World Trade Organization
|
WT/DS79/R
24 August 1998
(98-3091)
Original: English |
India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical
Products
Complaint by the European Communities and their member States
Report of the Panel
III. Findings and Recommendations Requested by the Parties
3.1 The European Communities and their member States requested the
Panel, given the particular circumstances of this case, in which the
measures at issue had already been examined by this Panel and by the
Appellate Body in an earlier dispute (WT/DS50) to which the European
Communities and their member States had been a third party, to extend its
findings in the earlier dispute, as modified by the Appellate Body, to the
European Communities and their member States as the complainant in the
present proceeding and, on this basis, to make the following rulings,
findings and recommendations:
Article 70.8 of the TRIPS Agreement
(a) That India had not complied with its obligations under Article
70.8(a) of the TRIPS Agreement to establish "a means" that
adequately preserved novelty and priority in respect of applications
for product patents in respect of pharmaceutical and agricultural
chemical inventions during the transitional period provided for in
Article 65 of the TRIPS Agreement.
Article 70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement
(b) That India had not complied with its obligations under Article
70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement.
Article 70.8 and 70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement
(c) That the DSB request India to bring its legal r�gime for
patent protection of pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products
into conformity with India's obligations under Article 70.8 and 70.9
of the TRIPS Agreement.
3.2 India requested the Panel to reject the complaints of the European
Communities and their member States on the basis of the following
findings:
I. That the complaints are not admissible
Articles 9.1 and 10.4 of the DSU
(a) The complaints of the European Communities and their member
States are inconsistent with the rules of the DSU on multiple
complainants, in particular Articles 9.1 and 10.4, according to
which multiple complaints should be submitted to a single panel
"whenever feasible" or "whenever possible",
because the same matter has already been the subject of a panel
procedure (WT/DS50) and there were neither legal, procedural nor
factual reasons that had prevented the European Communities and
their member States from bringing their complaint jointly with the
earlier case initiated by the United States, or at least at the same
time as the United States.
II. That, if the Panel were to find the complaints admissible
Article 70.8 of the TRIPS Agreement
(a) The evidence adduced in the present proceeding does not
demonstrate that "mailbox" applications can be challenged
in India's courts and that India's "mailbox" system9
fails to provide a sound legal basis to preserve the novelty of the
inventions and the priority of the date of the applications.
Article 70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement
(b) Article 70.9, interpreted in accordance with Article 31 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the principles of
interpretation enunciated by the Appellate Body in the earlier case
(WT/DS50), does not require the establishment of a mechanism to
provide for the grant of exclusive marketing rights before such
rights are due.
Article 70.8 and 70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement
(c) India has not acted inconsistently with Article 70.8(a) and
70.9.
IV. Arguments Of The Parties
Articles 9.1 and 10.4 of the DSU
4.1 The European Communities and their member States argued
that, given the particular circumstances of this case, in which the
measures at issue had already been examined by this Panel and by the
Appellate Body in an earlier dispute (WT/DS50), to which the European
Communities and their member States had been a third party, the Panel
should extend its findings in the earlier dispute, as modified by the
Appellate Body, to the European Communities and their member States as the
complainant in the present proceeding. The following points were advanced
in support of this argument:
- Since the DSB had adopted the Panel report and the Appellate Body
report in the earlier dispute10
dealing with the same measures at its meeting of 16 January 1998 no
change in factual circumstances had occurred. The domestic legal
situation in India had not changed and, in particular, no amendment to
the Patents Act of 1970 had been enacted in India in order to provide
for an appropriate means to file applications for patents for
inventions of pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products
pursuant to Article 70.8 of the TRIPS Agreement; nor had the same Act
been amended in order to provide for the possibility to grant
exclusive marketing rights pursuant to Article 70.9 of the TRIPS
Agreement.
- It was neither necessary nor appropriate to repeat all the legal
arguments that had already been put before this Panel when it dealt
with the United States' complaint. Article 10.4 of the DSU
specifically provided that a third party considering that a measure
already the subject of a panel proceeding nullified or impaired
benefits accruing to it under a covered agreement was entitled to
bring its complaint on that measure before the original panel. This
provision was designed to serve continuity, consistency and procedural
economy in the WTO dispute settlement system. Therefore, a
re-examination of the elements of the complaint in all legal detail
would go against the very purpose of Article 10.4 of the DSU.
- The present complaint was in all aspects identical, from a legal
point of view, with the earlier complaint submitted by the United
States. It would entail a repetitive exercise of formalistic exchanges
of views, which would be entirely futile given that the legal
situation had already been clarified by the adoption of the earlier
Panel and Appellate Body reports. It would also amount to a re-hearing
of the case and would thus give the parties to the dispute the
opportunity of having the equivalent of a further appeal not foreseen
in any provision of the DSU.
- In view of the fact that the Panel and the Appellate Body had
already found in the earlier dispute that the present Indian domestic
r�gime concerning the patent protection of pharmaceutical and
agricultural chemical products was inconsistent with India's
obligations under Article 70.8 and 70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement, it
followed pursuant to Article 3.8 of the DSU that there was a
presumption according to which this breach of the relevant WTO rules
by India had an adverse affect on the European Communities and their
member States as the other party to this dispute. In these
circumstances, the burden was on India to rebut the presumption
according to which India�s present domestic r�gime for the patent
protection of pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products
nullified or impaired benefits accruing to the European Communities
and their member States under Article 70.8 and 70.9 of the TRIPS
Agreement.
4.2 India, in response, requested the Panel to dismiss the
complaint of the European Communities and their member States as
inconsistent with the rules of the DSU on multiple complainants, in
particular Articles 9.1 and 10.4. It advanced the following points in
support of this view:
Successive complaints based on the same facts and legal claims were
unprecedented
- It had been the consistent practice of both the Contracting Parties
to GATT 1947 and the Members of the WTO to bring complaints based on
the same facts, claims and arguments either jointly before the same
panel or at least concurrently for examination by panels composed of
the same persons. About one third of the panels established to date by
the DSB had examined complaints submitted by two or more WTO Members
jointly or concurrently. Seven WTO panels had examined joint or
concurrent complaints, altogether representing 22 complaints. If each
of these 22 complaints had instead been examined individually, the
amount of resources spent by the WTO and its Members on settling these
disputes would have tripled.
- The United States and the EC had reacted in the past with hostility
to attempts by other Contracting Parties to GATT 1947 or Members of
the WTO to re-litigate a matter, even when the subsequent complaint
was justified. The United States had thus objected at the March 1991
meeting of the GATT 1947 Council to the establishment of a panel on Denial
of Most-favoured-nation Treatment as to Imports of Non-rubber Footwear
from Brazil because "this matter had already been
adjudicated" by a panel established under the Tokyo Round
Subsidies Agreement, even though Brazil had made legal claims in the
second proceeding under the GATT that it could not have made under the
Subsidies Agreement.11
Equally hostile had been the EC�s reaction to the request for
consultations on its r�gime for the importation, sale and
distribution of bananas by Panama in October 1997. The EC had
described Panama's initiation of the dispute settlement procedures on
a matter on which a panel had already ruled as an abuse of the dispute
settlement procedures, even though Panama had not been a WTO Member
when the original panel had been established and could therefore not
have joined the earlier complaint.12
An unmitigated right to bring successive complaints by different
parties based on the same facts and legal claims would entail serious
risks for the multilateral trade order
- In the WTO, the danger of unnecessary re-litigation of the same
matter arose mainly from the multilateral nature of the obligations at
issue. In principle, each Member had the same obligations towards each
of the other Members. The WTO presently had 132 Members. In theory, an
allegation of non-compliance against one Member could therefore give
rise to 131 different complaints by all the other Members. If multiple
complaints were submitted to the same panel few problems arose; if
they were brought successively before different panels, the confusion
and waste of resources were great.
- The objective of the proceedings under the DSU, just as those of any
other system of legal adjudication, was to settle disputes by giving
panels and the Appellate Body the authority to determine facts, to
find the applicable law and to apply the law to the facts. Legal
proceedings were troublesome and costly, not only for the parties to
the dispute but to society in general. Henry M. Herman had written in
1886:
"Interest republicae ut sit finis litium, is an old
maxim deeply fixed in the law of fundamentals; that it concerns the
state that there be an end to litigation. This maxim has wide
application; it . . . is obviously based on common sense and sound
policy. For if matters which have been solemnly decided are to be
drawn again into controversy; if facts, once solemnly affirmed, are to
be again denied whenever the affirmant sees his opportunity, there can
never be an end to litigation and confusion."
For these reasons, all legal systems had developed principles to ensure
that the same matter was not unnecessarily re-litigated, among which the
principles of res judicata and stare decisis.
- However, since the principle of res judicata did not apply if
the parties to the dispute were different and the principle of stare
decisis did not apply in the WTO to the interpretations of a panel
or the Appellate Body, if successive multiple complaints by different
Members on the same matter were to be admitted and examined as
separate new cases, it would engender the danger of contradictory
decisions and the waste of resources would be tremendous.13
If a panel ruled in one case in favour of the defendant, other
complainants could bring the same case again and again before
different panels with a different composition until a complainant
"scored a hit".
(i) The principle of res judicata applied only when the
parties to the dispute were the same14
and could therefore not prevent repeated disputes between different
WTO Members on the same matter. In fact, the DSU explicitly recognized
in Articles 9 and 10 the right of each Member to assert its rights
individually. The principle of stare decisis also did not
prevent multiple complaints on the same matter because this principle
had not been applied in GATT/WTO jurisprudence. Thus, the 1989 GATT
panel on EEC - Restrictions on Imports of Dessert Apples
(Complaint by Chile) had noted that a previous panel, in 1980, had
reported on a complaint involving a similar set of GATT issues but
that it "did not feel it was legally bound by all the details and
legal reasoning of the 1980 Panel report".15
(ii) The issue of the binding nature of panel decisions had arisen
in the WTO for the first time in the complaint on Japan - Taxes on
Alcoholic Beverages. The panel had decided this issue in the light
of Article 31.3(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
according to which there shall be taken into account in the
interpretation of a treaty "any subsequent practice in the
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the
parties regarding its interpretation". The panel had concluded
that "... panel reports adopted by the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES
and the WTO Dispute Settlement Body constitute subsequent practice in
a specific case by virtue of the decision to adopt them". The
Appellate Body had reversed this finding and pointed out that "an
isolated act is generally not sufficient to establish subsequent
practice; it is a sequence of acts establishing the agreement of the
practice that is relevant". It had further noted that "the
generally-accepted view under GATT 1947 was that the conclusions and
recommendations in an adopted panel report bound the parties in that
particular case, but subsequent panels did not feel legally bound by
the details and reasoning of a previous panel report". The
Appellate Body had further pointed out that Article IX:2 of the WTO
Agreement provided that "The Ministerial Conference and the
General Council shall have the exclusive authority to adopt
interpretations of this Agreement and of the Multilateral Trade
Agreements". In the view of the Appellate Body, this clause
provided the only possibility to adopt definitive interpretations.
According to the Appellate Body, "The fact that such an
'exclusive authority' in interpreting the treaty has been established
so specifically in the WTO Agreement is reason enough to conclude that
such authority does not exist by implication or by inadvertence
elsewhere".16
Articles 9 and 10 of the DSU required multiple complainants to submit
their case to the same panel whenever feasible
- The drafters of the DSU had addressed the problem of multiple
complaints on the same matter in Article 9.1 of the DSU, which
provided:
"Where more than one Member requests the establishment of a
panel related to the same matter, a single panel may be established to
examine these complaints taking into account the rights of all Members
concerned. A single panel should be established to examine such
complaints whenever feasible."
The issue was also addressed in Article 10.4, which stated:
"If a third party considers that a measure already the subject
of a panel proceeding nullifies or impairs benefits accruing to it
under any covered agreement, that Member may have recourse to normal
dispute settlement procedures under this Understanding. Such a dispute
shall be referred to the original panel wherever possible."
These provisions made clear that another Member's complaint, by itself,
did not foreclose a new complaint. Both joint and successive complaints by
different Members, before the same panel or different panels, were
therefore in principle allowed. However, Articles 9 and 10 also attached
an important condition to the right to resubmit the same matter to a
panel, by stipulating that "a single panel shall be established
whenever feasible". The same proviso was contained in Article 10.4,
according to which a dispute on a measure already under litigation must be
referred to the same panel "wherever possible". Articles 9 and
10 therefore balance two conflicting objectives: on the one hand, each
complainant must have the right to bring its own case, make its own claims
and develop its own arguments; on the other hand, each defendant and the
WTO must be protected against completely unnecessary re-litigation. The
compromise the drafters had found was logical and based on common sense:
when complaints could be joined, they must be joined; when a third party
could submit its complaint about a measure to a panel that examined the
same measure, it must do so.
- The obligations under Articles 9.1 and 10.4 were expressed in the
passive voice ("A single panel shall be established ...";
"Such a dispute shall be referred to ..."). The Articles
therefore did not make clear to whom they were addressed: were the
obligations established for the organs and officers of the WTO - in
particular, the DSB and the Director-General - or for the Members of
the WTO, or for both? This interpretative issue must be resolved in
the light of the purpose of these provisions, which was to avoid
unnecessary re-litigation. This purpose could not be achieved if the
responsibility to ensure the joint or concurrent examination of
multiple complaints fell exclusively on the organs and officers of the
WTO. The DSB must establish a panel "if the complaining party so
requests" whether or not that request was justified, and the DSB
could therefore not effectively prevent unnecessary re-litigation.
Equally, the Director-General was obliged under Article 8.7 to
determine the composition of a panel "at the request of either
party" irrespective of the nature of the complaint.
- The Panel had the responsability to determine the admissability of
the EC complaints in the light of the provisions of Articles 9.1 and
10.4 of the DSU. In this regard, it should be recalled that the WTO
panel on European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale
and Distribution of Bananas had examined whether the authority to
determine whether a request for the establishment of a panel met the
requirements of Article 6.2 of the DSU rested with the DSB or with the
panel. The panel had ruled that it had the authority:
"Because of the application of the 'reverse' consensus
decision-making applicable in the case of panel establishment in the
DSB, the DSB is not likely to be an effective body for resolving
disputes over whether a request for the establishment of a panel meets
the requirements of Article 6.2 of the DSU. Therefore, as a practical
matter only the panel established on the basis of the request (and
thereafter the Appellate Body) can perform that function."17
The reasoning of that panel applied equally to the question of whether
a complaint met the requirements of Articles 9.1 and 10.4 of the DSU.
- It might therefore be concluded that Articles 9.1 and 10.4 could
achieve their purpose only if the duty to submit multiple complaints
to a single panel whenever possible was interpreted as a duty falling
on both the WTO and its membership, and panels declared complaints
that did not meet the requirements of these provisions as
inadmissible. The present Panel was the first to address this issue
and therefore had the important task of resolving it in the light of
its broad systemic implications.
- It should be noted that India was not arguing against the submission
of successive complaints on the same matter by different WTO Members
in all cases. Successive complaints might be unavoidable and therefore
legitimate for a variety of reasons. There might be legal reasons. For
instance, the complainant might wish to make claims that went further
than those made in the earlier proceeding. There might be procedural
reasons. Thus, the complainant might not have been a WTO Member when
the original complaint had been brought, as noted above for Panama in
the Bananas case. There might be factual reasons. For instance,
the parties to the earlier dispute might have reached a settlement.
The interpretation of Articles 9 and 10 suggested above would not
curtail the legitimate exercise of the fundamental right of a WTO
Member to a new and separate examination of its complaint when the
need arose but would prevent only the needless, and therefore abusive,
delay in the exercise of this right.
- The EC's exercise of the right to bring a new complaint on the same
matter that had already been the subject of an earlier proceeding was
abusive. As the EC itself admitted, its complaint was "in all
aspects identical, from a legal point of view, with the earlier
complaint submitted by the United States". Not a single new fact,
claim or argument was presented by the EC. India had obligations under
Article 70.8 and Article 70.9 not only with respect to the United
States but with respect to all Members of the WTO, including the EC.
Moreover, Article 4 of the TRIPS Agreement obliged India to implement
its obligations under these provisions on a most-favoured-nation
basis. India could therefore have only one "mailbox" system
and only one mechanism for the granting of exclusive marketing rights,
and these must be equally applicable to all Members of the WTO. Any
change that India might make to implement the recommendations of the
Panel in the earlier dispute, as modified by the Appellate Body, would
therefore necessarily benefit not only the United States but also the
European Communities and their member States. The only purpose of the
EC's complaint was thus to obtain rights under Article 22.2 of the
DSU, which the EC could easily have obtained by submitting its
complaint jointly or concurrently with the United States. The EC had
presented no reasons of a legal, procedural or factual nature that
justified its decision to seek these rights belatedly in a separate
proceeding.
- The question before the Panel was essentially the following: do
complainants have an unlimited right to delay the initiation of
proceedings or do defendants and the WTO have the right to be
protected against unnecessary re-litigation? The EC's complaints
amounted to unwarranted harassment, entailing a waste of the WTO's
limited human and financial resources, as well as those of India. If
the EC's approach to re-litigation were sanctioned by this Panel, and
if Articles 9 and 10 of the DSU provided no point at which judicial
proceedings in the WTO must stop, the WTO could easily become one vast
scene of litigation, disturbance and ill will.
- The Appellate Body had stated in another context that "The WTO
rules are not so rigid or so inflexible as not to leave room for
reasoned judgements in confronting the endless and ever-changing ebb
and flow of real facts in real cases in the real world".18
India invited the Panel to approach the novel and important
interpretative issue before it in that spirit.
Continuation: Articles 9.1 and 10.4 of the DSU
9 The term "mailbox
system" is used in this Panel report as shorthand for the means to be
put in place which allow for the filing of patent applications for
pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products as required by Article
70.8.
10 Documents WT/DS50/R
and WT/DS50/AB/R, respectively
11 Document C/M/248,
pages 9-16
12 Document WT/DS105/1.
Panama became a Member of the WTO on 6 September 1997. The panel which
examined the Bananas case was established on 8 May 1996 (WT/DS27/7).
13 The WTO currently
does not levy any fees on complainants that might induce them not to
engage in re-litigation. The Member which fails to bring its complaint
jointly or concurrently with another Member can therefore now impose the
financial consequences of its inaction on the WTO and its membership.
14 See, for example,
Robert C. Casad, Res Judicata, West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn.,1976,
page 2.
15 BISD 36S/123-124
16 Appellate Body report
on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R,
WT/DS11/AB/R, Section E
17 Report of the panel
on European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/R/ECU, paragraph 7.26
18 Appellate Body Report
on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, (WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R,
WT/DS11/AB/R) |