Australia -
Subsidies Provided to Producers and
Exporters of Automotive Leather
9.30 We therefore deny Australia's request that we limit the evidence and
arguments on which the United States may rely in this proceeding to those set
forth in the request for consultations, WT/DS126/1.
4. Information acquired in the context of consultations held pursuant to the
first request (WT/DS106/1) and Exhibit 2 to the United States first submission
9.31 Australia also requests that we rule that information acquired in the
context of consultations held pursuant to the first request by the United
States, in document WT/DS106/1, including Exhibit 2 to the United States first
submission, is not admissible before this Panel.
Australia argues that those consultations, and any facts
derived by the United States from those consultations, including Exhibit 2,
and arguments based on those facts, are confidential to that panel process, and
should therefore not be permitted in this panel process without Australia's
agreement.
9.32 As Australia rightly notes, Article 4.6 of the DSU provides that
"Consultations shall be confidential, and without prejudice to the rights
of any Member in any further proceedings".
However, in our view, this does not mean that facts and
information developed in the course of consultations held pursuant to one
request cannot be used in a panel proceeding concerning, as it does in this
case, the same dispute, between the same parties, conducted pursuant to another,
different request.
9.33 We recall that Article 11 of the DSU obliges a panel to conduct "an
objective assessment of the matter before it".
As discussed earlier, any evidentiary rulings we make must be consistent
with this obligation. The panel in Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages recently confirmed the right
of a party to a WTO dispute to use information learned in consultations in panel
proceedings. After noting the
requirement of confidentiality in Article 4.6 of the DSU, which the panel viewed
as "essential if the parties are to be free to engage in meaningful
consultations", the panel continued:
"However,
it is our view that this confidentiality extends only as far as requiring the
parties to the consultations not to disclose any information obtained in the
consultations to any parties that were not involved in those consultations.
We are mindful of the fact that the panel proceedings between the parties
remain confidential, and parties do not thereby breach any confidentiality by
disclosing in those proceedings information acquired during the consultations.
Indeed, in our view, the very essence of consultations is to enable the
parties [to] gather correct and relevant information, for purposes of assisting
them in arriving at a mutually agreed solution, or failing which, to assist them
in presenting accurate information to the panel.
It would seriously hamper the dispute settlement process if the
information acquired during consultations could not be subsequently used by any
party in the ensuing proceedings".
9.34 Given that, in this case, the parties and the dispute are the same, no
panel was actually composed or considered the dispute in the first-requested
proceeding, and there are no third parties involved in either proceeding who
might have learned information in the course of consultations, we cannot see any
reason to exclude the United States Exhibit 2 from our consideration, merely
because it was developed in the course of the consultations held pursuant to the
first request.
Australia has failed to specify what other, if any, facts might have been
derived by the United States from the earlier consultations, and so there is no
basis for us to exclude any such facts.
9.35
B. Are the Measures before the Panel Eexport Subsidies within the Meaning of
Article3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement?
1. What are the measures before the Panel?
9.36 Australia argues that the measures before us
are the A$25 million preferential loan to Howe and the first two payments made
to Howe pursuant to the grant contract.
Thus, in Australia's view, neither the third payment to Howe,
made in June 1998, nor the grant contract itself are "measures"
encompassed by the request for establishment, and are consequently not before
us. The United States, on the
other hand, asserts that its request for establishment in this dispute
explicitly identifies the
measures before the Panel as being the loan contract and the grant contract,
including any and all possible disbursements under the latter contract.
In the alternative, citing
Japan – Film,
the United States asserts that if the Panel were to conclude that either the
grant contract or the third payment thereunder was not explicitly described in
the request for establishment, these were clearly included in the request for
establishment, as subsidiary or closely related to the specifically identified
measures.
9.37 Australia attempts to draw a distinction, in particular, between the
grant contract and the three payments made thereunder.
The issue is significant because the final payment under the grant
contract was not made until after the Panel was established, and thus, in
Australia's view, falls outside the Panel's terms of reference and cannot be
considered by the Panel.
Australia maintains that the Panel will have to consider the
consistency with the SCM Agreement of each of the grant payments, and of the
loan, separately, and could find that one or more were consistent, and the
other(s) were not.
9.38
"The
Government of Australia has provided subsidies [to Howe].
The United States understands that these subsidies include the provision
by the Government of Australia to Howe of grants worth as much as A$30 million
and a A$25 million loan on preferential and non-commercial terms”.
9.39 The ordinary meaning of the term “provision” is “the act or an
instance of providing".
The act or instance of providing the grant payments in this case was the
grant contract, which established the conditions for the disbursement of the
grant funds. Thus, the language of
the request for establishment specifically includes the grant contract.
Moreover, the ordinary meaning of the term "grant" means
"the process of granting or a thing granted",
and therefore includes both the government’s commitment to make payments (that
is, the grant contract), and the grant payments themselves, including all
possible disbursements, whether past or future.
9.40
9.41 Apart from the specific
language used in the panel request itself, other considerations also support our
conclusion that the measures before the Panel are not limited to the specific
payments made under the grant contract prior to the request for establishment of
this Panel, but include the contract itself and any payments thereunder.
The grant contract is the specific legal
instrument that lays out the terms and conditions for the individual payments to
be made thereunder, and which therefore governs and defines the nature of those
payments. The grant contract
commits the government of Australia to make certain payments to Howe, provided
the conditions established in the contract are satisfied.
In our view, we have before us all the necessary information to rule on
all the payments provided for in the grant contract.
9.42 Based on the foregoing, we do not consider it necessary to draw the
distinction that Australia proposes between the grant contract and the grant
payments for the purpose of defining the measures that are before the Panel, and
conclude that the measures before us are the loan contract, the grant contract
and the individual payments under the latter contract.
2. Are the measures before the panel "subsidies" within the meaning of Article 1 of the SCM Agreement?
9.43 The parties are in agreement that the loan is a subsidy within the
meaning of Article 1 of the SCM Agreement.
The parties are also in agreement that each of the three payments under
the grant contract is also a subsidy within the meaning of Article 1 of the SCM
Agreement. However, the parties are
not in agreement whether the grant contract itself is a subsidy within the
meaning of Article 1 of the SCM Agreement.
Therefore, we turn now to that question.
9.44 The United States argues that the grant contract is a "financial
contribution" that confers a "benefit" and is, therefore, a
subsidy under Article 1 of the SCM Agreement.
The United States asserts that Howe has been
given a benefit in the form of government funds that it need not repay.
Australia, on the other hand, asserts that the United States has
not demonstrated that the grant contract is a subsidy, although, as noted above,
it acknowledges that the payments authorized by that contract are subsidies, i.e.
"financial contributions" that confer a "benefit".
9.45 This issue is closely linked to our discussion above concerning what are
the "measures" that are before the Panel. Australia does not dispute
that the grant payments are, themselves, subsidies.
The terms and conditions for the disbursement of the payments are
provided for in the grant contract. In
our view, each payment can be evaluated individually to determine whether it is
a prohibited export subsidy, but only by reference to the criteria for
disbursement set out in the grant contract.
Thus, we need not decide whether or not the grant contract is a subsidy
in order to evaluate the individual payments. We have determined above that,
based on the specific language of the request for establishment, the grant
contract is a measure that is before us in this case.
The evaluation of the consistency of challenged elements of the grant
contract must take into account what actually occurs, particularly in a case
where the allegation is that the subsidies are contingent in fact on export
performance. Therefore, we need not
determine whether the grant contract is itself a subsidy in order to determine
whether the payments made pursuant to that contract, which Australia
acknowledges are subsidies, are prohibited export subsidies.
3. Are the subsidies in question "contingent, in law or in fact"
on export performance, within the meaning of Article 3.1(a) of the SCM
Agreement?
9.46 Article 3.1 of the SCM Agreement provides:
"3.1 Except as provided in the
Agreement on Agriculture, the following subsidies, within the meaning of Article1,
shall be prohibited:
(a) subsidies contingent, in
law or in fact 4 whether solely or as one of several other conditions,
upon export performance, including those illustrated in Annex I
4This
standard is met when the facts demonstrate that the granting of a subsidy,
without having been made legally contingent upon export performance, is in fact
tied to actual or anticipated exportation or export earnings.
The mere fact that a subsidy is granted to enterprises which export shall
not for that reason alone be considered to be an export subsidy within the
meaning of this provision".
Article 3.2 of the SCM Agreement reinforces this prohibition, providing:
"3.2
A Member shall neither grant nor maintain subsidies referred to in
paragraph1".
(a) contingent in law
9.47 The United States argued, in its first written submission to the Panel,
that, becauseHowe was granted the new aid package as a specific
replacement for the de jure subsidies of the ICS and EFS export schemes, the new
subsidies are also de jure export
subsidies. However, the United
States did not pursue this line of argument in subsequent submissions, after it
had received copies of the grant and loan contracts.
Australia asserts that the United States put forward no
evidence that any of the measures is contingent “in law” upon export
performance, and moreover that this issue is not properly before the Panel as
there is no claim regarding the question of "contingent in law" in the
request for establishment.
9.48 In our view, the Panel's terms of reference include the issue of whether
the subsidies in question are contingent "in law" on export
performance. The United States
panel request cites both the "in law" and "in fact" aspects
of Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement, and the United States claim is that the
subsidies are inconsistent with Article 3.1(a).
How those subsidies are inconsistent, whether because they are contingent
in law or in fact upon export performance, is an aspect of the arguments put
forward by the United States in support of its claim.
9.49 However, as the United States has not pressed its arguments in this
regard, we consider that it has abandoned them.
We therefore do not reach any conclusions on this issue, and, turn now to
the question whether the subsidies in question are contingent in fact upon
export performance.
(b) contingent in fact
9.50 The United States argues that the measures are subsidies contingent in
fact on Howe's export performance, as they are tied to actual or anticipated
exportation or export earnings. The
United States favours a broad approach to the "contingent … in fact"
standard in Article 3.1(a), and emphasizes that this standard must be approached
on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the structure and design of the
measure at stake and the specific facts involved.
In the United States view, the distinction between the "in law"
and "in fact" standard is that "in law" subsidies are
explicitly contingent, and "in fact" subsidies are implicitly
contingent, upon export performance. Moreover,
footnote 4 of the SCM Agreement does not preclude consideration of the fact of
exportation or the level of exports; it simply proscribes finding a prohibited
export subsidy basedsolely upon
the level of exports. In fact, the
explicit reference to level of exports in Article 3, in the United States view,
indicates that the drafters specifically contemplated that the level of exports
would be taken into account in determining whether a “contingent in fact”
export subsidy exists. The United
States argues that a contingent-in-fact export subsidy will exist when actual or
anticipated exportation is merely one of several potential criteria influencing
the bestowal of benefits. Thus, if
the totality of the circumstances reveal that these benefits are designed to
promote exports, then such benefits fall within the broad definition of Article
3.1(a). The United States urges us
to look to the assumptions underlying the government's decision to grant the
subsidy in order to determine whether the "in fact" standard has been
met.
9.51 Australia favours a narrow approach to the "contingent … in
fact" test in Article 3.1(a).
In Australia's view, the contingent in fact standard is defined and
limited by footnote 4 of the SCM Agreement.
The distinction between "contingent in law" and
"contingent in fact" is intended to distinguish between the situation
where something is set out explicitly in legislation or regulation ("in
law") and where there is some non-legislative, administrative arrangement
whereby the granting of the subsidy is actually tied to export performance
("in fact"). The purpose
of the “in fact” provision is to provide a way of dealing with the situation
where the administration of a subsidy programme allows the disbursement of funds
to favour exports, i.e.
to provide subsidies to firms tied to export performance.
Australia urges us to reject
a test based on some "undefined level of
exports" for determining whether a subsidy is a prohibited export subsidy.
The
facts must demonstrate that the granting of the
subsidy is in fact tied to actual or anticipated exportation or export earnings.
In other words, "the complainant must show that the granting of the
subsidy is in fact tied in its application to export performance and so favours
export over domestic sales".
In this regard, Australia argues that WTO
rules need to provide clear guidance to Members, and the United States position
would leave Member unable to plan domestic support policies in a way that would
avoid running afoul of the prohibitions of Article 3.1(a).
9.52
9.53
9.54 Pursuant to Article 3.2 of the DSU, we must interpret Article 3.1(a) of
the SCM Agreement "in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of
public international law". According
to established WTO practice, these rules are found in Article 31 of the
Vienna Convention. Paragraph 1
of this Article states:
"A
treaty shall be interpreted in good faith and in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light
of its object and purpose".
9.55 An inquiry into the meaning of the term
"contingent … in fact" in Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement must,
therefore, begin with an examination of the ordinary meaning of the word
"contingent". The
ordinary meaning of "contingent" is "dependent for its existence
on something else", "conditional; dependent on, upon".
The text of Article 3.1(a) also includes footnote 4, which states that
the standard of "in fact" contingency is met if the facts demonstrate
that the subsidy is "in fact tied to actual
or anticipated exportation or export earnings".
The ordinary meaning of "tied to" is "restrain or
constrain to or from an action; limit or restrict as to behaviour, location,
conditions, etc.".
Both of the terms used --
"contingent … in fact" and "in fact tied to" – suggest
an interpretation that requires a close connection between the grant or
maintenance of a subsidy and export performance.
9.56
9.57 Based on the explicit language of Article 3.1(a) and footnote 4 of the
SCM Agreement, in our view the determination of whether a subsidy is
"contingent … in fact" upon export performance requires us to
examine all the facts concerning the grant or maintenance of the challenged
subsidy, including the nature of the subsidy, its structure and operation, and
the circumstances in which it was provided.
In this context, Article 11 of the DSU requires a panel to make an
objective assessment of the facts of the case.
Obviously, the facts to be considered will depend on the specific
circumstances of the subsidy in question, and will vary from case to case.
In our view, all facts surrounding the grant and/or maintenance of the
subsidy in question may be taken into consideration in the analysis.
However, taken together, the facts considered must demonstrate that the
grant or maintenance of the subsidy is conditioned upon actual or anticipated
exportation or export earnings. The
outcome of this analysis will obviously turn on the specific facts relating to
each subsidy examined.
(c)
analysis of the facts
9.58 The United States asserts that the status of the loan contract, the grant
contract, and the grant payments is inextricably linked, and that the factual
circumstances demonstrate that each of them is a subsidy contingent in fact upon
export performance. In the United
States view, the following facts demonstrate that the subsidies in question are
prohibited export subsidies: the Australian government was aware that Howe was
exporting 90 per cent of its sales at the time the government of Australia
entered into the grant and loan contracts;
the replacement package was specifically and explicitly designed to
compensate Howe for its exclusion from two "in law" export subsidy
programmes (the ICS and EFS programmes) that had helped transform Howe into a
major exporter;
the recognized purpose of the replacement package by both the
Australian government and Howe was export promotion;
Howe had aggressive export plans;
Howe must significantly increase its sales to receive the
full A$30 million grant for which it is eligible; however, the Australian
leather market is too small to absorb Howe's current -- much less, its increased
-- production; the only way that Howe could increase its sales and utilise the
expanded production capacity that it has acquired as a result of the subsidies
in question is to significantly increase its exports; and the subsidies in
question were provided only to Howe, which exports virtually all of its
production, and not to any leather manufacturer that supplies the domestic
market.
9.59 Australia emphasizes that the measures before the Panel are individual
measures, and each must be individually considered in determining whether it is
consistent with the requirements of the SCM Agreement.
With
regard to the facts relied on by the United States, Australia asserts that the
nature of prior measures (the ICS and EFS programmes) is not relevant and, in
any case, these measures are outside the Panel's terms of reference; an
assessment of the imputed objectives of governments is not the basis on which a
rules-based system such as the WTO is supposed to operate; and the structure of
the loan and the grant demonstrate that they are not linked in any way to Howe's
export performance. With respect to
the loan, Australia argues that the level of Howe's production and sales is
irrelevant so long as the company pays the Government any monies owing.
Precisely how Howe and ALH finally repay the loan is a matter solely for
the borrowers themselves.
The loan contract determines the interest rate payable and
the schedule for repayments of principal. It
does not prescribe how Howe and ALH will fund the repayments or from where it
will source these funds. Australia
notes that the ability of Howe/ALH to repay does not rely solely on the domestic
or export markets for automotive leather. These
are currently important elements of Howe/ALH's operations, but it is impossible
to say what the markets or the product mix will be when the major repayments are
due.
9.60 With respect to the grant payments, Australia argues that only the first
two payments made under the grant contract are before the Panel.
Because these monies are not recoverable regardless of the actual level
of sales by Howe, they cannot be considered to be in fact tied to exports.
In Australia's view, they are not linked to future exports, let alone
satisfying what it considers the stringent requirements for the “in fact”
condition in Article 3.1(a). Australia
asserts that, in any event, the first payment of A$5 million was an automatic
payment made following the signing of the grant contract, and was not tied to
anything, let alone export performance. The
second payment of A$12.5 million was made on the basis that the company had
satisfied its investment and sales targets on a best endeavours basis, as well
as normal due diligence considerations. There
is no way in which the company could have obtained more money regardless of how
much it invested or sold. Assuming
the Panel considers the third grant payment, Australia asserts that it was made
on the basis of an assessment that the company had performed satisfactorily on a
best endeavours basis in respect of a combination of investment and production
in 1997/98, as well as normal due diligence considerations.
Again, Australia states that the government cannot take back
that money, provided that Howe continues in business.
The company could expand or reduce sales and the status of
the payments under the grant contract would be unchanged.
The money is gone and there is no connection with future
sales, including sales for export.
9.61 We agree with Australia that we must consider the challenged measures
individually to determine their consistency with the SCM Agreement.
Merely because all the challenged subsidies form part of a single
"package" of assistance to Howe does not mean that all of them are
perforce either prohibited export subsidies or not.
In this regard, we note that, in our view, it is perfectly possible for a
Member to construct a package of subsidies to aid domestic industry, of which
some are consistent with the SCM Agreement, and others are not.
It is, therefore, necessary that each subsidy be evaluated on its own
terms in deciding whether it is consistent with the SCM Agreement.
(i) the payments under the grant contract
9.62 The grant contract provides for three subsidy payments up to a maximum of
A$30 million.
The contract is between the government of Australia and Howe
and its parent company, ALH. However,
the terms of the grant contract are specifically directed at Howe, and more
particularly at Howe's automotive leather operations.
The contract provides for an aggregate sales performance
target for the period 1 April 1997 – 31 December 2000, broken down into four
interim sales targets.
The contract provides for the funds to be disbursed in three payments
during the first two years of the contract term.
The first payment of A$5 million was made upon the signing of the
contract between Howe/ALH and the Australian government.
The second and third payments of up to A$12.5 million each were to be
made on specific dates in 1997 and 1998 upon receipt of a report from Howe
showing performance against the sales performance and investment targets for the
years ending 30 June 1997 and 30 June 1998, respectively, satisfactory to the
Department of Industry, Science and Tourism.
Howe is obliged by the contract to use its "best endeavours" to
satisfy the performance targets set forth in the contract.
9.63
9.64 Australia argues that the nature of the ICS and EFS programmes cannot be
considered in analysing the consistency with the SCM Agreement of the challenged
subsidies, including the grant payments, asserting that it must be possible for
a government to provide subsidies to domestic firms without such assistance
being automatically deemed a prohibited export subsidy even assuming the
programme those firms previously benefitted from was a prohibited subsidy.
WTO Members cannot be prevented from replacing purported prohibited
export subsidies with other measures that are not prohibited, thereby bringing
themselves into compliance with their multilateral obligations under the SCM
Agreement. We agree that, even
assuming the ICS and EFS were prohibited export subsidies (a question on which
we draw no conclusions), this would not, ipso
facto, mean that any subsequent subsidy granted to a company that had
previously benefited from those programmes would be a prohibited export subsidy.
9.65 Nevertheless, in this case, based upon evidence concerning those
programmes submitted by the United States, the facts of which are undisputed by
Australia, we observe that both the ICS and EFS programmes give incentives to
Australian companies to export certain products.
Howe earned significant benefits from its exports of automotive leather
pursuant to those programmes. Automotive
leather was removed from eligibility under those programmes, and the government
of Australia entered into the loan contract and the grant contract providing
financial assistance at least in part to tide Howe over after it had lost
eligibility for benefits related to automotive leather under these programmes.
Public reports at the time indicated that the amount of the assistance
provided for was that deemed necessary to ensure that Howe continued in
business.lass [210]
9.66
At the time the grant contract was concluded, Howe exported a significant
portion of its production, and the Australian government was aware of this.
The parties dispute the level of Howe's exports in relation to domestic
sales. However, it is undisputed
that Howe's exports had increased significantly during the period it benefitted
from the ICS and EFS programmes, and that at the time automotive leather was
removed from eligibility under those programmes, the overwhelming majority of
Howe's sales were for export. The government of Australia was concerned that
Howe remain in business, and determined to give it a financial assistance
package in order to ensure that it did so.
9.67 Moreover, it is clear that the Australian market for automotive leather
is too small to absorb Howe's production, much less any expanded production that
might result from the financial benefits accruing from the grant payments, and
the required capital investments, which were to be specifically for automotive
leather operations.
Therefore, we conclude that, in order to expand its sales in a manner
that would enable it to reach the sales performance targets (interim targets and
the aggregate target) set out in the grant contract, Howe would, of necessity,
have to continue and probably increase exports.
At the time the contract was entered into, the government of Australia
was aware of this necessity, and thus anticipated continued and possibly
increased exports by Howe. In our
view, these facts effectively transform the sales performance targets into
export performance targets. We thus
consider that Howe's anticipated export performance was one of the conditions
for the grant of the subsidies. Australia
argues that this consideration would lead to a result that would penalize small
economies, where firms are often dependent on exports in order to achieve
rational economic levels of production. Nevertheless, in the specific
circumstances of this case, we find this consideration compelling evidence of
the close tie between anticipated exportation and the grant of the subsidies.
9.68
9.69 Australia insists that the fact that the grant contract was provided only
to Howe, which exports a large proportion of its production, and not to any
leather manufacturer that supplies the domestic market is irrelevant, since Howe
was the only company affected by the removal of automotive leather from
eligibility under the ICS and EFS programmes.
Australia has confirmed that Howe is the only dedicated producer and
exporter of automotive leather in Australia.
Australia specifically stated, in response to the Panel's question, that
aside from the grant and loan to Howe, Australia does not have any subsidy
specific to the Australian leather industry.
In our view, the fact that the government of Australia provided the
subsidies in question only to Howe, the only exporter
of automotive leather, is relevant, and supports the conclusion that one of the
conditions for the subsidy was anticipated exportation and/or export earnings.
9.70
9.71 All of the facts, weighed together, lead us to conclude that the three
subsidy payments under the grant contract are in fact tied to Howe's actual or
anticipated exportation or export earnings.
9.72 We therefore conclude that the payments under the grant contract are
subsidies "contingent … in fact" on export performance in violation
of Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement.
ii) the loan contract
9.73 The loan contract provides for a fifteen-year loan of $A25 million by the
Government of Australia to Howe/ALH. For
the first five-year period of this loan, Howe/ALH is not required to pay
principal or interest. After the
expiration of this five-year period, interest on the loan is to be based on the
rate for Australian Commonwealth Bonds with a ten-year maturity, plus two
percentage points. The loan is
secured by a second lien over the assets and undertakings of ALH.
9.74 There is nothing in the loan contract that explicitly links the loan to
Howe's production or sales, and therefore nothing in its terms, the design of
the loan payment, or the repayment provisions that would tie the loan directly
to export performance, or even sales performance.
Australia argues that under the loan contract, the level of production
and sales is irrelevant so long as the company pays the government any monies
owing.
10.1 In conclusion, we find that:
(a) The loan from the Australian government to Howe/ALH is not a subsidy
which is contingent upon export performance within the meaning of Article 3.1(a)
of the SCM Agreement;
(b)
The payments under the grant contract are subsidies within the meaning of
Article 1 of the SCM Agreement which are contingent upon export performance
within the meaning of Article3.1(a) of that Agreement.
10.2 Pursuant to Article 3.8 of the DSU, the finding in paragraph 10.1(b) also
constitutes a case of prima facie
nullification or impairment of benefits accruing to the United States under the
SCM Agreement, which Australia has not rebutted.
10.3 Accordingly, pursuant to Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement, we recommend
that Australia withdraw the subsidies identified in paragraph 10.1(b) above
without delay.
10.4 Article 4.7 further provides that "the panel shall specify in its
recommendation the time-period within which the measure [i.e.,
the measure found to be a prohibited subsidy] must be withdrawn".
This is one of the first cases involving
export subsidies to have been brought before the WTO, and there is consequently
no experience or prior practice as to what factors should be considered in
establishing the time-period within which the measure must be withdrawn.
Presumably, the nature of the measures and issues regarding
implementation might be relevant.
10.5 Australia has argued that, since the "normal" period of time
for implementation of panel decisions under the DSU is fifteen months, and time
periods in export subsidy disputes are halved pursuant to Article 4.12, a period
of seven and one-half months would be appropriate.
10.6 Even assuming Australia is correct in its consideration of fifteen months
as the "normal" period of time for implementation of panel decisions,
a question we do not reach, we do not agree that one-half of that period is
appropriate in a dispute involving export subsidies.
In the first place, Article4.12 specifically provides that
"except for time periods specifically prescribed in this Article"
the time periods otherwise provided for in the DSU should be halved in
export subsidy disputes. Article
4.7, which provides that the subsidy shall be withdrawn "without
delay", and that the panel shall specify the time-period for withdrawal of
the measure in its recommendation, in our view establishes that the time-period
for withdrawal is "specifically prescribed in this Article", that is,
in Article 4 of the SCM Agreement itself. Moreover,
we do not, as a factual matter, believe that a period of seven and one-half
months can reasonably be described as corresponding to the requirement that the
measure must be withdrawn "without delay".
10.7 In light of the nature of the measures, we consider that a 90-day period
would be appropriate for the withdrawal of the measures.
We therefore recommend that the measures be withdrawn within 90days.
[191]
In this regard we note that, as a matter of fact, almost all of the evidence
presented by the United States as exhibits to its first submission falls
within the scope of what is described in the request for consultations.
"It appears to
be the case that press reports, when significant but not denied by the
responsible state, or when reporting other events such as official
statements by responsible officials and agencies of that state, are
accepted; [footnote omitted] but when they are uncorroborated or do not
otherwise contain material with an independent title of credibility and
persuasiveness, the tendency of the Court is to discount them almost
entirely".
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