case by claiming that Panama "had attempted to get involved
in the implementation of the DSB recommendations and rulings of a dispute
settlement procedure in which it had not participated". However, was
this not precisely what the EC was trying to do in the present case? The
EC's attempt to distinguish Panama's course of action from its own could
not hide the fact that in this case the EC was submitting India to a legal
harassment to which the EC would not wish to be submitted itself.
4.5 India further made the following points in relation to Article 9.1
of the DSU:
- The first sentence of Article 9.1 of the DSU authorized the DSB to
establish a single panel to examine multiple complaints. As far as the
present case was concerned, this sentence made clear that the DSB
would have had the authority to establish a single panel if the United
States and the EC had submitted their requests for the establishment
of a panel contemporaneously. The second sentence of Article 9.1 went
further and stipulated the referral of multiple complaints to a single
panel whenever feasible. Since the DSB could establish a single panel
to examine multiple complaints related to the same matter only when
these were submitted contemporaneously, the second sentence implied
the duty to bring such complaints contemporaneously whenever feasible.
- Articles 9 and 10 balanced two conflicting objectives: on the one
hand, each complainant must have the right to bring its own case, make
its own claims and develop its own arguments; on the other hand, each
defendant and the WTO must be protected against completely unnecessary
re-litigation. The compromise the drafters had found was logical and
based on common sense: when complaints could be joined, they must be
joined; when a third party could submit its complaint about a measure
to a panel that examined the same measure, it must do so.
4.6 Addressing the points that India had made with regard to Articles
9.1 and 10.4 of the DSU, the European Communities and their member
States stated the following:
- India claimed that Article 9.1, second sentence, of the DSU created
a duty to submit disputes regarding the same matter by different WTO
Members simultaneously to the same panel. This reading of Article 9.1
of the DSU was clearly wrong. Article 9 dealt, in accordance with its
title, with a situation in which more than one complainant requested
the establishment of a panel on the same matter. Paragraph 1 of that
provision was concerned with situations in which such requests were
made simultaneously by several complainants. The first sentence of
that paragraph allowed several WTO Members to request a single panel
in such situations, while the second sentence encouraged the DSB to
resort to the establishment of a single panel whenever feasible.
Paragraph 3 dealt with a situation in which requests for the
establishment of a panel on the same matter were made successively,
but at a time when the first panel had not yet completed its work. In
such situations, more than one panel would have to be established.
This provision clearly demonstrated that there could be no obligation
for WTO Members to request the establishment of a single panel on the
same matter, since otherwise Article 9.3 would be superfluous. In WTO
practice, Article 9.3 had already been used on several occasions,
specifically in two disputes concerning the EC.22
These disputes demonstrated that there was no obligation for several
Members to submit their requests for the establishment of a panel on
the same matter simultaneously.
- In any case, the present dispute was governed by the procedural rule
laid down in Article 10.4 of the DSU. That provision explicitly dealt
with the situation at hand and required the dispute to be referred to
the original panel. The term "original panel" was a term of
art used elsewhere in the DSU, namely in Articles 21.5 and 22.6, where
it clearly dealt with procedures which by their very nature could not
be simultaneous with the procedure which the "original
panel" had been handling in the first place. The procedures
referred to in these latter provisions only occurred at the
implementation stage of a dispute in which the "original
panel" by necessity had already circulated its report on the
substance of the case. In other words, the term "original
panel" was used where the DSU referred to a panel having already
dealt with the same issue in an earlier procedure in which it had
already completed its work. India submitted that its interpretation of
Article 9.1, which created a duty on WTO Members to submit disputes
simultaneously to the same panel, applied mutatis mutandis to
Article 10.4. The EC did not agree with India's interpretation of
Article 9.1. To seek to apply this interpretation in addition to
Article 10.4, which had a different purpose, was obviously
far-fetched.
- The EC was, for these reasons, of the view that India's reading of
Articles 9.1, second sentence, and 10.4, second sentence, of the DSU
was wrong and should be rejected by the Panel. In this context, the EC
had already drawn the attention of the Panel to the first sentence of
Article 3.7 of the DSU which - as had been confirmed by the Appellate
Body in the Bananas case23
- gave Members broad discretion whether to launch a dispute settlement
case, which necessarily included the discretion to decide on the
timing of a dispute settlement procedure.
Normal dispute settlement procedures
4.7 India took the view that, in the alternative, if the Panel
were to consider that Article 10.4 of the DSU entitled the European
Communities and their member States to bring their complaints, the Panel
would be obliged to apply the "normal dispute settlement
procedures", as stipulated in Article 10.4, and make an objective
assessment of the facts and arguments presented in the present
proceedings, as required under Article 11 of the DSU. To support its view
that it would have to be given the benefit of the normal dispute
settlement procedures, if the EC complaints were found to be consistent
with rules of the DSU on multiple complainants, India advanced the
following arguments:
- The EC based its right to re-litigation on the first sentence of
Article 10.4 of the DSU, which provided:
"If a third party considers that a measure already the subject
of a panel proceeding nullifies or impairs benefits accruing to it
under any covered agreement, that Member may have recourse to normal
dispute settlement procedures under this Understanding."
The EC was thus requesting this Panel to go through the "normal
dispute settlement procedures" under the DSU for a purpose for which
these procedures had obviously not been designed. The role of a panel was
to determine facts, to find the applicable law and to apply the law to the
facts. But the EC was not requesting this Panel to perform these
functions. It was merely requesting the Panel to perform the mechanical
function of formally extending a ruling made in an earlier panel
proceeding to the present complaint.
- The EC had conceded that a re-litigation of the case would have
systemic and practical problems, when stating that "... a
re-examination of the elements of the complaint in all legal detail
would go against the very purpose of Article 10.4 of the DSU. It would
entail a repetitive exercise of formalistic exchanges of views which
would be entirely futile given that the legal situation has already
been clarified by the adoption of the earlier panel and Appellate Body
reports. It would also amount to a re-hearing of the case and would
thus give the parties to the dispute the opportunity of having the
equivalent of a further appeal not foreseen in any provision of the
DSU ..." This statement was contradictory. The EC first claimed
that it had the right to resort to the "normal dispute settlement
procedures" referred to in Article 10.4, notwithstanding the fact
that its complaint was "in all respects identical, from a legal
point of view, with the earlier complaint submitted by the United
States"; however, it then claimed that the application of the
normal dispute settlement procedures "would be entirely
futile", "amount to a re-hearing of the case" and
create the opportunity of "having the equivalent of a further
appeal". The EC thus interpreted Article 10.4 as conferring upon
it a right whose exercise was futile and dangerous for the
multilateral trading system.
- The implication of the EC's argumentation was that Article 10.4
should be interpreted as giving the EC the right to bring a new
complaint and as barring India from submitting new arguments or new
facts. This could not possibly be so. The Panel must either dismiss
the complaint "as entirely futile" or re-examine the matter
as a new case in accordance with the "normal dispute settlement
procedures"; it could not first permit the complaint and then
deny the defendant the application of the normal dispute settlement
procedures on the ground that this would be entirely futile. The
reasons that the EC advanced to deny India the right to normal dispute
settlement procedures were the very reasons that called for a
dismissal of its complaint. How could the EC reasonably expect any
Member of the WTO to cooperate in one-sided procedures violating the
most basic principles of procedural justice?
4.8 The European Communities and their member States said that
they recognized that normal dispute settlement procedures were applicable
in the present case. They remained, however, of the view that points dealt
with in the earlier dispute on the same subject should not be re-litigated
in the present dispute. The referral of this dispute to the original panel
served the purpose of ensuring consistency and procedural economy. Why
would the parties have to repeat all the factual allegations and legal
arguments already submitted in the earlier dispute? The Panel was familiar
with them and had already made its findings on them, as much as the
Appellate Body in the context of India's appeal in the earlier dispute.
The purpose of referring the dispute back to the original panel must be to
limit the debate to any new or unknown facts or new arguments on which the
Panel had not yet had an opportunity to make any findings, i.e the Panel
should concentrate on any new or so far unknown factual allegations and
legal arguments. If it were otherwise, the danger of lack of consistency
and of a wasting of resources would be inevitable. In any case, panels
should recognize earlier panel and Appellate Body reports as relevant for
the solution of a subsequent dispute in accordance with the Appellate Body
report in Japan - Taxation of Alcoholic Beverages.24
4.9 As regards the approach the Panel should take when applying the
normal dispute settlement procedures under Article 10.4 in the present
case, India made the following points:
- The ruling in the previous case on Article 70.8 was based on the
findings that the evidence submitted by India had not been sufficient
to rebut the presumption created by the evidence adduced by the United
States that the Indian mailbox system was inconsistent with Indian
law. In the present case, India had submitted evidence on the domestic
situation that it had not submitted in the previous case and had
requested the Panel to engage in further fact-finding. The facts
before this Panel were therefore different. It was irrelevant whether
or not India had changed in patent r�gime; relevant was only whether
the evidence adduced by India in the present proceeding was sufficient
to rebut whatever presumption the evidence submitted by the EC had
created. As confirmed by the Appellate Body, a panel could not
interpret domestic law but must examine the applications of the
domestic law. In such an examination an important new element to be
considered was the fact that since the initiation of the United
States' complaint (WT/DS50) about two years ago not even one attempt
had been made to challenge any of the mailbox applications while a
total number of over 2,000 applications had been submitted.
- There was a significant difference between being guided "by the
Appellate Body�s decision", as the United States suggested in
its third party submission in the present dispute, and being guided by
the Appellate Body's reasoning in the previous and other cases. If
this Panel were to declare that the Appellate Body had already decided
the matter and that an independent examination of the facts and
arguments in the present case was therefore not necessary, it would
effectively declare the matter res judicata and deny India its
procedural rights under the normal dispute settlement procedures. The
Panel could not logically first admit the complaint and then declare
the matter before it to have been decided by the Appellate Body.
- If the Panel were to be guided by the reasoning of the Appellate
Body in the previous and other cases, it would proceed as all panels
under the normal dispute settlement procedures did, using the
reasoning in the previous case as a precedent. India was in fact
urging the Panel to use the Appellate Body's reasoning in the previous
case as a precedent, in particular as regards the inappropriateness
of: (a) using the principle of predictability of conditions of
competition as a basis for expanding the scope of Article 70.8 and
70.9; (b) basing a finding of inconsistency with the TRIPS Agreement
on an interpretation of Indian law rather than an examination of the
application of Indian law; and (c) expanding the obligations under
Article 70.9 beyond the terms of this provision.
Article 70.8(a) of the TRIPS Agreement
4.10 The European Communities and their member States argued
that, in view of the fact that the Panel and the Appellate Body had
already found in the earlier dispute that the present Indian domestic r�gime
concerning the patent protection of pharmaceutical and agricultural
chemical products was inconsistent with India's obligations under Article
70.8 of the TRIPS Agreement, it followed pursuant to Article 3.8 of the
DSU that there was a presumption according to which this breach of the
relevant WTO rules by India had an adverse affect on the European
Communities and their member States as the other party to this dispute. In
these circumstances, the burden was on India to rebut the presumption
according to which India's present domestic r�gime for the patent
protection of pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products nullified
or impaired benefits accruing to the European Communities and their member
States under Article 70.8 of the TRIPS Agreement.
4.11 India argued that the Panel was not called upon to
determine whether the mailbox system that India had established was
consistent with Indian law but whether India, in applying that law, was
acting in conformity with Article 70.8(a) of the TRIPS Agreement.
- The EC was relying on the municipal law of India to prove its claim
that a competitor could obtain a judicial order to force the Patent
Office to examine and reject a mailbox application and thereby make it
ineligible for future patent protection. It was recognized that
"'municipal law' has to be proved by the party relying on such a
law in an international proceeding".25
It was thus for the EC to demonstrate that the domestic law of India
was such as to entail a violation of the obligations under Article
70.8(a). It was also recognized that an international tribunal could
not interpret municipal law; it must treat it as a fact to be
established by the party relying on it.26
- On this issue the Appellate Body had noted in its report on the
previous case27:
"In public international law, an international tribunal may
treat municipal law in several ways.28
Municipal law may serve as evidence of facts and may provide evidence
of state practice. However, municipal law may also constitute evidence
of compliance or non-compliance with international obligations. For
example, in Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia,
the Permanent Court of International Justice observed:
"It might be asked whether a difficulty does not arise from
the fact that the Court would have to deal with the Polish law of July
14th, 1920. This, however, does not appear to be the case. From the
standpoint of International Law and of the Court which is its organ,
municipal laws are merely facts which express the will and constitute
the activities of States, in the same manner as do legal decisions and
administrative measures. The Court is certainly not called upon to
interpret the Polish law as such; but there is nothing to prevent the
Court's giving judgment on the question whether or not, in applying
that law, Poland is acting in conformity with its obligations towards
Germany under the Geneva Convention."29
(emphasis by the Appellate Body)
- General international law, GATT 1947 precedents and the above ruling
of the Appellate Body all pointed in the same direction: the Panel was
not called upon to interpret Indian law; it was to give judgement on
the question of whether India, in applying that law, had acted in
accordance with Article 70.8(a) of the TRIPS Agreement. India
submitted that a distinction must be made between: (i) evaluating the
application of an Indian statute or regulations to determine whether
it violated WTO provisions; and (ii) deciding the purely municipal law
issue of whether a measure applied by India was valid under its
domestic law. The first was clearly necessary for the WTO to function
effectively; the second was the responsibility of the Government of
India, namely, upholding India's Constitution and its laws as a
sovereign government. In India's view, in its report the Appellate
Body had overlooked this central distinction.
Continuation: Article 70.8(a) of the TRIPS
Agreement
19 In response to a
question from the Panel, the EC explained that, in 1996 and at the
beginning of 1997, the European Communities and their member States were
engaged in intensive discussions with India with a view to convince the
Indian authorities to take the necessary steps for a correct
implementation of its obligations under Article 70.8 and 70.9 of the TRIPS
Agreement. Until that time, the EC was confident that India was preparing
the necessary steps concerning the implementation of its obligations under
these provisions without awaiting the end of the ongoing dispute
settlement procedure (WT/DS50). When it became clear that India was not in
fact taking the necessary steps to implement the above provisions
expeditiously, the EC requested consultations under the DSU. The request
for these consultations was submitted to India on 28 April 1997 and was
circulated to WTO Members on 6 May 1997 (document WT/DS79/1).
Consultations were held on 14 May 1997. While these consultations failed
to lead to a mutually acceptable solution, it was felt that the EC's
position had been sufficiently clarified so that India could have no doubt
that the EC were willing to pursue the dispute settlement procedure
further if necessary. Again, it was the impression of the EC that by means
of additional informal contacts it would be possible to avoid further
steps in the formal dispute settlement procedure. This was based also on
the EC's experience, particularly in the TRIPS context, that satisfactory
solutions are very often found on the basis of informal contacts before
resorting to a formal panel process. In addition, at the time of the EC's
formal consultations with India in May 1997, the panel process in the
dispute between the United States and India (WT/DS50) was well advanced
and it would have been difficult for the EC to join this ongoing dispute
as a complainant, since the EC had chosen earlier on to act as a third
party in that dispute. The EC does not believe that a party can be a
complainant and a third party in the same panel procedure. This reading of
the relevant DSU provisions is reinforced by the wording of Article 10.4
which in the view of the EC envisages successive procedures. As becomes
clear from the above, the EC did not make the same policy choice as the
United States, namely to resort to early dispute settlement procedures
once the problem had been identified. Rather, the EC used all available
channels in order to come to a mutually satisfactory solution without
submitting the matter to WTO dispute settlement. Unfortunately, these
efforts failed and the EC was left with no other option than to request
the establishment of a panel as a complainant in order to be able to
protect its interests in the context of the enforcement provisions of the
DSU (Articles 21 and 22), since these provisions require the party seeking
implementation of a panel report to have resorted to dispute settlement
procedures as a complainant rather than a third party (Article 22.2 DSU).
20 Report of 9 September
1997 (document WT/DS27/AB/R, paragraph 135)
21 Report of 29 April
1996 (document WT/DS2/AB/R, page 23)
22 Cf. the requests for
the establishment of a panel by Canada on the one hand and by Chile and
Peru on the other hand in the dispute on European Communities - Trade
Description of Scallops (WT/DS7/7 and WT/DS12/7 and WT/DS14/6) and the
requests by the United States on the one hand and Canada on the other hand
in the dispute on European Communities - Measures concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones) (WT/DS26/6 and WT/DS48/5).
23 Cf. Appellate Body
report on European Communities - R�gime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas (WT/DS27/AB/R), paragraph 135
24 Report of 4 October
1996 (WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, at page 14)
25 Mojtaba Kazazi,
Burden of Proof and Related Issues: A Study on Evidence Before
International Tribunals, Kluwer Law International, 1996, page 368
26 Id.
27 Document
WT/DS50/AB/R, paragraph 65
28 See, for example, I.
Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 4th ed. (Clarendon
Press, 1990), pages 40-42.
29 [1926], PCIJ Rep.,
Series A, No. 7, page 19 |