111. Article X:1 of the GATT 1994 makes it clear that Article X does not deal with specific transactions, but rather with rules "of general application".⁵⁵ It is clear to us that the EC rules pertaining to import licensing set out in Regulation 1431/94 are rules "of general application". The Panel found that with respect to these rules of general application, the European Communities had complied with its publication obligations under Article X.⁵⁶ Brazil does not appeal this finding.

112. Brazil, however, argues that the Panel erred in law in assessing measures of general application in Article X of the GATT 1994 and that the Panel also misinterpreted Brazil's submissions relating to Article X. According to Brazil, the generally applicable rules of the European Communities relating to imports of frozen poultry meat do not allow Brazilian traders to know whether a particular shipment will be subject to the rules governing in-quota trade or to rules relating to out-of-quota trade, and Brazil maintains that this is a violation of Article X.⁵⁷

113. The approach to Article X of the GATT 1994 advocated by Brazil would require that a Member specify in advance the precise treatment to be accorded to each individual shipment of frozen poultry meat into the European Communities. Although it is true, as Brazil contends, that any measure of general application will always have to be applied in specific cases, nevertheless, the particular treatment accorded to each individual shipment cannot be considered a measure "of general application" within the meaning of Article X. The Panel cited the following passage from the panel report in United States - Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-made Fibre Underwear:

We agree with the Panel that "conversely, licences issued to a specific company or applied to a specific shipment cannot be considered to be a measure 'of general application'" ⁵⁹ within the meaning of Article X.

114. It is inherent in the nature of a tariff-rate quota that imports over the threshold quantity specified in the rules of general application will not benefit from the terms of the tariff-rate quota. Within the framework of the rules of general application that establish the terms of the tariff-rate quota for frozen poultry meat, the detailed arrangements concerning the importation of a particular shipment of frozen poultry into the European Communities are made primarily among private operators. These arrangements will determine whether a particular shipment falls within or outside the tariff-rate quota, and will consequently determine whether the rules relating to in-quota trade or those relating to out-of-quota trade will apply to a given shipment. These arrangements among private operators have been generally left to them by the government of the Member concerned. Article X of the GATT 1994 does not impose an obligation on Member governments to ensure that exporters are continuously notified by importers as to the treatment particular impending shipments will receive in relation to a tariff-rate quota.

115. Article X relates to the publication and administration of "laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general application", rather than to the substantive content of such measures. In EC - Bananas, we stated:

Thus, to the extent that Brazil's appeal relates to the substantive content of the EC rules themselves, and not to their publication or administration, that appeal falls outside the scope of Article X of the GATT 1994.⁶¹ The WTO-consistency of such substantive content must be determined by reference to provisions of the covered agreements other than Article X of the GATT 1994.

116. For these reasons, we uphold the Panel's finding in paragraph 269 of the Panel Report that "the information which Brazil claims the EC should have made available concerns a specific shipment, which is outside the scope of Article X of GATT".

120. Brazil maintains that there is nothing in the text or context of Articles 1.2 and 3.2 of the Licensing Agreement that limits to in-quota trade the requirement in Article 1.2 that licensing systems be implemented "with a view to preventing trade distortions" or the prohibition in Article 3.2 of additional trade-restrictive or trade-distortive effects.⁶³

121. The preamble to the Licensing Agreement stresses that the Agreement aims at ensuring that import licensing procedures "are not utilized in a manner contrary to the principles and obligations of GATT 1994" and are "implemented in a transparent and predictable manner". Moreover, Articles 1.2 and 3.2 make it clear that the Licensing Agreement is also concerned, with, among other things, preventing trade distortions that may be caused by licensing procedures. It follows that wherever an import licensing regime is applied, these requirements must be observed. The requirement to prevent trade distortion found in Articles 1.2 and 3.2 of the Licensing Agreement refers to any trade distortion that may be caused by the introduction or operation of licensing procedures, and is not necessarily limited to that part of trade to which the licensing procedures themselves apply. There may be situations where the operation of licensing procedures, in fact, have restrictive or distortive effects on that part of trade that is not strictly subject to those procedures.

122. In the case before us, the licensing procedure established in Article 1 of Regulation 1431/94 applies, by its terms, only to in-quota trade in frozen poultry meat. ⁶⁴ No licensing is required by Regulation 1431/94 for out-of-quota trade in frozen poultry meat. To the extent that the Panel intended merely to reflect the fairly obvious fact that this licensing procedure applies only to in-quota trade, we uphold the finding of the Panel that "[t]he Licensing Agreement, as applied to this particular case, only relates to in-quota trade". ⁶⁵

123. Brazil maintains that the Panel failed to address or examine properly certain evidence, including evidence concerning Brazil's falling share of the EC poultry market, and did not examine whether this falling market share was caused by the introduction of the EC licensing procedures for the tariff-rate quota for frozen poultry meat.⁶⁶

124. The Panel stated that it "fail[ed] to understand the relevance of the decline in the percentage share in total trade to a violation of the Licensing Agreement."⁶⁷ The Panel then concluded that, "based on the evidence presented by Brazil regarding its percentage share of the EC poultry market, we do not find that the EC has acted inconsistently with Articles 1.2 and 3.2 of the Licensing Agreement."⁶⁸

125. Under Regulation 1431/94, Brazil's share in the EC tariff-rate quota for frozen poultry meat is 7,100 tonnes out of the total tariff-rate quota of 15,500 tonnes. ⁶⁹ This share is equal to approximately 45 per cent of the tariff-rate quota. This is the same as Brazil's percentage share of the total exports of frozen poultry meat to the European Communities during the reference period of the preceding three years. In addition, the Panel noted, licences issued by the European Communities for imports of frozen poultry meat from Brazil have been fully utilized. ⁷⁰ This means that Brazil's percentage share in the tariff-rate quota has remained at the same level as Brazil's share in the total trade over the relevant period. Moreover, the absolute volume of exports of frozen poultry meat by Brazil in the total exports of this product to the European Communities has been rising since the imposition of the tariff-rate quota for frozen poultry meat.⁷¹

126. Brazil has not, in our view, clearly explained, either before the Panel or before us, how the licensing procedure caused the decline in market share. Brazil has not offered any persuasive evidence that its falling market share could, in this particular case -- with a constant percentage share of the tariff-rate quota, full utilization of the tariff-rate quota and a growing total volume of exports -- be viewed as constituting trade distortion attributable to the licensing procedure. In other words, Brazil has not proven a violation of the prohibition of trade distortion in Articles 1.2 and 3.2 of the Licensing Agreement by the European Communities.

127. Brazil argues that the Panel did not consider a number of other arguments in its examination of the existence of trade distortion: that licences have been apportioned in non-economic quantities; that there have been frequent changes to the licensing rules; that licence entitlement has been based on export performance; and that there has been speculation in licences.⁷² These arguments, however, do not address the problem of establishing a causal relationship between imposition of the EC licensing procedure and the claimed trade distortion. Even if conceded arguendo, these arguments do not provide proof of the essential element of causation.

128. For these reasons, we uphold the finding of the Panel that Brazil has not established that the European Communities has acted inconsistently with either Article 1.2 or Article 3.2 of the Licensing Agreement. ⁷³

129. Brazil's notice of appeal contained no reference to a general issue of transparency in relation to the Licensing Agreement. However, Brazil argued in its appellant's submission that the Panel erred in restricting Brazil's "comprehensive claim in relation to a violation of the general principle of transparency underlying the Licensing Agreement"⁷⁴ to an analysis of Article 3.5(a) of the Licensing Agreement. The contention of Brazil is that "the administration of import licenses in such a way that the exporter does not know what trade rules apply is a breach of the fundamental objective of the Licensing Agreement."⁷⁵

130. Brazil argued before the Panel that "underlying the Licensing Agreement was the principle of transparency."⁷⁶ Brazil submitted, in particular, that the European Communities was obliged under either Article 3.5(a)(iii) or (iv) of the Licensing Agreement to provide complete and relevant information on the distribution of licences among supplying countries and statistics on volumes and values. According to Brazil, the European Communities failed to fulfil this obligation. ⁷⁷ The Panel found that Brazil had not demonstrated that the European Communities had violated either Article 3.5(a)(iii) or (iv) of the Licensing Agreement. ⁷⁸ In the light of the existence of express provisions in Article 3.5(a) of the Licensing Agreement relating to transparency on which the Panel did in fact make findings, we do not believe that the Panel erred by refraining from examining Brazil's "comprehensive" claim relating to a general principle of transparency purportedly underlying the Licensing Agreement.

132. Brazil maintains that the Panel did not make "an objective assessment of the matter before it", as required by Article 11 of the DSU, because the Panel allegedly failed to consider a series of arguments put forward by Brazil relating to GATT/WTO law and practice. These arguments were: "first, the similarities between Article XXIV and XXVIII: second, the flexible nature of Article XXVIII that permits bilateral agreements and the opening of bilateral concessions subject to the review of all Members: [and] third, the text of Article XXVIII, which allows the possibility of country-specific solutions when other contracting parties do not object." ⁷⁹

133. An allegation that a panel has failed to conduct the "objective assessment of the matter before it" required by Article 11 of the DSU is a very serious allegation. Such an allegation goes to the very core of the integrity of the WTO dispute settlement process itself. In EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), in relation to the requirement in Article 11 of the DSU that a panel "make an objective assessment of the facts of the case", we stated:

Subsequently, in Argentina - Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other Items⁸¹, we found that the panel there had not committed an abuse of discretion amounting to a failure to render "an objective assessment of the matter before it", as mandated by Article 11.

134. The same is true here. The alleged failures imputed to the Panel by Brazil do not approach the level of gravity required for a claim under Article 11 of the DSU to prevail.

135. We note, furthermore, that Brazil's appeal under Article 11 of the DSU relates, in effect, to the judicial economy exercised by the Panel in its consideration of a number of arguments in support of the v arious claims that Brazil submitted to the Panel. Brazil argues that the Panel, in effect, abused its discretion in not addressing in the Panel Report a series of arguments Brazil made in relation to GATT/WTO law and practice. In United States - Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, we stated that nothing in Article 11 "or in previous GATT practice requires a panel to examine all legal claims made by the complaining party", and that "[a] panel need only address those claims which must be addressed in order to resolve the matter in issue in the dispute." ⁸² Just as a panel has the discretion to address only those claims which must be addressed in order to dispose of the matter at issue in a dispute, so too does a panel have the discretion to address only those arguments it deems necessary to resolve a particular claim. So long as it is clear in a panel report that a panel has reasonably considered a claim, the fact that a particular argument relating to that claim is not specifically addressed in the "Findings" section of a panel report will not, in and of itself, lead to the conclusion that that panel has failed to make the "objective assessment of the matter before it" required by Article 11 of the DSU.

136. For these reasons, we conclude that the Panel did not fail to make the "objective assessment of the matter before it" required by Article 11 of the DSU.

To continue with Agreement on Agriculture

⁵⁴ Panel Report, paras. 269-270.

⁵⁵ Panel Report, para. 269.

⁵⁶ Panel Report, para. 270.

⁵⁷ Brazil's appellant's submission, paras. 105 and 114.

⁵⁸ Adopted 25 February 1997, WT/DS24/R, para. 7.65. In that case, we agreed with the panel's finding that the safeguard measure restraint imposed by the United States was "a measure of general application" within the contemplation of Article X:2 of the GATT 1994. See Appellate Body Report, United States - Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-made Fibre Underwear, adopted 25 February 1997, WT/DS24/AB/R, p. 21.

⁵⁹ Panel Report, para. 269.

⁶⁰ Adopted 25 September 1997, WT/DS27/AB/R, para. 200.

⁶¹ We note that the issue of the comprehensibility of the EC measure does not arise in this case.

⁶² Panel Report, para. 249.

⁶³ Brazil's appellant's submission, para. 140.

⁶⁴ Article 1 of Regulation 1431/94 states: "All imports into the Community under [the tariff-rate quota] � shall be subject to the presentation of an import licence."

⁶⁵ Panel Report, para. 249.

⁶⁶ Brazil's appellant's submission, paras. 143-150.

⁶⁷ Panel Report, para. 249.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Regulation 1431/94, Annex I.

⁷⁰ Panel Report, para. 249.

⁷¹ Panel Report, para. 249 and Annex I.

⁷² Brazil's appellant's submission, paras. 151-160. We note that these facts were considered by the Panel in the context of other alleged violations of the Licensing Agreement, but not in the context of trade distortion within the meaning of Articles 1.2 and 3.2 of the Licensing Agreement.

⁷³ Panel Report, para. 249.

⁷⁴ Brazil's appellant's submission, para. 161.

⁷⁵ Brazil's appellant's submission, para. 163.

⁷⁶ Panel Report, para. 105.

⁷⁷ Panel Report, para. 107.

⁷⁸ Panel Report, para. 265.

⁷⁹ Brazil's appellant's submission, para. 58.

⁸⁰ Adopted 13 February 1998, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, para. 133.

⁸¹ Adopted 22 April 1998, WT/DS56/AB/R, paras. 81 and 86.

⁸² Adopted 23 May 1997, WT/DS33/AB/R, pp. 18-19.